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A PONTOON BRIDGE

LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR



Grant-Lee Edition



PART II

BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS
BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.
BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES."
EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON
AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF THE EDI-
TORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE."

NEW-YORK

The Century Co.

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MILITARY WATER-SLED. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

THE military situation in Kentucky in September, 1861, cannot be properly understood without a brief sketch of the initial political struggle which resulted in a decisive victory for the friends of the Union. The State Legislature had assembled on the 17th of January in called session. The governor's proclamation convening it was issued immediately after he had received commissioners from the States of Alabama and Mississippi, and was followed by the publication of a letter from Vice-President Breckinridge advising the calling of a State convention and urging that the only way to prevent war was for Kentucky to take her stand openly with the slave States. About this time the latter's uncle, the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, an eminent Presbyterian minister, addressed a large meeting at Lexington in favor of the Union. The division of sentiment is further illustrated by the fact that one of his sons, Colonel W. C. P. Breckinridge, followed his cousin into the Confederate army, while another son, Colonel Joseph C. Breckinridge, fought for the Union. The position of the Union men was very difficult. They knew that Governor Magoffin was in sympathy with the secession movement and that the status of the Legislature on the question was doubtful. The governor had under his orders a military force called the State Guard, well armed and disciplined, and under the immediate command of General Simon B. Buckner, a graduate of West Point. There was a small Union element in it, but a large majority of its membership was known to be in favor of secession. Suspicious activity in recruiting for this force began as soon as the governor issued his call for the Legislature, and it was charged that new companies of known secession proclivities could get arms promptly from the State arsenal, while those supposed to be inclined toward the Union were subjected to annoying delays. The State Guard at its strongest numbered only about four thousand men, but it was organized and ready while the Union men had neither arms nor organization to oppose it.

When the Legislature assembled it was soon ascertained that it was very evenly divided in sentiment. Old party lines promptly disappeared, and members were classed as "Union" or "Southern Rights." In the Senate there was a safe majority against calling a convention. In the house on a test question the Union men prevailed by only one vote. There were some half-dozen waverers who always opposed any decisive step toward secession but were equally unwilling to give any active support to the Government. Outside pressure was brought to bear. Large delegations of secessionists assembled at Frankfort, to be speedily confronted by Union men, just as determined, summoned by telegraph from all parts of the State. Argument

was met by argument, threat by threat, appeals to sentiment and prejudice on one side by similar appeals on the other. The leading public men of the State, however, had been trained in a school of compromises, and they long cherished themselves, and kept alive in the people, the hope that some settlement would be reached that would avert war and save Kentucky from becoming the battle-field of contending armies. This hope accounts in a large degree for the infrequency of personal affrays during those exciting days.

The struggle, kept up during three sessions of the Legislature, demonstrated that the State could not be carried out of the Union by storm, and terminated in adopting the policy of neutrality as a compromise. The Union men, however, had gained some decided advantages. They had consented to large appropriations for arming the State, but on condition that the control of military affairs should be taken from the governor and lodged in a military board of five members, the majority being Union men; they provided for organizing and arming Home Guards, outside of the militia force, and not subject, as such, to the governor's orders, and they passed an act requiring all the State Guard to take the oath required of officers, this measure being mainly for the purpose of allowing the Union members of that organization to get rid of the stringent obligations of their enlistment.



THE REV. ROBERT J. BRECKINRIDGE, D. D.
FROM A STEEL PORTRAIT.

As in most compromises, the terms of the neutrality compromise were differently interpreted by the parties, but with both the object was to gain time. The secessionists believed that neutrality, as they interpreted it, would educate the people to the idea of a separation from the Union and result in alliance with the new Confederacy; the Union men expected to gain time to organize their forces, elect a new legislature in sympathy with their views, and put the State decisively on the side of the Government. Events soon showed that the Union men best understood the temper of the people. The Legislature adjourned May 24th, four days after the governor had issued his neutrality proclamation. At the special congressional election, June 20th, nine Union representatives were chosen to one secessionist by an aggregate majority of over 54,000 votes. The legislative election in August resulted in the choice of a new body three-fourths of whose members in each house were Union men.

Under the first call for troops, Kentucky was required to furnish four regiments for the United States service. These Governor Magoffin indignantly

refused to furnish. Shortly afterward he was asked by the Secretary of War of the Confederacy for a regiment. He declined this request as beyond his power to grant. His course did not suit the more ardent of the young men on either side. Blanton Duncan had already procured authority to recruit for the Confederacy, and in various portions of the State men were publicly engaged in raising companies for him. Before the end of April he had started with a regiment for Harper's Ferry by way of Nashville. An incident connected with this movement shows how strong the belief still was that the war was to be short, and that Kentucky might keep out of it. As Desha's company of Duncan's regiment was leaving Cyntiana, Ky., by rail, one of the privates said to a friend who was bidding him farewell: "Be sure to vote for Crittenden [then the Union candidate for delegate to the Border State Conference] and keep Kentucky out of the fuss. We are just going to Virginia on a little frolic and will be back in three months." On the other side, immediately after Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops, J. V. Guthrie, of Covington, went to Washington and got authority for himself and W. E. Woodruff, of Louisville, to raise two regiments. They established a camp just above Cincinnati, on the Ohio side of the river, and began recruiting in Kentucky. They soon filled two regiments, afterward known as the 1st and 2d Kentucky, which were sent early in July to take part in the West Virginia campaign.

The Union Club in Louisville was an important factor in organizing Union sentiment. Originating in May, in six weeks it numbered six thousand members in that city, and spread rapidly through the State and into East Tennessee. It was a secret society, the members of which were bound by an oath to be true to the flag and Government of the United States.

One of the most striking figures of the period was Lieutenant William Nelson of the navy. He was a man of heroic build, six feet four inches high, and carrying lightly his weight of three hundred pounds; he had many accomplishments, spoke several languages, and was endowed with a strong intellect and a memory which enabled him to repeat, verbatim, page after page of his favorite authors. A fluent and captivating talker, when he wished to please, no man could be more genial and companionable, but he had a quick and impetuous temper and an overbearing disposition, and when irritated or opposed was offensively dictatorial and dogmatic. A native of Kentucky and an ardent friend of the Union, he visited the State several times in the course of the spring to watch the course of events. As a result of his observations he reported to Mr. Lincoln that the arms of the State were in the hands of the secessionists, and that the Union men could not maintain themselves unless they were also furnished with arms. Mr. Lincoln placed at his disposal ten thousand muskets with means for their transportation. Toward the end of April he met in consultation at Frankfort a number of the leading Union men of the State and arranged for the distribution of the arms. When, shortly afterward, the organization of the Union Home Guards began, it was from this source they were armed. In Louisville, on the initiative of J. M. Delph, the Union mayor, a brigade of



MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM NELSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

On the morning of Sept. 29th, 1862, General Nelson had an altercation with General Jefferson C. Davis in the Galt House, Louisville. General Davis shot General Nelson, who died almost instantly.— EDITORS.

two full regiments and a battery were organized, which were destined to play a very useful part.

When the Legislature of which he was a member had finally adjourned, Lovell H. Rousseau went to Washington and obtained authority to recruit a brigade, and, in order to avoid possibly injurious effects on the approaching election, established his camp on the Indiana shore, opposite Louisville.

Nelson, after making arrangements for the distribution of guns to the Union men of the State, was authorized by the President to do a similar service for

the Union men of East Tennessee, and for an escort was empowered to recruit three regiments of infantry and one of cavalry in eastern Kentucky. He selected his colonels, commissioning them "for the Tennessee expedition" and appointing a rendezvous at Hoskin's Cross Roads, in Garrard county, on the farm of Richard M. Robinson, a staunch Union man, for the day after the legislative elections in August.

During this period of neutrality Kentucky history seemed to be repeating itself. As before its occupation by white men it was the common hunting-ground for the Indian of the North and of the South on which by tacit agreement neither was to make a permanent home, so now it had become the common recruiting-ground of Northern and Southern armies on which neither was to establish a camp. The Kentucky secessionists had opened a recruiting rendezvous near Clarksville, Tennessee, a few miles from the Kentucky border, which they called Camp Boone, and recruits began to gather there early in July. Buckner resigned from the State Guard a few days after the battle of Bull Run and soon took his way southward.† His example was followed by most of the higher officers, and the State Guard began rapidly to disintegrate. It was no uncommon sight in Louisville, shortly after this, to see a squad of recruits for the Union service marching up one side of a street while a squad destined for the Confederacy was moving down the other. In the interior, a train bearing a company destined for Nelson's camp took aboard at the next county town another company which was bound for Camp Boone. The officers in charge made a treaty by which their men were kept in separate cars.

On the day after the August election Nelson's recruits began to gather at his rendezvous. Camp Dick Robinson was situated in a beautiful blue-grass country, near where the pike for Lancaster and Crab Orchard leaves the Lexington and Danville Pike, between Dick's River and the Kentucky. By September 1st, there had gathered at this point four full Kentucky regiments and nearly two thousand East Tennesseans, who had been enlisted by Lieutenant



JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1857-61; CONFEDERATE SECRETARY OF
WAR, APPOINTED JAN. 28, 1865.
FROM A DAGUERRETYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1850.


†During the neutrality period it would appear that the Union authorities were in doubt as to which side General Buckner would espouse, since on August 17th, 1861, President Lincoln wrote to the Secretary of War: "Unless there be reason to the contrary, not known to me, make out a commission for Simon [B.] Buckner, of Kentucky, as a brigadier-general of volunteers. It is to be put into the hands of General Anderson, and delivered to General Buckner or not, at the discretion of General Anderson. Of course it is to remain a secret unless and until the commission is delivered." This letter bears the indorsement, "this day made."—EDITORS.

S. P. Carter. This officer, like Nelson, belonging to the navy, was a native of East Tennessee, and it was part of the original plan of the East Tennessee expedition that he should enter that section and organize men to receive the arms that Nelson was to bring. This was found to be impracticable, and he opened his camp at Barbourville and the men began to come to him.

In August, W. T. Ward, a prominent lawyer of Greensburg, commenced recruiting a brigade and soon had twenty-two companies pledged to rendezvous when he should obtain the necessary authority from Washington. In Christian county, Colonel J. F. Buckner, a wealthy lawyer and planter, recruited a regiment from companies which organized originally as Home Guards, but soon determined to enter the volunteer service. He established a camp five miles north of Hopkinsville, where a few companies remained at a time. Christian county was strongly Unionist, while all the counties west of it were overwhelmingly secessionist. Camp Boone was only a few miles from its southern border, and Fort Donelson about twenty miles south-west. Colonel Buckner had a 6-pounder cannon, which could be heard at Camp Boone and made his vicinity additionally disagreeable to those neighbors.

The neutrality proclaimed by Governor Magoffin on the 20th of May had been formally recognized by the Confederate authorities and treated with respect by those of the United States, but it was destined to speedy termination. It served a useful purpose in its time, and a policy that had the respectful consideration of the leading men of that day could not have been so absurd as it seems now.

On the 3d of September General Polk, who was in command in western Tennessee, caused Columbus, Kentucky, to be occupied, on account of the appearance of a body of Union troops on the opposite side of the Missis-



issippi.‡ Hearing of this, on the 5th General Grant moved from Cairo and occupied Paducah. A few days afterward General Zollicoffer advanced with four Confederate regiments through Cumberland Gap to Cumberland Ford. The Union Legislature had met on the 2d. Resolutions were passed on the 11th requiring the governor to issue a proclamation ordering the Confederate troops to leave the State. They were promptly vetoed and promptly passed over the veto, and the proclamation was issued. In spite of the governor's opposition, acts were passed putting the State in active support of the Government. The governor was reduced to a nullity. General Robert Anderson, who was assigned on May 28th to command the Department of Kentucky, was invited to remove his headquarters to Louisville, and the State's full quota of volunteers was called for. Recruiting was pushed with energy, and by the end of the year 28 regiments of infantry, 6 of cavalry, and 3 batteries had been organized.

On September 15th General Albert Sidney Johnston assumed command of the Confederate forces in the West, and at once ordered General Buckner with five thousand men from Camp Boone and another camp in the vicinity to proceed by rail and occupy Bowling Green. Buckner reached that point early on the 18th, having sent in advance one detachment by rail to seize the bridge over Green River at Munfordville, and another to go as far as Elizabethtown and bring back all the rolling-stock possible. This was successfully accomplished, a part of the advance detachment going as far as the bridge over the Rolling Fork of Salt River, within thirty-three miles of Louisville, and burning the bridge.

Buckner's movement was supposed in Louisville to have that city for its objective, and great excitement prevailed there. Rumor magnified his forces, but there was abundant ground for apprehension without that. General Anderson was in command, but he was without troops. The only forces in his department in Kentucky were the unorganized regiment of Colonel Buckner near Hopkinsville, the few hundred recruits gathered at Greensburg by General Ward, and Nelson's forces at Camp Dick Robinson,—none of which were ready for service,—the Home Guard Brigade of Louisville, and the scattered companies of Home Guards throughout the State. Opposite Louisville was Rousseau's camp, in which were some two thousand men not yet prepared for the field. Very few troops were in reach. Owing to the neutrality of Kentucky, the regiments recruited in Ohio, Indiana, and the North-west generally had been sent as fast as organized to the Potomac or Missouri armies. Fortunately, Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, had received information, about the 1st, which had led him to reserve a few regiments for Kentucky, and in response to General Anderson's appeal he hurried them forward. Anderson had learned of Buckner's intended advance the day it was made, and the non-arrival of the regular train from the south showed him that it had begun. The Home Guards of Louisville were at once ordered out for ten days, and, assembling at midnight, eighteen hundred of them under Colonel A. Y. Johnson, Chief of the Fire Department, started by rail for Mul-

‡ Thus the neutrality of Kentucky was first broken by the Confederates.—EDITORS.



JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, DURING FOUR TERMS UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY; TWICE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; EX-GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY.
FROM A DAGUERRETYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1851.

In the session of 1860-61 Senator Crittenden introduced resolutions called the "Crittenden Compromise," proposing as an unalterable Constitutional Amendment that slavery be prohibited north of the parallel of 36° 30',


and never interfered with by Congress south of that line. Though this was the most promising of the numerous plans for a compromise, the resolutions failed for want of agreement.—EDITORS.

draugh's Hill. Rousseau, with twelve hundred men, followed in a few hours. The whole force was under Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, who had shortly before, at Anderson's request, been assigned to duty with him. On arriving at Lebanon Junction Sherman learned that Rolling Fork Bridge, a few miles farther on, had just been destroyed. The Home Guards debarked at the junction, and Rousseau moved forward to the bridge, finding it still smoking. A reconnoissance in force, carried for some distance beyond the river, found no enemy, and the burning of the bridge indicated that no farther advance was intended immediately.

General Sherman's army was rather a motley crew. The Home Guards did not wear regulation uniforms, and Rousseau's men were not well equipped. Muldraugh's Hill had been occupied for six weeks or more during the summer by a regiment of the State Guard, and the people in the vicinity were gener-

ally in sympathy with the rebellion. Sherman's attention was attracted to a young man, without any uniform, who was moving around with what he considered suspicious activity, and he called him up for question. The young fellow gave a prompt account of himself. His name was Griffiths, he was a medical student from Louisville acting as hospital steward, and he had been called out in such a hurry that he had had no time to get his uniform. As he moved away he muttered something in a low tone to an officer standing by, and Sherman at once demanded to know what it was. "Well, General," was the reply, "he said that a general with such a hat as you have on had no right to talk to him about a uniform." Sherman was wearing a battered hat of the style known as "stovepipe." Pulling it off, he looked at it, and, bursting into a laugh, called out: "Young man, you are right about the hat, but you ought to have your uniform."

On the 20th, the 38th Indiana (Colonel B. F. Scribner) arrived, and soon after four other regiments. Sherman moved forward to Elizabethtown, not finding any available position at Muldraugh's Hill. A few days afterward, having on October 8th suc-



CAMP DICK ROBINSON — THE FARM-HOUSE.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

ceeded Anderson, who had been relieved by General Scott in these terms, "To give you rest necessary to restoration of health, call Brigadier-General Sherman to command the Department of the Cumberland," Sherman ordered Rousseau to advance along the railroad to Nolin, fifty-three miles from Louisville, and select a position for a large force.

While Sherman was at Elizabethtown, Buckner, with several thousand men, moved rapidly to Rochester, on Green River, and destroyed the locks there, and then moved against Colonel Buckner's camp near Hopkinsville. Warned of his approach, Colonel Buckner directed his men, who had not yet been regularly enrolled, to disperse and make their way to the Union camp near Owensboro'. They succeeded, but Colonel Buckner himself was taken prisoner. Occupying Hopkinsville after a slight skirmish with the Home Guards, Buckner left a garrison there under General Alcorn and returned to Bowling Green.

Rousseau's advance to Nolin and the arrival of large reinforcements there induced Johnston to move his headquarters from Columbus to Bowling Green, and on October 15th he sent Hardee with 1200 men from that place against Ward at Greensburg, who, hearing of Hardee's approach, fell back with his recruits 20 miles to Campbellsville.

No material change in this position of affairs in western Kentucky occurred while General Sherman remained in command, though there were several sharp skirmishes between bodies of Kentucky recruits and Confederate scouting parties in the Lower Green River country.

In the mean time the East Tennessee expedition was not progressing. Nelson, whose arbitrary temper had made him enemies among influential politi-

cians, was sent to eastern Kentucky to superintend recruiting camps, and Brigadier-General George H. Thomas took command at Camp Dick Robinson. Thomas was an ardent advocate of the movement on East Tennessee and bent all his energies to getting ready for it, but his command was not half equipped and was wholly without transportation; staff-officers were scarce, and funds were not furnished. More patient than Nelson, he was yet greatly tried by the importunities of the East Tennessee troops, and of the prominent politicians from that region, who made his camp their rendezvous, as well as by military suggestions from civilians more zealous than wise in such matters. The speech-making of distinguished visitors became a burden to



MAJOR-GENERAL LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

him. On one occasion, when General Sherman visited his camp, Ex-Senator J. J. Crittenden, Senator Andrew Johnson, and Horace Maynard were there. A band came from the camp to serenade them, and the soldiers, not yet rid of their civilian characteristics, began calling for speeches from one after another. Thomas withdrew from the orators to the seclusion of a little room used as an office, on one side of the piazza from which they were speaking. One of his aides was writing in a corner, but Thomas did not see him, and began striding up and down the floor in growing irritation. At last Sherman, who was not then such an orator as he is now, finished speaking, and cries arose for "Thomas." He blurted out, "—this speech-making! I won't speak! What does a man want to make a speech for, anyhow?" Observing that he had an auditor, he strode from the room slamming the door behind him, and kept his own quarters for the rest of the evening.

Accustomed to the discipline of the regular army, and fresh from the well-organized army of General Patterson on the upper Potomac, Thomas had little confidence in the raw recruits whom, for lack of a mustering officer, he mustered in himself. He was willing to advance into East Tennessee with half a dozen well-drilled regiments, and asked for and obtained them, but they came without transportation, and he had none for them. While he was struggling to get ready for an advance, Zollicoffer had made several demonstrations, and to oppose him Garrard's regiment had been thrown forward to

a strong position on Wild Cat Mountain just beyond Rockcastle River, supported by a detachment of Wolford's cavalry. On the 17th of October, Garrard reported that Zollicoffer was advancing in force, and asked for reënforcements. Thomas hurried forward several regiments under General Schoepf, who had reported to him shortly before. Schoepf arrived with the 33d Indiana, in time to help in giving Zollicoffer, who had attacked vigorously with two regiments, a decisive repulse. Zollicoffer retired, apparently satisfied with developing Garrard's force, and Thomas moved Schoepf with Carter's East Tennesseans and several other regiments forward in pursuit, till stopped by order of General Sherman, at London.

On the 12th of November, Sherman, having received information from his advance that a large force was moving between him and Thomas, apparently toward Lexington, ordered the latter to withdraw all his forces north of the Kentucky River. Making arrangements to obey, Thomas at the same time sent an officer to Sherman, urging the impolicy of the move unless absolutely necessary, and controverting the information on which it was based. The order was revoked, but the revocation did not reach Schoepf until his troops had begun the movement. The East Tennessee regiments had received it with an indignation that carried them to the verge of mutiny. They threw their guns to the ground and swore they would not obey. Many actually left the command, though they returned in a few days. It required all of Carter's influence to keep them to their standards, and hundreds of them wept as they turned their backs on their homes. Andrew Johnson was with them, and his indignation had added fuel to their discontent. He was so indiscreet that Thomas seriously contemplated his arrest. On the revocation of the order Carter returned to London, while Schoepf took position soon after at Somerset.


In September Colonel John S. Williams had begun to gather a Confederate force at Prestonburg, in eastern Kentucky, threatening incursions into the central part of the State. On the 8th of November

General Nelson, who had advanced against him with two Ohio and detachments of several Kentucky regiments, with a part of his force encountered a large detachment thrown forward by Williams to cover his retreat, in a strong position on Ivy Creek. After a well-contested engagement Williams was forced from his position, and retired through Pound Gap [see map, page 394]



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. CRITTENDEN, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

General Crittenden was a son of Senator John J. Crittenden. His brother, Thomas L. Crittenden, was a major-general in the Union army.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

D. C. Buell

into Virginia. Nelson with the Ohio regiments was then ordered to join the column in front of Louisville, where he was assigned to command the Fourth Division. On this expedition Nelson reported as part of his force, "thirty-six gentlemen volunteers," probably the latest appearance in history of that description of soldier. One of them, of strong bibulous propensities, acting as his private secretary, brought about an altercation between Nelson and a wagoner nearly as large, which narrowly missed fatal results. He was anxious to get the driver away from his wagon in which there was a jug of whisky, and directed him to Nelson's tent to find a big fellow who was employed to unhitch teams for tired drivers. He warned him that the big fellow was cross, but told him he must insist on his rights. The driver was just tipsy enough to be reckless, and he roused Nelson with little ceremony.

There was a terrible outburst of fury on both sides, which brought interference just in time to prevent a conflict between the two giants, one armed with a sword, and the other with a loaded whip-handle. The aide, not reporting next morning, was, after some search, found sound asleep in a wagon with the jug beside him. He was a noted wag, and Nelson, recognizing him at once as the author of the trick, dismissed him to his home.

A visit from Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, on their return from St. Louis in the latter part of October, resulted in the removal of General Sherman. In explaining the needs of his department to the Secretary, Sherman expressed the opinion that two hundred thousand men would be required for successful operations on his line. This estimate, which, as events showed, evinced remarkable foresight, then discredited his judgment. On their way to St. Louis, on the same tour, the Secretary had ordered General O. M. Mitchel to take charge of the East Tennessee expedition, superseding General Thomas, but General Sherman succeeded in having the order recalled.

On November 15th, General Don Carlos Buell assumed command of the Department of the Ohio, enlarged so as to include the States of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana.† He was given the advantage, not enjoyed by his predecessors, of controlling the new troops organized in those States. By one of his first orders, General Thomas was directed to concentrate his command at Lebanon. The new commander began at once the task of creating an efficient army out of the raw material at hand. He organized the regiments into brigades and divisions, and subjected them to a system of drill and discipline the beneficial effects of which endured throughout the war.

The advance into East Tennessee remained a favorite project with the authorities at Washington. Buell's instructions presented Knoxville as the objective of his first campaign. McClellan wrote several times urging that the seizing of the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad was essential to the success of his plans, and that the political results likely to follow success in that direction made the movement of the first importance. Buell did not consider East Tennessee important enough to be his principal objective; he wanted it to be a subordinate feature in a great campaign. He submitted his plans to McClellan in a personal letter. They were comprehensive and required a large force, and it was already seen that Sherman's estimate was not so far out of the way. Buell proposed that a heavy column should be moved up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers by steamer, to unite with another moving on Nashville, to the eastward of Bowling Green. Demonstrations were to be made in front of Columbus and Bowling Green, sufficient to keep the forces holding them fully occupied until their retreat was cut off by the marching columns. At the same time an expedition from Lebanon, moving by way of Somerset, was to be directed against East Tennessee. Until he was ready to move, he desired to do nothing to put the enemy on the alert. His brigades and regiments were allowed to remain in apparently objectless disper-

† General Buell was a graduate of West Point. In the Mexican war he twice received promotion for gallant and meritorious conduct, and was severely wounded. May 20th, 1861, to August 9th he was on duty in California, and from Sept. 14th to Nov. 9th in the defenses of Washington.

sion. He did not care if some isolated posts were occasionally raided by the enemy. But his regiments were frequently inspected and required to keep constantly ready for a movement the day and hour of which he proposed to keep to himself. The notion that Buckner or Zollicoffer contemplated an advance, which so frequently agitated the military mind before he came, was dismissed by him as idle. "I would as soon," he wrote to McClellan, "expect to meet the Army of the Potomac marching up the road, as Johnston."

His policy of quiet had to be laid aside when, early in December, Morgan and Helm burned the Bacon Creek bridge in his front. He advanced his lines to Munfordville and threw forward a small force beyond Green River. This resulted in a skirmish between a portion of the 32d Indiana, deployed as skirmishers, and Terry's Texas Cavalry—notable as one of the few fights of the war between infantry skirmishers in the open and cavalry.

Nothing else of moment occurred on Buell's main line until the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson compelled Johnston to retire from Bowling Green and leave the road to Nashville open.¶ During November Buell reviewed Thomas's command at Lebanon, and advised with him about an attack on Zollicoffer, who to meet a rumored advance had left Cumberland Gap in charge of a strong garrison, had made his appearance on the Cumberland at Mill Springs, a few miles south-west of Somerset, had crossed the river, and after some picket-firing with Schoepf had intrenched himself on the north side.

General Thomas left Lebanon on the 1st of January. As far as Columbia there was a good turnpike; beyond, only mud roads. It rained incessantly, and artillery carriages and wagons sank to their axles in the soft soil. On one part of the route eight days were consumed in advancing forty miles.

¶ The letter which follows shows Mr. Lincoln's ideas of what was demanded by the situation:

"Executive Mansion, Washington, January 13th, 1862. BRIGADIER-GENERAL BUELL: My dear sir,—Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, 'I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his.' In the midst of my many cares, I have not seen or asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer them, as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fall unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forbore to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate, and not to criticize. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting, every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the

want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months men. Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus, and 'down-river' generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road. Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN. [Indorsement]: January 13th, 1862. Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send General Halleck a copy of it. A. LINCOLN."

On February 5th, the day before the capture of Fort Henry, General Buell wrote thus to General Halleck in a correspondence with regard to co-operation:

"I think it is quite plain that the center of the enemy's line—that part which you are now moving against—is the decisive point of his whole front, as it is also the most vulnerable. If it is held, or even the bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers destroyed, and your force maintains itself near those points, Bowling Green will speedily fall, and Columbus will soon follow. The work which you have undertaken is therefore of the very highest importance, without reference to the injurious effects of a failure. There is not in the whole field of operations a point at which every man you can raise can be employed with more effect or with the prospect of as important results." EDITORS.


On the 17th of January Thomas reached Logan's Cross Roads, ten miles north of Zollicoffer's intrenched camp (on the north side of the Cumberland, opposite Mill Springs) and about the same distance west of Somerset, with the 9th Ohio and 2d Minnesota of Robert L. McCook's brigade, the 10th Indiana of Manson's brigade, Kenny's battery, and a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. The 4th Kentucky, 10th Kentucky, the 14th Ohio, Wetmore's battery, and the 18th regulars were still detained in the rear by bad roads. Halting at the cross roads, Thomas communicated with Schoepf and ordered him to send across Fishing Creek to his camp the 12th Kentucky, the 1st and 2d East Tennessee regiments, and Standart's battery, to remain until the arrival of his delayed force. Hearing that a large wagon train, sent on a foraging expedition by Zollicoffer, was on a road about six miles from the camp of Steedman, of the 14th Ohio, he ordered that officer to take his own regiment and Harlan's 10th Kentucky and attempt its capture. On the evening of the 18th the 4th Kentucky, the battalion of Michigan Engineers, and the battery arrived and went into camp near the 10th Indiana.

THE BATTLE OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS (MILL SPRINGS).

A FEW days before this General George B. Crittenden had arrived at Zollicoffer's camp and assumed command. Hearing of the arrival of Thomas with part of his command, and believing that Fishing Creek, which was a troublesome stream at any stage of water, was unfordable from recent rains, he called a council of his brigade and regimental commanders to consider the propriety of making an attack on Thomas before he could be reached by Schoepf or his regiments in the rear. There was little delay in coming to a decision. Their camp on the north side of the river was not tenable against a strong attack, and the means of crossing the river were so insufficient that a withdrawal without great loss could not have been effected, in the face of an enterprising enemy. The only chance for a satisfactory issue was to attack Thomas before he could concentrate. Crittenden ordered a movement to begin at midnight on the 18th in the following order: General Zollicoffer's brigade, consisting of two cavalry companies, a Mississippi regiment, three Tennessee regiments, and a battery in front; next, the brigade of General Carroll, composed of three Tennessee regiments and a section of artillery. An Alabama regiment and two cavalry regiments, intended as a reserve, closed the column. After a march of nine miles over muddy roads and through the rain, his cavalry about daylight encountered Wolford's pickets, who after firing fell back on the reserve, consisting of two companies of the 10th Indiana, and with them made a determined stand, in which they were promptly supported by Wolford with the rest of his battalion, and soon after by the rest of the 10th Indiana, ordered up by Manson, who had been advised by courier from Wolford of the attack. Colonel Manson proceeded in person to order forward the 4th Kentucky and the battery of his brigade and to report to General Thomas. On his way he notified Colonel Van Cleve, of the 2d Minnesota. As Manson dashed through the camp of the 4th Kentucky shouting for Colonel Speed S. Fry, and giving warning of the

trees who fired and wounded Fry's horse. Fry at once fired on the man who had accosted him, and several of his men, observing the incident, fired at the same time. The shots were fatal, and the horseman fell dead, pierced by a pistol-shot in his breast and by two musket-balls. It was soon ascertained that it was Zollicoffer himself who had fallen. In the mean time, the enemy were pressing Fry in front and overlapping his right. On his right front only the fence separated the combatants. The left of his regiment not being assailed, he moved two companies from that flank to his right. As he was making this change General Thomas appeared on the field, and at once placed the 10th Indiana in position to cover Fry's exposed flank.

The fall of Zollicoffer and the sharp firing that followed caused two of his regiments to retreat in confusion. Crittenden then brought up Carroll's brigade to the support of the other two, and ordered a general advance. Thomas met this by placing a section of Kenny's battery on the left of the 4th Kentucky, which was overlapped by Carroll's line, ordered the 12th Kentucky to the left of Kenny's two guns, and Carter with the two East Tennessee regiments, and Wetmore's battery still farther to the left, in front of the Somerset road. Standart's battery and Kenny's remaining guns were held in the rear of the center, and McCook's two regiments were ordered up, the 9th Ohio on the right of the 10th Indiana, and the 2d Minnesota in reserve behind the latter regiment and the 4th Kentucky. During these movements Kenny's section was so threatened that it was withdrawn some distance to the rear. There was little opportunity for the effective use of artillery on either side, and that arm played an insignificant part in the engagement, Thomas's superiority in that particular availing him little. Carroll's attack was pressed with great courage, and the ammunition of the 4th Kentucky and 10th Indiana beginning to fail, the 2d Minnesota was ordered to relieve them, which it did under severe fire. Both of McCook's regiments were admirably drilled and disciplined, and moved to the attack with the order and steadiness of veterans. Thomas's disposition of his troops had begun to tell. The advance of the 12th Kentucky on the left, the firing of Wetmore's battery, and the movement of Carter's East Tennesseans checked the enemy's right, and it soon began to give back. The 2d Minnesota was slowly pushing forward over the ground that had been the scene of the most persistent fighting from the first, and the 9th Ohio, on the right, was forcing back the enemy through open ground, when, slightly changing direction, it made a bayonet charge against the enemy's left, which gave way in confusion. Their whole line then broke into a disorderly retreat. After replenishing



BRIG.-GEN. FELIX K. ZOLLICOFFER, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

cartridge-boxes, Thomas pushed forward in pursuit. Within a few miles, a small body of the enemy's cavalry attempted to make a stand, but were scattered by a few shells from Standart. The road which the retreating force followed was strewn with evidences that the retreat had degenerated into a panic. A piece of artillery was found abandoned in a mud hole, hundreds



BRIGADIER-GENERAL SPEED S. FRY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

of muskets were strewn along the road and in the fields, and, most convincing proof of all, the flying foe had thrown away their haversacks filled with rations of corn pone and bacon. Those were the days when stories of "rebel atrocities" in the way of poisoning wells and food were current, and the pursuers, who had gone into the fight breakfastless, were doubtful about tasting the contents of the first haversacks they observed. Their great number, however, soon became a guarantee of good faith, and the hungry soldiers seized on them with avidity. As Crittenden in his report mentioned the loss of all the cooked rations carried to the field as enhancing the distress of his subsequent retreat, the abundance of the supply obtained by the pursuing force may be inferred. On arriving near the enemy's intrenchments the division was deployed in line of battle,


advancing to the summit of the hill at Moulden's, which commanded the enemy's intrenchments. From this point Standart and Wetmore's batteries kept up a cannonade till dark, while Kenny's on the left, at Russell's house, fired upon their ferry to keep them from crossing. The 14th Ohio and the 10th Kentucky had come up during the pursuit, and were placed in advance for the assault ordered for daybreak. General Schoepf arrived about dark with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio. [See also pp. 546, 547.]

At daybreak next morning Wetmore's Parrott guns, which had been moved to Russell's, began firing on the steamer which was evidently engaged in crossing troops, and it was soon abandoned and set on fire by the enemy. The assaulting columns moved forward, the 10th Kentucky and the 14th Ohio in advance, and reaching the intrenchments found them abandoned. In the bottom near the ferry-crossing were found 11 pieces of artillery, with their caissons, battery-wagons, and forges, hitched up and ready to move but abandoned by the artillerymen, more than 150 wagons, and over 1000 horses and mules. All the troops had escaped. The steep road on the other bank was strewn with abandoned baggage and other evidences of disorderly flight. The boats used for crossing having been destroyed by the retreating enemy, no immediate pursuit was possible; but during the day means were improvised for getting the 14th Ohio across for a reconnoissance and to secure abandoned property.

Thomas reported his loss in action as 39 killed and 207 wounded, the casualties being confined entirely to the 10th Indiana, 4th Kentucky, 2d Minnesota, 9th Ohio, and Wofford's cavalry. Colonels McCook and Fry were among the wounded. The enemy's loss he reported as 192 killed, 89 prisoners not wounded, and 68 prisoners wounded. Crittenden's report stated his own loss at 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing, much the heaviest loss being in the 15th Mississippi (Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Walthall), of Zollicoffer's brigade, which had led the attack on Fry and fought through the whole engagement.

Besides the property mentioned above, a large amount of ammunition, commissary stores, intrenching tools, camp and garrison equipage and muskets, and five stands of colors were found in the camp. The demoralization was acknowledged by Crittenden in his report, in which he says: "From Mill Springs and on the first steps of my march officers and men, frightened by false rumors of the movements of the enemy, shamefully deserted, and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee." Of one cavalry battalion, he reported that all had deserted except twenty-five. On his retreat his sick-list increased greatly from lack of food and fatigue, and the effective force of his army was practically destroyed.

After entrance into his intrenchments had demonstrated the panic that existed in the enemy's forces, Fry said to Thomas: "General, why didn't you send in a demand for surrender last night?" Looking at him a moment as if reflecting, Thomas replied: "Hang it, Fry, I never once thought of it." At this time originated a saying often heard in the Western army afterward. A sprightly



NATIONAL CEMETERY AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1887.

young prisoner slightly wounded was allowed the freedom of the camp. To some soldiers chaffing him about his army being in such a hurry as even to throw away their haversacks, he replied: "Well, we were doing pretty good fighting till old man Thomas rose up in his stirrups, and we heard him holler out: 'Attention, Creation! By kingdoms right wheel!' and then we knew you had us, and it was no time to carry weight."

Thomas's victory was complete, and the road was opened for the advance into East Tennessee which he had so long endeavored to make and which was



VIEW ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH, 1887.

contemplated by his instructions, but the scarcity of provisions, the badness of the roads, and the difficulty of crossing the river made progress on that line impracticable, and shortly afterward Carter was ordered with his brigade against Cumberland Gap and Thomas to rejoin Buell's main column, and the East Tennessee expedition, which Nelson had devised and McClellan had strongly urged and Thomas had labored so to put in motion, was definitively abandoned.

While Thomas was marching against Zollicoffer, Colonel Garfield was driving Humphrey Marshall from the mountainous region along the Virginia border. With Marshall's retreat the last Confederate force was driven from the State, and Garfield with his brigade joined the army in Tennessee.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, KNOWN AS MILL SPRINGS AND ALSO AS FISHING CREEK, KY.

The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.—EDITORS.

THE UNION ARMY. Brig.-Gen. George H. Thomas. *Second Brigade*, Col. Mahlon D. Manson: 10th Ind., Lt.-Col. William C. Kise; 4th Ky., Col. Speed S. Fry (w); 10th Ky., Col. John M. Harlan; 14th Ohio, Col. James B. Steedman. [The two latter regiments were engaged only in the pursuit of the enemy.] Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 127 = 146. *Third Brigade*, Col. Robert L. McCook (w): 2d Minn., Col. Horatio P. Van Cleve; 9th Ohio, Major Gustave Kummerling. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 61 = 79; *Twelfth Brigade*, Acting Brig.-Gen. Samuel P. Carter: 12th Ky., Col. William A. Hoskins; 1st Tennessee, Col.

Robert K. Byrd; 2d Tennessee, Col. J. P. T. Carter; 1st Ky. Cavalry, Col. Frank Wolford. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 19; m, 15 = 37. *Artillery*: Battery B, 1st Ohio, Capt. William E. Standart; Battery C, 1st Ohio, Capt. Dennis Kenny, Jr.; 9th Ohio Battery, Capt. Henry S. Wetmore. *Camp Guard*: D, F, and K, Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, Lieut.-Col. K. A. Hunton; A, 38th Ohio, Capt. Charles Greenwood.

Brig.-Gen. A. Schoepf joined Thomas on the evening of the battle, after the fighting had ceased, with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio.

The total loss of the Union forces was 40 killed, 207 wounded, and 15 captured or missing,—aggregate, 262.

In the Official Records, vol. VII., p. 86, Col. Manson reports that "the Federal force actually engaged did not exceed at any time over 2500." Gen. Thomas's entire command on the field during the engagement probably numbered about four thousand effectives.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. Major-Gen. George B. Crittenden. *First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer (k), Col. D. H. Cummings: 15th Miss., Lieut.-Col. E. C. Walthall; 19th Tenn., Col. D. H. Cummings, Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Walker; 20th Tenn., Col. Joel A. Battle; 25th Tenn., Col. S. S. Stanton (w); Tenn. Battery, Capt. A. M. Rutledge; Ind'pt Co. Tenn. Cav., Capt. W. S. Hedges; Ind'pt Co. Tenn. Cav., Capt. T. C. Sanders. Brigade

loss: k, 98; w, 265; m, 66 = 429. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Carroll: 16th Ala., Col. Wm. B. Wood; 17th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. C. H. Miller; 28th Tenn., Col. J. P. Murray; 29th Tenn., Col. Saml. Powell (w), Major Horace Rice; Tenn. Battery (2 guns), Capt. Hugh L. W. McClung; 4th Battalion Tenn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. B. M. Branner. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 46; m, 29 = 103. *Reserve*: 5th Battalion Tenn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. George R. McClellan.

The total Confederate loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 captured or missing,—aggregate, 533.

Gen. Crittenden says: "In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about 4000 effective men."

MARSHALL AND GARFIELD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.

BY THE REV. EDWARD O. GUERRANT, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL MARSHALL.




CONFEDERATE PRIVATE. FROM AN AMBROTYPE.

ON the 10th of September, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the five officers who then held the rank of "General" in the Confederate army, was assigned to the command of Department No. 2, embracing the States of Tennessee and Arkansas, and that part of the State of Mississippi west of the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern and Central Railroad; also, the military operations in Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian country immediately west of Missouri and Arkansas. Tennessee had entered into a league with the Confederacy on the 7th of May, 1861, and although the efforts of the Confederates to take Kentucky out of the Union had been defeated, the State contained a large element friendly to secession, from which was recruited at an early day a number of regiments. In order to afford securer opportunities for such enlistments, it was necessary to make an effort to occupy eastern Kentucky. This was desirable, also, in order to protect vital interests of the Confederacy in south-western Virginia, where were situated the great salt-works and lead-mines of the South, and where ran the chief line of railway, connecting Virginia with the Gulf States.

With these objects in view, on the 1st of November, 1861, Brigadier-General Humphrey Marshall was sent by the Confederate Government to take command of certain troops at Prestonburg, Ky., then under command of Colonel (afterward General) John S. Williams. These consisted of a regiment and a battalion in a camp on the Big Sandy, which had been organized in the fall of 1861, by Colonel Williams. The regiment was the 5th Kentucky, the famous "Ragamuffin Regiment," composed almost exclusively of mountain men, and one of the finest corps of soldiers ever enlisted in the army. They were hardy, raw-boned, brave mountaineers, trained to hardships, and armed with long rifles. Colonel Williams had also organized a battalion of mounted riflemen from the famous "Blue Grass" country in central Kentucky, composed of young men of education and fortune,—the class of men who afterward made John Morgan famous as a raider. This force was further increased by the 54th Virginia, under Colonel Robert C. Trigg, the 29th Virginia, under Colonel A. C. Moore, and a battery of field artillery, under Captain W. C. Jeffress. In General Marshall's official reports, he states that during the campaign of 1861-62 his force never exceeded 1800 effective men of all arms.† The force assigned to him was very small, considering the interests involved and the objects to be attained. The

† Yet, on the 30th of December, 1861, General Marshall had reported his force as "equal to 3000," including "battery of four pieces, equal to 600 men."—EDITORS.



MAP OF BIG SANDY RIVER AND
MIDDLE-CREEK BATTLE-FIELD
(JANUARY 10, 1862).

occupation of eastern Kentucky would have required an army of several thousand men. In response to his request for reinforcements, President Davis wrote to General Marshall that they "were sorely pressed on every side," and were unable to send him any troops.

It was a very severe winter, and Marshall's men were poorly clad, and many of the soldiers were nearly naked. One regiment had 350 barefooted men and not over 100 blankets for 700 men. General Albert Sidney Johnston, observing their condition, sent them one thousand suits of clothes, including hats and shoes. These supplies reached the army at Whitesburg, Ky. An incident connected with the distribution of them will serve to illustrate the poverty of the Quartermaster's Department, and the ready genius of General Marshall. When the quartermaster distributed the clothing among the soldiers, it was noticed that they examined with suspicion the peculiar color and texture of the cloth. General Marshall discovering that it was *cotton*, and fearing the result of such a discovery by his men, rose to the occasion with a stirring speech, in which he eulogized the courage, endurance, and patriotism of his men, and commended the Government for its thoughtful care of them, and relieved their fears as to the quality of the goods

by assuring them that they were "woven out of the *best quality of Southern wool, with which, doubtless, many of the Kentuckians were not acquainted.*" The men took the general's word for it (with a grain of salt) and walked off to their quarters with their cottonade suits. The general often remarked afterward that the deception nearly choked him, adding, "but something had to be done."

The army was not only badly clothed, but in general badly armed. Many of the men had only shot-guns and squirrel rifles. Requisitions on the War Department were not filled for want of supplies; and General Lee wrote that owing to the scarcity of arms he was having *pikes* made, which he offered to furnish General Marshall for his unarmed troops.

The field of operations lay in the Cumberland Mountains, along the sources of the Big Sandy River,—a poor, wild, thinly settled country. The roads ran along the water-courses between the mountains, and were often rendered impassable by the high waters, and during this winter were ruined by the passage of cavalry, wagons, and artillery. Captain Jeffress was three days moving his battery from Gladesville to Pound Gap, only sixteen miles. General Marshall's report states that his wagons were sometimes unable to make

over four miles a day. An unusual amount of rain fell, drenching the unprotected soldiers, most of them raw recruits, and keeping the roads deep and the waters high. This first winter was the worst of the war, and the scanty rations and great hardships made hundreds of the men sick. Besides, the measles and mumps broke out in the camps, and many died from these diseases and from exposure. The command at Prestonburg was over one hundred miles from its base of supplies at Abingdon, Va., with the Cumberland Mountains between. The farms were generally small and poor, lying along the mountain-sides or in narrow valleys. During January, 1862, corn was worth ten dollars per barrel, and had to be hauled thirty miles over desperate roads. For weeks they subsisted upon mountain beef and parched corn. These privations General Marshall shared, giving up his tent to the sick and wounded, and sleeping beneath a wagon.

On the 17th of December, 1861, General Don Carlos Buell, then in command of the Department of the Ohio, including Kentucky, assigned Colonel (afterward General and President) James A. Garfield, of Ohio, to command his Eighteenth Brigade, and sent him against General Marshall. Colonel Garfield concentrated his forces at Louisa, at the forks of the Sandy, from which place he began his advance movement on the 23d of December. His army consisted of his own regiment, the 42d Ohio, under Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Sheldon, the 1st Squadron Ohio Cavalry, Major William McLaughlin, the 14th Kentucky, Colonel L. T. Moore, the 22d Kentucky, Colonel D. W. Lindsey, 2d Virginia Cavalry (6 companies), Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Bolles, the 40th Ohio, Colonel Jonathan Cranor, and 300 of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Letcher, numbering in all some three thousand men. Garfield having found the road up the river impassable for wagons, many were taken to pieces and conveyed on boats; others, that were empty, were pulled by the men. His supplies were brought up on steam-boats and push-boats.

On the 6th of January, 1862, Garfield arrived within seven miles of Paintsville, where Marshall had established his camp and headquarters. It had been Marshall's intention to offer battle at Hagar's farm, near Paintsville, but he had intercepted a letter from Garfield to Cranor, who, with his regiment and some 400 cavalry, was advancing upon Marshall's left and rear from the direction of Salyersville. He then decided to fall back to the forks of Middle Creek, where he awaited the approach of the Federal forces. Garfield and Cranor made a junction near Paintsville, and all moved up to Marshall's front on the 10th of January.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES A. GARFIELD.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

General Marshall had selected a strong position along a high ridge south of Middle Creek, and covering the road to Virginia by way of Beaver Creek. Jeffress's battery was placed in a gorge of the left fork of Middle Creek; the 5th Kentucky and 29th Virginia regiments and part of the Kentucky Battalion of Mounted Riflemen occupied the spurs and heights to the right of the artillery; the 54th Virginia occupied a height covering the battery, with two cavalry companies in reserve; two other cavalry companies (dismounted and armed with Belgian rifles) were placed across Middle Creek, on a height commanding the valley. Skirmishing between the two commands began about 10 A.M., but the action began in earnest about noon by a charge of Federal cavalry, supported by infantry. This attack was repulsed, the artillery putting the cavalry to flight, and it appeared no more during the engagement. The men probably dismounted and fought on foot, as the ground was not suitable for cavalry operations. Colonel Garfield then endeavored to take the ridge occupied by the 5th Kentucky and 29th Virginia, on the right wing of General Marshall's position. He moved his infantry up the side of the mountain, above Spurlock's Branch, and made a desperate attempt to dislodge the Confederate forces, commanded by Colonel Williams, but was repulsed. The attack was renewed three times, with the same result. The ascent was steep, the top of the mountain was covered with trees and rocks affording good protection to the Confederate forces. The engagement lasted until dark, both sides claiming the victory, and both withdrawing from the field of battle.

General Marshall estimated Colonel Garfield's forces at 5000,‡ and states his own at *not over* 1500. In his official report to the War Department he gives his losses at 11 killed and 15 wounded.

General Marshall withdrew his forces next day, taking three days to reach Martin's Mill on Beaver Creek,—sixteen miles from the battle-field. This was the nearest point at which he could get provisions for his men, some of whom had fasted for thirty hours before the action.

Colonel Garfield withdrew his forces, February 22d, to the Big Sandy River, where he remained until March. This was the only engagement between the



BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUMPHREY MARSHALL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

‡ Garfield's strength on the field did not exceed 1700 men. He says in his report: "Not more than 900 of my force were actually engaged." Marshall's estimate of his own (1500) is probably correct. The Union loss was 2 killed and 25 wounded. Garfield's reports exhibit no doubt of his success in the engagement. He says: "At 4.30 he ordered

a retreat. My men drove him down the slopes of the hills, and at 5 o'clock he had been driven from every point. . . . It was growing dark, and I deemed it unsafe to pursue him." Garfield withdrew to Paintsville on the 12th and 13th, to procure supplies, having on the 11th occupied Prestonburg, which the enemy had abandoned.—EDITORS.

two forces. The next month General Marshall sent the bulk of his command south of the Cumberland Mountains, to go into winter quarters, because all supplies were exhausted in the mountains of Kentucky. General Marshall's forces would probably have been compelled to return to Virginia in order to secure supplies, even if they had not been opposed by an enemy. The occupation of the Sandy Valley by a largely superior force so crippled his resources that he could hardly have subsisted his troops among the impoverished mountains. Indeed, Colonel Garfield could not have maintained his position a week, without the aid of the river, by which supplies were brought on steamboats. On the 16th of March, 1862, Garfield with 750 men made an attack on a battalion of Virginia militia, occupying Pound Gap, and drove them away and burned the log-huts built for winter quarters. Soon after this he was ordered to report to General Buell, who had gone to the relief of General Grant at Pittsburg Landing. This he did on the 7th of April, 1862, in time to take part in the second day's contest.


General Marshall was born January 13th, 1812, in Frankfort, Ky., and came of a most distinguished family, which included Chief-Justice John Marshall of Virginia, the historian Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky, and the orator and lawyer Thomas F. Marshall. He was four times elected to Congress from the Louisville District, and was Minister to China under President Fillmore. In his profession of law Humphrey Marshall had probably no superior and few equals among the jurists of Kentucky. As an orator he fully inherited the talent of a family which was famous in the forum. As a soldier he enjoyed the confidence of General Lee, who wrote him frequently in reference to military operations, and earnestly opposed his retirement from the army. He was a graduate of West Point, and both he and General Williams had won distinction in the Mexican war—Marshall at Buena Vista and Williams at Cerro Gordo.

General Marshall personally was not adapted to mountain warfare, owing to his great size; nor was he qualified to command volunteers, being the most democratic of men. Moreover, his heart was tender as a woman's. For these reasons he could not enforce the rigorous discipline of an army. So well known was his leniency, that an officer of his staff made a standing offer to eat the first man the general should shoot for any crime. Speaking to Colonel Leigh about military dignity and discipline, Marshall said he "regarded these things as the decrepitudes of the military art." General Williams, who was his ablest lieutenant, was a man of very different mold, proud, imperious, a born soldier, who believed in discipline to its last extremity.

With his little command Marshall afterward successfully defended the vital interests of the Confederacy in south-west Virginia, so long as he remained in the service. In the summer of 1863 he was transferred to the Mississippi Department, but resigned his commission because he believed that he had been badly treated by President Davis in not having received the governmental support which he thought he deserved and which the necessities of his command required.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

BY LEW WALLACE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.



HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD.

THE village of Dover was — and for that matter yet is — what our English cousins would call the “shire-town” of the county of Stewart, Tennessee. In 1860 it was a village unknown to fame, meager in population, architecturally poor. There was a court-house in the place, and a tavern, remembered now as double-storied, unpainted, and with windows of eight-by-ten glass, which, if the panes may be likened to eyes, were both squint and cataractous. Looking through them gave the street outside the appearance of a sedgy slough of yellow backwater. The entertainment furnished man and beast was good of the kind; though at the time mentioned a sleepy traveler, especially if he were of the North, might have been somewhat vexed by the explosions which spiced the good things of a debating society that nightly took possession of the bar-room, to discuss the relative fighting qualities of the opposing sections.

If there was a little of the romantic in Dover itself, there was still less of poetic quality in the country round about it. The only beautiful feature was the Cumberland River, which, in placid current from the south, poured its waters, ordinarily white and pure as those of the springs that fed it, past the village on the east. Northward there was a hill, then a small stream, then a bolder hill round the foot of which the river swept to the west, as if courteously bent on helping Hickman’s Creek out of its boggy bottom and cheerless ravine. North of the creek all was woods. Taking in the ravine of the creek, a system of hollows, almost wide and deep enough to be called valleys, inclosed the town and two hills, their bluffest ascents being on the townward side. Westward of the hollows there were woods apparently interminable. From Fort Henry, twelve miles north-west, a road entered the village, stopping first to unite itself with another wagon-way, now famous as the Wynn’s Ferry road, coming more directly from the west. Still another road, leading

off to Charlotte and Nashville, had been cut across the low ground near the river on the south. These three highways were the chief reliances of the people of Dover for communication with the country, and as they were more than supplemented by the river and its boatage, the three were left the year round to the guardianship of the winds and rains.

However, when at length the Confederate authorities decided to erect a military post at Dover, the town entered but little into consideration. The real inducement was the second hill on the north — more properly a ridge. As it rose about a hundred feet above the level of the inlet, the reconnoitering engineer, seeking to control the navigation of the river by a fortification, adopted it at sight. And for that purpose the bold bluff was in fact a happy gift of nature, and we shall see presently how it was taken in hand and made terrible.

It is of little moment now who first enunciated the idea of attacking the rebellion by way of the Tennessee River; most likely the conception was simultaneous with many minds. The trend of the river; its navigability for large steamers; its offer of a highway to the rear of the Confederate hosts in Kentucky and the State of Tennessee; its silent suggestion of a secure passage into the heart of the belligerent land, from which the direction of movement could be changed toward the Mississippi, or, left, toward Richmond; its many advantages as a line of supply and of general communication, must have been discerned by every military student who, in the summer of 1861, gave himself to the most cursory examination of the map. It is thought better and more consistent with fact to conclude that its advantages as a strategic line, so actually obtrusive of themselves, were observed about the same time by thoughtful men on both sides of the contest. With every problem of attack there goes a counter problem of defense.


A peculiarity of the most democratic people in the world is their hunger for heroes. The void in that respect had never been so gaping as in 1861. General Scott was then old and passing away, and the North caught eagerly at the promise held out by George B. McClellan; while the South, with as much precipitation, pinned its faith and hopes on Albert Sidney Johnston. There is little doubt that up to the surrender of Fort Donelson the latter was considered the foremost soldier of all who chose rebellion for their part. When the shadow of that first great failure fell upon the veteran, President Davis made haste to reassure him of his sympathy and unbroken confidence. In the official correspondence which has survived the Confederacy there is nothing so pathetic, and at the same time so indicative of the manly greatness of Albert Sidney Johnston, as his letter in reply to that of his chief.]

] In this letter dated Decatur, Ala., March 18th, 1862, General Johnston says in part :

"The blow [Fort Donelson] was most disastrous and almost without remedy. I therefore in my first report remained silent. This silence you were kind enough to attribute to my generosity. I will not lay claim to the motive to excuse my course. I observed silence, as it seemed to me the best way to serve the cause and the country. The facts were not fully known, discontent prevailed, and criticism or condemnation were more likely to augment than to cure the evil. I refrained, well knowing that heavy censures would fall upon me,

but convinced that it was better to endure them for the present, and defer to a more propitious time an investigation of the conduct of the generals; for in the mean time their services were required and their influence useful. For these reasons Generals Floyd and Pillow were assigned to duty, for I still felt confidence in their gallantry, their energy, and their devotion to the Confederacy. . . . The test of merit, in my profession, with the people, is success. It is a hard rule, but I think it right. If I join this corps to the forces of Beauregard (I confess a hazardous experiment), those who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument."

EDITORS.



THE TOWN OF DOVER FROM ROBINSON'S HILL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

This view was taken from the site of a house on McClernand's right, which was destroyed for camp purposes after the surrender. The house is said to have been used by McClernand as headquarters. It was near the Wynn's ferry road, which reaches the river perhaps a quarter of a mile to the right of the picture.


When General Johnston assumed command of the Western Department, the war had ceased to be a new idea. Battles had been fought. Preparations for battles to come were far advanced. Already it had been accepted that the North was to attack and the South to defend. The Mississippi River was a central object; if opened from Cairo to Fort Jackson (New Orleans), the Confederacy would be broken into halves, and good strategy required it to be broken. The question was whether the effort would be made directly or by turning its defended positions. Of the national gun-boats afloat above Cairo, some were formidably iron-clad. Altogether the flotilla was strong enough to warrant the theory that a direct descent would be attempted; and to meet the movement the Confederates threw up powerful batteries, notably at Columbus, Island Number Ten, Memphis, and Vicksburg. So fully were they possessed of that theory that they measurably neglected the possibilities of invasion by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. Not until General Johnston established his headquarters at Nashville was serious attention given to the defense of those streams. A report to his chief of engineers of November 21st, 1861, establishes that at that date a second battery on the Cumberland at Dover had been completed; that a work on the ridge had been laid out, and two guns mounted; and that the encampment was then surrounded by an abatis of felled timber. Later, Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman was sent to Fort Donelson as commandant, and on January 25th he reports the batteries prepared, the entire field-works built with a trace of 2900 feet, and rifle-pits to guard the approaches were begun. The same officer speaks further of reënforcements housed in four hundred log-cabins, and

adds that while this was being done at Fort Donelson, Forts Henry and Heiman, over on the Tennessee, were being thoroughly strengthened. January 30th, Fort Donelson was formally inspected by Lieutenant-Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer of the Western Department, and the final touches were ordered to be given it.

It is to be presumed that General Johnston was satisfied with the defenses thus provided for the Cumberland River. From observing General Buell at Louisville, and the stir and movement of multiplying columns under General U. S. Grant in the region of Cairo, he suddenly awoke determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson. To this conclusion he came as late as the beginning of February; and thereupon the brightest of the Southern leaders proceeded to make a capital mistake. The Confederate estimate of the Union force at that time in Kentucky alone was 119 regiments. The force at Cairo, St. Louis, and the towns near the mouth of the Cumberland River was judged to be about as great. It was also known that we had unlimited means of transportation for troops, making concentration a work of but few hours. Still General Johnston persisted in fighting for Nashville, and for that purpose divided his thirty thousand men. Fourteen thousand he kept in observation of Buell at Louisville. Sixteen thousand he gave to defend Fort Donelson. The latter detachment he himself called "the best part of his army." It is difficult to think of a great master of strategy making an error so perilous.

Having taken the resolution to defend Nashville at Donelson, he intrusted the operation to three chiefs of brigade—John B. Floyd, Gideon J. Pillow, and Simon B. Buckner. Of these, the first was ranking officer, and he was at the time under indictment by a grand jury at Washington for malversation as Secretary of War under President Buchanan, and for complicity in an embezzlement of public funds. As will be seen, there came a crisis when the recollection of the circumstance exerted an unhappy influence over his judgment. The second officer had a genuine military record; but it is said of him that he was of a jealous nature, insubordinate, and quarrelsome. His bold attempt to supersede General Scott in Mexico was green in the memories of living men. To give pertinency to the remark, there is reason to believe that a personal misunderstanding between him and General Buckner, older than the rebellion, was yet unsettled when the two met at Donelson. All in all, therefore, there is little doubt that the junior of the three commanders was the fittest for the enterprise intrusted to them. He was their equal in courage; while in devotion to the cause and to his profession of arms, in tactical knowledge, in military bearing, in the faculty of getting the most service out of his inferiors, and inspiring them with confidence in his ability,—as a soldier in all the higher meanings of the word,—he was greatly their superior.

The 6th of February, 1862, dawned darkly after a thunder-storm. Pacing the parapets of the work on the hill above the inlet formed by the junction of Hickman's Creek and the Cumberland River, a sentinel, in the serviceable butternut jeans uniform of the Confederate army of the West, might that



MAP OF FORT DONELSON, AS INVESTED BY GENERAL GRANT; BASED ON THE OFFICIAL MAP BY GENERAL J. R. MCPHERSON.

day have surveyed Fort Donelson almost ready for battle. In fact, very little was afterward done to it. There were the two water-batteries sunk in the northern face of the bluff, about thirty feet above the river; in the lower battery 9 32-pounder guns and 1 10-inch Columbiad, and in the upper another Columbiad, bored and rifled as a 32-pounder, and 2 32-pounder carronades. These guns lay between the embrasures, in snug revetment of sand in coffee-sacks, flanked right and left with stout traverses. The satisfaction of the sentry could have been nowise diminished at seeing the backwater lying deep in the creek; a more perfect ditch against assault could not have been constructed. The fort itself was of good profile, and admirably adapted to the ridge it crowned. Around it, on the landward side, ran the rifle-pits, a continuous but irregular line of logs, covered with yellow clay. From Hickman's Creek they extended far around to the little run just outside the town on the south. If the sentry thought the pits looked shallow,


he was solaced to see that they followed the coping of the ascents, seventy or eighty feet in height, up which a foe must charge, and that, where they were weakest, they were strengthened by trees felled outwardly in front of them, so that the interlacing limbs and branches seemed impassable by men under fire. At points inside the outworks, on the inner slopes of the hills, defended thus from view of an enemy as well as from his shot, lay the huts and log-houses of the garrison. Here and there groups of later comers, shivering in their wet blankets, were visible in a bivouac so cheerless that not even morning fires could relieve it. A little music would have helped their sinking spirits, but there was none. Even the picturesque effect of gay uniforms was wanting. In fine, the Confederate sentinel on the ramparts that morning, taking in the whole scene, knew the jolly, rollicking picnic days of the war were over.

To make clearer why the 6th of February is selected to present the first view of the fort, about noon that day the whole garrison was drawn from their quarters by the sound of heavy guns, faintly heard from the direction of Fort Henry, a token by which every man of them knew that a battle was on. The occurrence was in fact expected, for two days before a horseman had ridden to General Tilghman with word that at 4:30 o'clock in the morning rocket signals had been exchanged with the picket at Bailey's Landing, announcing the approach of gun-boats. A second courier came, and then a third; the latter, in great haste, requesting the general's presence at Fort Henry. There was quick mounting at headquarters, and, before the camp could be taken into confidence, the general and his guard were out of sight. Occasional guns were heard the day following. Donelson gave itself up to excitement and conjecture. At noon of the 6th, as stated, there was continuous and heavy cannonading at Fort Henry, and greater excitement at Fort Donelson. The polemicists in Dover became uneasy and prepared to get away. In the evening fugitives arrived in groups, and told how the gun-boats ran straight upon the fort and took it. The polemicists hastened their departure from town. At exactly midnight the gallant Colonel Heiman marched into Fort Donelson with two brigades of infantry rescued from the ruins of Forts Henry and Heiman. The officers and men by whom they were received then knew that their turn was at hand; and at daybreak, with one mind and firm of purpose, they set about the final preparation.

Brigadier-General Pillow reached Fort Donelson on the 9th; Brigadier-General Buckner came in the night of the 11th; and Brigadier-General Floyd on the 13th. The latter, by virtue of his rank, took command.

The morning of the 13th — calm, spring-like, the very opposite of that of the 6th — found in Fort Donelson a garrison of 28 regiments of infantry: 13 from Tennessee, 2 from Kentucky, 6 from Mississippi, 1 from Texas, 2 from Alabama, 4 from Virginia. There were also present 2 independent battalions, 1 regiment of cavalry, and artillerymen for 6 light batteries, and 17 heavy guns, making a total of quite 18,000 effectives. [See page 430.]

General Buckner's division — 6 regiments and 2 batteries — constituted the right wing, and was posted to cover the land approaches to the water-bat-



GLIMPSE OF THE CUMBERLAND RIVER WHERE THE GUN-BOATS FIRST APPEARED, LOOKING NORTH FROM THE HIGHEST EARTHWORKS OF FORT DONELSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

New Uncle Sam, a steamboat that was afterward transformed into the gun-boat *Blackhawk*. The morning of the 11th of February, a staff-officer visited each commandant of division and brigade with the simple verbal message: "General Grant sends his compliments, and requests to see you this afternoon on his boat." Minutes of the proceedings were not kept; there was no adjournment; each person retired when he got ready, knowing that the march would take place next day, probably in the forenoon.

There were in attendance on the occasion some officers of great subsequent notability. Of these Ulysses S. Grant was first. The world knows him now; then his fame was all before him. A singularity of the volunteer service in that day was that nobody took account of even a first-rate record of the Mexican War. The battle of Belmont, though indecisive, was a much better reference. A story was abroad that Grant had been the last man to take boat at the end of that affair, and the addendum that he had lingered in face of the enemy until he was hauled aboard with the last gang-plank, did him great good. From the first his silence was remarkable. He knew how to keep his temper. In battle, as in camp, he went about quietly, speaking in a conversational tone; yet he appeared to see everything that went on, and was always intent on business. He had a faithful assistant adjutant-general, and appreciated him; he preferred, however, his own eyes, word, and hand. His

teries. A left wing was organized into six brigades, commanded respectively by Colonels Heiman, Davidson, Drake, Wharton, McCausland, and Baldwin, and posted from right to left in the order named. Four batteries were distributed amongst the left wing. General Bushrod R. Johnson, an able officer, served the general commanding as chief-of-staff. Dover was converted into a depot of supplies and ordnance stores. These dispositions made, Fort Donelson was ready for battle.

It may be doubted if General Grant called a council of war. The nearest approach to it was a convocation held on the

aides were little more than messengers. In dress he was plain, even negligent; in partial amendment of that his horse was always a good one and well kept. At the council—calling it such by grace—he smoked, but never said a word. In all probability he was framing the orders of march which were issued that night.

Charles F. Smith, of the regular army, was also present. He was a person of superb physique, very tall, perfectly proportioned, straight, square-shouldered, ruddy-faced, with eyes of perfect blue, and long snow-white mustaches. He seemed to know the army regulations by heart, and caught a tactical mistake, whether of command or execution, by a kind of mental *coup d'œil*. He was naturally kind, genial, communicative, and never failed to answer when information was sought of him; at the same time he believed in "hours of service" regularly published by the adjutants as a rabbi believes in the Ten Tables, and to call a court-martial on a "bummer" was in his eyes a sinful waste of stationery. On the occasion



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. MCCLELLAND. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

of a review General Smith had the bearing of a marshal of France. He could ride along a line of volunteers in the regulation uniform of a brigadier-general, plume, chapeau, epaulets and all, without exciting laughter—something nobody else could do in the beginning of the war. He was at first accused of disloyalty, and when told of it his eyes flashed wickedly; then he laughed, and said, "Oh, never mind! They'll take it back after our first battle." And they did. At the time of the meeting on the *New Uncle Sam* he was a brigadier-general, and commanded the division which in the land operations against Fort Henry had marched up the left bank of the river against Fort Heiman.

Another officer worthy of mention was John A. McClelland, also a brigadier. By profession a lawyer, he was in his first of military service. Brave, industrious, methodical, and of unquestioned cleverness, he was rapidly acquiring the art of war.

There was still another in attendance on the *New Uncle Sam* not to be passed—a young man who had followed General Grant from Illinois, and

was seeing his first of military service. No soldier in the least familiar with headquarters on the Tennessee can ever forget the slender figure, large black eyes, hectic cheeks, and sincere, earnest manner of John A. Rawlins, then assistant adjutant-general, afterward major-general and secretary of war. He had two special devotions—to the cause and to his chief. He lived to see the first triumphant and the latter first in peace as well as in war. Probably no officer of the Union was mourned by so many armies.

Fort Henry, it will be remembered, was taken by Flag-Officer Foote on the 6th of February. The time up to the 12th was given to reconnoitering the country in the direction of Fort Donelson. Two roads were discovered: one of twelve miles direct, the other almost parallel with the first, but, on account of a slight divergence, two miles longer.

By 8 o'clock in the morning, the First Division, General McClelland commanding, and the Second, under General Smith [see page 429], were in full march. The infantry of this command consisted of twenty-five regiments in all, or three less than those of the Confederates. Against their six field-batteries General Grant had seven. In cavalry alone he was materially stronger. The rule in attacking fortifications is five to one; to save the Union commander from a charge of rashness, however, he had also at control a fighting quality ordinarily at home on the sea rather than the land. After receiving the surrender of Fort Henry, Flag-Officer Foote had hastened to Cairo to make preparation for the reduction of Fort Donelson. With six of his boats, he passed into the Cumberland River; and on the 12th, while the two divisions of the army were marching across to Donelson, he was hurrying, as fast as steam could drive him and his following, to a second trial of iron batteries afloat against earth batteries ashore. The *Carondelet*, Commander Walke, having preceded him, had been in position below the fort since the 12th. By sundown of the 12th, McClelland and Smith reached the point designated for them in orders.

On the morning of the 13th of February General Grant, with about twenty thousand men, was before Fort Donelson.‡ We have had a view of the army in the works ready for battle; a like view of that outside and about to go into position of attack and assault is not so easily to be given. At dawn the latter host rose up from the bare ground, and, snatching bread and coffee as best they could, fell into lines that stretched away over hills, down hollows, and through thickets, making it impossible for even colonels to see their regiments from flank to flank.

Pausing to give a thought to the situation, it is proper to remind the reader that he is about to witness an event of more than mere historical interest; he is about to see the men of the North and North-west and of the South and South-west enter for the first time into a strife of arms; on one side, the best blood of Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas, aided materially by fighting representatives from Virginia; on the other, the best blood of Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska.

‡ General Grant estimates his available forces at this time at about 15,000, and on the last day at 27,000, 5000 or 6000 of whom were guarding transportation trains in the rear.—EDITORS.

We have now before us a spectacle seldom witnessed in the annals of scientific war—an army behind field-works erected in a chosen position waiting quietly while another army very little superior in numbers proceeds at leisure to place it in a state of siege. Such was the operation General Grant had before him at daybreak of the 13th of February. Let us see how it was accomplished and how it was resisted.

In a clearing about two miles from Dover there was a log-house, at the time occupied by a Mrs. Crisp. As the road to Dover ran close by, it was made the headquarters of the commanding general. All through the night of the 12th, the coming and going was incessant. Smith was ordered to find a position in front of the enemy's right wing, which would place him face to face with Buckner. McClelland's order was to establish himself on the enemy's left, where he would be opposed to Pillow.

A little before dawn Birge's sharp-shooters were astir. Theirs was a peculiar service. Each was a preferred marksman, and carried a long-range Henry rifle, with sights delicately arranged as for target practice. In action each was perfectly independent. They never manœuvred as a corps. When the time came they were asked, "Canteens full?" "Biscuits for all day?" Then their only order, "All right; hunt your holes, boys." Thereupon they dispersed, and, like Indians, sought cover to please themselves behind rocks and stumps, or in hollows. Sometimes they dug holes; sometimes they climbed into trees. Once in a good location, they remained there the day. At night they would crawl out and report in camp. This morning, as I have said, the sharp-shooters dispersed early to find places within easy range of the breastworks.

The movement by Smith and McClelland was begun about the same time. A thick wood fairly screened the former. The latter had to cross an open valley under fire of two batteries, one on Buckner's left, the other on a high point jutting from the line of outworks held by Colonel Heiman of Pillow's command. Graves commanded the first (Kentucky), Maney the second (Tennessee); both were of Tennessee. As always in situations where the advancing party is ignorant of the ground and of the designs of the enemy, resort was had to skirmishers, who are to the main body what antennæ are to insects. Theirs it is to unmask the foe. Unlike sharp-shooters, they act in bodies. Behind the skirmishers, the batteries started out to find positions, and through the brush and woods, down the hollows, up the hills the guns and caissons were hauled. Nowadays it must be a very steep bluff in face of which the good artillerist will stop or turn back. At Donelson, however, the proceeding was generally slow and toilsome. The officer had to find a vantage-ground first; then with axes a road to it was hewn out; after which, in many instances, the men, with the prolongs over their shoulders, helped the horses along. In the gray of the dawn the sharp-shooters were deep in their deadly game; as the sun came up, one battery after another opened fire, and was instantly and gallantly answered; and all the time behind the hidden sharp-shooters, and behind the skirmishers, who occasionally stopped to take a hand in the fray, the regiments marched, route-step, colors flying, after their colonels.



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIMON B. BUCKNER, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

About 11 o'clock Commander Walke, of the *Carondelet*, engaged the water-batteries. The air was then full of the stunning music of battle, though as yet not a volley of musketry had been heard. Smith, nearest the enemy at starting, was first in place; and there, leaving the fight to his sharp-shooters and skirmishers and to his batteries, he reported to the chief in the log-house, and, like an old soldier, calmly waited orders. McClelland, following a good road, pushed on rapidly to the high grounds on the right. The appearance of his column in the valley covered by the two Confederate batteries provoked a furious shelling from them. On the double-quick his

men passed through it; and when, in the wood beyond, they resumed the route-step and saw that nobody was hurt, they fell to laughing at themselves. The real baptism of fire was yet in store for them.

When McClelland arrived at his appointed place and extended his brigades, it was discovered that the Confederate outworks offered a front too great for him to envelop. To attempt to rest his right opposite their extreme left would necessitate a dangerous attenuation of his line and leave him without reserves. Over on their left, moreover, ran the road already mentioned as passing from Dover on the south to Charlotte and Nashville, which it was of the highest importance to close hermetically so that there would be no communication left General Floyd except by the river. If the road to Charlotte were left to the enemy, they might march out at their pleasure.

The insufficiency of his force was thus made apparent to General Grant, and whether a discovery of the moment or not, he set about its correction. He knew a reinforcement was coming up the river under convoy of Foote; besides which a brigade, composed of the 8th Missouri and the 11th Indiana

infantry and Battery A, Illinois, had been left behind at Forts Henry and Heiman under myself. A courier was dispatched to me with an order to bring my command to Donelson. I ferried my troops across the Tennessee in the night, and reported with them at headquarters before noon the next day. The brigade was transferred to General Smith; at the same time an order was put into my hand assigning me to command the Third Division, which was conducted to a position between Smith and McClelland, enabling the latter to extend his line well to the left and cover the road to Charlotte.

Thus on the 14th of February the Confederates were completely invested, except that the river above Dover remained to them. The supineness of General Floyd all this while is to this day incomprehensible. A vigorous attack on the morning of the 13th might have thrown Grant back upon Fort Henry. Such an achievement would have more than offset Foote's conquest.

The *morale* to be gained would have alone justified the attempt. But with McClelland's strong division on the right, my own in the center, and C. F. Smith's on the left, the opportunity was gone. On the side of General Grant, the possession of the river was all that was wanting; with that Grant could force the fighting, or wait the certain approach of the grimest enemy of the besieged — starvation.



DOVER TAVERN — GENERAL BUCKNER'S HEADQUARTERS AND THE SCENE OF THE SURRENDER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.

It is now — morning of the 14th — easy to see and understand with something more than approximate exactness the oppositions of the two forces. Smith is on the left of the Union army opposite Buckner. My division, in the center, confronts Colonels Heiman, Drake, and Davidson, each with a brigade. McClelland, now well over on the right, keeps the road to Charlotte and Nashville against the major part of Pillow's left wing. The infantry on both sides are in cover behind the crests of the hills or in thick woods, listening to the ragged fusillade which the sharp-shooters and skirmishers



MAJOR-GENERAL MORGAN L. SMITH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

maintain against each other almost without intermission. There is little pause in the exchange of shells and round shot. The careful chiefs have required their men to lie down. In brief, it looks as if each party were inviting the other to begin.

These circumstances, the sharp-shooting and cannonading, ugly as they may seem to one who thinks of them under comfortable surroundings, did in fact serve a good purpose the day in question in helping the men to forget their sufferings of the night before. It must be remembered that the weather had changed during the preceding afternoon: from suggestions of spring it turned to intensified

winter. From lending a gentle hand in bringing Foote and his iron-clads up the river, the wind whisked suddenly around to the north and struck both armies with a storm of mixed rain, snow, and sleet. All night the tempest blew mercilessly upon the unsheltered, fireless soldier, making sleep impossible. Inside the works, nobody had overcoats; while thousands of those outside had marched from Fort Henry as to a summer fête, leaving coats, blankets, and knapsacks behind them in the camp. More than one stout fellow has since admitted, with a laugh, that nothing was so helpful to him that horrible night as the thought that the wind, which seemed about to turn his blood into icicles, was serving the enemy the same way; they, too, had to stand out and take the blast. Let us now go back to the preceding day, and bring up an incident of McClernand's swing into position.

About the center of the Confederate outworks there was a V-shaped hill, marked sharply by a ravine on its right and another on its left. This Colonel Heiman occupied with his brigade of five regiments — all of Tennessee but one. The front presented was about 2500 feet. In the angle of the V, on the summit of the hill, Captain Maney's battery, also of Tennessee, had been planted. Without protection of any kind, it nevertheless completely swept a large field to the left, across which an assaulting force would have to come in order to get at Heiman or at Drake, next on the south.

Maney, on the point of the hill, had been active throughout the preceding afternoon, and had succeeded in drawing the fire of some of McClernand's guns. The duel lasted until night. Next morning it was renewed with increased sharpness, Maney being assisted on his right by Graves's battery of Buckner's division, and by some pieces of Drake's on his left.

McClelland's advance was necessarily slow and trying. This was not merely a logical result of unacquaintance with the country and the dispositions of the enemy; he was also under an order from General Grant to avoid everything calculated to bring on a general engagement. In Maney's well-served guns he undoubtedly found serious annoyance, if not a positive obstruction. Concentrating guns of his own upon the industrious Confederate, he at length fancied him silenced and the enemy's infantry on the right thrown into confusion — circumstances from which he hastily deduced a favorable chance to deliver an assault. For that purpose he reënforced his Third Brigade, which was nearest the offending battery, and gave the necessary orders.

Up to this time, it will be observed, there had not been any fighting involving infantry in line. This was now to be changed. Old soldiers, rich with experience, would have regarded the work proposed with gravity; they would have shrewdly cast up an account of the chances of success, not to speak of the chances of coming out alive; they would have measured the distance to be passed, every foot of it, under the guns of three batteries, Maney's in the center, Graves's on their left, and Drake's on their right — a direct line of fire doubly crossed. Nor would they have omitted the reception awaiting them from the rifle-pits. They were to descend a hill entangled for two hundred yards with underbrush, climb an opposite ascent partly shorn of timber; make way through an abatis of tree-tops; then, supposing all that successfully accomplished, they would be at last in face of an enemy whom it was possible to reënforce with all the reserves of the garrison — with the whole garrison, if need be. A veteran would have surveyed the three regiments selected for the honorable duty with many misgivings. Not so the men themselves. They were not old soldiers. Recruited but recently from farms and shops, they accepted the assignment heartily and with youthful confidence in their prowess. It may be doubted if a man in the ranks gave a thought to the questions, whether the attack was to be supported while making, or followed up if successful, or whether it was part of a general advance. Probably the most they knew was that the immediate objective before them was the capture of the battery on the hill.



MAJOR-GENERAL C. F. SMITH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The line when formed stood thus from the right: the 49th Illinois, then the 17th, and then the 48th, Colonel Haynie. At the last moment, a question of seniority arose between Colonels Morrison and Haynie. The latter was of opinion that he was the ranking officer. Morrison replied that he would

conduct the brigade to the point from which the attack was to be made, after which Haynie might take the command, if he so desired.

Down the hill the three regiments went, crashing and tearing through the undergrowth. Heiman, on the lookout, saw them advancing. Before they cleared the woods, Maney opened with shells. At the foot of the descent, in the valley, Graves joined his fire to Maney's. There Morrison reported to Haynie, who neither accepted nor refused the command. Pointing to the hill, he merely said, "Let us take it together." Morrison turned away, and rejoined his own regiment. Here was confusion in the beginning, or worse, an assault begun without a head. Nevertheless, the whole line went forward. On a part of the hillside the trees were yet standing. The open space fell to Morrison and his 49th, and paying the penalty of the exposure, he outstripped his associates. The men fell rapidly; yet the living rushed on and up, firing as they went. The battery was the common target. Maney's gunners, in relief against the sky, were shot down in quick succession. His first lieutenant (Burns) was one of the first to suffer. His second lieutenant (Massie) was mortally wounded. Maney himself was hit; still he staid, and his guns continued their punishment; and still the farmer lads and shop boys of Illinois clung to their purpose. With marvelous audacity they pushed through the abatis and reached a point within forty yards of the rifle-pits. It actually looked as if the prize were theirs. The yell of victory was rising in their throats. Suddenly the long line of yellow breastworks before them, covering Heiman's five regiments, crackled and turned into flame. The forlorn-hope stopped — staggered — braced up again — shot blindly through the smoke at the smoke of the new enemy, secure in his shelter. Thus for fifteen minutes the Illinoisans stood fighting. The time is given on the testimony of the opposing leader himself. Morrison was knocked out of his saddle by a musket-ball, and disabled; then the men went down the hill. At its foot they rallied round their flags and renewed the assault. Pushed down again, again they rallied, and a third time climbed to the enemy. This time the battery set fire to the dry leaves on the ground, and the heat and smoke became stifling. It was not possible for brave men to endure more. Slowly, sullenly, frequently pausing to return a shot, they went back for the last time; and in going their ears and souls were riven with the shrieks of their wounded comrades, whom the flames crept down upon and smothered and charred where they lay.

Considered as a mere exhibition of courage, this assault, long maintained against odds,—twice repulsed, twice renewed,—has been seldom excelled. One hundred and forty-nine men of the 17th and 49th were killed and wounded. Haynie reported 1 killed and 8 wounded.

There are few things connected with the operations against Fort Donelson so relieved of uncertainty as this: that when General Grant at Fort Henry became fixed in the resolution to undertake the movement, his primary object was the capture of the force to which the post was intrusted. To effect their complete environment, he relied upon Flag-Officer Foote and his gun-boats, whose astonishing success at Fort Henry justified the extreme of confidence.



THE CRISP FARM — GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS.

Foote arrived on the 14th, and made haste to enter upon his work. The *Carondelet* (Commander Walke) had been in position since the 12th. Behind a low outcrop of the shore, for two days, she maintained a fire from her rifled guns, happily of greater range than the best of those of the enemy.

At 9 o'clock on the 14th, Captain Culbertson, looking from the parapet of the upper battery, beheld the river below the first bend full of transports, landing troops under cover of a fresh arrival of gun-boats. The disembarkation concluded, Foote was free. He waited until noon. The captains in the batteries mistook his deliberation for timidity. The impinging of their shot on his iron armor was heard distinctly in the fort a mile and a half away. The captains began to doubt if he would come at all. But at 3 o'clock the boats took position under fire: the *Louisville* on the right, the *St. Louis* next, then the *Pittsburgh*, then the *Carondelet*, all iron-clad.



FRONT VIEW OF MRS. CRISP'S HOUSE.
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1864.

Five hundred yards from the batteries, and yet Foote was not content! In the Crimean war the allied French and English fleets, of much mightier ships, undertook to engage the Russian shore batteries, but little stronger than those at Donelson. The French on that occasion stood off 1800 yards. Lord Lyons fought his *Agamemnon* at a distance of 800 yards. Foote forged ahead within 400 yards of his enemy, and was still going on. His boat had been hit between wind and water; so with the *Pittsburgh* and *Carondelet*. About the guns the floors were slippery with blood, and both surgeons and carpenters were never so busy. Still the four boats kept on, and there was great cheering; for not only did the fire from the shore slacken; the lookouts reported the enemy running. It seemed that fortune would smile once more upon the fleet, and cover the honors of Fort Henry afresh at Fort Donelson. Unhappily, when about 350 yards off the hill a solid shot plunged through the pilot-house of the flag-ship, and carried away the wheel. Near the same time the

tiller-ropes of the *Louisville* were disabled. Both vessels became unmanageable and began floating down the current. The eddies turned them round like logs. The *Pittsburgh* and *Carondelet* closed in and covered them with their hulls.

Seeing this turn in the fight, the captains of the batteries rallied their men, who cheered in their turn, and renewed the contest with increased will and energy. A ball got lodged in their best rifle. A corporal and some of his men took a log fitting the bore, leaped out on the parapet, and rammed the missile home. "Now, boys," said a gunner in Bidwell's battery, "see me take a chimney!" The flag of the boat and the chimney fell with the shot.

When the vessels were out of range, the victors looked about them. The fine form of their embrasures was gone; heaps of earth had been cast over their platforms. In a space of twenty-four feet they had picked up as many shot and shells. The air had been full of flying missiles. For an hour and a half the brave fellows had been rained upon; yet their losses had been trifling in numbers. Each gunner had selected a ship and followed her faithfully throughout the action, now and then uniting fire on the *Carondelet*. The Confederates had behaved with astonishing valor. Their victory sent a thrill of joy through the army. The assault on the outworks, the day before, had been a failure. With the repulse of the gun-boats the Confederates scored success number two, and the communication by the river remained open to Nashville. The winds that blew sleet and snow over Donelson that night were not so unendurable as they might have been.

The night of the 14th of February fell cold and dark, and under the pitiless sky the armies remained in position so near to each other that neither dared light fires. Overpowered with watching,



THE POSITION OF THE GUN-BOATS AND THE WEST BANK. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.

Fort Donelson is in the farther distance on the extreme left — Hickman's Creek empties into the Cumberland in the middle distance — midway are the remains of the obstructions placed in the river by the Confederates. The upper picture, showing Isaac Williams's house, is a continuation of the right of the lower view.

fatigue, and the lassitude of spirits which always follows a strain upon the faculties of men like that which is the concomitant of battle, thousands on both sides lay down in the ditches and behind logs and whatever else would in the least shelter them from the cutting wind, and tried to sleep. Very few closed their eyes. Even the horses, after their manner, betrayed the suffering they were enduring.

That morning General Floyd had called a council of his chiefs of brigades and divisions. He expressed the opinion that the post was untenable, except with fifty thousand troops. He called attention to the heavy reinforcements of the Federals, and suggested an immediate attack upon their right wing to reopen land communication with Nashville, by way of Charlotte. The proposal was agreed to unanimously. General Buckner proceeded to make dispositions to cover the retreat, in the event the sortie should be successful. Shortly after noon, when the movement should have begun, the order was countermanded at the instance of Pillow. Then came the battle with the gun-boats.

In the night the council was recalled, with general and regimental officers in attendance. The situation was again debated, and the same conclusion reached. According to the plan resolved upon, Pillow was to move at dawn with his whole division, and attack the right of the besiegers. General Buckner was to be relieved by troops in the forts, and with his command to support Pillow by assailing the right of the enemy's center. If he succeeded, he was to take post outside the intrenchments on the Wynn's Ferry road to cover the retreat. He was then to act as rear-guard. Thus early, leaders in Donelson were aware of the mistake into which they were plunged. Their resolution was wise and heroic. Let us see how they executed it.

Preparations for the attack occupied the night. The troops for the most part were taken out of the rifle-pits and massed over on the left to the number of ten thousand or more. The ground was covered with ice and snow; yet the greatest silence was observed. It seems incomprehensible that columns mixed of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, could have engaged in simultaneous movement, and not have been heard by some listener outside. One would think the jolting and rumble of the heavy gun-carriages would have told the story. But the character of the night must be remembered. The pickets of the Federals were struggling for life against the blast, and probably did not keep good watch.

Oglesby's brigade held McClernand's extreme right. Here and there the musicians were beginning to make the woods ring with reveille, and the numbed soldiers of the line were rising from their icy beds and shaking the snow from their frozen garments. As yet, however, not a company had "fallen in." Suddenly the pickets fired, and with the alarm on their lips rushed back upon their comrades. The woods on the instant became alive.

The regiments formed, officers mounted and took their places; words of command rose loud and eager. By the time Pillow's advance opened fire on Oglesby's right, the point first struck, the latter was fairly formed to receive it. A rapid exchange of volleys ensued. The distance intervening between



THE BIVOUAC IN THE SNOW ON THE LINE OF BATTLE—QUESTIONING A PRISONER.

the works on one side and the bivouac on the other was so short that the action began before Pillow could effect a deployment. His brigades came up in a kind of echelon, left in front, and passed "by regiments left into line," one by one, however; the regiments quickly took their places, and advanced without halting. Oglesby's Illinoisans were now fully awake. They held their ground, returning in full measure the fire that they received. The Confederate Forrest rode around as if to get in their rear,¹ and it was then give and take, infantry against infantry. The semi-echelon movement of the Confederates enabled them, after an interval, to strike W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, on Oglesby's left. Soon Wallace was engaged along his whole front, now prolonged by the addition to his command of Morrison's regiments. The first charge against him was repulsed; whereupon he advanced to the top of the rising ground behind which he had sheltered his troops in the night. A fresh assault followed, but, aided by a battery across the valley to his left, he repulsed the enemy a second time. His men were steadfast, and clung to the brow of the hill as if it were theirs by holy right. An hour passed, and yet another hour, without cessation of the fire. Meantime the woods rang with a monstrous clangor of musketry, as if a million men were beating empty barrels with iron hammers.

Buckner flung a portion of his division on McClelland's left, and supported the attack with his artillery. The enfilading fell chiefly on W. H. L. Wallace. McClelland, watchful and full of resources, sent batteries to meet Buckner's batteries. To that duty Taylor rushed with his Company B; and McAllister pushed his three 24-pounders into position and exhausted his ammunition in the duel. The roar never slackened. Men fell by the score, reddening the snow with their blood. The smoke, in pallid white clouds, clung to the underbrush and tree-tops as if to screen the combatants from each other. Close to the ground the flame of musketry and cannon tinted everything a lurid red. Limbs dropped from the trees on the heads below, and the thickets were shorn as by an army of cradlers. The division was under peremptory orders to hold its position to the last extremity, and Colonel Wallace was equal to the emergency.

It was now 10 o'clock, and over on the right Oglesby was beginning to fare badly. The pressure on his front grew stronger. The "rebel yell," afterward a familiar battle-cry on many fields, told of ground being gained against him. To add to his doubts, officers were riding to him with a sickening story that their commands were getting out of ammunition, and asking where they could go for a supply. All he could say was to take what was in the boxes of the dead and wounded. At last he realized that the end was come. His right companies began to give way, and as they retreated, holding up their empty cartridge-boxes, the enemy were emboldened, and swept more fiercely around his flank, until finally they appeared in his rear. He then gave the order to retire the division.

¹ Colonel John McArthur, originally of General C. F. Smith's division, but then operating with McClelland, was there, and though at first dis-

comfited, his men beat the cavalry off, and afterward shared the full shock of the tempest with Oglesby's troops.—L. W.

W. H. L. Wallace from his position looked off to his right and saw but one regiment of Oglesby's in place, maintaining the fight, and that was John A. Logan's 31st Illinois. Through the smoke he could see Logan riding in a gallop behind his line; through the roar in his front and the rising yell in his rear, he could hear Logan's voice in fierce entreaty to his "boys." Near the 31st stood W. H. L. Wallace's regiment, the 11th Illinois, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom. The gaps in the ranks of the two were closed up always toward the colors. The ground at their feet was strewn with their dead and wounded; at length the common misfortune overtook Logan. To keep men without cartridges under fire sweeping them front and flank would be cruel, if not impossible; and seeing it, he too gave the order to retire, and followed his decimated companies to the rear. The 11th then became the right of the brigade, and had to go in turn. Nevertheless, Ransom changed front to rear coolly, as if on parade, and joined in the general retirement. Forrest charged them and threw them into a brief confusion. The greater portion clung to their colors, and made good their retreat. By 11 o'clock Pillow held the road

to Charlotte and the whole of the position occupied at dawn by the First Division, and with it the dead and all the wounded who could not get away.

Pillow's part of the programme, arranged in the council of the night before, was accomplished. The country was once more open to Floyd. Why did he not avail himself of the dearly bought opportunity, and march his army out?

Without pausing to consider whether the Confederate general could now have escaped with his troops, it must be evident that

he should have made the effort. Pillow had discharged his duty well. With the disappearance of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, it only remained for the victor to deploy his regiments into column and march into the country. The road was his. Buckner was in position to protect Colonel Head's withdrawal from the trenches opposite General Smith on the right; that done,



BRANCH OF HICKMAN'S CREEK NEAR JAMES CRISP'S HOUSE—THE LEFT OF GENERAL C. F. SMITH'S LINE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.



MCALLISTER'S BATTERY IN ACTION.

Captain Edward McAllister's Illinois battery did good service on the 13th. In his report he describes the manner of working the battery: "I selected a point, and about noon opened on the four-gun battery [see map, page 402] through an opening in which I could see the foe. Our fire was promptly returned with such precision that they cut our right wheel on howitzer number

three in two. I had no spare wheel, and had to take one off the limber to continue the fight. I then moved all my howitzers over to the west slope of the ridge and loaded under cover of it, and ran the pieces up by hand until I could get the exact elevation. The recoil would throw the guns back out of sight, and thus we continued the fight until the enemy's battery was silenced."

he was also in position to cover the retreat. Buckner had also faithfully performed his task.

On the Union side the situation at this critical time was favorable to the proposed retirement. My division in the center was weakened by the dispatch of one of my brigades to the assistance of General McClelland; in addition to which my orders were to hold my position. As a point of still greater importance, General Grant had gone on board the *St. Louis* at the request of Flag-Officer Foote, and he was there in consultation with that officer, presumably uninformed of the disaster which had befallen his right. It would take a certain time for him to return to the field and dispose his forces for pursuit. It may be said with strong assurance, consequently, that Floyd could have put his men fairly *en route* for Charlotte before the Federal commander could have interposed an obstruction to the movement. The real difficulty was in the hero of the morning, who now made haste to blight his laurels. General Pillow's vanity whistled itself into ludicrous exaltation. Imagining General Grant's whole army defeated and fleeing in rout for Fort Henry and the transports on the river, he deported himself accordingly. He began by ignoring Floyd. He rode to Buckner and accused him of shameful

conduct. He sent an aide to the nearest telegraph station with a dispatch to Albert Sidney Johnston, then in command of the Department, asseverating, "on the honor of a soldier," that the day was theirs. Nor did he stop at that. The victory, to be available, required that the enemy should be followed with energy. Such was a habit of Napoleon. Without deigning even to consult his chief, he ordered Buckner to move out and attack the Federals. There was a gorge, up which a road ran toward our central position, or rather what had been our central position. Pointing to the gorge and the road, he told Buckner that was his way and bade him attack in force. There was nothing to do but obey; and when Buckner had begun the movement, the wise programme decided upon the evening before was wiped from the slate.

When Buckner reluctantly took the gorge road marked out for him by Pillow, the whole Confederate army, save the detachments on the works, was virtually in pursuit of McClelland, retiring by the Wynn's Ferry road — falling back, in fact, upon my position. My division was now to feel the weight of Pillow's hand; if they should fail, the fortunes of the day would depend upon the veteran Smith.

When General McClelland perceived the peril threatening him in the morning, he sent an officer to me with a request for assistance. This request I referred to General Grant, who was at the time in consultation with Foote. Upon the turning of Oglesby's flank, McClelland repeated his request, with such a representation of the situation that, assuming the responsibility, I ordered Colonel Cruft to report with his brigade to McClelland. Cruft set out promptly. Unfortunately a guide misdirected him, so that he became involved in the retreat, and was prevented from accomplishing his object.

I was in the rear of my single remaining brigade, in conversation with Captain Rawlins, of Grant's staff, when a great shouting was heard behind me on the Wynn's Ferry road, whereupon I sent an orderly to ascertain the cause. The man reported the road and woods full of soldiers apparently in rout. An officer then rode by at full speed, shouting, "All's lost! Save yourselves!" A hurried consultation was had with Rawlins, at the end of which the brigade was put in motion toward the enemy's works, on the very road by which Buckner was pursuing under Pillow's mischievous order. It happened also that Colonel W. H. L. Wallace had dropped into the same road with such of his command as staid by their colors. He came up riding and at a walk, his leg over the horn of his saddle. He was perfectly cool, and looked like a farmer from a hard day's plowing. "Good-morning," I said. "Good-morning," was the reply. "Are they pursuing you?" "Yes." "How far are they behind?" That instant the head of my command appeared on the road. The colonel calculated, then answered: "You will have about time to form line of battle right here." "Thank you. Good-day." "Good-day."

At that point the road began to dip into the gorge; on the right and left there were woods, and in front a dense thicket. An order was dispatched to bring Battery A forward at full speed. Colonel John M. Thayer, commanding the brigade, formed it on the double-quick into line; the 1st Nebraska

and the 58th Illinois on the right, and the 58th Ohio, with a detached company, on the left. The battery came up on the run and swung across the road, which had been left open for it. Hardly had it unlimbered, before the enemy appeared, and firing began. For ten minutes or thereabouts the scenes of the morning were reënacted. The Confederates struggled hard to perfect their deployments. The woods rang with musketry and artillery. The brush on the slope of the hill was mowed away with bullets. A great cloud arose and



VIEW ON THE LINE OF PILLOW'S DEFENSES IN FRONT OF MCCLERNAND, SHOWING WATER IN THE OLD TRENCHES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

shut out the woods and the narrow valley below. Colonel Thayer and his regiments behaved with great gallantry, and the assailants fell back in confusion and returned to the intrenchments. W. H. L. Wallace and Oglesby re-formed their commands behind Thayer, supplied them with ammunition, and stood at rest waiting for orders. There was then a lull in the battle. Even the cannonading ceased, and everybody was asking, *What next?*

Just then General Grant rode up to where General McClernand and I were in conversation. He was almost unattended. In his hand there were some

papers, which looked like telegrams. Wholly unexcited, he saluted and received the salutations of his subordinates. Proceeding at once to business, he directed them to retire their commands to the heights out of cannon range, and throw up works. Reënforcements were *en route*, he said, and it was advisable to await their coming. He was then informed of the mishap to the First Division, and that the road to Charlotte was open to the enemy.

In every great man's career there is a crisis exactly similar to that which now overtook General Grant, and it cannot be better described than as a crucial test of his nature. A mediocre person would have accepted the news as an argument for persistence in his resolution to enter upon a siege. Had General Grant done so, it is very probable his history would have been then and there concluded. His admirers and detractors are alike invited to study him at this precise juncture. It cannot be doubted that he saw with painful distinctness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. His face flushed slightly. With a sudden grip he crushed the papers in his hand. But in an instant these signs of disappointment or hesitation — as the reader pleases — cleared away. In his ordinary quiet voice he said, addressing himself to both officers, "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken." With that he turned and galloped off.

Seeing in the road a provisional brigade, under Colonel Morgan L. Smith, consisting of the 11th Indiana and the 8th Missouri Infantry, going, by order of General C. F. Smith, to the aid of the First Division, I suggested that if General McClelland would order Colonel Smith to report to me, I would attempt to recover the lost ground; and the order having been given, I reconnoitered the hill, determined upon a place of assault, and arranged my order of attack. I chose Colonel Smith's regiments to lead, and for that purpose conducted them to the crest of a hill opposite a steep bluff covered by the enemy. The two regiments had been formerly of my brigade. I knew they had been admirably drilled in the Zouave tactics, and my confidence in Smith and in George F. McGinnis, colonel of the 11th, was implicit. I was sure they would take their men to the top of the bluff. Colonel Cruft was put in line to support them on the right. Colonel Ross, with his regiments, the 17th and 49th, and the 46th, 57th, and 58th Illinois, were put as support on the left. Thayer's brigade was held in reserve. These dispositions filled the time till about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when heavy cannonading, mixed with a long roll of musketry, broke out over on the left, whither it will be necessary to transfer the reader.

The veteran in command on the Union left had contented himself with allowing Buckner no rest, keeping up a continual sharp-shooting. Early in the morning of the 14th he made a demonstration of assault with three of his regiments, and though he purposely withdrew them, he kept the menace standing, to the great discomfort of his *vis-à-vis*. With the patience of an old soldier, he waited the pleasure of the general commanding, knowing that when the time came he would be called upon. During the battle of the gunboats he rode through his command and grimly joked with them. He who never permitted the slightest familiarity from a subordinate, could yet indulge

in fatherly pleasantries with the ranks when he thought circumstances justified them. He never for a moment doubted the courage of volunteers; they were not regulars — that was all. If properly led, he believed they would storm the gates of his Satanic Majesty. Their hour of trial was now come.


From his brief and characteristic conference with McClelland and myself, General Grant rode to General C. F. Smith. What took place between them is not known, further than that he ordered an assault upon the outworks as a diversion in aid of the assault about to be delivered on the right. General Smith personally directed his chiefs of brigade to get their regiments ready. Colonel John Cook by his order increased the number of his skirmishers already engaged with the enemy.

Taking Lauman's brigade, General Smith began the advance. They were under fire instantly. The guns in the fort joined in with the infantry who were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of the Confederate right wing being with General Buckner. The defense was greatly favored by the ground, which subjected the assailants to a double fire from the beginning of the abatis. The men have said that "it looked too thick for a rabbit to get through." General Smith, on his horse, took position in the front and center of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was kept. For the most part, however, he held his face steadily toward the enemy. He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in the rifle-pits. The air around him twittered with minie-bullets. Erect as if on review, he rode on, timing the gait of his horse with the movement of his colors. A soldier said: "I was nearly scared to death, but I saw the old man's white mustache over his shoulder, and went on."

On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and there some of the men halted, whereupon, seeing the hesitation, General Smith put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out, "No flinching now, my lads! — Here — this is the way! Come on!" He picked a path through the jagged limbs of the trees, holding his cap all the time in sight; and the effect was magical. The men swarmed in after him, and got through in the best order they could — not all of them, alas! On the other side of the obstruction they took the semblance of re-formation and charged in after their chief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he rode; up they followed. At the last moment the keepers of the rifle-pits clambered out and fled. The four regiments engaged in the feat — the 25th Indiana, and the 2d, 7th, and 14th Iowa — planted their colors on the breast-work. Later in the day, Buckner came back with his division; but all his efforts to dislodge Smith were vain.

We left my division about to attempt the recapture of the hill, which had been the scene of the combat between Pillow and McClelland. If only on account of the results which followed that assault, in connection with the heroic performance of General C. F. Smith, it is necessary to return to it.

Riding to my old regiments, — the 8th Missouri and the 11th Indiana, — I asked them if they were ready. They demanded the word of me. Waiting



MAJOR-GENERAL GIDEON J. PILLOW, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

excellent service to them. Now on the ground, creeping when the fire was hottest, running when it slackened, they gained ground with astonishing rapidity, and at the same time maintained a fire that was like a sparkling of the earth. For the most part the bullets aimed at them passed over their heads and took effect in the ranks behind them. Colonel Smith's cigar was shot off close to his lips. He took another and called for a match. A soldier ran and gave him one. "Thank you. Take your place now. We are almost up," he said, and, smoking, spurred his horse forward. A few yards from the crest of the height the regiments began loading and firing as they advanced. The defenders gave way. On the top there was a brief struggle, which was ended by Cruft and Ross with their supports.

The whole line then moved forward simultaneously, and never stopped until the Confederates were within the works. There had been no occasion to call on the reserves. The road to Charlotte was again effectually shut, and the battle-field of the morning, with the dead and wounded lying where they had fallen, was in possession of the Third Division, which stood halted within easy musket-range of the rifle-pits. It was then about half-past 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I was reconnoitering the works of the enemy preliminary to charging them, when Colonel Webster, of General Grant's staff, came to

a moment for Morgan L. Smith to light a cigar, I called out, "Forward it is, then!" They were directly in front of the ascent to be climbed. Without stopping for his supports, Colonel Smith led them down into a broad hollow, and catching sight of the advance, Cruft and Ross also moved forward. As the two regiments began the climb, the 8th Missouri slightly in the lead, a line of fire ran along the brow of the height. The flank companies cheered while deploying as skirmishers. Their Zouave practice proved of

me and repeated the order to fall back out of cannon range and throw up breastworks. "The general does not know that we have the hill," I said. Webster replied: "I give you the order as he gave it to me." "Very well," said I, "give him my compliments, and say that I have received the order." Webster smiled and rode away. The ground was not vacated, though the assault was deferred. In assuming the responsibility, I had no doubt of my ability to satisfy General Grant of the correctness of my course; and it was subsequently approved.

When night fell, the command bivouacked without fire or supper. Fatigue parties were told off to look after the wounded; and in the relief given there was no distinction made between friend and foe. The labor extended through the whole night, and the surgeons never rested. By sunset the conditions of the morning were all restored. The Union commander was free to order a general assault next day or resort to a formal siege.

A great discouragement fell upon the brave men inside the works that night. Besides suffering from wounds and bruises and the dreadful weather, they were aware that though they had done their best they were held in a close grip by a superior enemy. A council of general and field officers was held at headquarters, which resulted in a unanimous resolution that if the position in front of General Pillow had not been reoccupied by the Federals in strength, the army should effect its retreat. A reconnoissance was ordered to make the test. Colonel Forrest conducted it. He reported that the ground was not only reoccupied, but that the enemy were extended yet farther around the Confederate left. The council then held a final session.

General Simon B. Buckner, as the junior officer present, gave his opinion first; he thought he could not successfully resist the assault which would be made by daylight by a vastly superior force. But he further remarked, that as he understood the principal

object of the defense of Donelson was to cover the movement of General Albert Sidney Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville, if that movement was not completed he was of opinion that the defense should be continued at the risk of the destruction of the entire force. General Floyd replied that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville, whereupon General Buckner said that "it would be wrong to subject the army



BOWLETT'S MILL (SEE MAP, PAGE 402).
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.

to a virtual massacre, when no good could result from the sacrifice, and that the general officers owed it to their men, when further resistance was unavailing, to obtain the best terms of capitulation possible for them."

Both Generals Floyd and Pillow acquiesced in the opinion. Ordinarily the council would have ended at this point, and the commanding general would have addressed himself to the duty of obtaining terms. He would have called for pen, ink, and paper, and prepared a note for dispatch to the commanding general of the opposite force. But there were circumstances outside the mere military situation which at this juncture pressed themselves into consideration. As this was the first surrender of armed men banded together for war upon the general government, what would the Federal authorities do with the prisoners? This question was of application to all the gentlemen in the council. It was lost to view, however, when General Floyd announced his purpose to leave with two steamers which were to be down at daylight, and to take with him as many of his division as the steamers could carry away.

General Pillow then remarked that there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would rather capture than himself and General Floyd (who had been Buchanan's Secretary of War, and was under indictment at Washington). As to the propriety of his accompanying General Floyd, the latter said, coolly, that the question was one for every man to decide for himself. Buckner was of the same view, and added that as for himself he regarded it as his duty to stay with his men and share their fate, whatever it might be. Pillow persisted in leaving. Floyd then directed General Buckner to consider himself in command. Immediately after the council was concluded, General Floyd prepared for his departure. His first move was to have his brigade drawn up. The peculiarity of the step was that, with the exception of one, the 20th Mississippi regiment, his regiments were all Virginians. A short time before daylight the two steamboats arrived. Without loss of time the general hastened to the river, embarked with his Virginians, and at an early hour cast loose from the shore, and in good time, and safely, he reached Nashville. He never satisfactorily explained upon what principle he appropriated all the transportation on hand to the use of his particular command.

Colonel Forrest was present at the council, and when the final resolution was taken, he promptly announced that he neither could nor would surrender his command. The bold trooper had no qualms upon the subject. He assembled his men, all as hardy as himself, and after reporting once more at headquarters, he moved out and plunged into a slough formed by backwater from the river. An icy crust covered its surface, the wind blew fiercely, and the darkness was unrelieved by a star. There was fearful floundering as the command followed him. At length he struck dry land, and was safe. He was next heard of at Nashville.

General Buckner, who throughout the affair bore himself with dignity, ordered the troops back to their positions and opened communications with General Grant, whose laconic demand of "unconditional surrender,"

19th Dec, Army in the Field
 Camp near Vicksburg, May 16th 1862

Gen. A. S. Johnston

Confed. Army

Gen, Yours of this last morning
 Committee, and appointment of Commissioners
 to settle terms of Capitulation is just received.
 No terms except unconditional and immediate
 surrender can be accepted.

I propose to answer immediately upon
 your words. I am Sir, very respectfully

Yours etc. Genl.

W. J. Grant

Adj. Genl.

FAC-SIMILE OF THE ORIGINAL "UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER" DISPATCH.


The original of the dispatch was obtained by Charles L. Webster & Co., publishers of General Grant's "Memoirs," from Dr. James K. Wallace, of Litchfield, Conn., who received it, November 28th, 1868, from his relative by marriage, General John A. Rawlins, who, as chief of staff to General Grant, had the custody, after the capture, of General Buckner's papers. General Rawlins told

Dr. Wallace that it was the original dispatch. The above is an exact reproduction of the original dispatch in every particular, except that, in order to adapt it to the width of the page, the word, "Sir," has been lowered to the line beneath, and the words, "I am, sir, very respectfully," have been raised to the line above.—EDITORS.

in his reply to General Buckner's overtures, became at once a watchword of the war.

The Third Division was astir very early on the 16th of February. The regiments began to form and close up the intervals between them, the intention being to charge the breastworks south of Dover about breakfast-time. In the midst of the preparation a bugle was heard and a white flag was seen coming from the town toward the pickets. I sent my adjutant-general to meet the flag half-way and inquire its purpose. Answer was returned that General Buckner had capitulated during the night, and was now sending information of the fact to the commander of the troops in this quarter, that there might be no further bloodshed. The division was ordered to advance and take possession of the works and of all public property and prisoners. Leaving that agreeable duty to the brigade commanders, I joined the officer bearing the flag, and with my staff rode across the trench and into the town, till we came to the door of the old tavern already described, where I dismounted. The tavern was the headquarters of General Buckner, to whom I sent my name; and being an acquaintance, I was at once admitted.

I found General Buckner with his staff at breakfast. He met me with politeness and dignity. Turning to the officers at the table, he remarked: "General Wallace, it is not necessary to introduce you to these gentlemen; you are acquainted with them all." They arose, came forward one by one, and gave their hands in salutation. I was then invited to breakfast, which consisted of corn bread and coffee, the best the gallant host had in his kitchen. We sat at the table about an hour and a half, when General Grant arrived and took temporary possession of the tavern as his headquarters. Later in the morning the army marched in and completed the possession.



VIEW FROM THE NATIONAL CEMETERY, WITHIN THE HEDGE ON THE RIGHT, ACROSS TO THE HILL WHERE WERE SITUATED THE INTERIOR WORKS OF FORT DONELSON (SEE MAP, PAGE 402).
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT FORT DONELSON, TENN.

The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.—EDITORS.

COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE UNION ARMY.

Brig.-Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John A. McClernand. *First Brigade*, Col. Richard J. Oglesby: 8th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Frank L. Rhoads; 18th Ill., Col. Michael K. Lawler (w), Capt. Daniel H. Brush (w), Capt. Samuel B. Marks; 29th Ill., Col. James S. Rearden; 30th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Elias S. Dennis; 31st Ill., Col. John A. Logan (w); Battery D, 2d Ill. Lt. Artillery, Capt. Jasper M. Dresser; Battery E, 2d Ill. Lt. Artillery, Lieut. G. C. Gumbart; A and B, 2d Ill. Cavalry, Capt. John R. Hotelling and Thomas J. Harrison; C, 2d, and I, 4th U. S. Cavalry, Lieut. James Powell; Ind'p't companies Ill. Cavalry, Capt. E. Carmichael, James J. Dollins, M. J. O'Harenett, and Lieut. Ezra King. Brigade loss: k, 184; w, 603; m, 66 = 853. *Second Brigade*, Col. W. H. L. Wallace: 11th Ill., Lieut.-Col. T. E. G. Ransom (w), Major Garrett Nevins (temporarily); 20th Ill., Col. C. Carroll Marsh; 45th Ill., Col. John E. Smith; 48th Ill., Col. Isham N. Haynie (temporarily commanding Third Brigade), Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Smith (k); Battery B, 1st Ill. Lt. Artillery, Capt. Ezra Taylor; Battery D, 1st Ill. Lt. Artillery, Capt. Edward McAllister; 4th Ill. Cavalry, Col. T. Lyle Diekey. Brigade loss: k, 99; w, 350; m, 98 = 547. *Third Brigade*, Col. Wm. R. Morrison (w), Col. Leonard F. Ross; 17th Ill., Major Francis M. Smith, Capt. Henry H. Bush; 49th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Phineus Pense. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 105; m, 19 = 152.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles F. Smith. *First Brigade*, Col. John McArthur: 9th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Jesse J. Phillips; 12th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Augustus L. Chetlain; 41st Ill., Col. Isaac C. Pugh. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 340; m, 20 = 429. *Third Brigade*, Col. John Cook; 7th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Andrew J. Babcock; 50th Ill., Col. Moses M. Bane; 52d Ind., Col. James M. Smith; 12th Iowa, Col. J. J. Woods; 13th Mo., Col. Crafts J. Wright; Batteries D, H, and K, 1st Mo. Lt. Artillery, Capt. Henry Richardson, F. Welker, and George H. Stone. Brigade loss: k, 10; w,

109; m, 2 = 121. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. Jacob G. Lauman: 25th Ind., Col. James C. Venatch; 2d Iowa, Col. James M. Tuttle; 7th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. James C. Parrott; 14th Iowa, Col. William T. Shaw; Birge's Mo. Sharpshooters. Brigade loss: k, 55; w, 301; m, 1 = 357. *Fifth Brigade*, Col. Morgan L. Smith: 11th Ind., Col. George F. McGinnis; 8th Mo., Major John McDonald. Brigade loss: k, 11; w, 69 = 80.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Lew Wallace. *First Brigade*, Col. Charles Cruft: 31st Ind., Lieut.-Col. John Osborn, Major Fred. Arn; 44th Ind., Col. Hugh B. Reed; 17th Ky., Col. John H. McHenry, Jr.; 25th Ky., Col. James M. Shackelford. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 182; m, 16 = 233. *Second Brigade* [attached to the Third Brigade]: 48th Ill., Col. John A. Davis; 57th Ill., Col. Elias D. Baldwin; 58th Ill., Col. William F. Lynch; 20th Ohio, Col. Charles Whittlesey. Brigade loss: k, 6; w, 15; m, 1 = 22. *Third Brigade*, Col. John M. Thayer: 1st Neb., Lieut.-Col. Wm. D. McCord; 58th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. F. F. Rempel; 68th Ohio, Col. S. H. Steedman; 76th Ohio, Col. Wm. B. Woods. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 24; m, 1 = 28. *Unattached*: Battery A, 1st Ill. Lt. Artillery, Lieut. P. P. Wood; A, 32d Ill. Infantry, Capt. Henry Davidson. Loss: w, 10.

IRON-CLADS AND GUN-BOATS, Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote (w). *St. Louis* (flag-ship), Lieut. Leonard Paulding, k, 2; w, 8; *Carondelet*, Commander Henry Walke, k, 5; w, 28; *Louisville*, Commander Benjamin M. Dove, k, 4; w, 5; *Pittsburgh*, Lieut. Egbert Thompson, w, 2; *Tyler*, Lieut.-Com. William Gwin; *Conestoga*, Lieut.-Com. S. L. Phelps. Total loss: k, 11; w, 43 = 54. The vessels which had been in action at Fort Henry (see page 362) carried the same armament at Fort Donelson. The *Louisville* and *Pittsburgh* were each armed with 6 32-pounders, 3 8-inch, and 4 rifled 42-pounders. The *Louisville* had also 1 12-pounder boat-howitzer.

The total loss of the Union forces (army and navy) was 510 killed, 2152 wounded, 224 captured or missing = 2886.

COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

1 Brig.-Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, 2 Brig.-Gen. John B. Floyd, 3 Brig.-Gen. Simon B. Buckner (c).

BUCKNER'S DIVISION. *Second Brigade*, Col. Wm. E. Baldwin: 2d Ken., Col. R. W. Hanson; 14th Miss., Maj. W. L. Doss; 20th Miss., Maj. W. N. Brown; 26th Miss., Col. A. E. Reynolds; 26th Tenn., Col. John M. Lillard; 41st Tenn., Col. Robert Farquharson. *Third Brigade*, Col. John C. Brown: 3d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. M. Gordon (w), Maj. N. F. Cheairs; 18th Tenn., Col. J. B. Palmer; 32d Tenn., Col. E. C. Cook. *Artillery*: Kentucky Battery, Capt. R. E. Graves; Tenn. Battery, Capt. T. K. Porter (w), Lieut. John W. Morton; Jackson's Va. Battery. Division loss: k and w, 577 (approximate).

JOHNSON'S COMMAND (left wing), Brig.-Gen. Rushrod R. Johnson. *Heiman's Brigade*, Col. A. Heiman; 27th Ala., Col. A. A. Hughes; 10th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. W. MacGavock; 42d Tenn., Col. W. A. Quarles; 48th Tenn., Col. W. M. Voorhies; 53d Tenn., Col. A. H. Abernathy. Lieut.-Col. Thomas F. Winston; Tenn. Battery, Capt. Frank Maney (w). *Davidson's Brigade*, Col. T. J. Davidson, Col. J. M. Simonton; 8th Ky., Lieut.-Col. H. B. Lyon; 1st Miss., Col. J. M. Simonton, Lieut.-Col. A. S. Hamilton; 3d Miss., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Wells; 7th Texas,

Col. John Gregg. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 218 = 286. *Drake's Brigade*, Col. Joseph Drake; Ala. Battalion, Maj. John S. Garvin; 35th Ark., Col. J. J. Gee; 4th Miss., Maj. T. N. Adair; Tenn. Battalion, Col. B. M. Browder.

FLOYD'S DIVISION. *First Brigade*, Col. G. C. Wharton: 51st Va., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Massie; 56th Va., Capt. G. W. Davis. Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 80; m, 120 = 217. *Second Brigade*, Col. John McCausland; 36th Va., Lieut.-Col. L. W. Reld; 50th Va., Maj. Thomas Smith. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 91 = 115. *Artillery*: Va. Batteries, Captains D. A. French and J. H. Guy; Green's Ken. Battery.

GARRISON FORCES, Col. J. W. Head, Col. J. E. Bailey: 30th Tenn., Maj. J. J. Turner; 49th Tenn., Col. J. E. Bailey; 50th Tenn., Col. C. A. Sugg. *Fort Batteries*, Capt. Joseph Dixon (k), Capt. Jacob Culbertson; A, 30th Tenn., Capt. B. G. Bidwell; A, 50th Tenn., Capt. T. W. Beaumont; Maury (Tenn.) Battery, Capt. R. R. Ross.

CAVALRY: Tenn. Regiment, Col. N. B. Forrest; 9th Tenn. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. George Gantt; Milton's Company Tennessee. *Unattached*: Tennessee Battalion Infantry, Major S. H. Colma.

The total loss of the Confederate army is not definitely stated. General Gideon J. Pillow says, in his report, that in killed and wounded it was about two thousand. With regard to the number of Confederates captured, General Grant says in his "Memoirs": "I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. He replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry; that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night; the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000." But General Buckner says, in his official report, that "the aggregate of the army, never greater than 12,000, was now reduced to less than 9000 after the departure of General Floyd's brigade."



THE "CARONDELET" FIGHTING FORT DONELSON, FEBRUARY 14, 1862. FROM A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WATKES.

THE WESTERN FLOTILLA AT FORT DONELSON, ISLAND NUMBER TEN, FORT PILLOW AND MEMPHIS.

BY HENRY WATKES, REAR-ADMIRAL, U. S. N.

ON the 7th of February, the day after the capture of Fort Henry, I received on board the *Carondelet* Colonels Webster, Rawlins, and McPherson, with a company of troops, and under instructions from General Grant proceeded up the Tennessee River, and completed the destruction of the bridge of the Memphis and Bowling Green Railroad.

On returning from that expedition General Grant requested me to hasten to Fort Donelson with the *Carondelet*, *Tyler*, and *Lexington*, and announce my arrival by firing signal guns. The object of this movement was to take possession of the river as soon as possible, to engage the enemy's attention by making formidable demonstrations before the fort, and to prevent it from being reënforced. On February 10th the *Carondelet* alone (towed by the transport *Alps*) proceeded up the Cumberland River, and on the 12th arrived a few miles below the fort.

Fort Donelson occupied one of the best defensive positions on the river. It was built on a bold bluff about 120 feet in height, on the west side of the river, where it makes a slight bend to the eastward. It had 3 batteries, mounting in all 15 guns: the lower, about twenty feet above the water; the second, about fifty feet above the water; the third, on the summit.]

[The armament of the fort consisted of "ten 32-pounder guns (two of them ship carronades), one 8-inch howitzer, two nondescript 9-pounders, one 10-inch Columbiad, and one rifled gun throwing a conical shell of 128 pounds." The garrison was commanded by Colonel J. E. Bailey, the artillery by Captain Joseph Dixon, and after his death by

Captain Jacob Culbertson, with Captains Ross, Beaumont, and Bidwell in separate command of the guns of the lower batteries. Captain Dixon was killed in the action of the 13th with the *Carondelet* by a shot which dismounted one of his guns — "the only damage done to the batteries during the siege." (Captain Culbertson's report.) — EDITORS,

When the *Carondelet*, her tow being cast off, came in sight of the fort and proceeded up to within long range of the batteries, not a living creature could be seen. The hills and woods on the west side of the river hid part of the enemy's formidable defenses, which were lightly covered with snow; but the black rows of heavy guns, pointing down on us, reminded me of the dismal-looking sepulchers cut in the rocky cliffs near Jerusalem, but far more repulsive. At 12:50 P. M., to unmask the silent enemy, and to announce my arrival to General Grant, I ordered the bow-guns to be fired at the fort. Only one shell fell short. There was no response except the echo from the hills. The fort appeared to have been evacuated. After firing ten shells into it, the *Carondelet* dropped down the river about three miles and anchored. But the sound of her guns aroused our soldiers on the southern side of the fort into action; one report says that when they heard the guns of the *avant-courrier* of the fleet, they gave cheer upon cheer, and rather than permit the sailors to get ahead of them again, they engaged in skirmishes with the enemy, and began the battle of the three days following. On the *Carondelet* we were isolated and beset with dangers from the enemy's lurking sharp-shooters.

On the 13th a dispatch was received from General Grant, informing me that he had arrived the day before, and had succeeded in getting his army in position, almost entirely investing the enemy's works. "Most of our batteries," he said, "are established, and the remainder soon will be. If you will advance with your gun-boat at 10 o'clock in the morning, we will be ready to take advantage of any diversion in our favor."

I immediately complied with these instructions, and at 9:05, with the *Carondelet* alone and under cover of a heavily wooded point, fired 139 70-pound and 64-pound shells at the fort. We received in return the fire of all the enemy's guns that could be brought to bear on the *Carondelet*, which sustained but little damage, except from two shots. One, a 128-pound solid, at 11:30 struck the corner of our port broadside casemate, passed through it, and in its progress toward the center of our boilers glanced over the temporary barricade in front of the boilers. It then passed over the steam-drum, struck the beams of the upper deck, carried away the railing around the engine-room and burst the steam-heater, and, glancing back into the engine-room, "seemed to bound after the men," as one of the engineers said, "like a wild beast pursuing its prey." I have preserved this ball as a souvenir of the fight at Fort Donelson. When it burst through the side of the *Carondelet*, it knocked down and wounded a dozen men, seven of them severely. An immense quantity of splinters was blown through the vessel. Some of them, as fine as needles, shot through the clothes of the men like arrows. Several of the wounded were so much excited by the suddenness of the event and the sufferings of their comrades, that they were not aware that they themselves had been struck until they felt the blood running into their shoes. Upon receiving this shot we ceased firing for a while.

After dinner we sent the wounded on board the *Alps*, repaired damages, and, not expecting any assistance, at 12:15 we resumed, in accordance with General Grant's request, and bombarded the fort until dusk, when nearly all



EXPLOSION OF A GUN ON BOARD THE "CARONDELET" DURING THE ATTACK ON FORT DONELSON. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WAIKE.

our 10-inch and 15-inch shells were expended. The firing from the shore having ceased, we retired.

At 11:30 on the night of the 13th Flag-Officer Foote arrived below Fort Donelson with the iron-clads *St. Louis*, *Louisville*, and *Pittsburgh*, and the wooden gun-boats *Tyler* and *Conestoga*. On the 14th all the hard materials in the vessels, such as chains, lumber, and bags of coal, were laid on the upper decks to protect them from the plunging shots of the enemy. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon our fleet advanced to attack the fort, the *Louisville* being on the west side of the river, the *St. Louis* (flag-steamer) next, then the *Pittsburgh* and *Carondelet* on the east side of the river. The wooden gun-boats were about a thousand yards in the rear. When we started in line abreast at a moderate speed, the *Louisville* and *Pittsburgh*, not keeping up to their positions, were hailed from the flag-steamer to "steam up." At 3:30, when about a mile and a half from the fort, two shots were fired at us, both falling short. When within a mile of the fort the *St. Louis* opened fire, and the other iron-clads followed, slowly and deliberately at first, but more rapidly as the fleet advanced. The flag-officer hailed the *Carondelet*, and ordered us not to fire so fast. Some of our shells went over the fort, and almost into our camp beyond. As we drew nearer, the enemy's fire greatly increased in force and effect. But, the officers and crew of the *Carondelet* having recently been long under fire, and having become practiced in fighting, her gunners were as cool and composed as old veterans. We heard the deafening crack of the bursting shells, the crash of the solid shot, and the whizzing of fragments of shell and wood as they sped through the vessel. Soon a 128-pounder struck our anchor, smashed it into flying bolts, and bounded over the vessel, taking away a part of our smoke-stack; then another cut away the iron boat-davits as if they were pipe-stems, whereupon the boat dropped into the water. Another ripped up the iron plating and glanced over; another went through the plating and lodged in the heavy casemate; another struck the pilot-house, knocked the plating to pieces, and sent fragments of iron and splinters into the pilots, one of whom fell mortally wounded, and was taken below; another shot took away the remaining boat-davits and the boat with them; and still they came, harder and faster, taking flag-staffs and smoke-stacks, and tearing off the side armor as lightning tears the bark from a tree. Our men fought desperately, but, under the excitement of the occasion, loaded too hastily, and the port rifled gun exploded. One of the crew, in his account of the explosion soon after it occurred, said: "I was serving the gun with shell. When it exploded it knocked us all down, killing none, but wounding over a dozen men and spreading dismay and confusion among us. For about two minutes I was stunned, and at least five minutes elapsed before I could tell what was the matter. When I found out that I was more scared than hurt, although suffering from the gunpowder which I had inhaled, I looked forward and saw our gun lying on the deck, split in three pieces. Then the cry ran through the boat that we were on fire, and my duty as pump-man called me to the pumps. While I was there, two shots entered our bow-ports and killed four men and wounded several others. They were borne past me, three with their heads

off. The sight almost sickened me, and I turned my head away. Our master's mate came soon after and ordered us to our quarters at the gun. I told him the gun had burst, and that we had caught fire on the upper deck from the enemy's shell. He then said: 'Never mind the fire; go to your quarters.' Then I took a station at the starboard tackle of another rifled bow-gun and remained there until the close of the fight." The carpenter and his men extinguished the flames.

When within four hundred yards of the fort, and while the Confederates were running from their lower battery, our pilot-house was struck again and another pilot wounded, our wheel was broken, and shells from the rear boats were bursting over us. All four of our boats were shot away and dragging in the water. On looking out to bring our broadside guns to bear, we saw that the other gun-boats were rapidly falling back out of line. The *Pittsburgh* in her haste to turn struck the stern of the *Carondelet*, and broke our starboard rudder, so that we were obliged to go ahead to clear the *Pittsburgh* and the point of rocks below. The pilot of the *St. Louis* was killed, and the pilot of the *Louisville* was wounded. Both vessels had their wheel-ropes shot away, and the men were prevented from steering the *Louisville* with the tiller-ropes at the stern by the shells from the rear boats bursting over them. The *St. Louis* and *Louisville*, becoming unmanageable, were compelled to drop out of battle, and the *Pittsburgh* followed; all had suffered severely from the enemy's fire. Flag-Officer Foote was wounded while standing by the pilot of the *St. Louis* when he was killed. We were then about 350 yards from the fort.


There was no alternative for the *Carondelet* in that narrow stream but to keep her head to the enemy and fire into the fort with her two bow-guns, to prevent it, if possible, from returning her fire effectively. The enemy saw that she was in a manner left to his mercy, and concentrated the fire of all his batteries upon her. In return, the *Carondelet's* guns were well served to the last shot. Our new acting gunner, John Hall, was just the man for the occasion. He came forward, offered his services, and with my sanction took charge of the starboard-bow rifled gun. He instructed the men to obey his warnings and follow his motions, and he told them that when he saw a shot coming he would call out "Down" and stoop behind the breech of the gun as he did so; at the same instant the men were to stand away from the bow-ports. Nearly every shot from the fort struck the bows of the *Carondelet*. Most of them were fired on the ricochet level, and could be plainly seen skipping on the water before they struck. The enemy's object was to sink the gun-boat by striking her just below the water-line. They soon succeeded in planting two 32-pound shots in her bow, between wind and water, which made her leak badly, but her compartments kept her from sinking until we could plug up the shot-holes. Three shots struck the starboard casemating; four struck the port casemating forward of the rifle-gun; one struck on the starboard side, between the water-line and plank-sheer, cutting through the planking; six shots struck the pilot-house, shattering one section into pieces and cutting through the iron casing. The smoke-stacks were riddled.



THE GUN-BOATS AT FORT DONELSON (FEBRUARY 14, 1862) —
THE LAND ATTACK IN THE DISTANCE.
AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WATKE.

Our gunners kept up a constant firing while we were falling back; and the warning words, "Look out!" "Down!" were often heard, and heeded by nearly all the gun-crews. On one occasion, while the men were at the muzzle of the middle bow-gun, loading it, the warning came just in time for them to jump aside as a 32-pounder struck the lower sill, and glancing up struck the upper sill, then, falling on the inner edge of the lower sill, bounded on deck and spun around like a top, but hurt no one. It was very evident that if the men who were loading had not obeyed the order to drop, several of them would have been killed. So I repeated the instructions and warned the men at the guns and the crew generally to bow or stand off from the ports when a shot was seen coming. But some of the young men, from a spirit of bravado or from a belief in the doctrine of fatalism, disregarded the instructions, saying it was useless to attempt to dodge a cannon-ball, and they would trust to luck. The warning words, "Look out!" "Down!" were again soon heard; down went the gunner and his men, as the whizzing shot glanced on the gun, taking off the gunner's cap and the heads of two of the young men who trusted to luck, and in defiance of the order were standing up or passing behind him. This shot killed another man also, who was at the last gun of the starboard side, and disabled the gun. It came in with a hissing sound; three sharp spats and a heavy bang told the sad fate of three brave comrades. Before the decks were well sanded, there was so much blood on them that our men could not work the guns without slipping.

We kept firing at the enemy so long as he was within range, to prevent him from seeing us through the smoke.



MAP OF THE REGION OF THE FLOTILLA OPERATIONS.

The *Carondelet* was the first in and the last out of the fight, and was more damaged than any of the other gun-boats, as the boat-carpenters who repaired them subsequently informed me. She was much longer under fire than any other vessel of the flotilla; and, according to the report of the Secretary of the Navy, her loss in killed and wounded was nearly twice as great as that of all the other gun-boats together. She fired more shot and shell into Fort Donelson than any other gun-boat, and was struck fifty-four times. These facts are given because a disposition was shown by correspondents and naval historians to ignore the services of the *Carondelet* on this and other occasions.

In the action of the 14th all of the armored vessels were fought with the greatest energy, skill, and courage, until disabled by the enemy's heavy shot. In his official report of the battle the flag-officer said: "The officers and men in this hotly contested but unequal fight behaved with the greatest gallantry and determination." [For losses, see p. 429.] †

Although the gun-boats were repulsed in this action, the demoralizing effect of their cannonade, and of the heavy and well-sustained fire of the *Carondelet* on the day before, must have been very great, and contributed in no small degree to the successful operations of the army on the following day.

After the battle I called upon the flag-officer, and found him suffering from his wounds. He asked me if I could have run past the fort, something I should not have ventured upon without permission.

The 15th was employed in the burial of our slain comrades. I read the Episcopal service on board the *Carondelet*, under our flag at half-mast; and the sailors bore their late companions to a lonely field within the shadows of

† From the report of Captain B. G. Bidwell, "the only officer connected with the heavy batteries of Fort Donelson who was fortunate enough to escape," we take this account of the engagement:


"All was quiet until the evening of the 14th (Friday), when 4 boats came around the point, arranged themselves in line of battle, and advanced slowly, but steadily, up the river to within 200 yards of our battery, and halted, when a most incessant fire was kept up for some time. We were ordered to hold our fire until they got within range of our 32-pounders. We remained perfectly silent, while they came over about one and a half miles, pouring a heavy fire of shot and shell upon us all the time. Two more boats came around the point and threw shell at us. Our gunners were inexperienced and knew very little of the firing of heavy guns. They, however, did some excellent shooting. The rifled gun was disabled by the ramming of a cartridge while the wire was in the vent, it being left in there by a careless

gunner,—being bent, it could not be got out,—but the two center boats were both disabled, the left-center (I think) by a ricochet shot entering one of the port-holes, which are tolerably large. The right-center boat was very soon injured by a ball striking her on top, and also a direct shot in the port hole, when she fell back, the two flank boats closing in behind them and protecting them from our fire in retreat. I think these two were not seriously injured. They must have fired near two thousand shot and shell at us. Our Columbiad fired about 27 times, the rifled gun very few times, and the 32-pounders about 45 or 50 rounds each. A great many of our balls took effect, being well aimed. I am confident the efficiency of the gun-boat is in the gun it carries rather than in the boat itself. We can whip them always if our men will only stand to their guns. Not a man of all ours was hurt, notwithstanding they threw grape at us. Their fire was more destructive to our works at 2 miles than at 200 yards. They over-fired us from that distance."

the hills. When they were about to lower the first coffin, a Roman Catholic priest appeared, and his services being accepted, he read the prayers for the dead. As the last service was ended, the sound of the battle being waged by General Grant, like the rumbling of distant thunder, was the only requiem for our departed shipmates.

On Sunday, the 16th, at dawn, Fort Donelson surrendered and the gun-boats steamed up to Dover. After religious services the *Carondelet* proceeded back to Cairo, and arrived there on the morning of the 17th, in such a dense fog that she passed below the town unnoticed, and had great difficulty in finding the landing. There had been a report that the enemy was coming from Columbus to attack Cairo during the absence of its defenders; and while the *Carondelet* was cautiously feeling her way back and blowing her whistle, some people imagined she was a Confederate gun-boat about to land, and made hasty preparations to leave the place. Our announcement of the victory at Fort Donelson changed their dejection into joy and exultation. On the following morning an order congratulating the officers and men of the *Carondelet* was received from Flag-Officer Foote.

A few days later the *Carondelet* was taken up on the ways at Mound City, Illinois,—six or seven miles above Cairo on the Ohio River,—for repairs; and a crowd of carpenters worked on her night and day. After the repairs were completed, she was ordered to make the experiment of backing




MAP OF MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOUT ISLAND NUMBER TEN. (BASED ON THE TWO MAPS BY CAPTAIN A. B. GRAY, C. S. A., MADE IN MARCH, 1862, AND ON OFFICIAL REPORTS.)
FOR CORRECTION OF THE LINE OF THE CANAL, SEE PAGE 461.

up-stream, which proved a laughable failure. She would sheer from one side of the river to the other, and with two anchors astern she could not be held steady enough to fight her bow-guns down-stream. She dragged both anchors alternately, until they came together, and the experiment failed completely.

On the morning of the 23d the flag-officer made a reconnoissance to Columbus, Kentucky, with four gun-boats and two mortar-boats, accompanied by the wooden gun-boat *Conesports*. The fortifications than ever. The enemy sent up a transport was said, of effecting an exchange

toga, conveying five trans- looked more formidable fired two guns, and with the pretext, it



THE MORTAR-BOATS AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN.

of prisoners.↓ But at that time, as we learned afterward from a credible source, the evacuation of the fort (which General Grant's successes at Forts Henry and Donelson had made necessary) was going on, and the last raft and barge loads of all the movable munitions of war were descending the river, which, with a large quantity previously taken away, could and would have been captured by our fleet if we had received this information in time. On the 4th of March another reconnoissance in force was made with all the gun-boats and four mortar-boats, and the fortress had still a formidable, life-like appearance, though it had been evacuated two days before.↓

↓ The ostensible object was a request to permit the families of officers captured at Fort Donelson to pass through the Union lines. The request was granted on the following day, but General George W. Cullum (General Halleck's chief of staff) and Flag-Officer Foote remonstrated with General Polk for the use made of the flag of truce.—EDITORS.

↓ On the 3d of March the evacuated works had been occupied by a scouting party of the 2d Illinois Cavalry, sent from Paducah by Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, who had succeeded Briga-


dier-General Grant in command of the District of Cairo (February 14, 1862) on the assignment of General Grant to the command of the District of West Tennessee. The fact of the occupation was not known at the time of the gun-boat reconnoissance, which included a land force accompanied by General Sherman and by Brigadier-General Cullum. This detachment landed and took formal possession. In his report of the occupation, General Cullum speaks of Columbus as "the Gibraltar of the West." See also note, p. 367.—EDITORS.

On the 5th of March, while we were descending the Mississippi in a dense fog, the flag-steamer leading, the Confederate gun-boat *Grampus*, or *Dare-devil Jack*, the sauciest little vessel on the river, suddenly appeared across our track and "close aboard." She stopped her engines and struck her colors, and we all thought she was ours at last. But when the captain of the *Grampus* saw how slowly we moved, and as no gun was fired to bring him to, he started off with astonishing speed and was out of danger before the flag-steamer could fire a gun. She ran before us yawing and flirting about, and blowing her alarm-whistle so as to announce our approach to the enemy who had now retired to Island Number Ten, a strong position sixty miles below Columbus (and of the latitude of Forts Henry and Donelson), where General Beauregard, who was now in general command of our opponents, had determined to contest the possession of the river.

On March 15th the flotilla and transports continued on their way to Island Number Ten, arriving in its vicinity about nine in the morning. The strong and muddy current of the river had overflowed its banks and carried away every movable thing. Houses, trees, fences, and wrecks of all kinds were being swept rapidly down-stream. The twists and turns of the river near Island Number Ten are certainly remarkable. Within a radius of eight miles from the island it crosses the boundary line of Kentucky and Tennessee three times, running on almost every point of the compass. We were greatly surprised when we arrived above Island Number Ten and saw on the bluffs a chain of forts extending for four miles along the crescent-formed shore, with the white tents of the enemy in the rear. And there lay the island in the lower corner of the crescent, with the side fronting the Missouri shore lined with heavy ordnance, so trained that with the artillery on the opposite shore almost every point on the river between the island and the Missouri bank could be reached at once by all the enemy's batteries.

On the 17th an attack was made on the upper battery by all the iron-clads and mortar-boats. The *Benton* (flag-steamer), lashed between the *Cincinnati* and *St. Louis*, was on the east side of the river; the *Mound City*, *Carondelet*, and *Pittsburgh* were on the west side; the last, however, changed her position to the east side of the river before the firing began. We opened fire on the upper fort at 1:20, and by order of the flag-officer fired one gun a minute. The enemy replied promptly, and some of his shot struck the *Benton*, but, owing to the distance from which they were fired, did but little damage. We silenced all the guns in the upper fort except one. During the action one of the rifled guns of the *St. Louis* exploded, killing and wounding several of the gunners,—another proof of the truth of the saying that the guns furnished the Western flotilla were less destructive to the enemy than to ourselves.

From March 17th to April 4th but little progress was made in the reduction of the Confederate works—the gun-boats firing a few shot now and then at long range, but doing little damage. The mortar-boats, however, were daily throwing 13-inch bombs, and so effectively at times that the Confederates were driven from their batteries and compelled to seek refuge in caves and other places of safety. But it was very evident that the



THE "CARONDELET" RUNNING THE CONFEDERATE
BATTERIES AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN (APRIL 4, 1862).
AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

great object of the expedition—the reduction of the works and the capture of the Confederate forces—

could not be effected by the gun-boats alone, owing to their mode of structure and to the disadvantage under which they were fought in the strong and rapid current of the Mississippi. This was the opinion not only of naval officers, but also of General Pope and other army officers.

On the 23d of March the monotony of the long and tedious investment was unfortunately varied in a very singular manner. The *Carondelet* being moored nearest the enemy's upper fort, under several large cottonwood trees, in order to protect the mortar-boats, suddenly, and without warning, two of the largest of the trees fell across her deck, mortally wounding one of the crew and severely wounding another, and doing great damage to the vessel. This was twelve days before I ran the gauntlet at Island Number Ten with the *Carondelet*.

To understand fully the importance of that adventure, some explanation of the military situation at and below Island Number Ten seems necessary. After the evacuation of New Madrid, which General Pope had forced by blockading the river twelve miles below, at Point Pleasant, the Confederate forces occupied their fortified positions on Island Number Ten and the eastern shore of the Mississippi, where they were cut off by impassable swamps on the land side. They were in a *cul-de-sac*, and the only way open for them to obtain supplies or to effect a retreat was by the river south of Island Number Ten. General Pope, with an army of twenty thousand men, was on

the western side of the river below the island. Perceiving the defect in the enemy's position, he proceeded with great promptness and ability to take advantage of it. It was his intention to cross the river and attack the enemy from below, but he could not do this without the aid of a gun-boat to silence the enemy's batteries opposite Point Pleasant and protect his army in crossing. He wrote repeatedly to Flag-Officer Foote, urging him to send down a gun-boat past the enemy's batteries on Island Number Ten, and in one of his letters expressed the belief that a boat could pass down at night under cover of the darkness. But the flag-officer invariably declined, saying in one of his letters to General Pope that the attempt "would result in the sacrifice of the boat, her officers and men, which sacrifice I would not be justified in making."

During this correspondence the bombardment still went on, but was attended with such poor results that it became a subject of ridicule among the officers of Pope's army, one of whom (Colonel Gilmore, of Chillicothe, Ohio) is reported to have said that often when they met, and inquiry was made respecting the operations of the flotilla, the answer would generally be: "Oh! it is still bombarding the State of Tennessee at long range." And a Confederate officer said that no casualties resulted and no damage was sustained at Island Number Ten from the fire of the gun-boats.

On March 20th Flag-Officer Foote consulted his commanding officers, through Commander Stembel, as to the practicability of taking a gun-boat past the enemy's forts to New Madrid, and all except myself were opposed to the enterprise, believing with Foote that the attempt to pass the batteries would result in the almost certain destruction of the boat. I did not think so, but believed with General Pope that, under the cover of darkness and other favorable circumstances, a gun-boat might be run past the enemy's



THE LEVEE AT NEW MADRID. FROM A SKETCH MADE SOON AFTER THE CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN.

batteries, formidable as they were with nearly fifty guns. And although fully aware of the hazardous nature of the enterprise, I knew that the aid of a gun-boat was absolutely necessary to enable General Pope to succeed in his operations against the enemy, and thought the importance of this success would justify the risk of running the gauntlet of the batteries on Island Number Ten and on the left bank. The army officers were becoming impatient, and it was well known that the Confederates had a number of small gun-boats below, and were engaged in building several large and powerful vessels, of which the renowned *Arkansas* was one. And there was good reason to apprehend that these gun-boats would ascend the river and pass or silence Pope's batteries, and relieve the Confederate forces on Island Number Ten and the eastern shore of the Mississippi. That Pope and Foote apprehended this, appears from the correspondence between them. †


The flag-officer now called a formal council of war of all his commanding officers. It was held on board the flag-steamer, on the 28th or 29th of March, and all except myself concurred in the opinion formerly expressed that the attempt to pass the batteries was too hazardous and ought not to be made. When I was asked to give my views, I favored the undertaking, and advised compliance with the requests of General Pope. When asked if I was willing to make the attempt with the *Carondelet*, I replied in the affirmative. Foote accepted my advice, and expressed himself as greatly relieved from a heavy responsibility, as he had determined to send none but volunteers on an expedition which he regarded as perilous and of very doubtful success.

Having received written orders from the flag-officer, under date of March 30th, I at once began to prepare the *Carondelet* for the ordeal. All the loose material at hand was collected, and on the 4th of April the decks were covered with it, to protect them against plunging shot. Hawsers and chain cables were placed around the pilot-house and other vulnerable parts of the vessel, and every precaution was adopted to prevent disaster. A coal-barge laden with hay and coal was lashed to the part of the port side on which there was no iron plating, to protect the magazine. It was truly said that the *Carondelet* at that time resembled a farmer's wagon prepared for market. The engineers led the escape-steam, through the pipes aft, into the wheel-house, to avoid the puffing sound it made when blown through the smoke-stacks.

All the necessary preparations having been made, I informed the flag-officer of my intention to run the gauntlet that night, and received his approval. Colonel N. B. Buford, who commanded the land forces temporarily with the flotilla, assisted me in preparing for the trip, and on the night of the 4th brought on board Captain Hottenstein, of the 42d Illinois, and twenty-three sharpshooters of his command, who volunteered their services, which were gratefully accepted. Colonel Buford remained on board until the last moment, to encourage us. I informed the officers and crew of the character of the

† An interesting and important enterprise in this campaign was the sawing out, under great difficulties, of a channel, twelve miles in length, to complete a water-way for the Union transports across Madrid Bend. See paper by Colonel J. W. Bissell and corrected map, page 460.—EDITORS.

undertaking, and all expressed a readiness to make the venture. In order to resist boarding parties, in case of being disabled, the sailors were well armed, and pistols, cutlasses, muskets, boarding-pikes, and hand-grenades were within reach. Hose was attached to the boilers for throwing scalding water over any who might attempt to board. If it should be found impossible to save the vessel, it was designed to sink rather than burn her. During the afternoon there was a promise of a clear, moonlight night,



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN EARLY IN THE WAR.

and it was determined to wait until the moon was down, and then to make the attempt, whatever the chances. Having gone so far, we could not abandon the project without an effect on the men almost as bad as failure.

At 10 o'clock the moon had gone down, and the sky, the earth, and the river were alike hidden in the black shadow of a thunder-storm, which had now spread itself over all the heavens. As the time seemed favorable, I ordered the first master to cast off. Dark clouds now rose rapidly over us and enveloped us in almost total darkness, except when the sky was lighted up by the welcome flashes of vivid lightning, to show us the perilous way we were to take. Now and then the dim outline of the landscape could be seen, and the forest bending under the roaring storm that came rushing up the river.

With our bow pointing to the island, we passed the lowest point of land without being observed, it appears, by the enemy. All speed was given to the vessel to drive her through the tempest. The flashes of lightning continued with frightful brilliancy, and "almost every second," wrote a correspondent, "every brace, post, and outline could be seen with startling

distinctness, enshrouded by a bluish white glare of light, and then her form for the next minute would become merged in the intense darkness." When opposite Battery No. 2, on the mainland, the smoke-stacks blazed up, but the fire was soon subdued. It was caused by the soot becoming dry, as the escape-steam, which usually kept the stacks wet, had been sent into the wheel-house, as already mentioned, to prevent noise. With such vivid lightning as prevailed during the whole passage, there was no prospect of escaping the vigilance of the enemy, but there was good reason to hope that he would be unable to point his guns accurately. Again the smoke-stacks took fire, and were soon put out; and then the roar of the enemy's guns began, and from Batteries Nos. 2, 3, and 4 on the mainland came the continued crack and scream of their rifle-shells, which seemed to unite with the electric batteries of the clouds to annihilate us.

While nearing the island or some shoal point, during a few minutes of total darkness, we were startled by the order, "Hard a-port!" from our brave and skillful pilot, First Master William R. Hoel. We almost grazed the island, and it appears were not observed through the storm until we were close in, and the enemy, having no time to point his guns, fired at random. In fact, we ran so near that the enemy did not, probably could not, depress his guns sufficiently. While close under the lee of the island and during a lull in the storm and in the firing, one of our pilots heard a Confederate officer shout, "Elevate your guns!" It is probable that the muzzles of those guns had been depressed to keep the rain out, and that the officers ordered the guns elevated just in time to save us from the direct fire of the enemy's heaviest fort; and this, no doubt, was the cause of our remarkable escape.

¶ The Confederate land batteries above New Madrid were ten in number—five on the eastern side of Island Number Ten; four (Batteries No. 5, 4, 3, and 2) opposite the island on the mainland, as shown on the map (p. 437), besides Battery No. 1, two miles above the island.—EDITORS.

During the dark and stormy night of April 1st Colonel George W. Roberts, of the 42d Illinois Regiment, executed a brilliant exploit. Forty picked men, in five barges, with muffled oars, left for Bat-



BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. W. MACKALL, C. S. A., IN
COMMAND AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN, PREVIOUSLY
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GEN-
ERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

tery No. 1. They proceeded in silence, and were unobserved until within a few rods of the fort, when a flash of lightning discovered them to the sentries, who fired. Our men, who did not reply, were soon climbing up the slippery bank, and in three minutes more the six guns were spiked, Colonel Roberts himself spiking a huge 80-pounder pivot-gun. Some of these guns had been previously dismounted by our fleet, and were now rendered doubly useless.—H. W.

Having passed the principal batteries, we were greatly relieved from suspense, patiently endured, however, by the officers and crew. But there was another formidable obstacle in the way—a floating battery, which was the great “war elephant” of the Confederates, built to blockade the Mississippi permanently. As we passed her she fired six or eight shots at us, but without effect. One ball struck the coal-barge, and one was found in a bale of hay; we found also one or two musket-bullets. We arrived at New Madrid about midnight with no one hurt, and were most joyfully received by our army. At the suggestion of Paymaster Nixon, all hands “spliced the main brace.”

On Sunday, the 6th, after prayers and thanksgiving, the *Carondelet*, with General Gordon Granger, Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith of the 43d Ohio, and Captain Louis H. Marshall of General Pope’s staff on board, made a reconnoissance twenty miles down, nearly to Tiptonville, the enemy’s forts firing on her all the way down. We returned their fire, and dropped a few shells into their camps beyond. On the way back, we captured and spiked the guns of a battery of one 32-pounder and one 24-pounder, in about twenty-five minutes, opposite Point Pleasant. Before we landed to spike the guns, a tall Confederate soldier, with cool and deliberate courage, posted himself behind a large cottonwood tree, and repeatedly fired upon us, until our Illinois sharpshooters got to work on him from behind the hammock nettings. He had two rifles, which he soon dropped, fleeing into the woods with his head down. The next day he was captured and brought into camp at Tiptonville, with the tip of his nose shot off. After the capture of this battery, the enemy prepared to evacuate his positions on Island Number Ten and the adjacent shores, and thus, as one of the historians of the civil war says, the *Carondelet* struck the blow that secured that victory.

Returning to New Madrid, we were instructed by General Pope to attack the enemy’s batteries of six 64-pounders which protected his rear; and besides, another gun-boat was expected. The *Pittsburgh* (Lieutenant-Commander Thompson) ran the gauntlet without injury, during a thunder-storm, at 2 in the morning of April 7th, and arrived at 5 o’clock; but she was not ready for service, and the *Carondelet* attacked the principal batteries at Watson’s Landing alone and had nearly silenced them when the *Pittsburgh* came up astern and fired nearly over the *Carondelet*’s upper deck, after she and the Confederates had ceased firing. I reported to General Pope that we had cleared the opposite shores of the enemy, and were ready to cover the crossing of the river and the landing of the army. Seeing themselves cut off, the garrison at Island Number Ten surrendered to Foote on the 7th of April, the day of the Confederate repulse at Shiloh. The other Confederates retreating before Pope’s advance, were nearly all overtaken and captured at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 8th; and about the same time the cavalry under Colonel W. L. Elliott took possession of the enemy’s deserted works on the Tennessee shore.

The result of General Pope’s operations in connection with the services of the *Carondelet* below Island Number Ten was the capture of three generals (including General W. W. Mackall, who ten days before the surrender had succeeded General John P. McCown in the command at Madrid Bend), over



THE "CARONDELET" AND "PITTSBURGH" CAPTURING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES BELOW NEW MADRID.
AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

5000 men, 20 pieces of heavy artillery, 7000 stand of arms, and a large quantity of ammunition and provisions, without the loss of a man on our side.

On the 12th the *Benton* (flag-steamer), with the *Cincinnati*, *Mound City*, *Cairo*, and *St. Louis*, passed Tiptonville and signaled the *Carondelet* and *Pittsburgh* to follow. Five Confederate gun-boats came up the next day and offered battle; but after the exchange of a few shots at long range they retired down the river. We followed them all the way to Craighead's Point, where they were under cover of their fortifications at Fort Pillow. I was not aware at the time that we were chasing the squadron of my esteemed shipmate of the U. S. Frigates *Cumberland* and *Merrimac*, Colonel John W. Dunnington, who afterward fought so bravely at Arkansas Post.

On the 14th General Pope's army landed about six miles above Craighead's Point, near Osceola, under the protection of the gun-boats. While he was preparing to attack Fort Pillow, Foote sent his executive officer twice to me on the *Carondelet* to inquire whether I would undertake, with my vessel and two or three other gun-boats, to pass below the fort to coöperate with General Pope, to which inquiries I replied that I was ready at any time to make the attempt. But Pope and his army (with the exception of 1500 men) were ordered away, and the expedition against Fort Pillow was abandoned. Between the 14th of April and the 10th of May two or three of the mortar-boats were towed down the river and moored near Craighead's Point, with a gun-boat to protect them. They were employed in throwing 13-inch bombs across the point into Fort Pillow, two miles distant. The enemy returned our bombardment with vigor, but not with much accuracy or effect. Several of their bombs fell near the gun-boats when we were three miles from the fort,

The Confederate fleet called the "River Defense" having been reënforced, they determined upon capturing the mortar-boats or giving us battle. On the 8th three of their vessels came to the point from which the mortar-boats had thrown their bombs, but, finding none, returned. Foote had given special orders to keep up steam and be ready for battle any moment, day or night. There was so much illness at that time in the flotilla that about a third of the officers and men were under medical treatment, and a great many were unfit for duty. On the 9th of May, at his own request, our distinguished commander-in-chief, Foote, was relieved from his arduous duties. He had become very much enfeebled from the wounds received at Fort Donelson and from illness. He carried with him the sympathy and regrets of all his command. He was succeeded by Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis, a most excellent officer.

This paper would not be complete without some account of the naval battles fought by the flotilla immediately after the retirement of Flag-Officer Foote, under whose supervision and amid the greatest embarrassments it had been built, organized, and equipped. On the morning of the 10th of May a mortar-boat was towed down the river, as usual, at 5 A. M., to bombard Fort Pillow. The *Cincinnati* soon followed to protect her. At 6:35 eight Confederate rams came up the river at full speed.☆ The *Carondelet* at once prepared for action, and slipped her hawser to the "bare end," ready for orders to "go ahead." No officer was on the deck of the *Benton* (flag-steamer) except the pilot, Mr. Birch, who informed the flag-officer of the situation, and passed the order to the *Carondelet* and *Pittsburgh* to proceed without waiting for the flag-steamer. General signal was also made to the fleet to get under way, but it was not visible on account of the light fog.

The *Carondelet* started immediately after the first verbal order; the others, for want of steam or some other cause, were not ready, except the *Mound City*, which put off soon after we were fairly on our way to the rescue of the *Cincinnati*. We had proceeded about a mile before our other gun-boats left their moorings. The rams were advancing rapidly, and we steered for the leading vessel, *General Bragg*, a brig-rigged, side-wheel steam ram, far in advance of the others, and apparently intent on striking the *Cincinnati*. When about three-quarters of a mile from the *General Bragg*, the *Carondelet* and *Mound City* fired on her with their bow-guns, until she struck the *Cincinnati* on the starboard quarter, making a great hole in the shell-room, through which the water poured with resistless force. The *Cincinnati* then retreated up the river and the *General Bragg* drifted down, evidently disabled. The *General Price*, following the example of her consort, also rammed the *Cincinnati*. We fired our bow-guns into the *General Price*, and she backed off, disabled also. The *Cincinnati* was again struck by one of the enemy's rams, the *General Sumter*. Having pushed on with all speed to the rescue of the *Cincinnati*, the *Carondelet* passed her in a sinking condition, and, rounding to, we fired our bow and starboard broadside guns into the retreating *General Bragg* and the advancing rams, *General Jeff. Thompson*, *General Beauregard*,

☆ The mortar-boat, No. 16, which was the first object of attack, was defended with great spirit by Acting-Master Gregory, who fired his mortar eleven times, reducing the charge and diminishing the elevation. (See cut, p. 450.)—EDITORS.

and *General Lovell*. Heading up-stream, close to a shoal, the *Carondelet* brought her port broadside guns to bear on the *Sumter* and *Price*, which were dropping down-stream. At this crisis the *Van Dorn* and *Little Rebel* had run

above the *Carondelet*; the *Bragg*, *Jeff. Thompson*, *Beauregard*, and *Lovell* were below her. The last three, coming up, fired into the *Carondelet*; she returned their fire with her stern-guns; and, while in this position, I ordered the port rifled 50-pounder Dahlgren gun to be leveled and fired at the center of the *Sumter*. The shot struck the vessel just forward of her wheel-house, and the steam instantly poured out from her ports and all parts of her casemates, and we saw her men running out of them and falling or lying down on her deck. None of our gun-boats had yet come to the assistance of the *Carondelet*. The *Benton* and *Pittsburgh* had probably gone to aid the *Cincinnati*, and the *St. Louis* to relieve the *Mound City*, which had been badly rammed by the *Van Dorn*. The smoke at this time was so



FLAG-OFFICER CHARLES HENRY DAVIS (AFTERWARD REAR-ADMIRAL AND CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION). FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

dense that we could hardly distinguish the gun-boats above us. The upper deck of the *Carondelet* was swept with grape-shot and fragments of broken shell; some of the latter were picked up by one of the sharp-shooters, who told me they were obliged to lie down under shelter to save themselves from the grape and other shot of the *Pittsburgh* above us, and from the shot and broken shell of the enemy below us. Why some of our gun-boats did not fire into the *Van Dorn* and *Little Rebel* while they were above the *Carondelet*, and prevent their escape, if possible, I never could make out.]

As the smoke rose we saw that the enemy was retreating rapidly and in great confusion. The *Carondelet* dropped down to within half a mile above Craighead's Point, and kept up a continual fire upon their vessels, which were very much huddled together. When they were nearly, if not quite, beyond gunshot, the *Benton*, having raised sufficient steam, came down and passed the *Carondelet*; but the Confederates were under the protection of Fort Pillow before the *Benton* could reach them. Our fleet returned to Plum Point, except the *Carondelet*, which dropped her anchor on the battle-field, two miles or more below the point, and remained there two days on voluntary

] Flag-Officer Davis says in his report: "All of these vessels might easily have been captured if we had possessed the means of towing them out of action; but the steam-power of our gun-boats is

so disproportionate to the bulk of the vessels that they can accomplish but little beyond overcoming the strength of the current, even when unincumbered."— EDITORS.

guard duty. This engagement was sharp, but not decisive. From the first to the last shot fired by the *Carondelet*, one hour and ten minutes elapsed. After the battle, long-range firing was kept up until the evacuation of Fort Pillow.

On the 25th seven of Colonel Ellet's rams arrived,—a useful acquisition to our fleet. During the afternoon of June 4th heavy clouds of smoke were observed rising from Fort Pillow, followed by explosions, which continued through the night; the last of which, much greater than the others, lit up the heavens and the Chickasaw bluffs with a brilliant light, and convinced us that this was the parting salute of the Confederates before leaving for the lower Mississippi. At dawn next morning the fleet was all astir to take possession of Fort Pillow, the flag-steamers leading. We found the casemates, magazines, and breastworks blown to atoms.

On our way to Memphis the enemy's steamer *Sovereign* was intercepted by one of our tugs. She was run ashore by her crew, who attempted to blow her up, but were foiled in their purpose by a boy of sixteen whom the enemy had pressed into service, who, after the abandonment of the vessel, took the extra weights from the safety-valves, opened the fire-doors and flue-caps, and put water on the fires, and, having procured a sheet, signaled the tug, which came up and took possession. It may be proper to say that on our way down the river we respected private property, and did not assail or molest any except those who were in arms against us.

The morning of the 6th of June we fought the battle of Memphis, which lasted one hour and ten minutes. It was begun by an attack upon our fleet by the enemy, whose vessels were in double line of battle opposite the city. We were then at a distance of a mile and a half or two miles above the city. Their fire continued for a quarter of an hour, when the attack was promptly met by



PORT PILLOW AND THE WATER-BATTERY. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.



"MOUND CITY." "CARONDELET." "CINCINNATI." "PRICE." "BAGG." "BUNTER."
 "MORTAR NO. 16." "VAN DORN." "LITTLE REBEL."
 THE BATTLE OF FORT PILLOW, MAY 10, 1862 (LOOKING NORTH). AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

two of our ram squadron, the *Queen of the West* (Colonel Charles Ellet) leading, and the *Monarch* (Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ellet, younger brother of the leader). These vessels fearlessly dashed ahead of our gun-boats, ran for the enemy's fleet, and at the first plunge succeeded in sinking one vessel and disabling another. The astonished Confederates received them gallantly and effectively. The *Queen of the West* and *Monarch* were followed in line of battle by the gun-boats, under the lead of Flag-Officer Davis, and all of them opened fire, which was continued from the time we got within good range until the end of the battle—two or three tugs keeping all the while a safe distance astern. The *Queen of the West* was a quarter of a mile in advance of the *Monarch*, and after having rammed one of the enemy's fleet, she was badly rammed by the *Beauregard*, which then, in company with the *General Price*, made a dash at the *Monarch* as she approached them. The *Beauregard*, however, missed the *Monarch* and struck the *General Price* instead on her port side, cutting her down to the water-line, tearing off her wheel instantly, and placing her *hors de combat*. The *Monarch* then rammed the *Beauregard*, which had been several times raked fore and aft by the shot and shell of our iron-clads, and she quickly sank in the river opposite Memphis. The *General Lovell*, after having been badly rammed by the *Queen of the West*, was struck by our shot and shell, and, at about the same time and place as the *Beauregard*, sank to the bottom so suddenly as to take a considerable number of her officers and crew down with her, the others being saved by small boats and our tugs. The *Price*, *Little Rebel* (with a shot-hole

through her steam-chest), and our *Queen of the West*, all disabled, were run on the Arkansas shore opposite Memphis; and the *Monarch* afterward ran into the *Little Rebel* just as our fleet was passing her in pursuit of the remainder of the enemy's fleet, then retreating rapidly down the river. The *Jeff. Thompson*, below the point and opposite President's Island, was the next boat disabled by our shot. She was run ashore, burned, and blown up. The Confederate ram *Sumter* was also disabled by our shell and captured. The *Bragg* soon after shared the same fate and was run ashore, where her officers abandoned her and disappeared in the forests of Arkansas. All the Confederate rams which had been run on the Arkansas shore were captured. The *Van Dorn*, having a start, alone escaped down the river. The rams



"CARONDELET," "BENTON," "ST. LOUIS," "CAIRO," "LOUISVILLE," "QUEEN OF THE WEST," "MONARCH,"
IN THE DISTANCE CONFEDERATE FLEET ADVANCING.

THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS (JUNE 6, 1862), LOOKING SOUTH. AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

Monarch and *Switzerland* were dispatched in pursuit of her and a few transports, but returned without overtaking them, although they captured another steamer.‡

The scene at this battle was rendered most sublime by the desperate nature of the engagement and the momentous consequences that followed very speedily after the first attack. Thousands of people crowded the high bluffs overlooking the river. The roar of the cannon and shell shook the houses on shore on either side for many miles. First wild yells, shrieks, and clamors, then loud, despairing murmurs, filled the affrighted city. The screaming, plunging shell crashed into the boats, blowing some of them and their crews into fragments, and the rams rushed upon each other like wild beasts in

‡ See paper on "Ellet and his Steam-rams at Memphis," page 453.—EDITORS.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. JEFF. THOMPSON.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

deadly conflict. Blinding smoke hovered about the scene of all this confusion and horror; and, as the battle progressed and the Confederate fleet was destroyed, all the cheering voices on shore were silenced. When the last hope of the Confederates gave way, the lamentations which went up from the spectators were like cries of anguish.

Boats were put off from our vessels to save as many lives as possible. No serious injury was received by any one on board the United States fleet. Colonel Ellet received a pistol-shot in the leg; a shot struck the *Carondelet* in the bow, broke up her anchor and anchor-stock, and fragments were scattered over her deck among her officers and crew, wounding slightly Acting-Master Gibson and two or three others who were standing at the time on the forward deck with me. The heavy timber which was suspended at the water-line, to protect the boats from

the Confederate rams, greatly impeded our progress, and it was therefore cut adrift from the *Carondelet* when that vessel was in chase of the *Bragg* and *Sumter*. The latter had just landed a number of her officers and crew, some of whom were emerging from the bushes along the bank of the river, unaware of the *Carondelet's* proximity, when I hailed them through a trumpet, and ordered them to stop or be shot. They obeyed immediately, and by my orders were taken on board a tug and delivered on the *Benton*.

General Jeff. Thompson, noted in partisan or border warfare, having signally failed with those rams at Fort Pillow, now resigned them to their fate. It was said that he stood by his horse watching the struggle, and seeing at last his rams all gone, captured, sunk, or burned, he exclaimed, philosophically, "They are gone, and I am going," mounted his horse, and disappeared.

An enormous amount of property was captured by our squadron; and, in addition to the Confederate fleet, we captured at Memphis six large Mississippi steamers, each marked "C. S. A." We also seized a large quantity of cotton in steamers and on shore, and the property at the Confederate Navy Yard, and caused the destruction of the *Tennessee*, a large steam-ram, on the stocks, which was to have been a sister ship to the renowned *Arkansas*. About one hundred Confederates were killed and wounded and one hundred and fifty captured. Chief of all results of the work of the flotilla was the opening of the Mississippi River once for all from Cairo to Memphis, and the complete possession of Western Tennessee by the Union forces.



IN THE DISTANCE : " PRIDE," " LITTLE REBEL," " QUEEN OF THE WEST," AND " MONARCH." UNION GUN-BOATS.
 " VAN DORN " " JEFF. THOMPSON." " BRAGG." " SUMTER." " BEAUREGARD " (SINKING). " LOVELL " (SUNK).
 THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS, JUNE 6, 1862 (LOOKING NORTH). RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE FLEET. AFTER A SKETCH BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

ELLET AND HIS STEAM-RAMS AT MEMPHIS.

BY ALFRED W. ELLET, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V. †

ON the 8th of March, 1862, occurred the memorable catastrophe at Hampton Roads. The possibility of such a disaster had been repeatedly urged in warning terms by a gentleman who had vainly endeavored to avert it. I refer to the late eminent civil engineer, Charles Ellet, Jr., the inventor of the steam-ram as a vehicle of war destruction. On the 6th of February, 1862, Mr. Ellet wrote in a pamphlet as follows :

" It is not generally known that the rebels now have *five steam-rams* nearly ready for use. Of these five, two are on the lower Mississippi, two are at Mobile, and one is at Norfolk. The last of the five, the one at Norfolk, is doubtless the most formidable, being the United States steam-frigate *Merrimac*, which has been so strengthened that, in the opinion of the rebels, it may be used as a ram. But we have not yet a single vessel at sea, nor, so far as I know, in course of construction, able to cope at all with a well-built ram. If the *Merrimac* is permitted to escape from Elizabeth River, she will be almost certain to commit great depredations on our armed and unarmed vessels in Hampton Roads, and may even be expected to pass out under the guns of Fortress Monroe and prey upon our commerce in Chesapeake Bay. Indeed, if the alterations have been skillfully made, and she succeeds in getting to sea, she will not only be a terrible scourge to our commerce, but may prove also to be a most dangerous visitor to our blockading squadrons off the harbors of the southern coasts. I have attempted to call the attention of the Navy Department and the country so often to this subject during the last seven years, that I almost hesitate to allude to it again ; and I would not do so here but that I think the danger from these tremendous engines is *very imminent but not at all appreciated*. Experience,

† After the death of Colonel Ellet, the command of the ram-fleet was conferred upon the writer, by order of the Secretary of War.—EDITORS.



COLONEL CHARLES ELLET, JR. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

derived from accidental collisions, shows that a vessel struck in the waist by a steam-ram at sea will go down almost instantaneously, and involve, as has often happened, the loss of nearly all on board."

Upon the startling verification of his neglected admonitions afforded by the *Merrimac*, Mr. Ellet was called to the War Department, and, after a short conference with Secretary Stanton, was given authority to purchase, refit, man, and command, with the rank of colonel, any number of vessels deemed, in his judgment, necessary to meet and defeat the fleet of iron-clad rams then known to be in process of construction on the lower Mississippi River.

Never was work more promptly or more effectually performed. Colonel Ellet purchased a number of steamboats at different points on the Ohio River, the best he could find in the short time at his disposal. He took some old and nearly worn-out boats, strengthened their hulls and bows with heavy timbers, raised bulkheads of timber around the boilers, and started them down the river to Cairo as fast as they could be got off the ways. They were the *Dick Fulton*, *Lancaster*, *Lioness*, *Mingo*, *Monarch*, *Queen of the West*, *Samson*, *Switzerland*, and *T. D. Horner*.

While the work was progressing, and before any one of the rams was nearly completed, information was received that the Confederate fleet had come out from under the batteries of Fort Pillow, had attacked our fleet of gun-boats lying near Craighead's Point, and had disabled two of them. ¶ Colonel Ellet received most urgent telegrams from the Secretary of War to hurry the rams forward at the earliest possible moment. In consequence of these demands, five of them were immediately dispatched down the river under my command, work upon them being continued as they proceeded and for several days after their arrival at Fort Pillow. The other rams followed, and about the 25th of May Colonel Ellet joined the fleet on board the *Switzerland*, and the ram-fleet was now ready for action.

Colonel Ellet at once conferred with Flag-Officer Charles H. Davis on the propriety of passing Fort Pillow, and engaging the enemy's fleet wherever found. Flag-Officer Davis did not approve the plan suggested, but offered no objection to Colonel Ellet's trying the experiment. Accordingly, imme-

¶ The Cincinnati and the Mound City. See page 447.—EDITORS.

diate preparations were begun for running the batteries with the entire ram-fleet. During this period of preparation, constant watch was kept upon the fort and the enemy's fleet. On the night of the 4th of June I crossed the timber point in front of the fort, and reported to the colonel commanding my conviction that the fort was being evacuated. About 2 o'clock in the morning I obtained permission, with many words of caution from Colonel Ellet, to run down opposite the fort in a yawl and, after lying off in order to become assured that the place was abandoned, to land, with the assurance that the rams would follow in case my yawl did not return before daylight.



"BUNTER" AND "BRAGG" "THOMPSON" (BLOWING UP). "LOUISVILLE." "BENTON." "ST. LOUIS." "CAIRO." "BURNING OF UNFINISHED CONFEDERATE RAM." "CARONDELET."

CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF MEMPHIS, JUNE 6, 1862 (LOOKING NORTH).
AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKER.

I landed with my little band, only to find the fort entirely deserted; and after planting the National colors upon the ruins of one of the magazines, we sat down to wait for the coming of daylight and the rams. They came, followed by the entire fleet, and after a short stop all proceeded down the river, the rams taking the lead, to Fort Randolph, where they delayed long enough to plant the National flag and to examine the abandoned fortifications, the gunboats at this point taking the advance.]

After leaving Fort Randolph the ram-fleet proceeded without incident to within about twenty-five miles of Memphis, where they all rounded to and

[The advance of Halleck upon Corinth after Shiloh, and its evacuation on May 30th, gave the Union forces possession of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, broke the second line of Confederate defense, and turned all the positions on the river above Memphis. Fort Pillow and Fort Randolph were thus made untenable (just as Columbus had become untenable after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson on the Confederate first line of defense) and hence were evacuated.—EDITORS.

tied up for the night, with orders of sailing issued to each commander; instructions to be ready to round out at the signal from the flag-ship, and that "each boat should go into the anticipated fight in the same order they maintained in sailing." At the first dawn of day (June 6th) the fleet moved down the river, and at sunrise the flag-ship rounded the bend at "Paddy's Hen and Chickens," and immediately after came in sight of the Federal gun-boats anchored in line across the river, about a mile above Memphis. Colonel Ellet promptly signaled his vessels to tie up on the Arkansas shore, in the order of their sailing, as he desired to confer with Flag-Officer Davis before passing further.

The *Queen of the West* came to, first, followed by the *Monarch* and other rams in regular succession. The *Queen of the West* had made the land, and passed out line to make fast; the *Monarch* was closing in just above, but had not yet touched the shore. At this moment, and as the full orb of the sun rose above the horizon, the report of a gun was heard from around the point and down the river. It was the first gun from the Confederate River Defense Fleet moving to attack us. Colonel Ellet was standing on the hurricane-deck of the *Queen of the West*. He immediately sprang forward, and, waving his hat to attract my attention, called out: "It is a gun from the enemy! Round out and follow me! Now is our chance!" Without a moment's delay, the *Queen* moved out gracefully, and the *Monarch* followed. By this time our gun-boats had opened their batteries, and the reports of guns on both sides were heavy and rapid.

The morning was beautifully clear and perfectly still; a heavy wall of smoke was formed across the river, so that the position of our gun-boats could only be seen by the flashes of their guns. The *Queen* plunged forward, under a full head of steam, right into this wall of smoke and was lost sight of, her position being known only by her tall pipes which reached above the smoke. The *Monarch*, following, was greeted, while passing the gun-boats, with wild huzzas from our gallant tars. When freed from the smoke, those of us who were on the *Monarch* could see Colonel Ellet's tall and commanding form still standing on the hurricane-deck, waving his hat to show me which one of the enemy's vessels he desired the *Monarch* to attack,—namely, the *General Price*, which was on the right wing of their advancing line. For himself he selected the *General Lovell* and directed the *Queen* straight for her, she being about the middle of the enemy's advancing line. The two vessels came toward each other in most gallant style, head to head, prow to prow; and had they met in that way, it is most likely that both vessels would have gone down. But at the critical moment the *General Lovell* began to turn; and that moment sealed her fate. The *Queen* came on and plunged straight into the *Lovell's* exposed broadside; the vessel was cut almost in two and disappeared under the dark waters in less time than it takes to tell the story. The *Monarch* next struck the *General Price* a glancing blow which cut her starboard wheel clean off, and completely disabled her from further participation in the fight. \

\ It is impossible to reconcile this statement with that of Admiral Walke, on page 450, *q. v.* The reports of the engagement are meager and

conflicting, but it has always been the general impression that the *Price* received her disabling blow in an accidental collision with the *Beaure-*

As soon as the *Queen* was freed from the wreck of the sinking *Lovell*, and before she could recover headway, she was attacked on both sides by the enemy's vessels, the *Beauregard* on one side and the *Sumter* on the other. In the *mêlée* one of the wheels of the *Queen* was disabled so that she could not use it, and Colonel Ellet, while still standing on the hurricane-deck to view the effects of the encounter with the *General Lovell*, received a pistol-ball in his knee, and, lying prone on the deck, gave orders for the *Queen* to be run on her one remaining wheel to the Arkansas shore, whither she was soon followed by the *General Price* in a sinking condition. Colonel Ellet sent an officer and squad of men to meet the *General Price* upon her making the shore, and received her entire crew as prisoners of war. By this time consternation had seized upon the enemy's fleet, and all had turned to escape. The fight had drifted down the river, below the city.☆

The *Monarch*, as soon as she could recover headway after her conflict with the *General Price*, drove down upon the *Beauregard*, which vessel, after her encounter with the *Queen of the West*, was endeavoring to escape. She was thwarted by the *Monarch* coming down upon her with a well-directed blow which crushed in her side and completely disabled her from further hope of escape. Men on the deck waved a white flag in token of surrender, and the *Monarch* passed on down to intercept the *Little Rebel*, the enemy's flag-ship. She had received some injury from our gun-boats' fire, and was making for the Arkansas shore, which she reached at the moment when the *Monarch*, with very slight headway, pushed her hard and fast aground; her crew sprang upon shore and ran into the thick woods, making their escape. Leaving the *Little Rebel* fast aground, the *Monarch* turned her attention to the sinking *Beauregard*, taking the vessel in tow, and making prisoners of her crew. The *Beauregard* was towed by the *Monarch* to the bar, where she sank to her boiler-deck and finally became a total loss.

The others of the enemy's fleet were run ashore and fired by the crews before they escaped into the adjoining Arkansas swamps. The *Jeff. Thompson* burned and blew up with a tremendous report; the *General Bragg* was secured by our gun-boats before the fire gained headway, and was saved. The *Van Dorn* alone made her escape, and was afterward burned by the enemy at Liverpool Landing, upon the approach of two of our rams in Yazoo River, in order to prevent her from falling into our hands. Two other rebel boats were burned at the same time,—the *Polk* and the *Livingston*.

After the *Monarch* had towed the *Beauregard* into shoal water, from which, it was hoped, she might be raised, I received the first intelligence, from a dis-

gard, as has been stated by Captain Hurt, commander of the *Beauregard*. The reports of Flag-Officer Davis and of General M. Jeff. Thompson, commander of the Confederate troops at Memphis, agree in saying that the *Price* was rammed by one of her consorts,—General Thompson adding that the blow, which he states was delivered by the *Beauregard*, knocked off the *Price's* wheel and entirely disabled her.—EDITORS.

☆ The gun-boat flotilla, under Flag-Officer Davis, had weighed anchor at 4:30 A. M. and

proceeded immediately to quarters. The Confederate fleet opened at 5, and at 5:20 the gun-boats were returning the fire and steaming down the river. The higher speed of Colonel Ellet's rams enabled them to pass through the intervals in Davis's flotilla, and the latter, coming after them, completed with its batteries the work which the rams had so successfully begun. The guns of the flotilla were well served, and both the *Beauregard* and *Little Rebel* were disabled by shots in their boilers.—EDITORS.

patch-boat bearing orders, that Colonel Ellet was wounded. The orders I received from him were: "Continue the pursuit as long as there is any hope of overtaking the flying enemy."

One other episode of this day should not be omitted. Toward the close of the engagement, Colonel Ellet was informed that a white flag had been raised in Memphis, and he immediately sent his young son, Medical Cadet Charles Rivers Ellet, ashore with a party of three men and a flag of truce, to demand the surrender of the city. They landed in a row-boat and delivered Colonel Ellet's dispatch to the mayor, and received his reply; then, surrounded by an excited and threatening crowd, they proceeded to the post-office, ascended to the top of the building, and, while stoned and fired upon by the mob below, young Ellet lowered the Confederate colors and raised the National flag over the city of Memphis. This incident occurred a considerable length of time before the formal surrender of the city into the possession of the United States troops under command of Colonel G. N. Fitch.

At first, Colonel Ellet's wound was not considered necessarily dangerous, but a few days showed us all how futile was the hope that our brave commander would ever again tread the decks of his victorious fleet. He continued to send dispatches and issue necessary orders from his bed as long as he could receive the reports of his subordinates. Finally, his rapidly failing strength gave way; the *Switzerland*, to which he had been removed, and on board which he had been joined by his heart-broken wife and his young daughter, left Memphis on the night of the 18th of June, and as the vessel neared Cairo on the 21st, his gallant spirit passed away. He was accorded a state funeral in Independence Hall. †

The boats constituting the ram-fleet of the Mississippi River were not built for the purpose they were to serve; they were simply such river steamers as could be purchased under the urgency then pressing. Some were side-wheelers, others stern-wheel tugs, with strong machinery and great power, and were hurriedly strengthened and braced to sustain a severe headlong blow. In a letter to the Secretary of War respecting the rams, while they were being fitted out, Colonel Ellet wrote: "The boats I have purchased are illy adapted for the work I shall require of them; it is not their strength upon which I rely, but upon the audacity of our attack, for success."

His idea of an effective "steam-ram" was not a hermaphrodite thing, half ram, half gun-boat, nor did he favor those sharp knife-like prows which, if they cut a hole in an enemy, would plug it at the same time. He wanted a vessel of medium size, easy to handle, and of great speed; she should be built very strongly, fitted with machinery of great power, and have weight sufficient when projected against an enemy to crush the side of any vessel that could float. Colonel Ellet did not rely on heavy ordnance, and did not recommend arming his rams. At the battle of Memphis there were no fire-arms on board the ram-fleet except a few short carbines and some pocket-

† His devoted wife, stricken by grief, survived him but a few days. Both are buried at Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia.—A. W. E.

revolvers; his reliance was upon the prow of his vessel. † He desired, as far as possible, to protect the vulnerable parts of his ship, the boilers and engines, and with simply enough men as crew to handle the boat with certainty and dispatch, to run the gauntlet of any fire that could be precipitated upon him, and drive his ram deep into his unwieldy adversary. At the battle of Memphis the enemy concentrated their fire upon the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*, but their missiles passed harmlessly by. Not a splinter was raised off either of the rams, and not a man sustained the slightest injury except Colonel Ellet, whose fatal wound was received from a pistol-ball.


The battle of Memphis was, in many respects, one of the most remarkable naval victories on record. For *two* unarmed, frail, wooden river steamboats, with barely men enough on board to handle the machinery and keep the furnace-fires burning, to rush to the front, between two hostile fleets, and *into* the enemy's advancing line of eight iron-clad, heavily armed, and fully manned steam-rams, sinking one, disabling and capturing three, and carrying consternation to the others, was a sight never before witnessed.

The River Defense Fleet was composed of strong, well-built ocean steamers, well strengthened and protected with railroad iron so as to be almost invulnerable to shot when advancing. The intention was apparent to repeat at Memphis the tactics which had proved so successful at Fort Pillow,—to ram the Union gun-boats at anchor; and had the rams *Queen of the West* and *Monarch* not run through the line of gun-boats and attacked the Defense Fleet as it approached, sinking, disabling, and scattering its vessels, and thus removing the fight half a mile below, the result of the affair might have been very different. The Defense Fleet was advancing up-stream, thus exposing the strongest and best-protected portions of each vessel; the gun-boats, relying upon their guns, were at anchor, with their sterns, their most vulnerable part, pointing down-stream and consequently exposed to the tremendous attack of the enemy. Had the Confederate commanders trusted only to the strength of their vessels, ceased firing, and with every pound of steam on plunged at full speed into our anchored gun-boat fleet, who could doubt what the result would have been?

† The *Monarch* had 11 sharp-shooters out of a detail of 50 from the 59th Illinois regiment, who constituted the sole armed force of the ram-fleet.—EDITORS.



PRACTISING ON A RIVER PICKET.



METHOD OF CUTTING THE CHANNEL.

SAWING OUT THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NUMBER TEN.

BY J. W. BISSELL, COLONEL, U. S. V., IN CHARGE OF THE WORK.

THE Engineer Regiment of the West was an organization composed of twelve full companies of carefully selected workmen, chiefly mechanics, and officered by men capable of directing such skilled labor. Most of the officers and about six hundred of the men were engaged in the operations about New Madrid and Island Number Ten. In all the operations of that regiment I am not aware that any of its officers ever made a report beyond a verbal notification to the general in command that the work required of it was done. This narrative is therefore made entirely from memory, aided by reference to letters written to my family.

It is perhaps proper to state here that the term "canal," as used in all the letters and reports relating to the opening of this waterway, conveys an entirely wrong idea. No digging was done except by way of slightly widening a large break in the levee, and those who speak of "working waist-deep in the water" knew nothing of it.

The enemy held Island Number Ten and the left bank opposite, and the same bank from New Madrid down to Tiptonville, a ridge of high land between the back swamp and the river. In rear of their position was Reelfoot Lake and the overflow, extending from above them to a point below Tiptonville. Escape by land was impossible, New Madrid and the right bank below being occupied by General Pope. The gun-boats under Foote held the river above, and our heavy batteries commanded the only place of debarkation below. Having accomplished this much, the problem for General Pope to solve was to cross his army to make an attack, for which purpose he judged that two gun-boats, to be used as ferry-boats, would be sufficient. The general was so confident that his letter to Foote would bring the boats that he directed me to go back to the fleet at Island Number Eight by dug-out across the overflow, and come down with them past the batteries.


I reached the flag-ship in the afternoon about dark, and that evening Foote called together all his commanders in council. One or two wanted to

run the blockade, but the commodore flatly refused. He explained that his boats, since they were armored solely about the bows, were invincible fighting up-stream, but fighting down-stream were of little account; and that if one of them should be boarded and captured, she could be turned against us, and could whip the whole fleet and place Cairo, Louisville, and St. Louis at her mercy! One of the captains said that if he were allowed to go, he would blow the vessel out of water if the enemy got on board. Another, I think, was quite as emphatic, but Foote was firm.

The next day, with two of the tugs of the fleet, I explored the shore carefully on each side: first on the eastern shore, to see if the enemy were securely shut in, which I found to be the case; and then on the western, to see if St. James's Bayou, which emptied into the river seven miles above Island Number Eight, in any way communicated with St. John's Bayou, which débouched at New Madrid. Here I found no possible way across.

Early the next morning while standing on the levee, chagrined at my failure to obtain a gun-boat, and while waiting for the guide to get the dug-out ready to take me back to camp, I spied, directly opposite me across the submerged fields, an opening in the timber; and the thought flashed upon me that there was the place to take the transports through. This proved to be an old wagon-road extending half a mile into the woods; beyond and around was a dense forest of heavy timber. The guide said it was two miles to the nearest bayou. I asked him to make a map upon my memorandum-book, which he did, showing a straight cut to the first bayou and the general route of the bayous to New Madrid. This route we carefully explored, and I reached Pope's headquarters about dark. When in my report of the interview I mentioned Foote's refusal, the general gave vent to his disappointment and indignation. Some officer present making some suggestion about a "canal," I immediately pulled out my memorandum-book, and, showing the sketch, said the whole thing was provided for, and that I would have the boats through in fourteen days.

General Pope then gave me an order on the authorities at Cairo for steamboats and material. That evening Captain William Tweeddale, Lieutenant Mahlon Randolph, and I sat up till a late hour arranging all the details, including barges to be fitted with heavy artillery to be used as gun-boats, and the next morning they started with one hundred men for Cairo, to meet me at Island Number Eight with all the materials they could get



CORRECTED LINE OF THE CHANNEL ABOVE ISLAND NO. TEN CUT BY THE ENGINEER REGIMENT. (See p. 437.)

the first day. Other officers and men started by the same route daily, until the six hundred men of my force had returned, and my stock of supplies was complete. I returned in the dug-out through the selected channel, and in due time found at the proposed starting-point four stern-wheel steamboats, drawing thirty to thirty-six inches of water, and six large coal-barges, besides one Columbiad, three large siege-guns with carriages and ammunition, saws, lines, and all kinds of tools and tackle, and fully two million feet of timber and lumber.

The way through the submerged corn-field and the half-mile of road was easy enough, but when we reached the timber the labor of sawing out a channel commenced. The one steamer which had a powerful steam-capstan was put in the lead, and the others having hand-capstans were fastened single file in the rear, and then the six barges in like order, so that the progress of the first controlled all the others. Captain Tweeddale took charge of the cutting in front, while Lieutenant Randolph was fitting up the improvised gun-boats astern. About three hundred men were assigned to each, and they worked in relays from dawn until dark.

First of all, men standing on platforms on small rafts cut off the trees about eight feet above the water. As soon as a tree was down, another set of men, provided with boats and lines, adjusted about it a line which ran through a snatch-block and back to the steam-capstan, and hauled it out of the way; thus a partial cut was made forward,

the lines always working more than two hundred feet ahead of the capstan, so as to leave plenty of room for the saws. It took about four sets of lines to keep pace with twelve saws.

When the space about the stumps allowed sufficient room, a raft about forty feet long was lashed to a stump, and the saw set at work in a frame attached by a pivot and working in an arc as shown in the sketch [page 460]—two men working the saw at opposite ends by a rope, and a fifth on the farther side of the tree guiding its teeth into the tree. Where the stumps were too close, or irregular, three yawl-boats were used instead of the raft. No trouble was experienced with stumps a foot or less in diameter. With the larger ones it was different; the elms spread out so much at the bottom that the saw almost always would run crooked and pinch. If it ran up, we notched the top and set the frame farther in; if down, we put in powerful tackle, and pulled the top of the stump over.

Here was where the ingenuity of the officers and men was exercised; as the saws were working four and a half feet beneath the surface, and the water was quite turbid, the question was how to ascertain what was interfering with the saw, and then to apply the remedy. But I found Captain Tweeddale equal to the most obstinate stump. I think two and a half hours was the longest time ever expended upon any one, while about two minutes would dispose of some small ones when the saw was ready. It took eight days to cut the two miles.

When we reached the bayous the hard and wet work began. The river had begun to fall, and the water was running very rapidly. We had to get rid of great drift-heaps from the lower side with our machinery all on the upper side. Small pieces of drift would be disposed of by the yawl-boats, or a single line and snatch-block would take them right out; but sometimes a great swamp-oak, three feet through, and as heavy as lignum-vitæ, lying right across our channel a foot or so under water, would try our tackle. We had then to raise them up to the surface, and hold them there till they could be chopped in pieces. In one of the bayous for about two miles the current was so swift that all the men who were out on logs, or in exposed places, had safety-lines tied around them; and as the timber was slippery, some were indebted to these lines for their lives. During the whole work not a man was killed, injured, or taken sick.

While all this was being done in front of the boats, Lieutenant Randolph was at work with his detachment in the rear in improvising gun-boats to supply the lack of Foote's. The barges used were coal-barges, about eighty feet long and twenty wide, scow-shaped, with both ends alike. The sides were six inches thick, and of solid timber. The original plan was to use three of the steamboats with a barge on each side—the other steamer to be kept as a reserve. One Columbiad and three 32-pounders were mounted on platforms, and arrangements were made to use a considerable number of field-guns to be taken on board at New Madrid. Six hundred men of the Engineer Regiment, using one of the steamers with her two

barges, were to land at break of day at the mouth of the slough about a mile below and opposite Fort Thompson, and with their intrenching tools dig a line of rifle-pits as soon as possible. About the same number of picked men were to be with them to help fight or dig, as occasion might require. The other two sections of the flotilla were to be filled with men, and landed just below, as best could be done when the resistance was developed. The reserve steamer with her men, not being incumbered with barges, could move rapidly and take advantage of any opening to land the force.

When about half-way through the channel, I left the flotilla and reported progress to General Pope. Upon a re-examination of the ground from Fort Thompson, he concluded that it would be best to make the leading boat a fighting boat that could not be disabled; so he telegraphed to Cairo and St. Louis for a great number of coal-oil barrels, which were laid in two tiers all over the bottoms of two barges; the interstices were filled with dry rails, the whole well secured in place by a heavy floor. In the mean time the steamer was so bulk-headed with lumber that her engines and boilers were secure from damage from field-artillery, and the forward part of the hull, which projected beyond the barges, was bulkheaded off and filled with dry rails, to keep her from being disabled. On the steamer and barges protection was prepared for a large number of sharp-shooters.

The boats and barge gun-boats were kept concealed in the bayou, just back from New Madrid, for a day or two, till the soldiers could be prepared for the passage and attack. Meanwhile Foote concluded to risk the passage of the island with the

Carondelet and afterward with the *Pittsburgh*, and the whole plan was changed; the gun-boats could move so much more rapidly that they were to silence the Confederate field-guns, while the transports could land the troops wherever an opening could be found. The barges were not used at all; nor did any of the Engineer Regiment cross; they were kept on the right bank, ready in case of disaster.

Several of the captured officers told me that after the gun-boats had run their batteries, nearly their whole force was withdrawn from about Island Number Ten and kept concealed in the woods back of the practicable landing-places, and they were prepared to pick off all the men that could be landed; but when they saw the four transports, loaded with troops, steam out from the bayou, the word was given for each man to take care of himself. A few hundred did manage to make their way through the swamps in the rear, but the most of them quietly yielded to the inevitable. So well had the movement been concealed that they had not the least idea of what was being done. ☆

POSTSCRIPT: The Official Records, which, since writing the above, I have just seen for the first time, contain a letter from General Pope to me, which I never before heard of (dated the day I was on my way back from the gun-boat with the plan fully matured), asking if I could not dig a canal, a "mere ditch of a foot wide which the water of the river would soon wash out," from a point one mile above Island Number Ten to a point one mile below. That land was at this time ten feet under water.—J. W. BISSELL.

DECEMBER, 1884.

☆ The effort to cut the canal was known to the Confederates as early as March 31st, the day General Mackall relieved General McCown of the command at Madrid Bend; for General Mackall says in his report, that General McCown then informed him "that they [the

Union forces] were endeavoring to cut a canal across the opposite peninsula for the passage of transports, in order to land below the bend; that they would fail, and that the position was safe until the river fell, and no longer."—EDITORS.

COMMENT BY GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

I have read Colonel J. W. Bissell's article on the "Sawing out a Channel above Island Number Ten." I desire to call attention to what he says:

"Some officer making some suggestion about a 'canal,' I immediately pulled out my memorandum-book, and, showing the sketch, said the whole thing was provided for."

This on the evening of March 19th, 1862, which is the date of General Pope's letter to which Colonel Bissell refers in a foot-note, saying he did not receive the letter because he (Colonel Bissell) was on his return from the reconnaissance he had been ordered to make. To the public this reads as though the plan originated with Colonel Bissell, while I am ready to show that while the colonel directed the work, "some officer," as he says,—or to be exact I myself,—was the sole inventor of the project. My own official report, dated Headquarters Second Division Army of the Mississippi, Pittsburg Landing, April 22d, 1862, reads as follows:

"Transports having reached us through a channel cut with enormous labor under the direction of Colonel Bissell, on a suggestion advanced by the subscriber, March 17th, 1862, the Second Division embarked on them, April 7th, to cross the Mississippi, which was accomplished in gallant style, but without opposition, the gun-boats *Carondelet* and *Pittsburgh*, under Captain Walke, having in dashing style silenced the enemy's shore batteries."

General Pope wrote to General Halleck, under date New Madrid, Mo., April 9th, 1862:

"The canal across the peninsula opposite Island Number Ten, and for the idea of which I am indebted to General Schuyler Hamilton, was completed by Colonel Bissell's Engineer Regiment, and four steamers brought through on the night of the 6th."

General Pope again, in his official report to General Halleck of May 2d, 1862, writes:

"On the 10th of March I received your dispatch, directing me, if possible, to construct a road through the swamps to a point on the Missouri shore opposite Island Number Ten, and transfer a portion of my force sufficient to erect batteries at that point to assist in the artillery practice on the enemy's batteries. I accordingly dispatched Colonel J. W. Bissell, Engineer Regiment, to examine the country with this view, directing him at the same time, if he found it impracticable to build a road through the swamps and overflow of the river, to ascertain whether it were possible to dig a canal across the peninsula from some point above Island Number Ten to New Madrid, in order that steam transports might be brought to me, which would enable my command to cross the river. The idea of the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler Hamilton in a conversation upon the necessity of crossing the river and assailing the enemy's batteries near Island Number Ten in the rear."

The New York "Herald," in its issue of April 13th, 1862, published an article in reference to this channel, entitled "The Schuyler Hamilton Canal."

NEW YORK, June 16th, 1885.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT NEW MADRID (ISLAND NUMBER TEN), FORT PILLOW, AND MEMPHIS.

The composition and losses of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.—EDITORS.

UNION ARMY AT NEW MADRID. Major-Gen. John Pope. *FIRST DIVISION*, Brig.-Gen. David S. Stanley. *First Brigade*, Col. John Groesbeck: 27th Ohio, Col. John W. Fuller; 39th Ohio, Major Edward F. Noyes. *Brigade loss*: k, 2; w, 5=7. *Second Brigade*, Col. J. L. Kirby Smith: 43d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Wager Swayne; 63d Ohio, Col. John W. Sprague. *Brigade loss*: w, 8.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Schuyler Hamilton. *First Brigade*, Col. W. H. Worthington: 59th Ind., Col. J. I. Alexander; 5th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. Charles L. Matthes. *Brigade loss*: k, 2; w, 4=6. *Second Brigade*, Col. Nicholas Percezel: 10th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William E. Small; 26th Mo., Col. George B. Boomer. *Artillery*: 11th Ohio Battery, Capt. Frank C. Sands. *Loss*: k, 1.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John M. Palmer. *First Brigade*, Col. James R. Slack: 34th Ind., Col. Townsend Ryan; 47th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Milton S. Robinson. *Second Brigade*, Col. Graham N. Fitch: 43d Ind., Col. William E. McLean; 46th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Newton G. Scott. *Cavalry*: 7th Ill., Col. Wm. P. Kellogg. *Loss*: w, 1; m, 2=3. *Artillery*: G, 1st Mo., Capt. Henry Hescok.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. E. A. Paine. *First Brigade*, Col. James D. Morgan: 10th Ill., Lieut.-Col. John Tillson; 16th Ill., Col. Robert F. Smith. *Brigade loss*: k, 1; w, 1=2. *Second Brigade*, Col. Gilbert W. Cumming: 22d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Harrison E. Hart; 51st Ill., Lieut.-Col. Luther P. Bradley. *Cavalry*: H and I, 1st Ill., Major D. P. Jenkins. *Sharpshooters*: 64th Ill., Major F. W. Matteson.

FIFTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Plummer. *First Brigade*, Col. John Bryner: 47th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Daniel L. Miles; 8th Wis., Lieut.-Col. George W. Robbins. *Second Brigade*, Col. John M. Loomis: 26th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Charles J. Tinkham; 11th Mo., Lieut.-Col. William E. Panabaker. *Artillery*: M, 1st Mo., Capt. Albert. M. Powell.

CAVALRY DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Gordon Granger: 2d Mich., Lieut.-Col. Selden H. Gorham; 3d Mich., Lieut.-Col. R. H. G. Minty, Col. John K. Mizner.

ARTILLERY DIVISION, Major Warren L. Lothrop: 2d Iowa, Capt. N. T. Spoor; 5th Wis., Capt. Oscar F. Pinney; 6th Wis., Capt. Henry Dillon; 7th Wis., Capt. Richard R. Griffiths; C, 1st Mich., Capt. A. W. Dees; H, 1st Mich., Capt. Samuel De Golyer; C, 1st Ill., Capt. Charles Houghtaling; F, 2d U. S., Lieut. John A. Darling, Lieut. D. P. Walling.

UNASSIGNED TROOPS: Engineer Regt. of the West, Col. Josiah W. Bissell; 22d Mo., Lieut.-Col. John D. Foster; 2d Iowa Cav., Col. W. L. Elliott; 2d Ill. Cav. (4 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Harvey Hogg; 4th U. S. Cav. (3 cos.), Lieut. M. J. Kelly; 1st U. S. Infantry (6 cos.), Capt. George A. Williams. *Loss of latter regiment*: k, 2; w, 5; m, 1=8.

FLOTILLA BRIGADE, Col. Napoleon B. Buford: 27th Ill., Lieut.-Col. F. A. Harrington; 43d Ill., Col. George W. Roberts; 15th Wis., Col. Hans C. Heg; G, 1st Ill. Artillery, Capt. Arthur O'Leary; G, 2d. Ill. Artillery, Capt. Frederick Sparrestrom.

UNION NAVAL FORCES AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN. Flag-Officer A. H. Foote: *Benton* (flag-ship), Lieut.-Comr. S. L. Phelps; *St. Louis*, Lieut.-Comr. Leonard Paulding; *Cincinnati*, Comr. R. N. Stembel; *Pittsburgh*, Lieut.-Comr. Egbert Thompson; *Mound City*, Comr. A. H. Kilty; *Carondelet*, Comr. Henry Walke; *Eleven Mortar-boats*, Capt. Henry E. Maynadler.

The total Union loss (including 2 killed and 13 wounded on the *St. Louis*, by the bursting of a gun March 17) was 17 killed, 34 wounded, and 3 captured or missing.

CONFEDERATE ARMY AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN. (1) Major-Gen. John P. McCown; (2) Brig.-Gen. W. W. Mackall. *Subordinate General Officers*: Brig.-Generals A. P. Stewart, L. M. Walker, E. W. Gantt, and James

Trudeau. *Infantry*: 1st Ala., Tenn., and Miss., Col. Alpheus Baker; 1st Ala., Col. J. G. W. Steedman; 4th Ark. Battalion, Major M. M. McKay; 5th Ark. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. F. A. Terry; 11th Ark., Col. J. M. Smith; 12th Ark., Lieut.-Col. W. D. S. Cook; 11th La., Col. S. F. Marks; 12th La., Col. Thomas M. Scott; 5th La. Battalion, Col. J. B. G. Kennedy; 4th Tenn., Col. R. P. Neely; 5th Tenn., Col. W. E. Travis; 31st Tenn., Col. W. M. Bradford; 40th Tenn., Col. C. C. Henderson; 46th Tenn., Col. John M. Clark; 53th Tenn., Col. A. J. Brown. *Cavalry*: Hudson's and Wheeler's companies, Miss.; Neely's and Haywood's companies, Tenn. *Light Artillery*: Point Coupee, La. Battery, Capt. R. A. Stewart; Tenn. Battery, Capt. Smith P. Bankhead. *Tenn. Heavy Artillery*: Companies of Captains Jackson, Sterling, Humes, Hoadley, Caruthers, Jones, Dismuke, Kucker, Fisher, Johnston, and Upton. *Engineer Corps*: Captains A. B. Gray and D. B. Harris. *Sappers and Miners*: Capt. D. Wintter.

CONFEDERATE NAVAL FORCES AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN. Flag-Officer George N. Hollins. *Melroe* (flag-ship), Lieut. Thomas B. Huger, 6 32-pounders, 1 9-inch, 1 24-pounder rifle; *Livingston*, Comr. R. F. Pinkney; *Polk*, Lieut.-Comr. J. H. Carter, 5 guns; *Ponchartrain*, Lieut.-Comr. John W. Dunnington; *Mauvevas*, Lieut. Joseph Fry, 5 rifled guns; *Jackson*, Lieut. F. B. Renshaw, 2 guns; *Floating Battery, New Orleans*, Lieut. B. W. Averett. No loss reported. The fleet, with the exception of the *Floating Battery*, was not actively engaged.

The total Confederate loss in killed and wounded is estimated at about 30. Of the number of Confederates captured the Confederate and Union reports range from 2000 to 7000, respectively.

UNION FLEET AT FORT PILLOW, MAY 10TH, 1862. Capt. Charles Henry Davis, commanding *pro tem.* *Benton* (flagship), Lieut. S. L. Phelps; *Carondelet*, Comr. Henry Walke; *Mound City*, Comr. A. H. Kilty; *Cincinnati*, Comr. R. N. Stembel (w); *St. Louis*, Lieut. Henry Erben; *Cairo*, Lieut. N. C. Bryant; *Pittsburgh*, Lieut. Egbert Thompson.

The Union loss as officially reported was: *Cincinnati*, wounded, 3 (1 mortally). *Mound City*, wounded, 1. Total, 4.

UNION FLEET AT MEMPHIS, JUNE 6TH, 1862. Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis, commanding. *Gun-boats*—*Benton* (flagship), Lieut. S. L. Phelps; *Louisville*, Comr. B. M. Dove; *Carondelet*, Comr. Henry Walke; *Cairo*, Lieut. N. C. Bryant; *St. Louis*, Lieut. Wilson McGunneagle. *Ram fleet*—*Queen of the West* (flag-ship), Col. Charles Ellet, Jr.; *Monarch*, Lieut.-Col. Alfred W. Ellet; *Switzerland*, First Master David Millard.

The Union loss as officially reported was: *Gun-boats*—wounded, 3. *Ram fleet*—wounded, 1 (Col. Ellet, who subsequently died). Total, 4.

CONFEDERATE RIVER DEFENSE FLEET, AT FORT PILLOW AND MEMPHIS. Capt. J. E. Montgomery, commanding. *Little Rebel* (flag-ship), Capt. Montgomery; *General Bragg*, Capt. William H. H. Leonard; *General Sterling Price*, First Officer, J. E. Henthorne; *Sumter*, Capt. W. W. Lamb; *General Earl Van Dorn*, Capt. Isaac D. Fulkerson; *General M. Jeff. Thompson*, Capt. John H. Burke; *General Lovell*, Capt. James C. Delancy; *General Beauregard*, Capt. James Henry Hurt. Each vessel carried one or more guns, probably 32-pounders.

The Confederate loss in the action off Fort Pillow, May 10th, as officially reported, was: killed, 2; wounded, 1=3. No report was made of the Confederate loss in the action at Memphis of June 6th, nor is it possible, in view of the irregular organization of the fleet, the nature of the conflict, and the dispersal of the survivors, to form even an approximate estimate of it.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN, PROBABLY, IN 1862.

V. A. Grant

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

BY ULYSSES S. GRANT, GENERAL, U. S. A.




ON THE SKIRMISH LINE.

THE battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, fought on Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th of April, 1862, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau, and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion, and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed.

Events had occurred before the battle, and others subsequent to it, which determined me to make no report to my then chief, General Halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle, informing him that an engagement had been fought, and announcing the result. The occurrences alluded to are these: After the capture of Fort Donelson, with over fifteen thousand effective men and all their munitions of war, I believed much more could be accomplished without further sacrifice of life.

Clarksville, a town between Donelson and Nashville, in the State of Tennessee, and on the east bank of the Cumberland, was garrisoned by the enemy. Nashville was also garrisoned, and was probably the best-provisioned depot at the time in the Confederacy. Albert Sidney Johnston occupied Bowling Green, Ky., with a large force. I believed, and my information justified the belief, that these places would fall into our hands without a battle, if threatened promptly. I determined not to miss this chance. But being only a district commander, and under the immediate orders of the department commander, General Halleck, whose headquarters were at St. Louis, it was my duty to communicate to him all I proposed to do, and to get his approval, if possible. I did so communicate, and, receiving no reply, acted upon my own judgment. The result proved that my information was correct, and sustained my judgment. What, then, was my surprise, after so much had been accomplished by the troops under my immediate command between the time of leaving Cairo, early in February, and the 4th of March, to receive from my chief a dispatch of the latter date, saying: "You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of



OUTLINE MAP OF THE SHILOH CAMPAIGN.

your command?" I was left virtually in arrest on board a steamer, without even a guard, for about a week, when I was released and ordered to resume my command.

Again: Shortly after the battle of Shiloh had been fought, General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg Landing, and assumed command of the troops in the field. Although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I was ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point

of territory within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh, I was not permitted to see one of the reports of General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the War Department, long after the event. In consequence, I never myself made a full report of this engagement.

When I was restored to my command, on the 13th of March, I found it on the Tennessee River, part at Savannah and part at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles above, and on the opposite or western bank. I generally spent the day at Pittsburg, and returned by boat to Savannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my headquarters to Pittsburg, where I had sent all the troops immediately upon my reassuming command, but Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had been ordered to reinforce me from Columbia, Tenn. He was expected daily, and would come in at Savannah. I remained, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwise should have done, for the purpose of meeting him on his arrival.

General Lew Wallace, with a division, had been placed by General Smith at Crump's Landing, about five miles farther down the river than Pittsburg, and also on the west bank. His position I regarded as so well chosen that he was not moved from it until the Confederate attack in force at Shiloh.

The skirmishing in our front had been so continuous from about the 3d of April up to the determined attack, that I remained on the field each night until an hour when I felt there would be no further danger before morning. In fact, on Friday, the 4th, I was very much injured by my horse falling with me and on me while I was trying to get to the front, where firing had been heard. The night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when I met General W. H. L. Wallace and General (then Colonel) McPherson coming from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. The extreme softness of

the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. As it was, my ankle was very much injured; so much so, that my boot had to be cut off. During the battle, and for two or three days after, I was unable to walk except with crutches.

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived at Savannah, and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be

in a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's Landing or Pittsburg Landing, as occasion required. I had learned that General Buell himself would be at Savannah the next



MRS. CRUMP'S HOUSE.

day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. Affairs at Pittsburg Landing had been such for several days that I did not want to be away during the day. I determined, therefore, to take a



THE LANDING BELOW THE HOUSE. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.

Crump's Landing is, by river, about five miles below (north of) Pittsburg Landing. Here one of General Lew Wallace's three brigades was encamped on the morning of the battle, another brigade being two miles back, on the road to Purdy, and a third brigade half a mile farther advanced. The Widow Crump's house is about a quarter of a mile above the landing.

very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save time. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact, and I was not aware of it until some time after. While I was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buell, informing him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah. On the way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to Crump's Landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew Wallace. I found him waiting on a boat, apparently expecting to see me, and I directed him to get his troops in line ready to

execute any orders he might receive. He replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's Landing might not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, about 8 A. M., I found that the attack on Shiloh was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at Crump's. Captain A. S. Baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to march immediately to Pittsburg, by the road nearest the river. Captain Baxter made a memorandum of his order. About 1 P. M., not hearing from Wallace, and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two more of my staff, Colonel James B. McPherson and Captain W. R. Rowley, to bring him up with his division. They reported finding him marching toward Purdy, Bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several miles than when he started. The road from his first position was direct, and near the river. Between the two points a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at which Wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. General Wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy, where it crosses Owl Creek, on the right of Sherman; but this is not where I had ordered him nor where I wanted him to go. I never could see, and do not now see, why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to Pittsburg Landing, without specifying by what route. His was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. Later in the war, General Wallace would never have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of April, 1862. I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did, he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country.‡

‡ Since the publication in "The Century" of my article on "The Battle of Shiloh" I have received from Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight at that battle, a letter from General Lew Wallace to him, dated the morning of the 5th. At the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates had troops out along the Mobile and Ohio railroad west of Crump's Landing and Pittsburg Landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his position, extending from Crump's Landing westward; and he sends the letter over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg Landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek,

where our right rested. In this letter General Lew Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road, so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps."

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew Wallace at the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did



NEW SHILOH CHURCH, ON THE SITE OF THE LOG CHAPEL WHICH WAS DESTROYED AFTER THE BATTLE.

wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement, but I thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. McClermand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at Fort Donelson, and were therefore veterans so far as Western troops had become such at that stage of the war. Next to McClermand came Prentiss, with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart, with one brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division of General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smith was

start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up to Pittsburg Landing, and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff-officer who was to deliver it to Gen-

Shiloh was a log meeting-house, some two or three miles from Pittsburg Landing, and on the ridge which divides the waters of Snake and Lick creeks, the former entering into the Tennessee just north of Pittsburg Landing, and the latter south. Shiloh was the key to our position, and was held by Sherman. His division was at that time



SHILOH SPRING, IN THE RAVINE SOUTH OF THE CHAPEL. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1884.

The spring is on the Confederate side of the ravine. Hard fighting took place here, in the early morning of Sunday, between Sherman's and Hardee's troops.

eral Wallace, so that I am not competent to say just what order the general actually received.

General Wallace's division was stationed, the First Brigade at Crump's Landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle, General Wallace early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the River road.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MCGREGOR, N. Y., June 21, 1885.



FIRST POSITION OF WATERHOUSE'S BATTERY. FROM A SKETCH MADE SHORTLY AFTER THE BATTLE.

Major Ezra Taylor, General Sherman's chief of artillery, says in his report: "Captain A. C. Waterhouse's battery [was placed] near the left of the division [Sherman's]—four guns on the right bank of the Owl Creek [to the left and front of General Sherman's headquarters] and two guns on the left bank of Owl Creek [about 150 yards to the front]. The enemy appearing in large masses, and opening a battery to the front and right of the two guns, advanced across Owl Creek. I instructed Captain Waterhouse to retire the two guns to the position occupied by the rest of his battery, about which time the enemy appeared in large force in the open field

directly in front of the position of this battery, bearing aloft, as I supposed, the American flag, and their men and officers wearing uniforms so similar to ours that I hesitated to open fire on them until they passed into the woods and were followed by other troops who wore a uniform not to be mistaken. I afterward learned that the uniform jackets worn by these troops were black. As soon as I was certain as to the character of the troops, I ordered the firing to commence, which was done in fine style and with excellent precision." Both Captain Waterhouse and Lieutenant A. R. Abbott were severely wounded.—EDITORS.

sick in bed at Savannah, some nine miles below, but in hearing of our guns. His services on those two eventful days would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. The command of his division devolved upon Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer,—a veteran, too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war, and had been with his command at Henry and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the

editors for the reasons which influenced General Grant in making the substitution, Colonel Grant wrote as follows, under date of Chicago, Ill., March 20th, 1887: "Father was very ill when the map used with his article, on Shiloh, by 'The Century' Co., was submitted to him. He looked at the topography and found it about as he remembered the ground; but after you published it, he read some of the criticisms upon both the article and the map. Thus having his attention called to the subject, he revised the article, making it more forcible, and directed me to get for his book the map which was in the possession of

Colonel Dayton, Secretary of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and which he had heard of or seen.

"This map proved to be more satisfactory to him than the one he had first used, as it agreed more perfectly with his statements and recollection of the positions occupied by the troops at the end of the first day's battle. Therefore, the only reason that can be assigned for General Grant's change of maps is that the one used in his book ['Memoirs'] was more satisfactory to him, his delicate health having prevented his thorough investigation of the map in the first place."



CONFEDERATE CHARGE UPON PRENTISS'S CAMP ON SUNDAY MORNING.

Of the capture of General Prentiss's camp, Colonel Francis Quinn (Twelfth Michigan Infantry) says in his official report dated April 9th: "About daylight the dead and wounded began to be brought in. The firing grew closer and closer, till it became manifest a heavy force of the enemy was upon us. The division was ordered into line of battle by General Prentiss, and immediately advanced in line about one-quarter of a mile from the tents, where the enemy were met in short-firing distance. Volley after volley was given and returned, and many fell on both sides, but their numbers were too heavy for our forces. I could see to the right and left. They were visible in line, and every hill-top

in the rear was covered with them. It was manifest they were advancing, in not only one, but several lines of battle. The whole division fell back to their tents and again rallied, and, although no regular line was formed, yet from behind every tree a deadly fire was poured out upon the enemy, which held them in check for about one half-hour, when, reinforcements coming to their assistance, they advanced furiously upon our camp, and we were forced again to give way. At this time we lost four pieces of artillery. The division fell back about one half-mile, very much scattered and broken. Here we were posted, being drawn up in line behind a dense clump of bushes."—EDITORS.

change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle, the efficiency of his division was much weakened.

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek, on the left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly south, and possibly a little west. [See map, page 470.] The water in all these streams was very high at the time, and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but suffering much heavier on his own.

The Confederate assaults were made with such disregard of losses on their own side, that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. The ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered, with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. There was also considerable underbrush. A number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman was posted, but every

effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled several times to take positions to the rear, nearer Pittsburg Landing. When the firing ceased at night, the National line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning.

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by General Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left his flanks exposed, and enabled the enemy to capture him, with about 2200 of his officers and men. General Badeau gives 4 o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. General Prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. I was with him, as I was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly, and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, as currently reported at the time, and yet believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the Confederate side.

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left, above Pittsburg. There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash against Northern pluck and endurance.

Three of the five divisions engaged on Sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their States to the field. Many of them had arrived but a day or two before, and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. Their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. Under these circumstances, it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases, as I now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position. But not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. Better troops never went upon a battlefield than many of these officers and men afterward proved themselves to be who fled panic-stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at Shiloh.

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman. Although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody

battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. McClernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh. And how near we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition to this he had several horses shot during the day.

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; I therefore formed ours into line, in rear, to stop stragglers, of whom there were many. When there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reënforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments, or brigades.

On one occasion during the day, I rode back as far as the river and met General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river-bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. This meeting between General Buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the bank. I saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. He even threatened them with shells from the gun-boats near by. But it was all to no effect. Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt that this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, while occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. Some of the country people estimated the stragglers from Johnston's army as high as twenty thousand. Of course, this was an exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: Along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg Landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south, or up the river. This line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the Tennessee. Hurlbut, with his division intact, was on the right of this artillery, extending west and



CHECKING THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE ON THE EVENING OF THE FIRST DAY.

Above this ravine, near the landing, the Federal reserve artillery was posted, and it was on this line the Confederate advance was checked, about sunset, Sunday evening. The Confederates then fell back and bivouacked in the Federal camps.

possibly a little north. McClernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. His division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. All three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization, and did not occupy a place in the line as a division; Prentiss's command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded, or captured. But it had rendered valiant service before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defense of Shiloh.

There was, I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The Tennessee River was very high, and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. The gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington*, Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. Before any of Buell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do not remember that there was the whistle of a

single musket-ball heard. As his troops arrived in the dusk, General Buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill, where they fired briskly for some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury; the attack had spent its force.

General Lew Wallace, with 5000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came, Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came, but none—unless night—in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved Shiloh on that first day, against large odds. Buell's loss on the 6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th Indiana Infantry. The Army of the



PRESENT ASPECT OF THE OLD HAMBURG ROAD (TO THE LEFT OF THE NEW ROAD) WHICH LED UP TO "THE HORNET'S NEST."
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

Tennessee lost on that day at least 7000 men. The presence of two or three regiments of his army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of Pittsburg Landing.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. I directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assured when Wallace arrived even if there had been no other support. The enemy received no reinforcements. He had suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, and straggling, and his commander, General Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead. I was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell

and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's army, crossed the river, and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up the river from Savannah in the transports, and were on the west bank early on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.

During the night rain fell in torrents, and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river-bank. My ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that I could get no rest. The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep, without this additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house on the bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated, as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before. It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's command. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gun-boats every fifteen minutes during the night.

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: General Lew Wallace on the right, Sherman on his left; then McClelland, and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river; Crittenden was next in line after Nelson, and on his right; McCook followed, and formed the extreme right of Buell's command. My old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under Buell constituted the left wing of the army. These relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. This day everything was favorable to the Federal side. We had now become the attacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last point held by him



MAJOR-GENERAL B. M. PRENTISS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on the left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About 3 o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. At this point there was a clearing between us and

the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break, and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-range, I stopped and let the troops pass. The command, *Charge*, was given, and was executed with loud cheers, and with a run, when the last of the enemy broke.

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early part of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel James B. McPherson and Major J. P. Hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery



BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. H. L. WALLACE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did not stop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over, it had broken off entirely. There were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed, one a hat, and one a sword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no worse.

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemy, carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did not feel disposed positively to order Buell,

or any part of his command, to pursue. Although the senior in rank at the time, I had been so only a few weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but, had I seen him at the moment of the last charge, I should have at least requested him to follow.

The enemy had hardly started in retreat from his last position, when, looking back toward the river, I saw a division of troops coming up in beautiful order, as if going on parade or review. The commander was at the head of the column, and the staff seemed to be disposed about as they would have been had they been going on parade. When the head of the column came near where I was standing, it was halted, and the commanding officer, General A. McD. McCook, rode up to where I was and appealed to me not to send his division any farther, saying that they were worn out with marching and fighting. This division had marched on the 6th from a point ten or twelve miles east of Savannah, over bad roads. The men had also lost rest during the night while crossing the Tennessee, and had been engaged in the battle of the 7th. It was not, however, the rank and file or the junior officers who asked to be excused, but the division commander.† I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition, and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out we found their field-hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns.

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and but few in the East equaled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On our side National and Confederate were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not been plowed for several years, probably because the land was

† In an article on the battle of Shiloh, which I wrote for "The Century" magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook, who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the 6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the

battle of the second day, and did as good service as its position allowed. In fact, an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman, both in his memoirs and report, makes mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook injustice in my article in "The Century," though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fullest admission.

U. S. GRANT.

MOUNT MCGREGOR, N. Y., June 21, 1885.



FORD WHERE THE HAMBURG ROAD CROSSES LICK CREEK, LOOKING FROM COLONEL STUART'S POSITION ON THE FEDERAL LEFT.

Lick Creek at this point was fordable on the first day of the battle, but the rains on Sunday night rendered it impassable on the second day.

poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all cut down.

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders, and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the Confederate dead in their respective fronts, and to report the numbers so buried. The latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were

by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions.


The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been intrenched at Shiloh; but up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after reassuming command in the field. McPherson, my only military engineer, had been directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water from them; and in case of attack, these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. Besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel, and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments—fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications.

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. I had been two years at West Point with him, and had served with him afterward, in garrison



BRIDGE OVER SNAKE CREEK BY WHICH GENERAL LEW WALLACE'S TROOPS REACHED THE FIELD, SUNDAY EVENING. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

Pittsburg Landing is nearly two miles to the left. Owl Creek empties from the left into Snake Creek, a short distance above the bridge.



BIVOUAC OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS, SUNDAY NIGHT.

and in the Mexican war, several years more. He was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. One system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth, and independence of character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. No one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. When I came into command of the army, in 1864, I requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I traveled considerably through the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted; who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend General Buell against what

I believed to be most unjust charges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge I had so often refuted—of disloyalty. This brought from General Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York "World" some time before I received the letter itself. I could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I replied to him, but not through the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor did I ever see it in print, neither did I receive an answer.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound in the afternoon of the first day. His wound, as I understood afterward, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger, and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. The news was not long in reaching our side, and, I suppose, was quite an encouragement to the National soldiers. I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war, and later as an officer in the regular army. He was a man of high character and ability. His contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later, and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce. Nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability.†

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston, and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when Johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. *If*s defeated the Confederates at Shiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten *if* all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy, and *if* all of theirs had taken effect. Commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, no hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reënforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour.

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill claimed I could not, and still cannot, see; though there is nothing to criticise

† In his "Personal Memoirs" General Grant says: "I once wrote that 'nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability'; but after studying the

orders and dispatches of Johnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. My judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions."



WOUNDED AND STRAGGLERS ON THE WAY TO THE LANDING, AND AMMUNITION-WAGONS GOING TO THE FRONT.

except the claims put forward for it since. But the Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship, and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troops on both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more dash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring.

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours—first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. The object of the Confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. We were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if further pursuit could have been made. As it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy gained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost 7 pieces of artillery, McCler-

nand 6, Prentiss 8, and Hurlbut 2 batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured 7 guns, McClernand 3, and the Army of the Ohio 20.


At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union force on the morning of the 6th was 33,000. Lew Wallace brought five thousand more after nightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician, or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers,—everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay from the Government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought twenty thousand more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.

Our loss in the two-days fight was 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 missing. Of these 2103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1728 were killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 missing. This estimate must be incorrect. We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field. Beauregard reports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it always did, both before and subsequently, when I was in command. The nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. The country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gun-boats as the foe. But about sundown, when the National troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, proximately, of the position of our troops, and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. This was done with effect, as is proved by the Confederate reports.

Up to the battle of Shiloh, I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapse suddenly and soon if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. Henry and Donelson were such victories. An army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus, and Hickman, Ky., fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tenn., the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. But when Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold

a line farther south, from Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive, and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us, and which we expected to continue to hold. But such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as contraband as much as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed, and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers, who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments, to be issued as if furnished from our Northern depots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners when it could not be brought within our lines, and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. This policy, I believe, exercised a material influence in hastening the end.



ABOVE THE LANDING — THE STORE, AND A PART OF THE NATIONAL CEMETERY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864.

SHILOH REVIEWED.

BY DON CARLOS BUELL, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.




BATTERY, FORWARD !

TWENTY-THREE years ago the banks of the Tennessee witnessed a remarkable occurrence. There was a wage of battle. Heavy blows were given and received, and the challenger failed to make his cause good. But there were peculiar circumstances which distinguished the combat from other trials of strength in the rebellion: An army comprising 70 regiments of infantry, 20 batteries of artillery, and a sufficiency of cavalry, lay for two weeks and more in isolated camps, with a river in its rear and a hostile army claimed to be superior in numbers 20 miles distant in its front, while the commander made his headquarters and passed his nights 9 miles away on the opposite side of the river. It had no line or order of battle, no defensive works of any sort, no outposts, properly speaking, to give warning, or check the advance of an enemy, and no recognized head during the absence of the regular commander. On a Saturday the hostile force arrived and formed in order of battle, without detection or hindrance, within a mile and a half of the unguarded army, advanced upon it the next morning, penetrated its disconnected lines, assaulted its camps in front and flank, drove its disjointed members successively from position to position, capturing some and routing others, in spite of much heroic individual resistance, and steadily drew near the landing and depot of its supplies in the pocket between the river and an impassable creek. At the moment near the close of the day when the remnant of the retrograding army was driven to refuge in the midst of its magazines, with the triumphant enemy at half-gunshot distance, the advance division of a reënforcing army arrived on the opposite bank of the river, crossed, and took position under fire at the point of attack; the attacking force was checked, and the battle ceased for the day. The next morning at dawn the reënforcing army and a fresh division belonging to the defeated force advanced against the assailants, followed or accompanied by such of the broken columns of the previous day as had not lost all cohesion, and after ten hours of conflict drove the enemy from the captured camps and the field.

Such are the salient points in the popular conception and historical record of the battle of Shiloh. Scarcely less remarkable than the facts themselves are the means by which the responsible actors in the critical drama have endeavored to counteract them. At society reunions and festive entertainments, in newspaper interviews and dispatches, in letters and contributions to periodicals, afterthought official reports, biographies, memoirs, and other popular sketches, the subject of Shiloh, from the first hour of the battle to the present time, has been invaded by pretensions and exculpatory statements which revive the discussion only to confirm the memory of the grave faults that brought an army into imminent peril. These defenses and assumptions, starting first, apparently half suggested, in the zeal of official attendants and other partisans, were soon taken up more or less directly by the persons in whose behalf they were put forward; and now it is virtually declared by the principals themselves, that the Army of the Ohio was an unnecessary intruder in the battle, and that the blood of more than two thousand of its members shed on that field was a gratuitous sacrifice. .

With the origin of the animadversions that were current at the time upon the conduct of the battle, the Army of the Ohio had little to do, and it has not generally taken a willing part in the subsequent discussion. They commenced in the ranks of the victims, and during all the years that have given unwonted influence to the names which they affected, the witnesses of the first reports have without show of prejudice or much reiteration firmly adhered to their earlier testimony. It does not impair the value of that testimony if extreme examples were cited to illustrate the general fact; nor constitute a defense that such examples were not the general rule. I have myself, though many years ago, made answer to the more formal pleas that



PITTSBURG LANDING, VIEWED FROM THE FERRY LANDING ON THE OPPOSITE SHORE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.



PITTSBURG LANDING FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN A FEW DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE.

Of the six transports, the one farthest up stream, on the right, is the *Tycoon*, which was dispatched by the Cincinnati Branch of the Sanitary Commission with stores for the wounded. The next steamer is the *Tigress*, which was General Grant's headquarters boat during the Shiloh campaign. On the opposite side of the river is seen the gun-boat *Tyler*.

concerned the army which I commanded, and I am now called upon in the same cause to review the circumstances of my connection with the battle, and investigate its condition when it was taken up by the Army of the Ohio.

WHEN by the separate or concurrent operations of the forces of the Department of the Missouri, commanded by General Halleck, and of the Department of the Ohio, commanded by myself, the Confederate line had been broken, first at Mill Springs by General Thomas, and afterward at Fort Henry and at Fort Donelson by General Grant and the navy, and Nashville and Middle Tennessee were occupied by the Army of the Ohio, the shattered forces of the enemy fell back for the formation of a new line, and the Union armies prepared to follow for a fresh attack. It was apparent in advance that the Memphis and Charleston railroad between Memphis and Chattanooga would constitute the new line, and Corinth, the point of intersection of the Memphis and Charleston road running east and west, and the Mobile and Ohio road running north and south, soon developed as the main point of concentration.

While this new defense of the enemy and the means of assailing it by the Union forces were maturing, General Halleck's troops, for the moment under

the immediate command of General C. F. Smith, were transported up the Tennessee by water to operate on the enemy's railroad communications. It was purely an expeditionary service, not intended for the selection of a rendezvous or depot for future operations. After some attempts to debark at other points farther up the river, Pittsburg Landing was finally chosen as the most eligible for the temporary object; but when the concentration of the enemy at Corinth made that the objective point of a deliberate campaign, and the coöperation of General Halleck's troops and mine was arranged, Savannah, on the east bank of the river, was designated by Halleck as the point of rendezvous. This, though not as advisable a point as Florence, or some point between Florence and Eastport, was in a general sense proper. It placed the concentration under the shelter of the river and the gun-boats, and left the combined force at liberty to choose its point of crossing and line of attack.

On the restoration of General Grant to the immediate command of the troops, and his arrival at Savannah on the 17th of March, he converted the expeditionary encampment at Pittsburg Landing into the point of rendezvous of the two armies, by placing his whole force on the west side of the river, apparently on the advice of General Sherman, who, with his division, was already there. Nothing can be said upon any rule of military art or common expediency to justify that arrangement. An invading army may, indeed, as a preliminary step, throw an inferior force in advance upon the enemy's coast or across an intervening river to secure a harbor or other necessary foothold; but in such a case the first duty of the advanced force is to make itself secure by suitable works. Pittsburg Landing was in no

sense a point of such necessity or desirability as to require any risk, or any great expenditure of means for its occupation. If the force established there was not safe alone, it had no business there; but having been placed there, still less can any justification be found for the neglect of all proper means to make it secure against a superior adversary. General Grant continued his headquarters at Savannah, leaving General Sherman with a sort of control at Pittsburg Landing. Sherman's



THE LANDING AT SAVANNAH, NINE MILES BELOW (NORTH OF)
PITTSBURG LANDING.

General Grant's headquarters were in the Cherry mansion, on the right; the portico has since been added. The building on the left is a new hotel. The town lies about a quarter of a mile back from the bluff, and is much changed since the war.—EDITORS.

rank did not allow him the command, but he was authorized to assign the arriving regiments to brigades and divisions as he might think best, and designate the camping-grounds. In these and other ways he exercised an important influence upon the fate of the army.

The movement of the Army of the Ohio from Nashville (which I had occupied on February 25th) for the appointed junction was commenced on the night of the 15th of March by a rapid march of cavalry to secure the bridges in advance, which were then still guarded by the enemy. It was followed on the 16th and successive days by the infantry divisions, McCook being in advance with instructions to move steadily forward; to ford the streams where they were fordable, and when it was necessary to make repairs on the roads, such as building bridges over streams which were liable to frequent interruption by high water, to leave only a sufficient working party and guard for that purpose; to use all possible industry and energy, so as to move forward steadily and as rapidly as possible without forcing the march or straggling; and to send forward at once to communicate with General Smith at Savannah, and learn his situation.



MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDER M.D. MCCOOK.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

When the cavalry reached Columbia the bridge over Duck River was found in flames, and the river at flood stage. General McCook immediately commenced the construction of a frame bridge, but finding, after several days, that the work was progressing less rapidly than had been expected, I ordered the building of a boat bridge also, and both were completed on the 30th. On the same day the river became fordable. I arrived at Columbia on the 26th. General Nelson succeeded in getting a portion of his division across by fording on the 29th, and was given the advance. Most of his troops crossed by fording on the 30th. The other divisions followed him on the march with intervals of six miles, so as not to incommode one another—in all 5 divisions; about 37,000 effective men. On the first day of April, General Halleck and General Grant were notified that I would concentrate at Savannah on Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th, the distance being ninety miles. On the 4th General Nelson received notification from General Grant that he need not hasten his march, as he could not be put across the river before the following Tuesday; but the rate of march was not changed.

After seeing my divisions on the road, I left Columbia on the evening of the 3d, and arrived at Savannah on the evening of the 5th with my chief of staff, an aide-de-camp (Lieutenant C. L. Fitzhugh), and an orderly, leaving

the rest of my staff to follow rapidly with the headquarters train. Nelson had already arrived and gone into camp, and Crittenden was close in his rear. We were there to form a junction for the contemplated forward movement under the command of General Halleck in person, who was to leave St. Louis the first of the following week to join us. General Grant had been at Nelson's camp before my arrival, and said he would send boats for the division "Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week." "There will," he said, "be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson." I did not see General Grant that evening—probably because he was at Pittsburg Landing when I arrived, but he had made an appointment to meet me next day.

We were finishing breakfast at Nelson's camp Sunday morning, when the sound of artillery was heard up the river. We knew of no ground to apprehend a serious engagement, but the troops were promptly prepared to march, and I walked with my chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry, to Grant's quarters at Savannah, but he had started up the river. I there saw General C. F. Smith, who was in his bed sick, but apparently not dangerously ill. He had no apprehension about a battle, thought it an affair of outposts, and said that Grant had sixty thousand men. This would agree approximately with the estimate which Grant himself made of his force, at Nelson's camp.

As the firing continued, and increased in volume, I determined to go to the scene of action. Nelson only waited for the services of a guide to march by land. The river bottom between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing was a labyrinth of roads from which the overflows had obliterated all recent signs of travel, and left them impassable except in certain places, and it was with great difficulty that a guide could be obtained. The artillery had to be left behind to be transported by water. After disposing of these matters and sending orders for the rear divisions to push forward without their trains, I took a small steamer at the landing and proceeded up the river, accompanied only by my chief of staff. On the way we were met by a descending steamer which came alongside and delivered a letter from General Grant addressed to the "Commanding Officer, advanced forces, near Pittsburg, Tenn.," and couched in the following words:

"PITTSBURG, April 6, 1862.

"GENERAL: The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated at over one hundred thousand men. My headquarters will be in the log-building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff-officer to guide you to your place on the field. Respectfully, &c., U. S. GRANT, Maj.-Gen."

About half-way up we met a stream of fugitives that poured in a constantly swelling current along the west bank of the river. The mouth of Snake Creek was full of them swimming across. We arrived at the landing about 1 o'clock. I inquired for General Grant and was informed that he was on his headquarters boat, nearly against which we had landed. I went on

board, and was met by him at the door of the ladies' cabin, in which there were besides himself two or three members of his staff. Other officers may have entered afterward. He appeared to realize that he was beset by a pressing danger, and manifested by manner more than in words that he was relieved by my arrival as indicating the near approach of succor; but there was nothing in his deportment that the circumstances would not have justified without disparagement to the character of a courageous soldier. Certainly there was none of that masterly confidence which has since been assumed with reference to the occasion. After the first salutation, and as I walked to a seat, he remarked that he had just come in from the front, and held up his sword to call my attention to an indentation which he said the scabbard had received from a shot. I did not particularly notice it, and after inquiring about the progress of the battle and requesting him to send steamers to bring up Crittenden's division, which was coming into Savannah as I left, I proposed that we should go ashore. As we reached the gangway I noticed that the horses of himself and his staff were being taken ashore. He mounted and rode away, while I walked up the hill; so that I saw him no more until the attack occurred at the landing late in the evening. I state these particulars of our meeting with so much detail because a totally incorrect version of the place, manner, and substance of the interview has been used to give a false impression of the state of the battle, and a false coloring to personal traits which are assumed to have had the issue in control. ¶

¶ About two weeks after the battle of Shiloh there appeared in some newspaper that was shown to me a report of a conversation assumed to have taken place between General Grant and myself soon after the battle, in which I was represented as rallying him upon the narrowness of his escape, and saying that he had not transports enough to carry off ten thousand men; to which he was reported as replying, in substance, that when it came to retreating transportation would not have been required for more than ten thousand.

The story had been colored for popular effect, but was traceable to a conversation in a vein of pleasantry that occurred at my camp, after the battle, among a party of officers in which I had taken but little part.

Some time afterward it took on a modification which suited the alleged conversation, to my meeting with General Grant on my arrival at Pittsburg Landing during the battle. This changed materially the character of the report, but I continued to treat it with the indifference which I thought it deserved, though the story has been freely circulated. I never knew until within a few months past, through the publication of the "War Records," that in its modified form it had the indorsement of an official authorship.

From that publication it appears that a year after the battle General Grant called upon three of his staff-officers to make reports concerning the movements of General Lew Wallace's division on the day of the battle, in answer to a complaint of the latter officer that injustice had been done him in General Grant's reports. Two of the officers, namely, General McPherson and Captain Rowley, in their replies confined themselves to that sub-

ject. The third, Colonel Rawlins, on the other hand, made it the occasion of a specific defense, or explanation, or commendation, or whatever it may be called, of General Grant's relation to the battle. Among other things that have since been more or less disputed, he said:


"General Nelson's division of the Army of the Ohio reached Savannah on the afternoon of the 5th of April, but General Buell himself did not arrive. . . . You [General Grant] then rode back to the house near the river that had been designated for headquarters, to learn what word if any had been received from General Nelson, whose division you expected soon to arrive at the landing on the opposite side of the river; and you there met Maj.-Gen. D. C. Buell, who had arrived at Savannah and taken a steamer and come up to see you, and learn how the battle was progressing in advance of his force. Among his first inquiries was: 'What preparations have you made for retreating?' To which you replied, 'I have not yet despaired of whipping them, general'; and went on to state to him your momentary expectation of the arrival of General Wallace, to whom orders had been timely and repeatedly sent, and that General Nelson's division might soon be expected by the wagon-road from Savannah," etc.

This statement, ridiculous and absurd in its principal feature, is incorrect in every particular.

It is well known that I arrived at Savannah on the 5th of April; General Grant did not, as might be inferred, find *me* at the landing at Pittsburg—I found *him* there; we did not meet at "the house near the river," but on his headquarters steamer.

I mention these points only to show the tendency of the statement to error, and I aver that no such conversation as is described ever occurred, and that the contingency of a retreat was not brought forward by General Grant or by me.

My attention has within a few days been called



PITTSBURG LANDING IN THE SUMMER OF 1864. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The central or main landing is here shown. On the hill to the right is seen the flag-staff of the National Cemetery; in the rear and to the left of the cemetery is the steamboat-store and post-office, where the roads from the landings meet.

On the shore I encountered a scene which has often been described. The face of the bluff was crowded with stragglers from the battle. The number there at different hours has been estimated at from five thousand in the morning to fifteen thousand in the evening. The number at nightfall would not have fallen short of fifteen thousand, including those who had passed down the river, and the less callous but still broken and demoralized fragments about the camps on the plateau near the landing. At the top of the bluff all was confusion. Men mounted and on foot, and wagons with their teams and excited drivers, all struggling to force their way closer to the river, were mixed up in apparently inextricable confusion with a battery of artillery which was standing in park without men or horses to man or move it. The increasing throng already presented a barrier which it was evidently necessary to remove, in order to make way for the passage of my troops when they should arrive. In looking about for assistance I fell upon one officer, the quartermaster of an Ohio regiment, who preserved his senses, and was anxious to do something to abate the disorder. I instructed him to take control of the teams, and move them down the hill by a side road which led to the narrow bottom below the landing, and there park them. He went to work with alacrity and the efficiency of a strong will, and succeeded in clear-

to the fact that an article, in a recent number of "The Century" magazine [General Adam Badeau's paper on "General Grant," in the number for May, 1885], has given fresh circulation to the story, and has combined the official and the original phraseology of it. I have regarded it as a

trivial question, of little moment to either General Grant or myself; but perhaps the value attached to it by others makes it proper for me to give it an attention which I have not heretofore chosen to bestow upon it.—D. C. BUELL.


AIRDRIE, Kentucky, July 10th, 1885.

ing the ground of the wagons. It proved before night to have been a more important service than I had expected, for it not only opened the way for Nelson's division, but extricated the artillery and made it possible to get it into action when the attack occurred at the landing about sunset.

It is now time to glance at the circumstances which had brought about and were urging on the state of affairs here imperfectly portrayed.

UPON learning on the 2d of April of the advance of the Army of the Ohio toward Savannah, General Sidney Johnston determined to anticipate the junction of that army with General Grant's force, by attacking the latter, and at once gave orders for the movement of his troops on the following day. It was his expectation to reach the front of the army at Pittsburg Landing on Friday, the 4th, and make the attack at daylight on Saturday; but the condition of the roads, and some confusion in the execution of orders, prevented him from getting into position for the attack until 3 o'clock P. M. on Saturday. This delay and an indiscreet reconnoissance which brought on a sharp engagement with the Federal pickets, rendered it so improbable that the Union commander would not be prepared for the attack, that General Beauregard advised the abandonment of the enterprise, to the success of which a surprise was deemed to be essential. General Johnston overruled the proposition, however, and the attack was ordered for the following morning. The army was drawn up in three parallel lines, covering the front of the Federal position. Hardee commanded the first line, Bragg the second, and Polk and Breckinridge the third, the latter being intended as a reserve.

The locality on which the storm of battle was about to burst has often been described with more or less of inaccuracy or incompleteness. It is an undulating table-land, quite broken in places, elevated a hundred feet or thereabout above the river; an irregular triangle in outline, nearly equilateral, with the sides four miles long, bordered on the east by the river, which here runs nearly due north, on the north-west by Snake Creek and its tributary, Owl Creek, and on the south, or south-west, by a range of hills which immediately border Lick Creek on the north bank, two hundred feet or more in height, and sloping gradually toward the battle-field. In these hills rise the eastern tributaries of Owl Creek, one of them called Oak Creek, extending half-way across the front or south side of the battle-field, and interlocking with a ravine called Locust Grove Creek, which runs in the opposite direction into Lick Creek a mile from its mouth. Other short, deep ravines start from the table-land and empty into the river, the principal among them being Dill's Branch, six hundred yards above the landing. Midway in the front, at the foot of the Lick Creek hills, start a number of surface drains which soon unite in somewhat difficult ravines and form Tillman's Creek, or Brier Creek. It runs almost due north, a mile and a quarter from the river, in a deep hollow, which divides the table-land into two main ridges. Tillman's Creek empties into Owl Creek half a mile above the Snake Creek bridge by which the division of Lew Wallace arrived. Short, abrupt ravines break from the main ridges into Tillman's Hollow, and the broad surface of the west ridge



opposite the church. In the official reports these various roads are called with some confusion, but not altogether inaccurately, Crump's Landing road, Hamburg road, Corinth road or Purdy road, even over the same space, according to the idea of the writer. The Corinth road from the landing has two principal branches. The western branch passes by the church, and the eastern passes a mile east of the church into the Bark road, which extends along the crest of the Lick Creek hills. The military maps show many other roads, some of them farm-roads, and some only well-worn tracks made in hauling for the troops. In some places the old roads were quite obliterated, and are improperly represented on the maps, as in the case of the River road, which is not shown on the official map between McArthur's and Hurlbut's headquarters, immediately west of the landing. It is shown on Sherman's camp map, and its existence is not doubtful. At

the time of the battle, much the largest part of the ground was in forest, sometimes open, sometimes almost impenetrable for horsemen, with occasional cleared fields of from 20 to 80 acres; and these variations operated in a signal manner upon the fortune of the combatants. There was not a cleared field within the limits of the battle that has not its history.

We may now locate the troops in their encampments, for there is where the battle found them, and its currents and eddies will frequently be discovered by the reference to certain camps in the official reports. The camp map which I received from General Sherman will serve as a useful guide, subject to some necessary modifications, to make a field sketch agree with an actual survey. But the regimental camps did not always conform to the lines laid down for the brigades and divisions. Sometimes they were in front, sometimes in rear of the general line. I have not pretended generally to introduce these variations into the map which I have prepared to accompany this article.

Starting at the landing, we find the Second Division, commanded by W. H. L. Wallace, in the space bounded by the river, Snake Creek, the River road, and the right-hand road leading west from the landing. Along that road are, in this order, the camps of the 12th, 7th, 14th, and 2d Iowa, and the 52d and 9th Illinois. At the point where that road crosses the River road, in the south-west angle of the intersection, are the headquarters of General McArthur. On the east side of the River road, north of McArthur are, first, the 14th Missouri, called "Birge's sharp-shooters" (not on the Sherman camp map), and next the 81st Ohio. The 16th Wisconsin has been assigned to Prentiss's division since the Sherman map was made, and the 13th Missouri has probably taken that ground. All these points are particularly mentioned in the reports of the battle and have been verified.

On the left-hand road where it crosses the River road, three-quarters of a mile from the landing, is the Fourth Division (Hurlbut's), its Third Brigade between the road and the river, and the line of the two other brigades bearing off to the north-west. I have located the 3d Iowa, of that division, on the ground just in front of which Crittenden's division was first formed in line Monday morning, because it was stated to me at the time that General Prentiss was killed at that camp; the fact being that near that point Prentiss was captured and W. H. L. Wallace mortally wounded.

At the fork of the River road and the Hamburg and Purdy road, is the camp of Sherman's Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Stuart, two miles from the division to which it belongs, and one mile from Hurlbut's division. On both sides of the eastern Corinth road, half a mile south of the Hamburg and Purdy road, is Prentiss's division (the Sixth) of 2 brigades. It is not shown on the Sherman map. Stretching across the western Corinth road at the church, along Oak Creek, are the other three brigades of the Fifth Division (Sherman's)—Hildebrand's brigade being on the east side of the road, Buckland's next on the west side, and John A. McDowell's next on Buckland's right. Only one regiment (the 6th Iowa) of McDowell's brigade is shown on the Sherman map.

The official reports and other authority locate the First Division (McClermand's) as follows: The right of the Third Brigade is at the point where the western Corinth road crosses the Hamburg and Purdy road, 500 yards from the church, and the left is 200 yards from Hildebrand's brigade, which is thus obliquely in its front. The other 2 brigades, on a general line starting from the right of the Third, form an obtuse angle with the Third, and are along the ridge nearly parallel with Tillman's Creek, the extreme right being not far from the bluff overlooking Owl Creek bottom. The First Brigade is on the east side of the adjacent field instead of the west side, as the Sherman map, according to the road, would seem to place it, though that map does not show the field. It remains to be added that 3 of the 5 divisions were for that period of the war old and experienced troops. Hurlbut's Third Brigade belonged to the Army of the Ohio, and had been sent to reënforce Grant before Donelson. Eight other regiments were furnished by me for the first movement up the Tennessee, and remained with Grant's army. Sherman's division, one of the newest, had been under his command more than a month, and ought to have been in a tolerably efficient state of discipline. Prentiss's division, composed largely of raw regiments, had only been organized a few days; yet it was posted in the most exposed and assailable point on the front. The effective force at the date of the battle, exclusive of Lew Wallace's division, which was at or near Crump's Landing, 6 miles below, is stated by General Sherman at 32,000 men; by General Grant at 33,000. General Wallace left 2 regiments of his division and a piece of artillery at Crump's Landing, and joined the army Sunday evening, with, as he states, not more than 5000 men.

I proceed now, in the light of the official reports and other evidence, to explain briefly what happened: the object being not so much to criticise the manner of the battle, or give a detailed description of it, as to trace it to its actual condition at the close of the first day, and outline its progress during the second. With this object the question of a surprise has little to do. I stop, therefore, only to remark that each revival of that question has placed the fact in a more glaring light. The enemy was known to be at hand, but no adequate steps were taken to ascertain in what force or with what design. The call to arms blended with the crash of the assault, and when the whole forest on the rising ground in front flashed with the gleam of bayonets, then General Sherman, as he reports, "became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack." Yet among the more watchful officers in the front divisions, there was a nervous feeling that their superiors were not giving due heed to the presence of hostile reconnoitering parties, though they little imagined the magnitude of the danger that impended. On Saturday General Sherman was notified of these parties. He answered that the pickets must be strengthened, and instructed to be vigilant; that he was embarrassed for the want of cavalry; his cavalry had been ordered away, and the cavalry he was to have instead had not arrived; as soon as they reported he would send them to the front and find out what was there. In one of his brigades the regimental commanders held a consultation, at which it was

determined to strengthen the pickets. These are curious revelations to a soldier's ear.

Prentiss's vigilance gave the first warning of the actual danger, and in fact commenced the contest. On Saturday, disquieted by the frequent appearance of the enemy's cavalry, he increased his pickets, though he had no evidence of the presence of a large force. Early Sunday morning one of these picket-guards, startled no doubt by the hum of forty thousand men half a mile distant, waking up for battle, went forward to ascertain the cause, and soon came upon the enemy's pickets, which it promptly attacked. It was then a quarter past 5 o'clock, and all things being ready, the Confederate general, accepting the signal of the pickets, at once gave the order to advance. Previously, however, General Prentiss, still apprehensive, had sent forward Colonel Moore of the 21st Missouri, with five companies to strengthen the picket-guard. On the way out Colonel Moore met the guard returning to camp with a number of its men killed and wounded. Sending the latter on to camp and calling for the remaining companies of his regiment, he proceeded to the front in time to take a good position on the border of a cleared field and opened fire upon the enemy's skirmishers, checking them for a while; but the main body forced him back upon the division with a considerable list of wounded, himself among the number. All this occurred in front of Sherman's camp, not in front of Prentiss's. This spirited beginning, unexpected on both sides, gave the first alarm to the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss. The latter promptly formed his division at the first news from the front, and moved a quarter of a mile in advance of his camp, where he was attacked before Sherman was under arms. He held his position until the enemy on his right passed him in attacking Sherman, whose left regiment immediately broke into rout. He then retired in some disorder, renewing the resistance in his camp but forced back in still greater disorder, until at 9 o'clock he came upon the line which Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace were forming half a mile in rear.


Upon the first alarm in his camp, which was simultaneous with the attack upon Sherman, McClelland rapidly got under arms, and endeavored to support Sherman's left with his Third Brigade, only two hundred yards in rear, while he placed his First and Second Brigades in inverted order still farther to the rear and left, to oppose the enemy's columns pouring in upon his left flank through the opening on Sherman's left; but his Third Brigade was forced back with the fugitives from Sherman's broken line by the advancing enemy, and endeavored with only partial success to form on the right of McClelland's line, which at first was formed with the left a little south, and the center north of the Corinth road. Before the formation was completed the line was compelled to retire by the pressure on its front and left flank, with the loss of 6 pieces of artillery, but it re-formed 300 yards in rear.

Hildebrand's brigade had now disappeared in complete disorder from the front, leaving three pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. Buckland formed promptly at the first alarm, and in order to keep the enemy back endeavored by Sherman's direction to throw a regiment beyond Oak Creek,

which covered his front at a distance of two hundred yards, but on reaching the brow of the low hill bordering the stream the enemy was encountered on the hither side. Nevertheless the brigade resisted effectively for about two hours the efforts of the assailants to cross the boggy stream in force. The enemy suffered great loss in these efforts, but succeeded at last. Before being quite forced back, Buckland received orders from Sherman to form line on the Purdy road four hundred yards in rear, to connect with McClerland's right. Orders were also given to McDowell, who had not yet been engaged, to close to the left on the same line. These orders were in effect defeated in both cases, and five pieces of artillery lost by faults in the execution and the rapid advance of the enemy. Sherman's division as an organized body disappeared from the field from this time until the close of the day. McDowell's brigade preserved a sort of identity for a while. Sherman reports that at "about 10:30 A. M. the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClerland's whole front. Finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover—trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right." It sounds like the signal to disperse, and a little after 1 o'clock the brigade and regiments are seen no more. Some fragments of the division and the commander himself attached themselves to McClerland's command, which now, owing to its composite and irregular organization, could hardly be denominated a division.

The contest which raged in McClerland's camp was of a fluctuating character. The ground was lost and won more than once, but each ebb and flow of the struggle left the Union side in a worse condition. In his fifth position McClerland was driven to the camp of his First Brigade, half of his command facing to the south and half to the west, to meet the converging attack of the enemy. His nominal connection with the left wing of the army across the head of Tillman's Hollow had been severed, by the dispersion or defeat of the detached commands that formed it. Another reverse to his thinned ranks would drive him over the bluff into Owl Creek bottom, and perhaps cut him off from the river. He determined, therefore, between 2 and 3 o'clock to retire across Tillman's Hollow in the direction of the landing. That movement was effected with a good deal of irregularity, but with the repulse of a small body of pursuing cavalry, and a new line was formed on the opposite ridge along the River road, north of Hurlbut's headquarters. I shall have occasion farther along to remark upon the display of force on the right of this line in the vicinity of McArthur's headquarters. The movement must have been completed about 3 o'clock. Leaving the right wing, as it may be called, in this position prior to the attack of 4 o'clock, which drove it still farther back, we will return to the current of events in the left wing.

With Stuart on the extreme left, as with the other commanders, the presence of the enemy was the first warning of danger. He was soon compelled to fall back from his camp to a new position, and presently again to a third, which located him on the prolongation and extreme left of the line formed



MAP OF THE FIELD OF SHILOH,

Near Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., showing the positions of the U. S. forces under Maj.-Gen'l U. S. Grant, U. S. Vol., and Maj.-Gen'l D. C. Buell, U. S. Vol., on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862. Surveyed under the direction of Col. Geo. Thom, Chief of Top'l Eng'rs, Dept. of the Mississippi.

REVISED AND AMENDED BY GEN. D. C. BUELL.

The topography is substantially that of the original Thom, or "Official Map" (see p. 308), with some proper corrections taken from a survey made under the direction of Capt. A. T. Andreas, an officer in the battle, and now President of the Western Art Association; and from the official map of the Army of the Ohio, made by Captain Michler, Topographical Engineer.

The camps are located partly in accordance with a camp map made prior to the battle by Gen. W. T. Sherman (see fac-simile, p. 456); partly from information, original or confirmatory, obligingly furnished by Capt. Andreas, and from other authority. All camps referred to in the official reports have been carefully identified.

The positions A, B, and C, numbers 3 and 9, agree with the positions of McCook, Nelson, and Crittenden for "the morning" and "evening of the 7th" on the Thom map, and also on the Michler map.

The positions of Terrill's, Mendenhall's, and Bartlett's batteries also correspond with those maps.

The other positions of the Army of the Ohio are not on the Thom map, but are copied from the Michler map, excepting numbers 2 and 7, which, with the positions of the Army of the Tennessee, prior to number 4 and between numbers 4 and 9, have been determined from the official reports.


The position number 4 (10 o'clock A. M.) of McClelland, Wallace, and Sherman, after four hours of fighting, corresponds with their position on the Thom map for the "morning of the 7th."

The first position of the Army of the Tennessee on the morning of the 6th conformed substantially to the camps of Stuart on the left, Prentiss in the center, and Sherman on the right.

At 4 P. M. of the 6th, McClelland, Sherman, and one brigade of Hurlbut were on the River road north of Hurlbut's headquarters. The remainder of the army that was in ranks at that hour — Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Prentiss — was almost exactly in the position, number 4, occupied on the 7th by Crittenden, and the right and center brigades of Nelson, extending from the western Corinth road across to and a little beyond the River road. The "Hornet's Nest" was in front of Crittenden's left brigade and Nelson's right brigade. — D. C. B.

AIRDRIE, KENTUCKY, June, 1885.

This edition includes a few corrections which do not appear in the map as printed in "The Century" magazine for March, 1886.






THE "HORNETS' NEST" — PRENTISS'S TROOPS AND HICKENLOOPER'S BATTERY REPULSING HARDEE'S TROOPS.

This cut and the one on the next page form one picture relating to the battle of the first day.

by Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, but without having any connection with it. As soon as the first advance of the enemy was known, these two commanders were called upon by those in front for support. In the absence of a common superior it was sent forward by regiments or brigades in such manner as seemed proper to the officer appealed to, and after that was left to its own devices. It seldom formed the connection desired, or came under the direction of a common superior. Indeed, the want of cohesion and concert in the Union ranks is conspicuously indicated in the official reports. A regiment is rarely overcome in front, but falls back because the regiment on its right or left has done so, and exposed its flank. It continues its backward movement at least until it is well under shelter, thus exposing the flank of its neighbor, who then must also needs fall back. Once in operation, the process repeats itself indefinitely. In a broken and covered country which affords occasional rallying-points and obstructs the pursuit, it proceeds step by step. On an open field, in the presence of light artillery and cavalry, it would run rapidly into general rout.

This outflanking, so common in the Union reports at Shiloh, is not a mere excuse of the inferior commanders. It is the practical consequence of the absence of a common head, and the judicious use of reserves to counteract partial reverses and preserve the front of battle. The want of a general direction is seen also in the distribution of Hurlbut's and Wallace's divisions. Hurlbut sent a brigade under Colonel Veatch to support Sherman's left; Wallace sent one under General McArthur to the opposite extreme to sup-



GIBSON'S BRIGADE CHARGING HURLBUT'S TROOPS IN THE "HORNETS' NEST."

From the Cyclorama of Shiloh at Chicago. By permission.

port Stuart; and the two remaining brigades of each were between the extremes — Wallace on Veatch's left but not in connection with it, and Hurlbut on McArthur's right, also without connection. Stuart himself with his brigade was two miles to the left of Sherman's division to which he belonged. When the three Confederate lines were brought together successively at the front, there was, of course, a great apparent mingling of organizations; but it was not in their case attended with the confusion that might be supposed, because each division area was thereby supplied with a triple complement of brigade and division officers, and the whole front was under the close supervision of four remarkably efficient corps commanders. The evils of disjointed command are plainly to be seen in the arrangement of the Federal line, but the position of the left wing after the forced correction of the first faulty disposition of Hurlbut's brigades was exceedingly strong, and in the center was held without a break against oft-repeated assaults from 9 o'clock until 5 o'clock. From 12 until 2 it was identical with the second position taken by Nelson and Crittenden on Monday, and it was equally formidable against attack from both directions. Its peculiar feature consisted in a wood in the center, with a thick undergrowth, flanked on either side by open fields, and with open but sheltering woods in front and rear. The Confederates gave the name of "Hornets' Nest" to the thicket part of it on Sunday, and it was in the open ground on the east flank that General Sidney Johnston was killed.

On this line, between and under the shelter of Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, Prentiss rallied a considerable force, perhaps a thousand men, of his

routed division at 9 o'clock, and fought stubbornly until near the close of the day. By 3 o'clock the withdrawal of the right wing, accompanied by Veatch's brigade, exposed W. H. L. Wallace's right flank, which also partially crumbled away; and the retirement of Stuart about the same hour before the strong attack brought against him, and of Hurlbut at 4 o'clock under the same powerful pressure upon his left flank, left Prentiss and Wallace with his remaining regiments isolated and unsupported. Still they held their ground while the enemy closed upon each flank. As they were about being completely enveloped, Wallace endeavored to extricate his command, and was mortally wounded in the attempt at 5 o'clock. Some of his regiments under Colonel Tuttle fought their way through the cross-fire of the contracting lines of the enemy, but 6 regiments of the 2 divisions held fast until the encompassment was complete, and one by one with Prentiss, between half-past 5 and 6 o'clock, they were forced to surrender. This gallant resistance, and the delay caused by the necessary disposition of the captives, weakened the force of the attack which McClelland sustained in his seventh position on the River road at 4 o'clock, and retarded the onward movement of the enemy for nearly 3 hours after the retirement of the right wing from the west side of Tillman's Creek.

Before the incumbrance of their success was entirely put out of the way the Confederates pressed forward to complete a seemingly assured victory, but it was too late. John K. Jackson's brigade and the 9th and 10th Mississippi of Chalmers's brigade crossed Dill's ravine, and their artillery on the south side swept the bluff at the landing, the missiles falling into the river far beyond. Hurlbut had hurriedly got into line in rear of the siege-guns, as they are called in the official reports posted half a mile from the river, but for five hundred yards from the landing there was not a soldier in ranks or any organized means of defense. \ Just as the danger was perceived, Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of artillery, rapidly approached Colonel Fry and myself. The idea of getting the battery which was standing in park into action was expressed simultaneously by the three, and was promptly executed by Colonel Webster's immediate exertion. General Grant came up a few minutes later, and a member of his escort was killed in that position. Chalmers's skirmishers approached to within one hundred yards of the battery. The number in view was not large, but the gunners were already abandoning their pieces, when Ammen's brigade, accompanied by Nelson, came into action. The attack was repelled, and the engagement ended for the day.

In his report of April 9th, to Halleck, General Grant says of this incident:

"At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded by the gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington*, Captains Gwin and Shirk, U. S. Navy, commanding, four 20-pounder Parrott guns, and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery or cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this point, no troops were stationed here, except the necessary artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at this moment the

\ In studying the Official Reports these "siege-guns" must not be confounded with the battery of rifle field-guns nearer the river; to all of these the term "Reserve Artillery" has been given on the map (page 503).—D. C. B.

advance of Major-General Buell's column (a part of the division under General Nelson) arrived, the two generals named both being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack and the enemy soon driven back. In this repulse, much is due to the presence of the gun-boats *Tyler* and *Lexington*, and their able commanders, Captains (twin and Shirk."


My own official report is to the same effect. In a calm review of the battle, not unfriendly to General Grant, and written some years after the occurrence, General Hurlbut said:

"About 6 P. M. this movement (for a final attack at the landing) was reported to General Hurlbut. He at once took measures to change the front of 2 regiments, or parts of regiments, of which the 55th Illinois was one, and to turn 6 pieces of artillery to bear upon the point of danger. At that instant, he being near the head of the Landing road, General Grant came up from the river, closely followed by Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division. Information of the expected attack was promptly given, and two of Ammen's regiments deployed into line, moved rapidly forward, and after a few sharp exchanges of volleys from them, the enemy fell back, and the bloody series of engagements of Sunday at Pittsburg Landing closed with that last repulse."

The reports of all the officers who took part in the action at the landing, Nelson, Ammen, and the regimental commanders, fully sustain the main point in these accounts, and are totally at variance with General Grant's statement in his "Century" article [see page 465]. I have myself never described the attack at the landing as "a desperate effort" of the enemy; but I have said that the condition of affairs at that point made the occasion critical. We know from the Confederate reports that the attack was undertaken by Jackson's and Chalmers's brigades as above stated; that the reserve artillery could effect nothing against the attacking force under the shelter of Dill's ravine; that the fire of the gun-boats was equally harmless on account of the elevation which it was necessary to give the guns in order to clear the top of the bluff; and that the final assault, owing to the show of resistance, was delayed. Jackson's brigade made its advance without cartridges. When they came to the crest of the hill and found the artillery supported by infantry, they shrank from the assault with bayonets alone, and Jackson went in search of coöperation and support. In the meantime the attack was superseded by the order of the Confederate commander calling off his troops for the night. The attack was poorly organized, but it was not repelled until Ammen arrived, and it cannot be affirmed under the circumstances that the action of his brigade in delaying and repelling the enemy was not of the most vital importance. Had the attack been made before Nelson could arrive, with the means which the enemy had abundantly at hand, it would have succeeded beyond all question.

As fast as Nelson's division arrived it was formed in line of battle in front of Grant's troops, pickets were thrown across Dill's ravine, and the dawn of another day was awaited to begin the second stage in the battle; or, speaking more correctly, to fight the second battle of Shiloh. Let us in the meantime examine more in detail the condition in which the first day had left General Grant's command, and its prospects unaided for the morrow.

THE evidence relied upon to refute the accepted belief in the critical condition of General Grant's command on Sunday evening is of two sorts: first,



THE OFFICIAL, OR THOM, MAP OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

On Nov. 28th, 1884, two weeks before the Official Map was sent to press with General Grant's Shiloh article (in "The Century" magazine for February, 1885), inquiry was made of General George Thom concerning its history. He replied, Dec. 5th, that it was prepared under his direction as Chief of Topographical Engineers on Halleck's staff soon after the battle, while the Union troops were still encamped on and near the battleground, and that Generals Grant, Buell, and Sherman furnished him with information as to the positions occupied by the troops in the battle. On Dec. 15th, General Thom "called the attention of General Grant to certain criticisms which General Sherman published on the Official Map . . . of that battle-field, at a meeting of the Army of the Tennessee held in Cincinnati on the 6th and 7th of April, 1881." In reply, General Grant wrote:

"3 E. 66th ST., N. Y. City, Dec. 30th, 1884.

"MY DEAR GENERAL THOM: Your letter of the 15th instant was duly received, and I now have yours of the 28th. In

regard to the matter of the map which 'The Century' magazine is to use in illustration of the article which I have furnished on the battle of Shiloh, I have examined it, and see nothing to criticize. I was not aware before the receipt of your first letter that General Sherman had ever criticised your map of the battle-field of Shiloh. I have not spoken to Sherman on that particular subject recently, nor ever that I remember of. 'The Century,' as I understand, has taken the Official Map to illustrate my article. Very truly yours, U. S. GRANT."

General Grant's approval of the use of the Official Map with his article was given in an interview with one of the editors over the map, at his house early in Nov., 1884. On June 24th, 1885, five months after the appearance of the article, Colonel F. D. Grant wrote to the editor from Mount McGregor, inclosing notes for the revision of the map, and saying: "He [General Grant] would like you to make the changes in the map, indicated." For General Grant's map and Colonel Grant's explanation, see page 470.—EDITORS.

the *official map*, as it is called, and second, the personal statements and assumptions of General Grant and General Sherman. I shall examine these data upon the evidence of the official reports and my own observation.

The official map was prepared, after the arrival of General Halleck at Pittsburg Landing, by his topographical engineer, General George Thom. The topographical part of it was made from an approximate survey, and, though not strictly accurate, is sufficiently so for an intelligent study of the battle. For the errors in the location of the troops General Thom cannot be supposed to be responsible, since he could have no knowledge of the facts except what he derived from the statements of others; but in what is given and what is withheld they are of a very misleading nature. They consist, first, in the extension of Grant's line on the evening of the 6th a full half-mile to the west of its true limit—placing Hurlbut's division on the front actually occupied by McClernand, McClernand on and four hundred yards beyond Sherman's ground, and Sherman entirely on the west side of Tillman's Hollow on the right of the camping-ground of McClernand's division, and within the lines occupied by the Confederates. On the morning of the 7th they place from left to right, McClernand, then Sherman, then Lew Wallace, along the bluff bordering Owl Creek bottom, all west of Tillman's Creek, and on ground which we did not possess until after four hours of fighting; followed on the left by Hurlbut's division; thus occupying a solid front of a mile and a third, in comparison with which the undeveloped front of my army presents a very subordinate appearance. They give no account of the positions during the battle, in which the right of that army was substantially in contact with Wallace's division on the extreme right. They give two of its positions,—one in the first formation before its front was developed, and the other at the close of the day, when Grant's troops had taken possession of their camps again, and mine had been withdrawn from the ground on which they fought. These two positions are taken from my official map, but not the intermediate positions shown on that map. Below the copy of the Thom map, as published with General Grant's article in the February number of "The Century" (1885), it was stated that "the positions of the troops were indicated in accordance with information furnished at the time by Generals Grant, Buell, and Sherman." It would be presumed that Grant and Sherman, the latter especially, in consequence of his intimate relations with Halleck's headquarters, were consulted about the location of the troops; and it is not to be doubted that their information was the guide. If any information of mine was adopted, it was only through the map that accompanied my report, and with reference to the position of my own troops.

Nineteen years after the battle General Sherman revised the official map, and deposited his version with the archives of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee for historical use. Ostensibly it accepts the topography of the Thom map, but modifies the positions of the troops in the most radical manner. On the Thom map the line of battle Sunday evening is represented as being along the right-hand road leading west from the landing, with the reserve artillery and Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions on the left, and



CONFEDERATES.

IN THE "HORNETS' NEST"—W. H. L. WALLACE'S LINE.

This cut and the one on the next page form one picture relating to the first day's battle.

Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman in the order mentioned, toward the right. The modification of this position of the troops by the Sherman edition, may be described as follows [see map, page 470]: Looking west over the map, we see a line on the east bank of the river marked "Buell." No part of my army is represented on the west bank. On the west side of the river, 400 yards back from the landing and parallel with the river, is a line 100 yards long marked "Grant." Extending back from the river along Dill's Branch, is a line half a mile long marked "Detachments." This might mean the reserve artillery. From the outer extremity of the "Detachments" is a line two-thirds of a mile long running west, but swelling in the center well to the south, with its right resting on Tillman's Creek, and marked "Hurlbut." On the right of Hurlbut extending in the same west course, and entirely on the west side of Tillman's Creek, is a double line one-eighth of a mile long marked "McClernand." Then commencing one hundred yards north-west of McClernand's right and extending due north, along the edge of the field in front of the camp of McClernand's First Brigade, is a line two-thirds of a mile long marked "Sherman." On the right of this line are three houses covered in front by a sort of demi-lune and wing, between which and the main Sherman line is a bastion-like arrangement. The demi-lune figure Sherman designates as a "strong flank," and says it was occupied by Birge's sharp-shooters. Off to the right is seen Lew Wallace's division crossing Snake Creek bridge, and marching toward the demi-lune by a road which had no existence in fact or on the original Thom map. At the angle between Sherman and McClernand is a



GEN. W. H. L. WALLACE.

IN THE "HORNETS' NEST"—W. H. L. WALLACE'S LINE.

From the Cyclorama of Shiloh at Chicago. By permission.

ravine which extends into the camp of McClernand's division, and along the sides of this ravine from the right and left respectively of McClernand and Sherman are two dotted lines terminating in a point at the head of the ravine. In his speech submitting his map to the society, Sherman explains how that horn-like projection was formed, with other particulars, as follows:

"In the very crisis of the battle of April 6, about 4 o'clock P. M., when my division occupied the line from Snake Creek bridge to the forks of the Corinth and Purdy road, there occurred an incident I have never seen recorded. Birge's sharp-shooters, or 'Squirrel Tails,' occupied the stables, granaries, and house near the bridge as a strong flank. My division occupied a double line from it along what had once been a lane with its fences thrown down, and the blackberry and sassafras bushes still marking the border of an open cotton-field in front, and the left was in a ravine near which Major Ezra Taylor had assembled some ten or twelve guns. This ravine was densely wooded and extended to the front near two hundred yards, and I feared it might be occupied by the enemy, who from behind the trees could drive the gunners from their posts. I ordered the colonel of one of my regiments to occupy that ravine to anticipate the enemy, but he did not quickly catch my meaning or comprehend the tactics by which he could fulfill my purpose. I remember well that Colonel Thomas W. Sweeny, a one-armed officer who had lost an arm in the Mexican War and did not belong to my command, stood near by and quickly spoke up: 'I understand perfectly what you want; let me do it.' 'Certainly,' said I, 'Sweeny, go at once and occupy that ravine, converting it into a regular bastion.' He did it, and I attach more importance to that event than to any of the hundred achievements which I have since heard 'saved the day,' for we held that line and ravine all night, and the next morning advanced from them to certain victory."

And yet it will be seen that this new line, prepared with such elaboration of detail and introduced with such richness of anecdotal embellishment, was

a thorough delusion; that Birge's sharp-shooters were not there, and that General Sherman was in a different place! Setting aside historical accuracy, however, the advantage of the revised arrangement is obvious. It extended General Grant's territory a half-mile to the south, fully as much to the west, taking in Tillman's Hollow, one-third of McClelland's captured camp, and a large part of the Confederate army, giving a battle front of two miles and a half instead of one mile, and requiring no greater power of imagination to man it than to devise it. In presenting his map to the Society, Sherman said: "The map as thus modified tells the story of the battle!"

There can be no doubt that General Sherman's position will carry unhesitating credence to his naked assertion in the minds of a considerable number of persons; while the more cautious but still unsearching readers will say that until the accuracy of the official map is disproved, it must be accepted as the standard representation of the battle. It is proper, therefore, to cite the proof which rejects both, and establishes a materially different version. The investigation may be confined, for the present, to the location of the Federal line of battle on Sunday evening. The other errors in the maps will be developed incidentally as the general subject progresses. Moreover, the inquiry will be directed specifically to the Sherman map, as that includes the faults of the Thom map as well as its own peculiar errors.

It is unnecessary to remark upon the exclusion of Nelson's leading brigade from the west bank of the river on the Sherman map. Its presence there at the time in question is as notorious as the battle itself. The distance from the landing to Dill's Branch is six hundred yards. Sherman places his "Detachments," *i. e.*, the "reserve artillery," exactly on the line of that branch, whereas they were five hundred yards north of it. During the engagement the Confederates passed the ravine and reached the crest of the hill on the north side. After the engagement Nelson's division occupied the ravine, and his pickets held ground beyond it during the night. None of Grant's troops were ever in that position.

In adducing evidence from the official reports to determine the further position of the Union line, the extracts will be somewhat extended when the context is pertinent, in order to show at the same time the number and condition of the troops occupying it. The reader will be spared the impression of some irrelevancy if he will keep these additional objects in mind.

Of the position of General Hurlbut's division, the next on the right of the "Detachments," that officer says in his official report:

"On reaching the 24-pounder siege-guns in battery near the river, I again succeeded in forming line of battle *in rear of the guns.*"

That brought his division on the line of the right-hand road leading back from the river, but not entirely to the right of the artillery where the Thom map places it. He adds:

"I passed to the right *and found myself in communication with General Sherman*, and received his instructions. In a short time the enemy appeared *on the crest of the ridge*, led by the 18th Louisiana," etc. . . . "General Sherman's artillery also was rapidly engaged, and after an artillery contest of some duration, the enemy fell back." . . . "About dark the firing

ceased. I advanced my division one hundred yards to the front, threw out pickets, and officers and men bivouacked in a heavy storm of rain. About 12 P. M. *General Nelson's leading columns passed through my line and went to the front, and I called in my advance-guard.*"

The next division in the regular order is McClernand's, though the reader will not have failed to observe the presence of General Sherman, with at least a portion of his command, in communication with Hurlbut's right. General Sherman, it will be remembered, locates this division (McClernand's) on the west side of Tillman's Creek. We trace its retrogression step by step, from its permanent camp, across Tillman's Hollow, at the close of the day, by the following extracts from General McClernand's report:

"Continuing this sanguinary conflict until several regiments of my division had exhausted their ammunition, and its right flank had been borne back, and it was in danger of being turned, the remainder of my command . . . also fell back to the camp of the First Brigade. Here the portion that had first fallen back re-formed parallel with the camp, and fronting the approach of the enemy from the west, while the other portion formed at right angles with it, still fronting the approach of the enemy from the south. . . . It was 2 o'clock when my fifth line had been thus formed. . . . Deterred from direct advance, he (the enemy) moved a considerable force by the right flank, with the evident intention of turning my left. To defeat this purpose, *I ordered my command to fall back in the direction of the landing, across a deep hollow, and to re-form on the east side of another field, in the skirts of a wood. This was my sixth line.* Here we rested a half-hour, continuing to supply our men with ammunition, until the enemy's cavalry were seen rapidly crossing the field to the charge. Waiting until they approached within some thirty paces of our line, I ordered a fire, which was delivered with great coolness and destructive effect. First halting, then wavering, they turned and fled in confusion, leaving behind a number of riders and horses dead on the field. The 29th Illinois Infantry, inspired by the courageous example of their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ferrell, bore the chief part in this engagement. . . . In the meantime, under cover of this demonstration strengthened by large additions from other portions of the field yielded by our forces, the enemy continued his endeavors to turn the flanks of my line, and to cut me off from the landing. To prevent this I ordered my left wing to fall back a short distance and form an obtuse angle with the center, opposing a double front to the enemy's approach. Thus disposed, my left held the enemy in check, *while my whole line slowly fell back to my seventh position. Here I re-formed the worn and famished remnant of my division, on favorable ground along a north and south road, supported on my right by fragments of General Sherman's division, and on my left by the [14th Illinois and 25th Indiana] under command of Colonel Veatch, acting brigadier-general.*"

The identity of this seventh position of McClernand is determined by the following extracts. Colonel Marsh, commanding McClernand's Second Brigade, says:

"At this time, *my command having been reduced to a merely nominal one, I received orders to fall a short distance to the rear and form a new line, detaining all stragglers, portions of commands, and commands which should attempt to pass. In obedience to this, though with some difficulty as regarded portions of some commands, whose officers seemed little inclined to halt short of the river, . . . I had gathered quite a force, and formed a line near the camp of the Second Division, concealing my men in the timber facing an open field. I here requested Colonel Davis, of the 46th Illinois, to take position on my right. He promptly and cheerfully responded. . . . In a short time General McClernand, with portions of the First and Third Brigades of his own division, and two regiments of Ohio troops, came up and formed on the left of the line I had already established.*"

Colonel Davis, of the 46th Illinois, says:

"It being now 1 o'clock, my ammunition exhausted, the men tired and hungry, and myself exhausted, having lost my horse in the first engagement, and compelled to go on foot the



THE SIEGE-BATTERY, ABOVE THE LANDING, THAT WAS A PART OF THE "LAST LINE" IN THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN A FEW DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE.

balance of the time, and finding myself within one-half mile of my regimental encampment, I marched my men to it and got dinner for them. Calling my men into line immediately after dinner, I formed them upon the right of the brigade commanded by Colonel C. C. Marsh, at his request, in front and to the left of my camp, where we again met the enemy on Sunday evening."

Colonel Engelmann, of the 43d Illinois, whose report in many respects is a remarkably clear and interesting one, says:

"We now fell back by degrees [from McClernand's sixth position], and a new line being formed, we found ourselves posted between the 46th Illinois and the 13th Missouri, our position being midway between the encampments of the 46th and 9th Illinois."

Colonel Wright, 13th Missouri, of McArthur's brigade, Second Division, but attached during the battle to Sherman's division, says:

"After advancing and falling back several times, the regiment was forced to retire, with all the others there, to the road which crosses the Purdy road at right angles near General McArthur's headquarters. We here took up quarters for the night, bivouacking without fires within four hundred yards of our regimental camp."

The "Purdy road" here mentioned is the continuation of the right-hand road leading from the landing. The camp of the 9th Illinois was in the north-east angle of the intersection of that road with the River road, and General McArthur's headquarters were in the south-west angle of the same intersection. The camp of the 46th Illinois was located in the south-east angle of the intersection of the River road and a middle road leading west from the landing, about five hundred yards from McArthur's headquarters. These reports plainly identify General McClernand's seventh position, of which General Sherman formed part, with the River road between McArthur's and Hurlbut's headquarters. It is a full half-mile in rear of the position given to Sherman's division on the Thom map, and of the position which

General Sherman assigns to himself on his edition, with the deep hollow of Tillman's Creek intervening.

The struggle which drove General McClernand from his seventh position is described by that officer as follows :

"The enemy renewed the contest by trying to shell us from our position. . . . Advancing in heavy columns led by the Louisiana Zouaves to break our center, we awaited his approach within sure range, and opened a terrific fire upon him. The head of the column was instantly mowed down ; the remainder of it swayed to and fro for a few seconds, and turned and fled. This second success of the last two engagements terminated a conflict of ten and a half hours' duration, from 6 o'clock A. M. to 4:30 o'clock P. M., and probably saved our army, transports and all, from capture. Strange, however, at the very moment of the flight of the enemy, the right of our line gave way, and immediately after, notwithstanding the indignant and heroic resistance of Colonel Veatch, the left, comprising the [14th Illinois and 25th Indiana] was irresistibly swept back by the tide of fugitive soldiers and trains seeking vain security at the landing. . . . *Left unsupported and alone, the 20th and 17th Illinois, together with other portions of my division not borne back by the retreating multitude, retired in good order under the immediate command of Colonel Marsh and Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, and re-formed under my direction, the right resting near the former line, and the left at an acute angle with it. A more extended line, comprising portions of regiments, brigades, and divisions, was soon formed on this nucleus by the efforts of General Sherman, myself, and other officers. Here, in the eighth position occupied by my division during the day, we rested in line of battle upon our arms, uncovered and exposed to a drenching rain during the night.*"

This last position would locate McClernand, excepting his First Brigade, perhaps three hundred yards south of, and obliquely with reference to the right-hand road leading from the landing, facing a little to the west. His First Brigade is traced to within half a mile of the river, where it was rallied by its commander "in front of the camp-ground of the 14th Iowa," on the road to the landing. It did not join the division again until after the battle, but acted in connection with my troops. Colonel Veatch, who was on McClernand's left with the 14th Illinois and 25th Indiana in the seventh position, fell back and took "position on the road leading to the landing near the heavy siege-guns," and became reunited there with Hurlbut's division, to which he belonged. The space along the road in rear of McClernand was filled in with various fragments which constituted Sherman's command, including at last Buckland's two regiments. General Sherman says that Colonel Sweeny was with him. No doubt some of Sweeny's men also were there. It was the camp-ground of his brigade—the camp of his own regiment, the 52d Illinois, being immediately on the road. Two of his regiments were captured with Prentiss, and the remainder had been driven back from W. H. L. Wallace's right and virtually broken up. One of his regiments, the 50th Illinois, was sent in the morning to support Colonel Stuart on the extreme left, and shared the fate of the sufferers in that quarter. The space along the road between Sherman and Hurlbut was occupied by the remnant of Colonel Tuttle's brigade and a portion of McClernand's First Brigade which united itself to Tuttle. It was Tuttle's camp-ground. Two of his regiments had been captured with Prentiss.

From the reports of the 13th Missouri and 43d Illinois it is inferred that those two regiments did not move from their position on the River road in the last falling back. But that, if certain, is not important. They were at

any rate substantially on the general line above indicated. The same, in a careless reading, might be presumed of the 46th Illinois, which was immediately on the left of the 43d. The report of that regiment says: "The regiments both *on my right and left fell back*, but my line did not *waver under the fire of the enemy*." But it evidently fell back at last, for the report continues: "After breakfast on Monday morning, still retaining my position on the right of Colonel Marsh's brigade, I moved with him until *I reached and went beyond* the ground of *our last engagement of Sunday*, where our pickets were driven in," etc. It remains now to determine the question of the extreme right of the general line.

General Sherman says, and his statement on that point is sustained by the reports, that Birge's sharp-shooters were immediately on his right and constituted the extreme right of the line. The official report of that regiment shows that during the afternoon it occupied a "*position near Colonel McArthur's headquarters*" in an open field. Its camp was in its rear along the opposite or east side of the River road. This would fix General Sherman's right at the cross-roads near McArthur's headquarters. It is more than a mile from the Snake Creek bridge. Other evidence confirms these positions. The official reports of Lew Wallace's division show that he marched along the River road from the bridge, and formed in line of battle, facing Tillman's Creek in front of the camp of Birge's sharp-shooters and the 81st Ohio, the right of the division being in front of the latter, and the left in front of the former; and that it came in actual contact with the "sharp-shooters," who occupied their camp that night and received the new-comers with cheers. This is clearly and more circumstantially explained by General Force in his book entitled "From Fort Henry to Corinth," page 163. He was present and commanded the right regiment of Lew Wallace's division on that occasion. The position thus assigned to Wallace must have taken his left well up to the cross-road at McArthur's headquarters, and covered the entire field toward the north; for the distance from the cross-road to the right of the camp of the 81st Ohio was only half a mile.

It is particularly to be observed that in no report, either from Sherman's division or from Lew Wallace's, is there any mention of actual contact or of any definite proximity of these two divisions on the evening of the 6th, or earlier than 10 o'clock on the morning of the 7th. The inference is, that at the time of Wallace's arrival and subsequently, no part of Sherman's division was on the River road, or anywhere along the heights of Tillman's Creek north of McArthur's headquarters. General Sherman, in his report, says: "General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark and formed his line to my right and rear." That relative position could only exist by assuming that Sherman's command was on the road leading to the landing east of McArthur's headquarters, and nearly at right angles with Wallace,—a supposition which is strengthened by the condition indicated in Sherman's revised map, that Birge's sharp-shooters were on his right—not entirely in his front, as they would have been if his front had been on the River road. It is also sustained by General Buckland's statement in the


"Journal of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee" for 1881, p. 82. "About dark," he says, "General Wallace's division commenced arriving, and formed to the right of my brigade." Buckland states in his report and in the "Journal" that he lay "on the road." If he had been on the River road, Wallace would have come in contact with him, and when he formed in line would have been entirely in his front—not in rear or on his right. Buckland seems to know nothing about Birge's sharp-shooters. The probable explanation is that when he came along the road from the bridge they were on the west side of the road, in the field near McArthur's headquarters. After Lew Wallace arrived and formed in front of them, they probably retired to their camp on the east side of the road. The explanation of Buckland's position is that, after the retreat across Tillman's Creek from the west side, he found himself, as he says, near Snake Creek bridge "late in the afternoon, after the repulse of the right of the line," entirely apart from the rest of the army, and that to reestablish his connection with it he started on the road to the landing, where one of his regiments actually went and remained overnight; and that he came upon the outer flank of the new line where General Sherman soon after found him, east of McArthur's headquarters, and thus placed himself where he is described by Sherman as being, between Birge's sharp-shooters and the rest of the line.

The Confederate reports mention a considerable appearance of force in a camp opposite their extreme left in the afternoon, evidently referring to McArthur's camp. The student of the reports will not be misled by this appearance; it was the force that clustered with Sherman on McClermand's right near McArthur's headquarters; by the 9th Illinois, 81st Ohio, and Birge's sharp-shooters, all belonging to McArthur's brigade; and by the movement of Buckland's regiments from the bridge as already explained. The sharp-shooters and the 81st Ohio had been posted at the bridge, and returned to their camps probably at the time of the retreat from the west side of Tillman's Creek. The 9th Illinois had during the morning been engaged on the extreme left under its brigade commander. It had lost 250 men out of 550, and was ordered to its camp "to replenish cartridge-boxes, clean guns, and be ready for action." While there at 3 o'clock it was ordered "to support the right wing of General Sherman's division," as the report expresses it, and in the subsequent engagements retired to within half a mile of the landing. Birge's sharp-shooters retained their position at or in front of their camp. The movements of the 81st Ohio are not very clearly defined, but in the advance next morning it is found on McClermand's left. The "10 or 12 guns" mentioned by General Sherman in his map-presentation speech as being near a ravine on his left, Sunday afternoon, were Taylor's battery, as it was called, though commanded by Captain Barrett, and Bouton's battery. The former had retired for ammunition from McClermand's camp, probably to near McArthur's headquarters, but afterward evidently went near the river, where it received "1 lieutenant and 24 men with 3 horses" from Fitch's battery. Bouton's battery was taken into action in the field in front of McClermand's right about 4 o'clock, and was forced to retire,

its support helping to draw off its guns. Both the battery and the support went back toward the river, for in the advance next morning the support is found on McClernand's left, and the battery was brought into service with McCook in the afternoon. Sherman had no artillery with him on Monday until about 10 o'clock. Major Taylor then brought up three pieces of an Illinois battery under Lieutenant Wood, not belonging to Sherman's command. The final retreat from McClernand's seventh position, Sunday evening, undoubtedly carried with it all of the fragments connected with Sherman near McArthur's headquarters, along the road toward the river, where I found him about dark, excepting Birge's sharp-shooters, the 13th Missouri, and the 43d Illinois. The latter belonged to McClernand's Third Brigade, but remained with the 13th Missouri Sunday night. After crossing Tillman's Creek next morning, both were brought into line on McClernand's left, and did not form with Sherman, though the 13th Missouri subsequently joined him.

My own observation as to the position and extent of General Grant's line accords substantially with the evidence of the reports. In the dusk of the evening after the close of the engagement on Sunday, I walked out with my chief-of-staff, following the road and the line of the troops. My object was to gain information by which to determine the formation of my divisions, and I not only observed all that I could see at such an hour, but I made inquiry as I passed along. I came to Hurlbut's left five hundred yards from the river; I passed along its front and came to troops that answered as McClernand's, and which I supposed at the time to constitute his division, but which were proba-

bly his First Brigade only; I passed to the front of these troops, and when I turned in toward the road again, I came upon Sherman's line, as it happened, not far from where he was, and I was conducted to him. It was then growing dark. I judge the distance to have been about three-quarters of a mile from the river—less than half a mile from Hurlbut's



BUELL'S TROOPS DEBARKING AT PITTSBURG LANDING, SUNDAY NIGHT.

left, and I think now that it was near the camp of Colonel Sweeny's regiment, the 52d Illinois, that I found General Sherman.

The impression made upon my mind by that interview has remained as vivid as the circumstances were peculiar. I had no thought of seeing General Sherman when I set out, but on every score I was glad to meet him, and I was there to gain information. By what precise words I sought and he gave it, I would not pretend at this day to repeat. It is sufficient for the present to say that I learned the nature of the ground in front; that his right flank was some three hundred yards from us; and that the bridge by which Lew Wallace was to cross Snake Creek was to his right and rear at an angle, as he pointed, of about forty degrees. I do not know whether I asked the question, but I know now that it was a mile and a quarter from his flank, and that he did not cover it in any practical sense, though in advancing Wallace would approach by his right and rear. I also see now that I was mistaken in supposing that these several commands retained a regular organization and had distinct limits; whereas they were in fact much intermixed.

Of course we talked of other incidental matters. In all his career he has, I venture to say, never appeared to better advantage. There was the frank, brave soldier, rather subdued, realizing the critical situation in which causes of some sort, perchance his own fault chiefly, had placed him, but ready, without affectation or bravado, to do anything that duty required of him. He asked me what the plans were for the morrow. I answered that I was going to attack the enemy at daylight, and he expressed gratification at my reply, though apparently not because of any unmixed confidence in the result. I had had no consultation with General Grant, and knew nothing of his purpose. I presumed that we would be in accord, but I had been only a few hours within the limits of his authority, and I did not look upon him as my commander, though I would zealously have obeyed his orders. General Sherman allowed me to take with me the map of which a fac-simile accompanies this article [page 496]. I never imagined that in the future it would have the interest which now attaches to it, and after the battle it was laid aside and forgotten.

Within two years after that meeting, quite contrary opinions developed themselves between General Sherman and myself concerning the battle of Shiloh, and his Memoirs give a different account of the interview above described. He says that he handed the map to my engineer-officer, Captain



MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS J. WOOD.
COPIED FROM AN ENGRAVING.

Michler, who, in fact, was not present, and complains that it was never returned to him. He says that I grumbled about the stragglers, and that he feared I would not bring my army across the river. One would suppose that his fears would have been allayed by the fact that, at that very moment, my troops were arriving and covering his front as fast as legs and steamboats could carry them.

In the execution of the retreat described in the reports of McClelland and Sherman, from the west to the east side of Tillman's Creek, there was a quite thorough disintegration of divisions and brigades, lacking nothing but the pressure of a vigorous pursuit to convert it into a complete rout. In its seventh position, McClelland's division recovered some force and preserved a recognized organization; but not so with Sherman's. Indeed, in that division the disorganization occurred, as has already been stated, at an earlier period. In Hildebrand's brigade it was almost coincident with the enemy's first assault. With McDowell's it commenced with the unsuccessful attempt to form line of battle along the Purdy road, and was complete very soon after 1 o'clock; and these two brigades never recovered their aggregation again until after the battle. With Buckland's brigade also it occurred at the miscarriage at the Purdy road about 10 o'clock, but it was not so thorough as in the other brigades—at least it was afterward partially repaired during the first day, as his report explains. He says, after the retreat from his camp about 10 o'clock:

"We formed line on the Purdy road, but the fleeing mass from the left broke through our lines, and many of our men caught the infection and fled with the crowd. Colonel Cockerill became separated from Colonel Sullivan and myself, and was afterward engaged with part of his command at McClelland's camp. Colonel Sullivan and myself kept together, and made every effort to rally our men, but with very poor success. They had become scattered in all directions. We were borne considerably to the left, but finally succeeded in forming a line, and had a short engagement with the enemy, who made his appearance soon after our line was formed. The enemy fell back, and we proceeded to the road where you [General Sherman] found us. At this point I was joined by Colonel Cockerill, and we there formed line of battle and slept on our arms Sunday night. Colonel Sullivan, being out of ammunition, marched to the landing for a supply, and while there was ordered to support a battery at that point."

It is only after a close examination of the records that we can understand the full significance of the following passage in General Sherman's report:

"In this position we rested for the night. My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's brigade was the only one with me that retained its organization. Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall from his horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not in line. The 13th Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization, and it formed part of my line during Sunday night and all of Monday; other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle."

It thus appears that from about 1 o'clock until the time when General Sherman found Colonel Buckland with two regiments on the road from the bridge to the landing, not a single regiment of his division excepting Cockerill's, and not one prominent individual representative of it excepting that officer and

Colonel Hildebrand, was present with him. The only body of troops besides Cockerill's regiment having any recognized organization was the 13th Missouri, which belonged to another division. All the rest were squads or individual stragglers. In all the official reports, not a regiment or part of a regiment is described as being with him at this juncture or for several hours before. Of the 9 regiments that composed the 3 brigades under his immediate command at the church, only 5 rendered reports, and 3 of these were from Buckland's brigade. The division did not exist except in the person of its commander. Such is the story of the official reports. The number of men present could not have been large. Less than 1000, including Buckland's 2 regiments after they were found, would have told the number that lay on their arms in Sherman's ranks on Sunday night.

This explains the close relation of McClelland and Sherman during the last five hours of Sunday, and the identity of their experiences. General Sherman has nothing to report of his own command distinctively. Everything is conjunctive and general as between McClelland and himself. "We held this position, General McClelland and myself acting in perfect concert." "*General McClelland and I*, on consultation, selected a new line." "*We* fell back as well as we could." "The enemy's cavalry charged *us*, and was handsomely repulsed." General McClelland's account of this incident has been quoted on a preceding page. When Colonel Hildebrand lost his brigade, it is not with General Sherman that he is identified, but with McClelland, on whose staff he served part of the day. Hildebrand seems to have been active, but not under the direction of his division commander. "About 3 o'clock," he says, "I assumed command of a regiment already formed of fragmentary regiments. I marched in a north-western direction, where I aided a regiment of sharp-shooters in defeating the enemy in an attempt to flank our rear." This movement was evidently made from McClelland's and Sherman's seventh position, and the troops assisted were Birge's sharp-shooters. General Sherman makes no mention of this significant if not important occurrence. His right flank was threatened, and the regiment of sharp-shooters posted in the field near McArthur's headquarters met, and, in conjunction with Hildebrand's temporary regiment, repelled the danger.

We have in the official reports a good clew to the condition of McClelland's division also. It was in a far better state. It was shattered and worn, but it was represented by at least some recognized following of regiments and brigades. One of the brigades had five hundred men, and another, the commander reports, was "merely nominal," not long before McClelland took up his seventh position. In the last collision, one of the brigades became entirely separated from the division, and did not return to it until after the battle. Fifteen hundred, exclusive of that brigade, would cover the number of men that rested that night under McClelland's colors.

Hurlbut's division was in a somewhat better condition than either of the others. Its loss in killed and wounded was greater than McClelland's, but it had not, like the latter, been affected in its organization by oft-repeated shocks sustained in a cramped and embarrassing position, and his command

had received some accessions from the driftings of other divisions. The estimate which he makes of his force is wholly fallacious. It could not have stood on the space which he occupied. There may have been two thousand men in his line on the night of the 6th. These three divisions, if they may be so called, and Tuttle's command, with Birge's sharp-shooters on the extreme right, and the reserve artillery on the left, which, according to General Grant's report, consisted of "four 20-pounder Parrott guns and a battery of rifled guns," constituted the line of battle, which extended a mile from the river. Five thousand men occupied it. Other partially organized fragments were crowded together about the river and the camps on the plateau, and with proper effort could have been fitted for good service; but no steps to that end were taken. The defect in the command that opened the way for the disaster, facilitated its progress at every step—the want of a strong executive hand guided by a clear organizing head. Some of these fragmentary commands sought places for themselves in the advance next day. The remnant of the Second Division under Colonel Tuttle was one of these. Indeed, it deserves a higher name. It presented itself to me on the field without orders, and rendered efficient service with my divisions. There may have been 1500 or 2000 men of these unrecognized commands that went to the front on Monday without instructions. Seven thousand men at the utmost, besides Lew Wallace's 5000, were ready Sunday night to take part in the struggle which was to be renewed in the morning. Of the original force, 7000 were killed or wounded, 3000 were prisoners, at least 15,000 were absent from the ranks and hopelessly disorganized, and about 30 pieces of artillery were in the hands of the enemy.

The physical condition of the army was an exact type of its moral condition. The ties of discipline, not yet of long enough duration or rigidly enough enforced to be very strong, were in much the largest part of the army thoroughly severed. An unbroken tide of disaster had obliterated the distance between grades, and brought all men to the standard of personal qualities. The feeble groups that still clung together were held by force of individual character more than by discipline, and a disbelief in the ability of the army unaided to extricate itself from the peril that environed it, was, I do not hesitate to affirm, universal. In my opinion, that feeling was shared by the commander himself. A week after the battle the army had not recovered from its shattered and prostrated condition. On the 14th, three days after Halleck's arrival, he instructed Grant: "Divisions and brigades should, where necessary, be reorganized and put in position, and all stragglers returned to their companies and regiments. Your army is not now in condition to resist an attack." We are told that the enemy had stragglers too. Yes, every cause which demands effort and sacrifice will have them; but there is a difference between the straggling which is not restrained by the smile of fortune, and that which tries to elude the pursuit of fate—it is the difference between victory and defeat. The Confederates in their official reports make no concealment of their skeletons, but when the time for action arrived they were vital bodies, and, on Sunday, always in sufficient force to do the work at last.

General McClelland, it will have been observed, ascribes the breaking up of his seventh position to a panic among the troops, but the other reports show a different reason. Colonel Veatch on McClelland's left says:

"Our men were much encouraged by the strength of our position, and our fire was telling with terrible effect. Our forces were eager to advance and charge him [the enemy], when we were surprised by his driving back the whole left wing of our army, and advancing close to our rear near General Hurlbut's headquarters. A dense mass of baggage wagons and artillery crowded upon our ranks, while we were exposed to a heavy fire of the enemy both in front and rear."

General Hurlbut thus describes the crisis at that stage of the battle:

"I had hoped to make a stand on the line of my camp, but masses of the enemy were pressing rapidly on each flank, while their light artillery was closing rapidly in the rear. On reaching the 24-pounder siege-guns in battery near the river, I again succeeded in forming line of battle in rear of the guns."

We see here that there was a stern cause for the falling back. It was the tide of defeat and pursuit from the left wing of the army, and was compulsory in the strictest sense. How fortunate that it did not set in an hour earlier, and strike in flank the disorganized material of the right wing as it struggled across the ravines of Tillman's Creek! How more than fortunate that the onward current of the victor was obstructed still an hour longer by the unyielding tenacity of the remaining regiments of Wallace and Prentiss! From the self-assuring interview in which, according to one of General Sherman's reminiscences, it was "agreed that the enemy had expended the furor of his attack" at 4 o'clock, and General Grant told the "anecdote of his Donelson battle," that officer was aroused by the renewal of the din of the strife, and made his way to the river through the disorganized throng of his retreating army. While those mutual felicitations were in progress, the enemy, a mile to the left, was disarming and marching six captured regiments to the rear. Thus disembarrassed, his *furor* revived, and manifested itself at last at the very landing. What worse state of affairs than this could have existed when at noon General Grant wrote: "If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be a move to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us"?

Under the circumstances here described, General Grant and General Sherman have said that reënforcements other than Lew Wallace's division were in nowise necessary at the close of the first day, and that, without reference to them, General Grant would have assumed the offensive and defeated the Confederate army next morning. Those who study the subject attentively will find no ground to accept that declaration as regards either the purpose or the result. The former indeed presents an intangible question which it would seem to be useless to discuss. At the time it is alleged to have been entertained, the reënforcements were actually at hand, and their presence gives to the announcement the semblance of a vain boast, which could never have been put to the test of reality. That with the reënforcements from my army, General Grant confidently expected that the enemy would be defeated the following day, it is impossible to doubt; but it was not known, Sunday night, that the enemy had withdrawn from our immediate front, and the evi-

dence establishes that General Grant had not determined upon or had not promulgated a plan of action in the morning. Not an order was given or a note of preparation sounded for the struggle which, with or without his assistance, was to begin at daybreak. To my certain knowledge, if words and actions were not wholly misleading, General Sherman, when I saw him on the night of the 6th, did not consider that any instructions had been given for battle, and if he had such instructions he did not obey them. His report sustains the impression which I derived from our interview. "At daylight on Monday," he says, "I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps." Then only it was that he dispatched several members of his staff to bring up all the men they could find. Is that the way in which General Sherman would have acquitted himself of the obligation of orders received the day before to engage in battle? I answer unhesitatingly, No! The reports of the other division commanders are to the same effect. General McClelland says: "Your [General Grant's] order of the morning of the 7th for a forward movement," etc. The hour of the delivery of this order is indicated approximately by the following passage in the report of Colonel Marsh:

"At daylight on Monday morning the men in line were supplied with some provisions. While this was being done firing opened on our right, afterwards ascertained to come from a portion of General Lew Wallace's command. Directly afterwards, firing commenced to our left and front, both artillery and musketry, supposed by me to be a portion of General Buell's command, who, I had been informed during the night, had taken position on our left and considerably in advance. I now received orders from General McClelland to throw out skirmishers and follow with my whole command."

We must presume that General McClelland proceeded to the execution of General Grant's order as soon as it was received, which must then have been after the commencement of the battle in front of Nelson.

General Hurlbut says: "On Monday, about 8 A. M., my division was formed in line close to the river-bank, and I obtained a few crackers for my men. About 9 A. M. I was ordered by General Grant to move up to the support of General McClelland." Colonel Tuttle, commanding the Second Division, acted without any orders. He says: "On Monday morning I collected all of the division that could be found, and such other detached regiments as volunteered to join me, and formed them in column by battalion closed in mass as a reserve for General Buell." The action of General Lew Wallace was not the result of orders, but proceeded from his own motion on discovering the enemy in his front at daylight across Tillman's Hollow. While that action was in progress, General Grant came up and gave Wallace "the direction of his attack." Nelson had been in motion an hour, and was sharply engaged before these orders were given.

General Grant's official reports of the battle are in accord with the subordinate reports upon this question. In his first telegraphic announcement of the battle to General Halleck, he says:

"Yesterday the rebels attacked us here with an overwhelming force, driving our troops in from their advanced position to near the landing. General Wallace was immediately ordered up

from Crump's Landing, and in the evening, one division of General Buell's army and General Buell in person arrived. During the night one other division arrived, and still another to-day. *This morning, at the break of day, I ordered an attack, which resulted in a fight, which continued until late this afternoon, with severe loss on both sides, but a complete repulse of the enemy. I shall follow to-morrow far enough to see that no immediate renewal of an attack is contemplated.*"

In his more detailed report of April 9th he says:

"During the night [Sunday] all was quiet, and feeling that a great moral advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party, an advance was ordered as soon as day dawned. The result was a gradual repulse of the enemy at all parts of the line from morning until probably 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when it became evident that the enemy was retreating. Before the close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's division arrived in time to take part in the action. My force was too much fatigued, from two days' hard fighting and exposure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediately. Night closed in cloudy and with heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning. General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreated in good order."

Several points worthy of note present themselves in these dispatches of General Grant. There is still, at the close of the second day, the impression of the enemy's overwhelming force, which the day before he "estimated at over one hundred thousand men." He felt on Monday, after the arrival of reënforcements to the number of 25,000 fresh troops, that "a great moral advantage would be gained by becoming the attacking party." There was, then, a question in his mind, namely, to attack, or to await attack; it was necessary to consider all the advantages, moral and physical; he concluded to secure the former at least, and accordingly gave the order, not on Sunday, but on Monday "at break of day," to attack. The severity of the contest on Monday is affirmed in both dispatches; it was of such a nature as to prevent an immediate pursuit, which at any rate he would only make the next morning after the battle, far enough to see that no immediate renewal of the attack was contemplated. The pursuit was made on that plan, and found "that the main part of the army had retreated in good order." If the fact were not duly authenticated, one would wonder whether these dispatches were actually written by an officer who, twenty-three years afterward, said with boastful assurance over his own signature, "Victory was assured when Wallace arrived with his division of 5000 effective veterans, even if there had been no other support!"

With this tedious but necessary review of the results of the first day, I take up the story of the second.

THE engagement was brought on, Monday morning, not by General Grant's order, but by the advance of Nelson's division, along the River road in line of battle, at the first dawn of day, followed by Crittenden's division in column. The enemy was encountered at 5:20 o'clock, and a little in advance of Hurlbut's camp Nelson was halted while Crittenden came into line on his right. By this time the head of McCook's division came up and was formed on the right of Crittenden. Before McCook's rear brigade was up the line moved forward, pushing back the enemy's light troops, until Nelson and Crittenden reached the very position occupied by Hurlbut, Prentiss, and W. H. L. Wallace at 4



MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

o'clock the previous day, where the enemy was found in force. McCook was on the north side of the western Corinth road, and eventually swept across half of McClernand's camp and released his headquarters from the grasp of the enemy. The "Hornets' Nest" was in front of Crittenden's left brigade, and "the peach orchard" and the ground where Albert Sidney Johnston fell were in front of Nelson.

Without following the vicissitudes of the struggle in this part of the field, I enter with a little more detail, but still cursorily, upon the operations of Grant's troops, which have not been connectedly explained in any official report. The action here was commenced by Lew Wallace, one of whose batteries at half-past 5 o'clock opened fire on the enemy, who was discovered on the

high ground across Tillman's Hollow. There is some diversity of statement among the official reports as to the priority of artillery firing in front of Nelson and Wallace. Colonel Hovey, who was in immediate support of Wallace's battery, gives the priority to Nelson, while Colonel Marsh, who was half a mile farther to the left, gives it to Wallace. But this is unimportant. Nelson was in motion three-quarters of an hour before that time, and had been engaged with the enemy's light troops. The first artillery fire was from the enemy, Nelson at first having no artillery. Wallace's action was not yet aggressive, no orders having been given for his advance; but while the firing was in progress General Grant came up, and gave him his "direction of attack, which was formed at a right angle with the river, with which at the time his line ran almost parallel." The enemy's battery and its supports having been driven from the opposite height by the artillery of Wallace, the latter moved his line forward about 7 o'clock, crossed the hollow, and gained the crest of the hill almost without opposition. "Here," he says, "as General Sherman's division, next on my left, had not made its appearance to support my advance, a halt was ordered for it to come up." Wallace was now on the edge of the large oblong field which was in front of the encampment of McClernand's right brigade.

The next of Grant's commands to advance was McClernand's. The orders to that effect have already been cited, and their execution is explained by Colonel Marsh, into whose brigade what was present of McClernand's division seems to have merged. He says:

"Moving steadily forward for half a mile, I discovered a movement of troops on the hill nearly a quarter of a mile in front. Dispatching scouts to ascertain who they were, they were met by a message from Colonel Smith, commanding a [the left] brigade of the Third Division [Wallace's], informing me that he would take position on the right and wait my coming up."

Sherman, it thus appears, was not yet in motion. Hurlbut moved out about 9 o'clock, and formed one brigade on McClermand's left.

When Lew Wallace advanced across Tillman's Hollow, followed next on the left by McClermand, the force opposed to him fell gradually back upon reënforcements beyond the field on the edge of which was the encampment of McClermand's First Brigade; the enemy's left then clinging a little to the bluffs of Owl Creek in that quarter, but yielding without a very stubborn resistance, chiefly because of McCook's vigorous pressure along the western Corinth road, until it fell into a general line running through the center of

McClermand's camp, and nearly parallel with the Hamburg and Purdy road. This swinging back of the enemy's left, and the direction of the Owl Creek bluffs, naturally caused a change in the direction of Wallace's front, until about 10 o'clock it faced south, at right angles to its direction in the beginning. A sharp artillery contest and some infantry fighting had been going on all the time. It was at 10 o'clock, according to Sherman's report, that McClermand formed line obliquely in rear of the camp of his First Brigade, to advance against the enemy's position. Here for the first time Sherman's division appears in the movement, from which its absence at an earlier

period is mentioned by both McClermand and Wallace. The statement in General Sherman's report, in regard to its movements, is as follows:



CAPTURE OF A CONFEDERATE BATTERY.

Colonel Robert H. Sturgess (8th Illinois Infantry) says in his official report that while awaiting orders on the Purdy road, during the morning of the second day's fight, "General Crittenden ordered the Eighth and Eighteenth (Illinois) to take a rebel battery which some regiment had endeavored to capture, but had been driven back with heavy loss. The men received the order with a cheer, and charged on a double-quick. The enemy, after firing a few shots, abandoned his guns and retreated to the woods. My color-bearer rushed up and planted his colors on one of the guns, and the color-bearer of the Eighteenth took possession of another."

"At daylight I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps. I dispatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find,

and especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before; and at the appointed time the division, or, rather, what remained of it, with the 13th Missouri and other fragments, marched forward and reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClelland's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here I remained patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 A. M. the heavy firing in that direction and its steady approach satisfied me, and General Wallace being on our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General McClelland's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's brigade on its right in the woods, and thus advanced slowly and steadily under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery."

The contest thus inaugurated in and around McClelland's camp involved the whole of Grant's available force and McCook's division of the Army of the Ohio, and continued with great violence from 10 until 4 o'clock. The significant facts connected with it are, the narrowness of the space covered by the interior divisions,—McClelland's, Hurlbut's, and Sherman's,—the lapping over them by McCook, so as to form, in fact, a connection with the division of Wallace on the extreme right, and the decisive part ascribed to McCook's division in that part of the field in the reports of McClelland, Wallace, and Sherman. General McClelland says:

"Here one of the severest conflicts ensued that occurred during the two days. We drove the enemy back . . . to the edge of a field . . . where reserves came to his support. Our position at this moment was most critical, and a repulse seemed inevitable; but fortunately the Louisville Legion, forming part of General Rousseau's brigade, came up at my request and succored me. Extending and strengthening my line, this gallant body poured into the enemy's ranks one of the most terrible fires I ever witnessed. Thus breaking its [his] center, it [he] fell back in disorder, and thenceforth he was beaten at all points."

Wallace mentions particularly an important service rendered to the left of his division at a crisis in its operations, by one of McCook's regiments.

Colonel McGinnis, of the 11th Indiana, whose regiment was on Wallace's extreme left, describes this incident as follows:

"At 2:30 o'clock I discovered that the Federal forces on our left were falling back and the rebels advancing, and that they were nearly in rear of our left flank. I immediately notified you [the brigade commander] of their position, changed front with our left wing, opened our fire upon them, and sent to you for assistance. During this the most trying moment to us of the day, I received your order to fall back if it got too hot for us. . . . Fortunately and much to our relief, at this critical moment the 32d Indiana, Colonel Willich, came up on our left, and with their assistance the advancing enemy was compelled to retire."

General Sherman says:

"We advanced until we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McClelland's camp, and here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less-disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, which lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of timber is about five hundred yards east of Shiloh Meeting House, and it was evident that here was to be the struggle. The enemy could be seen forming his lines to the south. . . . This was about 2 o'clock P. M. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, and entered this dreaded woods. . . . Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it."

This occurred in front of Sherman, who was between McClelland and Wallace, for he says: "I ordered my Second Brigade . . . to form on its right, and my Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, on its right, all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade." Of the action of McCook's division, General Sherman further says: "I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great central line of this battle."

The conclusion to be drawn from these several reports is that at this stage of the battle McCook's division reached across and practically connected the Army of the Ohio with Wallace's division, which formed the extreme right of Grant's force, and that its steady valor and effective service, not without the coöperation of McClelland's, Hurlbut's, and Sherman's commands, decided the issue of the conflict on that portion of the field. The result, however, was not brought about without the concurrence of decisive action at other points.

While the battle was going on in McClelland's camp, it raged with great fury from an earlier hour in front of Nelson and Crittenden on the left, and vigorously but with less destructive effects in front of Wallace on the right. As soon as the enemy's right began to yield, the splendid batteries of Mendenhall and Terrill directed an enfilading fire upon the Confederate batteries playing fiercely upon McCook, and they were soon silenced. General Sherman ascribes that result to the action of two pieces of artillery to which he says he gave personal direction, but it is probable that he mistook the principal cause. A Confederate view of the contest in front of Nelson and Crittenden is seen in the report of Colonel Trabue, whose brigade at a certain stage of the battle (about 1 o'clock) was moved with Anderson's brigade to their right, in front of Crittenden. The report describes the conflict at this point as terrific, the ground being crossed and recrossed four times in the course of it. I refer to it, chiefly because in some accounts of the battle it has erroneously been identified with McCook's front, where Trabue's brigade was first engaged.

Without going further into details in which the official reports abound, it may be sufficient to add briefly, that at 4 o'clock the flag of the Union floated again upon the line from which it had been driven the previous day, and General Grant's troops at once resumed their camps.

What more need be said? Must I sketch the scenes with twenty thousand of the soldiers of the Army of the Ohio left out of their place in the combat, as it is described by General Grant and his own officers? Shall I not, indeed, already have wearied the reader with the citation of evidence to substantiate a view of the case which unbiased intelligence is forbidden to deny?

But if the Army of the Ohio had not arrived, and General Grant had remained on the defensive, what then? Some of those who frankly acknowledge the reality of their discomfiture on Sunday, like now to believe with natural pride, the difficulties that beset them then being far in the past, that they would have been more successful the second day; and it has been argued that the withdrawal of the Confederates from their advanced positions on the night of the 6th threw doubt upon the final result. A newspaper interviewer has even said for General Grant that they were then

preparing to retreat. The inconsistency of that observation is evident. A general who stops to fight a fresh army is not likely to have had it in contemplation to flee before one that he had already defeated on the same ground. The published reports show that the withdrawal on Sunday night did not proceed from any faltering of the Confederate commander. On the contrary, he believed the victory to have been substantially won, and that the fruit would certainly be gathered the following day. His confidence in that respect was shared in the fullest manner by his entire army, backed by a particularly able body of high officers. All demanded to be led against the last position: not one doubted the result. We can imagine the effort such an army would have put forth when animated by such a spirit.

With the usual apologies for defeat on Monday, they rated their strength at 20,000 men, but, with the fruits of victory in view, it will be safe to say they would have brought at least 25,000 into action; and it has been claimed that 25,000, according to the Confederate method of computation, would have been equal to about 28,000 according to the Federal method. Their relative strength would have been materially increased by the large accession of captured cannon. They had also improved their condition by having exchanged their inferior arms for better ones which they had captured. Comparatively, the enemy was in a more efficient state than before the battle.

The Union ranks might have been swelled to 15,000—not more. That force on such ground could not have ventured to cover a line of more than a mile—its left at the river, and its right near the ravines of Tillman's Creek. The high ground beyond the creek would have enfiladed it, and the ravines would have afforded a lodgment and shelter for the enemy. Dill's ravine on the left might also have proved an element of weakness, and though that flank could not be turned, the peculiar advantage of position that aided the Union troops on the left so much on Sunday, would not have existed on Monday—the field of action in front was a uniform wooded surface.

Nowhere in history is the profane idea that, in a fair field fight, Providence is on the side of the strongest battalions, more uniformly sustained than in our Civil War. It presents no example of the triumph of 15,000 or even 20,000 men against 25,000. It affords some such instances where the stronger force was surprised by rapid and unexpected movements, and still others where it was directed with a want of skill against chosen positions strengthened by the art of defense; but nowhere else. The weaker force is uniformly defeated or compelled to retire. In this case the missiles of the assailant would have found a target in the battle-line of the defense, and in the transportation and masses of stragglers crowded together about the landing. The height of the bluff would have rendered the gun-boats powerless; the example of Belmont could only have been partially repeated, if at all; the bulk of the defeated force must have laid down its arms. There are those who argue that General Grant's personal qualities were a guarantee for his triumph. That is a poor sort of logic, and thousands of patriotic citizens, not unfriendly to General Grant, would draw back in alarm from the contemplation of any contingency that would have deprived the Union cause of its superior numbers at more than one period of his career.

In the usual extravagant newspaper dispatches from the field of battle, there was a statement of charges led by General Grant and his staff, which were assumed to have decided the fate of the day on Monday, or at least to have given a crowning touch to the victory. It would be a satire to reproduce that statement in its original form at this time. Its adoption, however, by various books and sketches, and especially the reference to such an incident by General Grant in his recent "Century" article [see page 465], makes it properly an object of inquiry. Such an act as leading a charge is a conspicuous incident rarely resorted to by the commander of an army. General Grant in some former newspaper interview is made to assume that General Sidney Johnston lost his life under such circumstances, from which he argues the failing fortune of the Confederate attack on Sunday. General Johnston's conduct in that affair is described in the Confederate reports. It was an outburst of impatient valor not caused by any crisis in the battle, though an attack by his troops at a certain point had been repulsed. He did not lose his life in the attack, and the most substantial successes of the Confederates were achieved at a later hour. We likewise naturally look in the official reports for a circumstantial account of the charge said to have been led by General Grant, for no colonel of a regiment is likely to overlook the honor of having been led in a charge by the commander of the army.

In the report of Colonel Veatch of Hurlbut's division, there occurs the following passage: "Maj.-Gen. Grant now ordered me forward to charge the enemy. I formed my brigade in column of battalions, and moved forward in double-quick through our deserted camps and to the thick woods beyond our lines in pursuit of the retreating enemy, following until we were in advance of our other forces, and were ordered to fall back by General Buell." It is proper to remark that I witnessed this movement. I was in advance on the line toward which it was made, and understand its bearing. It does not answer the description of a charge led by General Grant, since he is not said to have been present in it.

In the report of General Rousseau occurs the following:

"When thus repulsed, the enemy fell back and his retreat began: soon after which I saw two regiments of Government troops advancing in double-quick time across the open fields in our front, and saw that one of them was the 1st Ohio, which had been moved to our left to wait for ammunition. I galloped to the regiment and ordered it to halt, as I had not ordered the movement, but was informed that it was advancing by order of General Grant, whom I then saw in rear of the line with his staff. I ordered the regiment to advance with the other, which it did some two or three hundred yards farther, when it was halted, and a fire was opened upon it from one of our camps, then occupied by the enemy. The fire was instantly returned, and the enemy soon fled, after wounding eight men of the 1st Ohio."

There is in the official reports no other mention of such an occurrence. This must have been the charge referred to, though it does not satisfy the description, since it appears that General Grant was not taken into the enemy's fire; and there is nothing in it which fills the definition of a charge. The professional soldier at least understands that the term implies something more serious than a movement of troops upon the field of battle, even at a rapid pace, in the presence of an enemy. But putting out of the question all

appropriate distinctions in the use of terms, there was nothing in the occasion or in these simple movements which promised any advantage, or entitled them to the slightest prominence. The enemy had retired from the last line, and was believed to be in retreat; but he had withdrawn in good order, and it is known that he halted a half-mile beyond, fully prepared to repel a careless pursuit. The topographical feature of larger fields and intervening woods, made the left and left-center of the battle-field more difficult for attack than the ground about McClernand's camp, as was illustrated by the battle of the previous day. The antagonists, except when in immediate contact, were kept at a greater distance apart, and were more screened from the observation of each other. The resistance, quelled for the moment, would be renewed unexpectedly by reinforcements or on a new line with increased vigor, and did not always allow the assailant to retain the advantage he had gained.

Nelson and Crittenden were working their way step by step over this difficult ground, when the cheers of victory commenced on the right where the enemy could be better observed. It was my misfortune to know nothing about the topography in front, and when at that moment the enemy on the left was found to be yielding readily to our advance, it was my mistake to suppose that the retirement was more precipitate and disordered than proved to be the case. On that supposition Nelson was ordered rapidly to the lower ford of Lick Creek, by which I supposed a part of the enemy had advanced and would retreat, and was thus out of position for the state of the case as it turned out. The last attack of Crittenden was made through thick woods, and his division had become a good deal scattered; but a brigade of Wood's division came up just then and was pushed forward on the eastern Corinth road. It soon came upon and engaged the enemy's skirmishers, and was attracting a flank fire from a battery a considerable distance off on the right. The orderly withdrawal of the enemy was now discovered, and indicated that a single brigade unsupported would be insufficient for a pursuit. Wood's brigade was therefore halted while its skirmishers occupied the enemy's cavalry, and orders were sent to McCook and Crittenden to form on the new line. Just at that moment a feeble column was seen to the right and rear of Wood's brigade, moving in a direction which would bring it into the flank fire of the enemy's artillery on the right. I therefore ordered it to be halted until other dispositions were made; but, misapprehending the object of the order, or deeming perhaps that enough had been done for one day, it withdrew altogether, and, like the rest of Grant's troops, retired to its camp. Following the same example, and most probably with General Grant's authority, McCook's division had started to the river. Before these misconceptions could be corrected, and my divisions got into position, night came on, and the time for a further forward movement passed for the day. Indeed, while my troops were being called up, I received from General Grant, who had retired to the landing, the following letter:

"HEADQUARTERS DIST. OF W. TENN., PITTSBURG, April 7, 1862. MAJOR-GENERAL D. C. BUELL. GEN.: When I left the field this evening, my intention was to occupy the most advanced

position possible for the night, with the infantry engaged through the day, and follow up our success with cavalry and fresh troops expected to arrive during my last absence on the field. The great fatigue of our men — they having been engaged in two days' fight, and subject to a march yesterday and a fight to-day — would preclude the idea of making any advance to-night without the arrival of the expected reinforcements. My plan, therefore, will be to feel out in the morning, with all the troops on the outer lines, until our cavalry force can be organized (one regiment of your army will finish crossing soon), and a sufficient artillery and infantry support to follow them are ready for a move. Under the instructions which I have previously received, and a dispatch also of to-day from Major-General Halleck, it will not then do to advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point which we can reach and return in a day. General Halleck will probably be here himself to-morrow. Instructions have been sent to the division commanders not included in your command, to be ready in the morning either to find if an enemy was in front, or to advance. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General Commanding."

This letter implies the hypothesis expressed also in General Grant's dispatch of the same evening to General Halleck, that the enemy might still be in our front with the intention of renewing the attack. I make no comment on that point further than to contrast it with the later pretensions with which the battle has been reviewed by General Grant and his friends. The idea is again indicated in his orders to his division commanders on the 8th:

"I have instructed Taylor's cavalry to push out the road toward Corinth to ascertain if the enemy have retreated. . . . Should they be retreating, I want all the cavalry to follow them."

Something in the same vein, which I would by no means be understood as dwelling upon censoriously, is seen in a dispatch of the next day to Halleck.

"I do not" [he says] "like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing upon our troops here to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river, and unsafe to remain on this many weeks without large reinforcements."

The passage is chiefly noteworthy as showing that the fault of Shiloh was not in an excess of rashness or contempt for the adversary, and that the lesson of the occasion had not yet pointed out a means of security other than in reinforcements or retreat. The introduction of the evidence is not to be ascribed to any motive of disparagement. It is entirely pertinent to the subject under consideration.

General Grant has recently admitted that a pursuit ought to have been made, and vaguely intimates that somebody else than himself was responsible that it was not done. The reason given in his letter to me is, of course, insufficient. General McCook may have told him that his men were hungry and tired; but if the order had been issued, both McCook and his troops would cheerfully have shown how much tired and hungry soldiers can do when an emergency demands it. If General Grant meant to imply that I was responsible that the pursuit was not made, I might perhaps answer that it is always to be expected that the chief officer in command will determine the course to be pursued at such a juncture, when he is immediately upon the ground; but I inwardly imposed upon myself the obligation of employing the army under my command as though the whole duty of the occasion rested upon it. There was no doubt in my mind or hesitation in my conduct as to the propriety of continuing the action, at least as long as the enemy



SCENE IN A UNION FIELD-HOSPITAL.

was in our presence, as I considered him still to be; and I make no attempt to excuse myself or blame others when I say that General Grant's troops, the lowest individual among them not more than the commander himself, appear to have thought that the object of the battle was sufficiently accomplished when they were reinstated in their camps; and that in some way that idea obstructed the reorganization of my line until a further advance that day became impracticable.

MUCH harsh criticism has been passed upon General Lew Wallace for having failed to reach the field in time to participate in the battle on Sunday. The naked fact is apt to be judged severely, and the reports made a year afterward by General Grant's staff-officers—the report of Colonel Rawlins especially—are calculated to increase the unfavorable impression. But some qualification of that evidence must be made, on account of the anxiety produced in the minds of those officers by their peculiar connection with the exciting circumstances of the battle. The statement of Rawlins is particularly to be received with reservation. They found Wallace on a different road from the one by which they expected him, and assumed that he was wrongfully there. Rawlins pretends to give the words of a verbal order that would have taken him to a different place. Wallace denies that version of the order, and the circumstances do not sustain it. [See page 607.] He was

on the road to and not far from the upper ford of Owl Creek, which would have brought him on the right flank of the Federal line, as it was in the morning, and as he presumed it still to be. It would have been at least an honest if not a reasonable interpretation of the order, that took him to a point where the responsibility and danger were liable to be greatly increased. The impression of Major Rowley, repeated more strongly by General Grant in his "Century" article, that when found he was farther from the battle-field than when he started, the map shows to have been incorrect. The statement of Rawlins, that he did not make a mile and a half an hour, is also not correct of the whole day's march. He actually marched nearly 15 miles in six hours and a half. That is not particularly rapid marching, but it does not indicate any loitering. At the same time it must be said that, under the circumstances, the manner in which the order was given to Wallace is liable to unqualified disapproval, both as it concerned the public interest and the good name of the officer.

To these qualifying facts it must be added that a presumption of honest endeavor is due to Wallace's character. He did good service at Donelson, and at Shiloh on the 7th, and on no other occasion have his zeal and courage been impugned. The verdict must perhaps remain that his action did not respond to the emergency as it turned out, but that might fall far short of a technical criminality, unless under a more austere standard of discipline than prevailed at that, or indeed at any other period of the war. If he had moved energetically after McPherson and Rawlins arrived and informed him of the urgency of the occasion, no just censure could be cast upon his conduct. The reports of those officers imply that he did not do so; but McPherson, who was more likely to be correct, is least positive on that point. It would probably be easy in any of the armies to point to similar examples of a lack of ardent effort which led to grave disappointment without being challenged, and to many more that would have been attended with serious consequences if any emergency had arisen. It was a defect in the discipline which it was not possible at that time to remedy completely.

WHEN this article was urged upon me by the recent revival of the discussion, I was advised by friends in whose judgment I have great confidence, to write an *impersonal* account of the battle. The idea was perfectly in harmony with my disposition, but a moment's reflection showed me that it was impracticable. It would ignore the characteristics which have made the battle of Shiloh the most famous, and to both sides the most interesting of the war. The whole theme is full of personality. The battle might be called, almost properly, a personal one. It was ushered in by faults that were personal, and the resistance that prolonged it until succor came was personal. This does not pretend to be a history of it, but only a review of some of the prominent facts which determined its character and foreshadowed its result. Even this fragmentary treatment of the subject would be incomplete without a revision of the roll of honor. The task is not difficult, for the evidence is not meager or doubtful. It says of McClellan, that, crippled at the start by

the rudeness of the unexpected attack and the wreck of the division in his front, before he had time well to establish his line, he struggled gallantly and long with varying fortune to keep back the columns of the enemy; and though he failed in that, he was still able to present an organized nucleus which attracted the disrupted elements of other divisions: of Hurlbut, that he posted the two brigades under his immediate command, not in the strongest manner at first, but with judgment to afford prompt shelter to the defeated division of Prentiss, and maintained his front with some serious reverses to his left flank, for 7 hours and until his left was turned, with a greater list of mortality than any other division sustained: of W. H. L. Wallace, that, never dislodged, he sacrificed his life in a heroic effort with Prentiss to maintain his front between the enemy and the landing: of Prentiss, that with the rawest troops in the army his vigilance gave the earliest warning of the magnitude of the danger, and offered a resolute resistance to its approach; that, though overwhelmed and broken in advance, he rallied in effective force on the line of Hurlbut and Wallace, and firmly held his ground until completely surrounded and overpowered: and of Sherman, that he, too, strove bravely, but from an early hour with a feeble and ineffective force, to stay the tide of disaster for which his shortcoming in the position of an advanced guard was largely responsible; but it discloses no fact to justify the announcement of General Halleck that he "saved the fortune of the day on the 6th." On the contrary it shows, that, of all the division commanders, not one was less entitled to that distinction. This will be a strange and may seem like a harsh utterance to many readers, but it is the verdict of the record. The similar indorsement of General Grant a year later, that "he held the key-point to the landing," is equally alien to the evidence, and still further without intelligent meaning. If the key-point was any other than the landing itself, it was on the left where the attack was strongest and the resistance longest maintained.

Into the list of brave men in the inferior grades — captains and even lieutenants who for the moment led the wrecks of regiments and brigades, and field-officers who represented brigades and divisions, and who poured out their lives on the field or survived its carnage — I cannot here pretend to enter, though it is a most interesting chapter in the battle.

And of Grant himself — is nothing to be said? The record is silent and tradition adverse to any marked influence that he exerted upon the fortune of the day. The contemporaneous and subsequent newspaper accounts of personal adventure are alike destitute of authenticity and dignity. If he could have done anything in the beginning, he was not on the ground in time. The determining act in the drama was completed by 10 o'clock. From Sherman's report and later reminiscences we learn that he was with that officer about that hour, and again, it would seem, at 3 and 5 o'clock, and he was with Prentiss between 10 and 11; but he is not seen anywhere else in front. We read of some indefinite or unimportant directions given without effect to straggling bodies of troops in rear. That is all. But he was one of the many there who would have resisted while resistance could avail. That is all that can be said, but it is an honorable record.

AIRDRIE, Kentucky, June, 1885.

THE SKIRMISHING IN SHERMAN'S FRONT.

Robert W. Medkirk, of Co. E, 72d Ohio Vols., wrote, March 22d, 1886, from Indianapolis, Ind.:

"On Friday afternoon, April 4th, two days before the battle of Shiloh, while our regiment of Buckland's brigade was drilling on the west side of Rea Creek [see map, page 502], about a mile from our camp, rapid firing was heard from the direction of our brigade pickets, from the 70th Ohio, Colonel Cockerill. Our commander, Major Crockett, was conversing with Colonel Buckland, who soon rode rapidly in the direction of the firing. Major Crockett ordered the regiment to double-quick toward the outposts. When we arrived at the picket post, we found that it had been captured. Major Crockett, with part of our regiment, started in pursuit of the enemy. In a little while a soldier came back, out of breath, and asked that the rest of the regiment be sent to the major's aid. Then we heard the roar of artillery, and felt that the enemy was there in force. Colonel Cockerill sent an orderly back to camp, with orders for the 70th Ohio to hurry out to the front. The remainder of our regiment pushed on to the assistance of Major Crockett. After wandering in the woods for a time, night came on, and we returned to the outpost. There we found the 70th Ohio, and General Sherman with them. The general was enraged at what he designated indiscreet conduct, and ordered us all back to camp. That portion of the 72d Ohio which had been

with Major Crockett came straggling in. Then it was that we learned of the capture of the major and eight men.

"The next day, Saturday, my company, 'E,' and Company 'C' constituted the brigade picket. We were stationed on the east side of the Howell farm [see page 502]. All day the enemy kept in our front. We fired on them frequently, but they did not return the fire until toward evening, when they had a brush with a squadron of the 5th Ohio Cavalry. Late Saturday afternoon, a Confederate officer with his staff rode up on a knoll on the west side of the Howell farm, and with his glass began to take observations; in a few minutes we opened fire on them and they rode rapidly away. To show that no serious attack was expected, a detail from Colonel Buckland's brigade worked all day Saturday, April 5th, building two bridges in front of Buckland's brigade, one over the east branch of Oak Creek and one over the west branch of Rea Creek, which bridges were used by the enemy to cross their artillery on Sunday, after our brigade fell back from its first line."

General Sherman's report of the affair of April 4th to Grant's headquarters, written on the 5th, says: "I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge," or Monterey, about eight miles from Shiloh Church.—EDITORS.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT SHILOH.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m for mortally wounded; n for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE. Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant.

FIRST DIVISION, Major-Gen. John A. McClernand. Staff loss: w, 2.

First Brigade, Col. A. M. Hare (w), Col. M. M. Crocker; 8th Ill., Capt. James M. Ashmore (w), Capt. William H. Harvey (k), Capt. R. H. Sturgess; 18th Ill., Major Samuel Eaton (w), Capt. Daniel H. Brush (w), Capt. William J. Dillon (k), Capt. J. J. Anderson; 11th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. William Hall; 13th Iowa, Col. Marcellus M. Crocker; Battery D, 2d Ill. Artillery, Capt. James P. Timony. Brigade loss: k, 104; w, 467; m, 9 = 580. *Second Brigade*, Col. C. Carroll Marsh; 11th Ill., Lieut.-Col. T. E. G. Ransom (w), Major Garrett Nevins (w), Capt. Lloyd D. Waddell, Major Garrett Nevins; 20th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Evan Richards (w), Capt. Orton Frisbie; 45th Ill., Col. John E. Smith; 48th Ill., Col. Isham N. Haynie (w), Maj. Manning Mayfield. Brigade loss: k, 80; w, 475; m, 30 = 585. *Third Brigade*, Col. Julius Raith (m w), Lieut.-Col. Enos P. Wood, Col. C. Carroll Marsh; 17th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Enos P. Wood, Maj. Francis M. Smith; 29th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Charles M. Ferrell; 43d Ill., Lieut.-Col. Adolph Engelmann; 49th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Phineas Pease; Company III, Cavalry, Capt. E. Carmichael. Brigade loss: k, 96; w, 393; m, 46 = 535. *Unattached*: Stewart's Co. Ill. Cav., Lieut. Ezra King; D, 1st Ill. Artillery, Capt. Edward McAllister (w); E, 2d Ill. Artillery, Lieut. George L. Nispele; 14th Ohio Battery, Capt. J. B. Burrows (w). Unattached loss: k, 5; w, 36 = 40.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. W. H. L. Wallace (m w). Col. James M. Tuttle. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. James M. Tuttle; 2d Iowa, Lieut.-Col. James Baker; 7th Iowa, Lieut.-Col. James C. Parrott; 12th Iowa, Col. Joseph J. Woods (w), Capt. Samuel R. Edgington; 14th Iowa, Col. William T. Shaw. Brigade loss: k, 39; w, 143; m, 676 = 858. (A number of the captured or missing were also wounded.) *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John McArthur (w), Col. Thomas Morton; 9th Ill., Col. August Merz; 12th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Augustus L. Chetlain, Capt. James R. Huginin; 81st Ohio, Col. Thomas Morton; 13th Mo., Col. Crafts J. Wright; 14th

Mo. (Birge's Sharpshooters), Col. B. S. Compton. Brigade loss: k, 99; w, 470; m, 11 = 580. *Third Brigade*, Col. Thomas W. Sweeney (w), Col. Silas D. Baldwin; 8th Iowa, Col. James L. Geddes (w and c); 7th Ill., Maj. Richard Rowett; 50th Ill., Col. Moses M. Bane (w); 52d Ill., Maj. Henry Stark, Capt. Edwin A. Bowen; 57th Ill., Col. Silas D. Baldwin, Lieut.-Col. F. J. Hurlbut; 58th Ill., Col. William F. Lynch (c). Brigade loss: k, 127; w, 501; m, 619 = 1247. (A number of the captured or missing were also wounded.) *Cavalry*: C, 2d, and I, 4th U. S., Lieut. James Powell; A and B, 2d Ill., Capt's John R. Hotelling and Thomas J. Larison. Cavalry loss: k, 1; w, 5 = 6. *Artillery*: A, 1st Ill., Lieut. Peter P. Wood; D, 1st Mo., Capt. Henry Richardson; H, 1st Mo., Capt. Frederick Welker; K, 1st Mo., Capt. George H. Stone. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 53 = 57.

THIRD DIVISION, Major-General Lew Wallace.

First Brigade, Col. Morgan L. Smith; 11th Ind., Col. G. F. McHinnis; 24th Ind., Col. Alvin P. Hovey; 8th Mo., Lieut.-Col. James Peckham. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 114 = 132. *Second Brigade*, Col. John M. Thayer; 23d Ind., Col. W. L. Sanderson; 1st Neb., Lieut.-Col. William D. McCord; 56th Ohio (at Crump's Landing), Col. Peter Kinney; 58th Ohio, Col. Valentine Bausenwein. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 99; m, 3 = 122. *Third Brigade*, Col. Charles Whittlesey; 20th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Manning F. Force; 68th Ohio (at Crump's Landing), Col. S. H. Steedman; 76th Ohio, Col. Charles R. Woods; 78th Ohio, Col. M. D. Leggett. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 32; m, 1 = 35. *Artillery*: 9th Ind. Battery, Capt. N. S. Thompson; I, 1st Mo., Lieut. Charles H. Thurber. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 6 = 7. *Cavalry*: 2d Battalion, 11th Ill., Maj. James F. Johnson; 3d Battalion, 5th Ohio, Maj. C. F. Hayes.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut.

First Brigade, Col. N. G. Williams (w), Col. Isaac C. Pugh; 28th Ill., Col. A. K. Johnson; 32d Ill., Col. John Logan (w); 41st Ill., Col. Isaac C. Pugh, Lieut.-Col. Ansel Tupper (k), Maj. John Warner, Capt. John H. Nale; 3d Iowa, Maj. William M. Stone (c), Lieut. G. W.

Crosley. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 592; m, 48 = 687. *Second Brigade*, Col. James C. Veatch: 14th Ill., Col. Cyrus Hall; 15th Ill., Lieut.-Col. E. F. W. Ellis (k), Capt. Louis D. Kelley, Lieut.-Col. William Cam; 46th Ill., Col. John A. Davis (w), Lieut.-Col. John J. Jones; 25th Ind., Lieut.-Col. William H. Morgan (w), Maj. John W. Foster. Brigade loss: k, 180; w, 492; m, 8 = 680. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jacob G. Lauman: 31st Ind., Col. Charles Cruft (w), Lieut.-Col. John Osborn; 44th Ind., Col. Hugh B. Reed; 17th Ky., Col. John H. McHenry, Jr.; 25th Ky., Lieut.-Col. B. H. Bristow, Maj. Wm. B. Wall (w), Col. John H. McHenry, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 384; m, 4 = 458. *Cavalry*: 1st and 2d Battalions, 6th Ohio, Col. W. H. H. Taylor. Loss: k, 1; w, 6 = 7. *Artillery*: 2d Mich. Battery, Lieut. C. W. Laing; Mann's Mo. Battery, Lieut. Edward Brotzmann; 13th Ohio Battery, Capt. John B. Myers. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 27; m, 56 = 87. *FIFTH DIVISION*, Brig.-Gen. William T. Sherman (w). Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. John A. McDowell: 40th Ill., Col. Stephen G. Hicks (w), Lieut.-Col. James W. Boothe; 6th Iowa, Capt. John Williams (w), Capt. Madison M. Walden; 46th Ohio, Col. Thomas Worthington; 6th Ind. Battery, Capt. Frederick Beltr (k). Brigade loss: k, 137; w, 444; m, 70 = 651. *Second Brigade*, Col. David Stuart (w), Lieut.-Col. Oscar Malmborg (temporarily), Col. T. Kilby Smith: 55th Ill., Lieut.-Col. Oscar Malmborg; 64th Ohio, Col. T. Kilby Smith, Lieut.-Col. James A. Farden; 71st Ohio, Col. Rodney Mason. Brigade loss: k, 80; w, 380; m, 80 = 550. *Third Brigade*, Col. Jesse Hildebrand: 83d Ohio, Col. J. J. Appier, Lieut.-Col. Robert A. Fulton; 57th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Americus V. Rice; 77th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Willis De Haas, Maj. Benjamin D. Fearing. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 222; m, 65 = 356. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. Ralph Buckland: 48th Ohio, Col. Peter J. Sullivan (w), Lieut.-Col. Job R. Parker; 70th Ohio, Col. Joseph R. Cockorill; 72d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Herman Canfield (k), Col. Ralph P. Buckland. Brigade loss: k, 36; w, 203; m, 74 = 313. *Cavalry*: 1st and 2d

Battalions, 4th Ill., Col. T. Lyle Dickey. Cavalry loss: w, 6. *Artillery*, Maj. Ezra Taylor: B. 1st Ill., Capt. Samuel E. Barrett; E. 1st Ill., Capt. A. C. Waterhouse (w), Lieut. A. R. Abbott (w), Lieut. J. A. Fitch. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 22 = 24.

SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin M. Prentiss (c). Staff loss: k, 1; m, 2 = 3.

First Brigade, Col. Everett Peabody (k): 12th Mich., Col. Francis Quinn; 21st Mo., Col. David Moore (w), Lieut.-Col. H. M. Woodyard; 25th Mo., Col. Robert T. Van Horn; 16th Wis., Col. Benjamin Allen (w). Brigade loss: k, 113; w, 372; m, 236 = 721. *Second Brigade*, Col. Madison Miller (c): 61st Ill., Col. Jacob Fry; 16th Iowa, Col. Alexander Chambers (w), Lieut.-Col. A. H. Sanders; 18th Mo., Lieut.-Col. Isaac V. Pratt (c). Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 228; m, 178 = 450. *Cavalry*: 11th Ill. (8 co's), Col. Robert G. Ingersoll. Cavalry loss: k, 3; w, 3 = 6. *Artillery*: 1st Minn Battery, Capt. Emil Munch (w), Lieut. William Pfender; 5th Ohio Battery, Capt. A. Hickenlooper. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 27 = 31. *Unattached Infantry*: 15th Iowa, Col. Hugh T. Reid; 23d Mo., Col. Jacob T. Tindall (k), Lieut.-Col. Quin Morton (c); 18th Wis., Col. James S. Alban (k). Loss Unattached Infantry: k, 71; w, 298; m, 592 = 961. (Some of the captured or missing [1008] of this division were also wounded.)

UNASSIGNED TROOPS: 15th Mich., Col. John M. Oliver; 14th Wis., Col. David E. Wood; H, 1st Ill. Artillery, Capt. Axel Hiltverparre; I, 1st Ill. Artillery, Capt. Edward Bouton; B, 2d Ill. Artillery, Capt. Rely Madison; F, 2d Ill. Artillery, Capt. John W. Powell (w); 8th Ohio Battery, Capt. Louis Markgraf. Loss unassigned troops: k, 39; w, 159; m, 17 = 215. The total loss of the Army of the Tennessee was 1513 killed, 6601 wounded, and 2830 captured or missing = 10,944.

UNION GUN-BOATS Tyler, Lieut.-Com. William Gwin; Lexington, Lieut.-Com. James W. Shirk.

ARMY OF THE OHIO — Major-General Don Carlos Buell.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alexander McD. McCook.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau: 6th Ind., Col. Thomas T. Crittenden; 6th Ky., Col. H. M. Buckley; 1st Ohio, Col. B. F. Smith; 1st Battalion, 15th U. S. (Capt. Peter T. Swaine), and 1st Battalion, 16th U. S. (Capt. Edwin F. Townsend), Major John H. King; 1st Battalion, 19th U. S., Maj. S. D. Carpenter. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 280; m, 8 = 311. *Fifth Brigade*, Col. Edward N. Kirk (w): 34th Ill., Maj. Charles N. Levanway (k), Capt. Hiram W. Bristol; 29th Ind., Lieut.-Col. David M. Dunn; 80th Ind., Col. Slon S. Bass (m w), Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Dodge; 77th Pa., Col. Fred. S. Stumbaugh. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 310; m, 2 = 346. *Sixth Brigade*, Col. William H. Gibson: 32d Ind., Col. August Willrich; 39th Ind., Col. Thomas J. Harrison; 15th Ohio, Maj. William Wallace; 49th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Albert M. Blackman. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 220; m, 2 = 247. *Artillery*: H, 5th U. S., Capt. William R. Terrill. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 13 = 14.

FOURTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William Nelson.

Tenth Brigade, Col. Jacob Ammen: 36th Ind., Col. William Grose; 6th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Nicholas L. Anderson; 24th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Frederick C. Jones. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 106; m, 8 = 130. *Nineteenth Brigade*, Col. William B. Hazen: 9th Ind., Col. Hideon C. Moody; 6th Ky., Col. Walter C. Whitaker; 41st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. George S. Mygatt. Brigade loss: k, 48; w, 357; m, 1 =

The total loss of the Army of the Ohio was 241 killed, 1807 wounded, and 55 captured or missing = 2103.

The grand total of Union loss was 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 captured or missing = 13,047.

The only official statement of Grant's strength at Shiloh is on page 112, Vol. X., "Official Records," which is compiled from division returns of April 4th and 6th, and shows (exclusive of two regiments and one battery not reported), an aggregate, "present for duty," of 44,895. Included, however, in these figures are such non-combatants as medical officers, quartermasters, chaplains, musicians, hospital stewards, buglers, etc., etc. Deducting from the total above given the "present for duty" of Lew Wallace's division (7564), leaves 37,331 as the "present for duty" (combatant and non-combatant) in Grant's army on the morning of April 6th. The actual number of effectives is nowhere officially reported, nor do the "Official Records" afford any information as to the number of men brought by Buell to Grant's assistance. General Buell speaks in a general way of "25,000 reinforcements," including "Lew Wallace's 6000." General Grant says: "At Shiloh, the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. Lew Wallace brought 6000 more after nightfall. . . . Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than

406. *Twenty-second Brigade*, Col. Sanders D. Bruce: 1st Ky., Col. David A. Euyart; 2d Ky., Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick; 20th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Charles S. Hanson. Brigade loss: k, 29; w, 138; m, 11 = 178. *Cavalry*: 2d Ind. (not actively engaged), Lieut.-Col. Edward M. McCook. *FIFTH DIVISION*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.

Eleventh Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jeremiah T. Boyle: 9th Ky., Col. Benjamin C. Grider; 13th Ky., Col. Edward H. Hobson; 19th Ohio, Col. Samuel Beatty; 59th Ohio, Col. James P. Pyffe. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 212; m, 18 = 263. *Fourteenth Brigade*, Col. William Scoy Smith: 11th Ky., Col. Pierce B. Hawkins; 26th Ky., Lieut.-Col. Cicero Maxwell; 13th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Joseph G. Hawkins. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 157; m, 10 = 192. *Artillery*: G, 1st Ohio, Capt. Joseph Bartlett; H and M, 4th U. S., Capt. John Mendenhall. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 8 = 10. *Cavalry*: 3d Ky. (not actively engaged), Col. James S. Jackson.

SIXTH DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Thomas J. Wood.

Twentieth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James A. Garfield: 13th Mich., Col. Michael Shoemaker; 64th Ohio, Col. John Ferguson; 65th Ohio, Col. Charles G. Harker. *Twenty-first Brigade*, Col. George D. Wagner: 15th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Gustavus A. Wood; 40th Ind., Col. John W. Blake; 57th Ind., Col. Cyrus C. Hines; 24th Ky., Col. Lewis B. Grigsby. Brigade loss: w, 4.

25,000 men in line. On the 7th Buell brought 20,000 more (Nelson's, Crittenden's, and McCook's divisions). Of his remaining two divisions Thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service." General M. F. Force, in "From Fort Henry to Corinth" (Charles Scribner's Sons), says: "The reinforcements of Monday numbered, of Buell's army about 25,000; Lew Wallace's 6500 other regiments about 1400." General Lew Wallace says in his report that his command "did not exceed 5000 men of all arms."

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.—General Albert Sidney Johnston (k.). General G. T. Beauregard.

FIRST ARMY CORPS.—Major-Gen. Leonidas Polk.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Charles Clark (w), Brig.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. R. M. Russell: 11th La., Col. S. F. Marks (w), Lieut.-Col. Robert H. Barrow; 12th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. H. Bell, Major R. P. Caldwell; 13th Tenn., Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.; 22d Tenn., Col. T. J. Freeman (w); Tenn. Battery, Capt. Smith P. Bankhead. Brigade loss: k, 97; w, 512 = 609. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart: 13th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Grayson (k), Major James A. McNeely (w), Col. J. C. Tappan; 4th Tenn., Col. R. P. Neely, Lieut.-Col. O. F. Strahl; 5th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. C. D. Venable; 33d Tenn., Col. Alexander W. Campbell (w); Missa. Battery, Capt. T. J. Stanford. Brigade loss: k, 93; w, 421; m, 3 = 517.

SECOND DIVISION, Major-Gen. B. F. Cheatham (w). Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson (w), Col. Preston Smith (w); Blythe's Missa., Col. A. K. Blythe (k), Lieut.-Col. D. L. Herron (k), Major James Moore; 2d Tenn., Col. J. Knox Walker; 15th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. R. C. Tyler (w), Major John F. Hearn; 154th Tenn. (senior), Col. Preston Smith, Lieut.-Col. Marcus J. Wright; Tenn. Battery, Capt. Marshall T. Polk (w). Brigade loss: k, 120; w, 607; m, 13 = 740. Second Brigade, Col. William H. Stephens, Col. George Maney; 7th Ky., Col. Charles Wickliffe (m, w), Lieut.-Col. W. D. Lannom; 1st Tenn. (battalion), Col. George Maney, Major H. R. Field; 6th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. T. P. Jones, Col. W. H. Stephens; 9th Tenn., Col. H. L. Douglass; Missa. Battery, Capt. Melancthon Smith. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 413; m, 3 = 491. Cavalry: 1st Missa., Col. A. J. Lindsay; Missa. and Ala. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Brewer. Cavalry loss: k, 5; w, 12; m, 2 = 19. Unattached: 47th Tenn., Col. M. R. Hill.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Major-Gen. Braxton Bragg. Escort: Alabama Cavalry, Capt. R. W. Smith.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Ruggles. First Brigade, Col. Randall L. Gibson: 1st Ark., Col. James F. Fagan; 4th La., Col. H. W. Allen (w), Lieut.-Col. S. E. Hunter; 13th La., Major A. P. Avegno (m, w), Capt. S. O'Leary (w), Capt. E. M. Dubroca; 19th La., Col. Benjamin L. Hodge, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Hollingsworth. Brigade loss: k, 97; w, 488; m, 97 = 682. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Patton Anderson: 1st Fla. Battalion, Major T. A. McDonell (w), Capt. W. G. Poole, Capt. W. C. Bird; 17th La., Lieut.-Col. Charles Jones (w); 20th La., Col. August Reichard; 9th Texas, Col. W. A. Stanley; Confederate Guards Response Battalion, Major Franklin H. Clark; 5th Company Washington (La.) Artillery, Capt. W. I. Hodgson. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 313; m, 63 = 434. Third Brigade, Col. Preston Pond, Jr.: 16th La., Maj. Daniel Gober; 18th La., Col. Alfred Mouton (w), Lieut.-Col. A. Roman; Crescent (La.) Regt., Col. Marshall J. Smith; Orleans Guard Battalion, Major Leon Querouze (w); 38th Tenn., Col. R. F. Looney; Ala. Battery, Capt. Wm. H. Ketchum. Brigade loss: k, 89; w, 336; m, 169 = 594. Cavalry: Ala. Battalion, Capt. T. F. Jenkins. Cavalry loss, k, 2; w, 6; m, 1 = 9.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Jones M. Withers. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. H. Gladden (m, w), Col. Daniel W. Adams (w), Col. Z. C. Deas (w); 21st Ala., Lieut.-Col. S. W. Cayce, Maj. F. Stewart; 22d Ala., Col. Z. C. Deas, Lieut.-Col. John C. Marrast; 25th Ala., Col. J. Q. Loomis (w), Maj. George D. Johnston; 26th Ala., Col. J. G. Col-

tart (w), Lieut.-Col. William D. Chadlek; 1st La., Col. Daniel W. Adams, Maj. F. H. Farrar, Jr.; Ala. Battery, Capt. F. H. Robertson. Brigade loss: k, 129; w, 597; m, 103 = 829. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James R. Chalmers: 5th Missa., Col. A. E. Fant; 7th Missa., Lieut.-Col. H. Mayson; 9th Missa., Lieut.-Col. William A. Rankin (m, w); 10th Missa., Col. R. A. Smith; 62d Tenn., Col. B. J. Lea; Ala. Battery, Capt. Charles P. Gage. Brigade loss: k, 83; w, 343; m, 19 = 445. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John K. Jackson: 17th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Robert C. Farris; 18th Ala., Col. Eli S. Shorter; 19th Ala., Col. Joseph Wheeler; 2d Tex., Col. John C. Moore, Lieut.-Col. W. P. Rogers, Maj. H. G. Runnels; (Ga. Battery, Capt. I. P. Girardey. Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 364; m, 194 = 644.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Maj.-Gen. Wm. J. Hardee (w). First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. C. Hindman (commanded his (w) and the Third Brigade), Col. R. G. Shaver; 2d Ark., Col. D. C. Govan, Maj. R. F. Harvey; 6th Ark., Col. A. T. Hawthorn; 7th Ark., Lieut.-Col. John M. Dean (k), Maj. James T. Martin; 3d Confederate, Col. John S. Marmaduke; Missa. Battery, Capt. Charles Swett. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 546; m, 38 = 693. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne: 15th Ark., Lieut.-Col. A. K. Patton (k); 6th Missa., Col. J. J. Thornton (w), Capt. W. A. Harper; 2d Tenn., Col. W. B. Bate (w), Lieut.-Col. D. L. Goodall; 5th Tenn., Col. Ben. J. Hill; 23d Tenn., Lieut.-Col. James F. Neill (w); 24th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. Thomas H. Peebles; Ark. Batteries, Capt. J. T. Trigg and J. H. Calvert. Brigade loss: k, 188; w, 790; m, 65 = 1043. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. A. M. Wood, Col. W. K. Patterson (temporarily): 16th Ala., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Harris; 8th Ark., Col. W. K. Patterson; 9th Ark. (battalion), Maj. J. H. Kelly; 3d Missa. Battalion, Maj. A. B. Hardesty; 27th Tenn., Col. Chris. H. Williams (k), Maj. Samuel T. Love (m, w); 44th Tenn., Col. C. A. McDaniel; 55th Tenn., Col. James L. McKoin; Missa. Battery, Capt. W. L. Harper (w), Lieut. Put. Darden; Ga. Dragoons, Capt. I. W. Avery. Brigade loss: k, 107; w, 600; m, 38 = 745.

RESERVE CORPS, Brig.-Gen. John C. Breckinridge. First Brigade, Col. Robert P. Trahuc: 4th Ala. Batt., Maj. J. M. Clifton; 31st Ala., Lieut.-Col. — Galbraith; 3d Ky., Lieut.-Col. Ben. Anderson (w); 4th Ky., Lieut.-Col. A. R. Hynea (w); 5th Ky., Col. Thomas H. Hunt; 6th Ky., Col. Joseph H. Lewis; Tenn. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Crews; Ky. Battery, Capt. Edward P. Byrne; Ky. Battery, Capt. Robert Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 151; w, 557; m, 92 = 800. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John S. Bowen (w), Col. John D. Martin; 9th Ark., Col. Isaac L. Dunlop; 10th Ark., Col. T. D. Merriek; 2d Confederate, Col. John D. Martin, Maj. Thomas H. Mangum; 1st Mo., Col. Lucius L. Rich; Missa. Battery, Capt. Alfred Hudson. Brigade loss: k, 98; w, 498; m, 28 = 624. Third Brigade, Col. W. S. Statham: 15th Missa.; 22d Missa.; 19th Tenn., Col. D. H. Cummings; 20th Tenn., Col. J. A. Battle (e); 26th Tenn.; 45th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. E. F. Lytle; Tenn. Battery, Capt. A. M. Rutledge. Brigade loss: k, 137; w, 627; m, 45 = 809.

TROOPS NOT MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING LIST. Cavalry: Tenn. Regt., Col. N. B. Forrest (w); Ala. Regt., Col. James H. Clanton; Texas Regt., Col. John A. Wharton (w); Ky. Squadron, Capt. John H. Morgan. Artillery: Ark. Battery, Capt. George T. Hubbard; Tenn. Battery, Capt. H. L. W. McClung.

The total Confederate loss, as officially reported, was 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 missing = 10,699.

According to a field return for April 3d, 1862 ("Official Records," Vol. X, 398), the effective strength of the Confederate forces that marched from Corinth was as follows: Infantry, 34,772; artillery, 1973; cavalry, 2073,—or an aggregate of 36,773. The 47th Tennessee Regiment reached the field on the 7th with probably 550 men, making in all 37,323. Another return ("Official Records," Vol. X, 396) gives the following "effective total before the battle": Infantry and artillery, 36,953; cavalry, 4382,—grand total, 40,335.

ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT SHILOH.†

BY HIS SON, WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON, COLONEL, C. S. A.



ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT THE AGE OF 25.
FROM A MINATURE BY THOMAS CAMPBELL, PAINTED IN
LOUISVILLE, KY., IN 1828 OR 1829.

DURING the angry political strife which preceded the contest of arms, General Albert Sidney Johnston‡ remained silent, stern, and sorrowful. He determined to stand at his post in San Francisco, performing his full duty as an officer of the United States, until events should require a decision as to his course. When Texas—his adopted State—passed the ordinance of secession from the Union, the alternative was presented, and, on the day he heard the news, he resigned his commission in the army. He kept the fact concealed, however, lest it might stir up disaffection among the turbulent population of the Pacific Coast. He said, "I shall do my duty to the last, and, when absolved, shall take my course." All honest and competent witnesses now accord that he carried out this purpose in letter and spirit. General Sumner, who relieved him, reported that he found him "carrying out the orders of the Government."

Mr. Lincoln's Administration treated General Johnston with a distrust which wounded his pride to the quick, but afterward made such amends as it could, by sending him a major-general's commission. He was also assured through confidential sources that he would receive the highest command in the Federal army. But he declined to take part against his own people, and retired to Los Angeles with the intention of farming. There he was subjected to an irritating surveillance; while at the same time there came

† For extended treatment of this subject, see "The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," by William Preston Johnston (D. Appleton & Co.), upon which Colonel Johnston has drawn freely in the preparation of this paper.—EDITORS.

‡ General Johnston was of New England descent, though both he and his mother were of pioneer stock, and natives of Kentucky. His father was the village physician. He was born February 3d, 1803, in Mason County, Kentucky. He was "a handsome, proud, manly, earnest, and self-reliant boy," "grave and thoughtful." His early education was desultory, but was continued at Transylvania and at West Point, where he evinced superior talents for mathematics, and was graduated in 1826. He was a lieutenant of the 6th Infantry, from 1827 to 1834, when he resigned. His only active service during this period was the Black Hawk war, in which he won considerable distinction. In 1829 he married Miss Henrietta Preston, who died in 1835. In 1836 he joined the army of the young republic of Texas,

and rapidly rose to the chief command. In 1839 he was Secretary of War, and expelled the intruding United States Indians, after two battles on the River Neches. He served one campaign in Mexico under General Taylor, and was recommended by that commander as a brigadier-general for his conduct at Monterey, but was allowed no command by the Administration. In 1843 he married Miss Eliza Griffin, and retired to a plantation in Brazoria County, Texas, where he spent three years in seclusion and straitened circumstances. In 1849 he was appointed a paymaster by President Taylor, and served in Texas until 1855, when he was made colonel of the 2d Cavalry by President Pierce. In 1857 he conducted the remarkable expedition to Utah, in which he saved the United States army there from a frightful disaster by his prudence and executive ability. He remained in command in Utah until the summer of 1860, which he passed with his family in Kentucky. In December of that year he was assigned to the command of the Pacific Coast.—W. P. J.

across mountain and desert the voice of the Southern people calling to him for help in their extremity.† His heart and intellect both recognized their claim upon his services, and he obeyed. At this time he wrote, "No one could feel more sensibly the calamitous condition of our country than myself, and whatever part I may take hereafter, it will always be a subject of gratulation with me that no act of mine ever contributed to bring it about. I suppose the difficulties now will only be adjusted by the sword. In my humble judgment, that was not the remedy."

When he arrived in the new Confederacy, his coming was welcomed with a spontaneous outburst of popular enthusiasm, and deputations from the West preceded him to Richmond, entreating his assignment to that department. President Davis said that he regarded his coming as of more worth than the accession of an army of ten thousand men; and on the 10th of September, 1861, he was intrusted with the defense of that part of the Confederate States which lay west of the Alleghany Mountains, except the Gulf Coast (Bragg having control of the coast of West Florida and Alabama, and Mansfield Lovell of the coast of Mississippi and Louisiana). His command was

† The following statement was written in response to an inquiry by the editors as to the details of the offer of high command referred to by Colonel Johnston:

"The circumstances which gave rise to the expressed desire of the Administration in 1861 to retain General Albert Sidney Johnston in the Federal army were as follows:

"Early in April, 1861, while on duty in the adjutant-general's office in Washington, I learned that Colonel Sumner had been dispatched *incoq.* to California, with secret orders to assume command of the Department of the Pacific, and that this unusual course had been prompted by the fear that the forts and arsenals and garrisons on that coast would be placed in the hands of the secessionists by General Johnston, the then commander, who was reported to be arranging to do so.

"I had just received a letter from General Johnston expressing his pleasure at the large and handsome parade of State troops in San Francisco, on February 22d, and at the undoubted loyalty to the Union cause of the whole Pacific coast, and also his earnest hope that the patriotic spirit manifested in California existed as strongly in all other States, and would as surely be maintained by them as it would be in the Pacific States in case of attempted secession.

"Fearing the effect of the superseding orders upon a high-toned and sensitive officer, one whom I esteemed as a brother, and earnestly desired to be secured to our cause, I induced Major McDowell to show the letter to Secretary Cameron, and to urge every effort to keep General Johnston from leaving the service. His superior qualifications, his influence among prominent citizens at the South, and especially among his relatives in his native State, Kentucky,—which it was exceedingly desirable to keep in the Union,—were strong

inducements to these efforts. My desire was met as cordially and earnestly as it existed, and I was authorized to send, as I did through my friend 'Ben' Holliday, in New York, for transmission by telegraph to St. Louis, and thence by his 'pony express' to San Francisco, the following message: 'I take the greatest pleasure in assuring you, for the Secretary of War, that he has the utmost confidence in you, and will give you the most important command and trust on your arrival here. Sidney is appointed to the Military Academy.' This message reached General Johnston after the arrival of Colonel Sumner.

"In response to the above, and by the same channel of communication, I received this message: 'I thank you and my friends for efforts in my behalf. I have resigned, and resolved to follow the fortunes of my State.' His letter of resignation was soon received, and put an end to all hope, especially as Texas—which had then seceded—was his adopted State.

"I felt in 1861, as I now know, that the assertion that General Johnston intended to turn over to the secessionists the defenses of California, or any part of the regular army, was false and absurd. Under no circumstances, even if intended, could such a plan have succeeded, especially with the regular army. But no such breach of trust was intended, nor would any graduate of West Point in the army have committed or permitted it. It had no better foundation than the statement of Senator Conness of California, who three years later urged and secured the assignment of General McDowell to command on the Pacific coast, on the ground that after the war for the Union should have ended there would be in California a more powerful rebellion than that then existing among the Southern States.

"FITZ JOHN PORTER.

"NEW YORK, December 8, 1884."



GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON AT THE AGE OF FIFTY-SEVEN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN SALT LAKE CITY IN 1860.

The appearance of General Albert Sidney Johnston before the war is described as both commanding and attractive. In some respects the bust of Alexander Hamilton is the best extant likeness of him, a resemblance very frequently remarked. His cheek-bones were rather high, and with his nose and complexion gave him a Scotch look. His chin was delicate and handsome; his teeth were white and regular, and his mouth was square and firm. In the portrait by Bush taken about this time, his lips seem rather full, but as they are best remembered, they were somewhat thin and very

firmly set. Light-brown hair clustered over a noble forehead, and from under heavy brows his deep-set but clear, steady eyes looked straight at you with a regard kind and sincere, yet penetrating. In repose his eyes were as blue as the sky, but in excitement they flashed to a steel-gray, and exerted a remarkable power over men. He was six feet and an inch in height, of about one hundred and eighty pounds weight, straight as an arrow, with broad, square shoulders and a massive chest. He was strong and active, and of a military bearing.—W. P. J.

imperial in extent, and his powers and discretion as large as the theory of the Confederate Government permitted. He lacked nothing except men, munitions of war, and the means of obtaining them. He had the right to ask for anything, and the State Executives had the power to withhold everything.

The Mississippi River divided his department into two distinct theaters of war. West of the river, Frémont held Missouri with a force of from 60,000 to 80,000 Federals, confronted by Price and McCulloch in the extreme south-

west corner of the State with 6000 men, and by Hardee, in north-eastern Arkansas, with about as many raw recruits down with camp diseases and unable to move. East of the Mississippi, the northern boundary of Tennessee was barely in his possession, and was held under sufferance from an enemy who, for various reasons, hesitated to advance. The Mississippi opened the way to a ruinous naval invasion unless it could be defended and held. Grant was at Cairo and Paducah with 20,000 men; and Polk, to oppose his invasion, had seized Columbus, Ky., with about 11,000 Confederates, and had fortified it. Tennessee was twice divided: first by the Tennessee River, and then by the

A S Johnston
3^d April 62
en avant

AUTOGRAPH FOUND INSIDE THE COVER OF GENERAL JOHNSTON'S POCKET-MAP OF TENNESSEE, AND WRITTEN THREE DAYS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH—PROBABLY HIS LAST AUTOGRAPH.

Cumberland, both of which invited the advance of a hostile force. Some small pretense of fortifications had been made on both rivers at Forts Henry and Donelson, near the boundary line, but practically there was nothing to prevent the Federal army from capturing Nashville, then the most important depot of supplies west of the Alleghanies. Hence the immediate and pressing question for General Johnston was the defense of the Tennessee border. The mock neutrality of Kentucky, which had served as a paper barrier, was terminated, on the 13th of September, by a formal defiance from the Union Legislature of Kentucky. The United States Government had about 34,000 volunteers and about 6000 Kentucky Home Guards assembled in the State


under General Robert Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, who had with him such enterprising corps commanders as Sherman, Thomas, and Nelson.

The Confederacy had some four thousand ill-armed and ill-equipped troops at Cumberland Gap under General Zollicoffer, guarding the only line of railroad communication between Virginia and Tennessee, and overawing the Union population of East Tennessee. This hostile section penetrated the heart of the Confederacy like a wedge and flanked and weakened General Johnston's line of defense, requiring, as it did, constant vigilance and repression.

Besides Zollicoffer's force, General Johnston found only 4000 men available to protect his whole line against 40,000 Federal troops. There were, it is true, some four thousand more raw recruits in camps of



BIRTHPLACE OF ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON, WASHINGTON, KY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.




FORT ANDERSON, PADUCAH, IN APRIL, 1862. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.


instruction, but they were sick and not half armed. Of course he might have abandoned the Mississippi River to Grant and brought Polk to his aid, but he had no thought of that; that would have been all which the Federals could have asked. The boldest policy seemed to him the best, and he resolved on a daring step. On September 17th he threw forward his whole force of four thousand men under Buckner by rail

into Kentucky and seized Bowling Green. It was a mere skirmish line to mask his own weakness. But if he could maintain it, even temporarily, it gave him immense strategic and political advantages, and, most of all, time to collect or create an army. And then (I hold in spite of some dilettante criticism) it gave him a formidable line, with Cumberland Gap and Columbus as the extremities and Bowling Green as the salient.

The result more than answered his expectations. Buckner's advance produced the wildest consternation in the Federal lines. Even Sherman, writing thirteen years later, speaks of a picket which burned a bridge thirty miles from Louisville as a "division." As late as November 10th, 1861, he said: "If Johnston chooses, he could march into Louisville any day." The effect of the movement was for a time to paralyze the Federal army and put it on the defensive.



CAMP BURGESS, BOWLING GREEN—THE 70TH INDIANA ON DRESS PARADE. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.
On the hill are seen the Confederate fortifications erected by General Buckner.



General Johnston had made the opportunity required by the South, if it meant seriously to maintain its independence. He had secured time for preparation; but it neglected the chance, and never recovered it. He at once strongly fortified Bowling Green, and used every measure to stir up and rally the Kentuckians to his standard. He brought Hardee with four thousand men from Arkansas, and kept his little force in such constant motion as to produce the impression of a large army menacing an attack. Even before Buckner advanced, General Johnston had sent to the Southern governors an appeal for arms and a call for fifty thousand men. Harris of Tennessee alone responded heartily, and the Government at Richmond seemed unable to reënforce him or to arm the troops he had. Many difficulties embarrassed it, and not half his men were armed that winter; while up to the middle of November he received only three new regiments. General Johnston realized the magnitude of the struggle, but the people of the South only awoke to it when it was too late. Calamity then stirred them to an ineffectual resistance, the heroism of which removed the reproach of their early vainglory and apathy. General Johnston never was able to assemble more than 22,000 men at Bowling Green, to confront the 100,000 troops opposed to him on that line.

The only battle of note that occurred that fall was at Belmont, opposite Columbus, in which Polk scored a victory over Grant. General Johnston wrote as follows to the Secretary of War, on Christmas Day, from Bowling Green: "The position of General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland holds in check the meditated invasion and hoped-for revolt in East Tennessee; but I can neither order Zollicoffer to join me here nor withdraw any more force from Columbus without imperiling our communications toward Richmond



COL. SPEED S. FRY.

DEATH OF GENERAL ZOLLICOFFER.

BATTLE OF LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS (SEE MAP, PAGE 388). FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

or endangering Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley. This I have resolved not to do, but have chosen, on the contrary, to post my inadequate force in such a manner as to hold the enemy in check, guard the frontier, and hold the Barren [River] till the winter terminates the campaign; or, if any fault in his movements is committed, or his lines become exposed when his force is developed, to attack him as opportunity offers." This sums the situation.

In January, 1862, General Johnston found himself confronted by Halleck in the West, and by Buell, who had succeeded Sherman, in Kentucky. With the exception of the army under Curtis in Missouri, about twelve thousand strong, the whole resources of the North-west, from Pennsylvania to the plains, were turned against General Johnston's lines in Kentucky. Halleck, with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Grant and C. F. Smith, threatened equally Columbus, the key of the Mississippi River, and the water-lines of the Cumberland and Tennessee, with their defenses, at Forts Donelson and Henry. Buell's right wing also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his center was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing against Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, on the Upper Cumberland. If this last-named position could be forced, the way seemed open to East Tennessee on the one hand, and to Nashville on the other.


The campaign opened with the defeat of the Confederates under Crittenden and Zollicoffer, January 19th, 1862, by General Thomas, at Mill Springs, or Fishing Creek. The fighting was forced by the Confederates, but the whole affair was in disregard of General Johnston's orders. The loss was not severe, but it ended in a rout which left General Johnston's right flank exposed.

There has been much discussion as to who originated the movement up the Tennessee River. Grant *made* it, and it made Grant. It was obvious enough to all the leaders on both sides. General Johnston wrote, January 22d:

"To suppose, with the facilities of movement by water which the well-filled rivers of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee give for active operations, that they will suspend them in Tennessee and Kentucky during the winter months is a delusion. All the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defense of Tennessee."

Great efforts were made to guard against it, but the popular fatuity and apathy prevented adequate preparations. General Polk says in a report, "The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers in question was the want of an adequate force." It was only one of a number of possible and equally fatal movements, which could not have been properly met and resisted except by a larger force than was to be had. General Johnston could not reduce the force at Columbus without imperiling the Mississippi River, and this was not even debatable. Nor could he hazard the loss of Nashville, if it could be saved. He was compelled, therefore, to take the risk at Forts Henry and Donelson. The thrust was made at Henry, and it fell.

As soon as General Johnston learned of the movement against Fort Henry he resolved to fall back to the line of the Cumberland, and make the defense of Nashville at Donelson. Buell was in his front with 90,000 men, and to save Nashville—Buell's objective point—he had to fall back upon it with part of his army. He kept for this purpose 14,000 men, including his sick,—only 8500 effectives in all,—to confront Buell's 90,000 men, and concentrated at Fort Donelson 17,000 men under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, his three most experienced generals, to meet Grant, who had 28,000 troops, but was reported



COLONEL SCHOEPF'S TROOPS CROSSING FISHING CREEK ON THE WAY TO JOIN GENERAL THOMAS AT LOGAN'S CROSS ROADS, OR MILL SPRINGS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

as having only 12,000. He certainly reserved for himself the more difficult task, the place of greater hazard, leaving the chance of glory to others. The proposition that he should have left Nashville open to capture by Buell, and should have taken all his troops to Donelson, could not have been seriously considered by any general of even moderate military capacity. General Beauregard alleges that he urged General Johnston to concentrate all

his available forces and attack Grant at Fort Henry. Conclusive contemporary evidence demonstrates that General Beauregard's memory is at fault. But, this aside, no more fatal plan of campaign could have been proposed. Such a concentration was impracticable within the limits of the time required for success. The Confederates would have been met by a superior force under General Grant, whose position, flanked by the batteries of Fort Henry, covered by gun-boats, and to be approached only over causeways not then con-



CONFEDERATE TYPES OF 1862.

structed, was absolutely impregnable. It requires an utter disregard of facts seriously to consider such a project. Moreover, this movement would have been an abandonment to Buell of Nashville, the objective point of the Federal campaign. And, finally, this desperate project, commended by General Beauregard, was exactly what the Union generals were striving, hoping, planning, to compel General Johnston to do. The answer to any criticism as to the loss of the army at Donelson is *that it ought not to have been lost*. That is all there is of it.

At midnight of February 15th-16th General Johnston received a telegram announcing a great victory at Donelson, and before daylight information that it would be surrendered. His last troops were then arriving at Nashville from Bowling Green. His first words were: "I must save this army." He at once determined to abandon the line of the Cumberland, and concentrate all available forces at Corinth, Mississippi, for a renewed struggle. He had indicated this movement as a probable event to several distinguished officers some time previous; it was now to be carried into effect. He had remaining only his little army from Bowling Green, together with the fragments of

Crittenden's army, and the fugitives from Donelson. These he reorganized at Murfreesboro' within a week. He saved the most of his valuable stores and munitions, which fully absorbed his railroad transportation to Stevenson, Alabama, and moved his men over the mud roads to Corinth, Mississippi, by way of Decatur, in a wet and stormy season. Nevertheless, he assembled his army of 23,000—about 16,000 effectives—at Corinth, on the 25th day of March, full of enthusiasm and the spirit of combat. In the meantime the Confederate Government lent him all the aid in its power, reënforcing him with an army ten thousand strong, from the Southern coast, under General Braxton Bragg, who had been in command at Pensacola [see note, page 32], and with such arms as could be procured.

General Beauregard has claimed that he raised, concentrated, and organized the army which fought at Shiloh; that he persuaded General Johnston to turn aside from a retreat toward Stevenson and join him at Corinth, and substituted an offensive campaign for a defensive one projected by General Johnston; and that he likewise planned the battle of Shiloh, induced General Johnston to fight it, and executed all the general movements on the field, and that General Johnston was merely the ostensible commander. I have elsewhere fully confuted each of these absurd pretenses; and as this rapid survey is historical, not controversial, the space at my disposal does not permit me to argue here the points involved; I shall, therefore, merely state the facts, which rest upon unimpeachable contemporary evidence. The final verdict I am satisfied to leave to the soldiers of both armies who fought there, to the careful analysis of impartial military criticism, or to the ultimate arbitrament of history.

When the capture of Fort Henry separated Tennessee into two distinct theaters of war, General Johnston assigned the district west of the Tennessee River to General Beauregard, who had been sent to him for duty. This officer had suddenly acquired a high reputation at the battle of Bull Run, and General Johnston naturally intrusted him with a large discretion. He sent him with instructions to concentrate all available forces near Corinth, a movement previously begun. His own plan was to defend Columbus to the last extremity with a reduced garrison, and withdraw Polk and his army for active movements. Beauregard made the mistake, however, of evacuating Columbus, and making his defense of the Mississippi River at Island Number Ten, which proved untenable and soon surrendered with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 men. He was ill most of the time and intrusted the actual command to Bragg, but did what he could from his sick-bed.

Besides the reënforcements brought by Bragg, General Beauregard found in the western district 17,500 effectives under Polk, and at or near Corinth 3000 men under Pope Walker and Chalmers, and 5000 under Ruggles sent from Louisiana by Lovell. He made eloquent appeals, which brought him several regiments more. Thus he had nearly 40,000 men collected for him, 10,000 of whom he disposed in river defenses, and the remainder to protect the railroads from Grant's force which was concentrating at Pittsburg

Landing. General Johnston's arrival increased the force at Corinth to about 50,000 men, about 40,000 of whom were effectives.

After the surrender at Donelson, the South, but especially the important State of Tennessee, was in a delirium of rage and terror. As the retreat from Nashville to the Tennessee River went on, the popular fury rose to a storm everywhere. The people who had refused to listen to his warnings, or answer his appeals for aid, now denounced General Johnston as an idiot, coward, and traitor. Demagogues joined in the wild hunt for a victim, and deputations waited on President Davis to demand his removal. To such a committee of congressmen he replied: "If Sidney Johnston is not a general, I have none." General Johnston was too calm, too just, and too magnanimous to misapprehend so natural a manifestation. His whole life had been a training for this occasion. To encounter suddenly and endure calmly the obloquy of a whole nation is, to any man, a great burden. To do this with a serenity that shall not only not falter in duty, but restore confidence and organize victory, is conclusive proof of greatness of soul.

But while the storm of execration raged around him, the men who came into immediate contact with General Johnston never for a moment doubted his ability to perform all that was possible to man in the circumstances. To a friend who urged him to publish an explanation of his course he replied: "I cannot correspond with the people. What the people want is a battle and a victory. That is the best explanation I can make. I require no vindication. I trust that to the future." ¶

General Johnston's plan of campaign may be summed up in a phrase. It was to concentrate at Corinth and interpose his whole force in front of the great bend of the Tennessee, the natural base of the Federal army: this effected, to crush Grant in battle before the arrival of Buell. This meant immediate and decisive action. The army he had brought from Nashville was ready for the contest, but Generals Beauregard and Bragg represented to him that the troops collected by them were unable to move without thorough reorganization. Ten days were consumed in this work of reorganization. Moments were precious, but there was the hope of reënforcement by Van Dorn's army, which might arrive before Buell joined Grant, and which did arrive only a day or two later. [See page 277.] But Buell's movements were closely watched, and, hearing of his approach on the 2d of April, General Johnston resolved to delay no longer, but to strike at once a decisive blow.

In the reorganization of the army, he assigned General Bragg as chief of staff, with command of a corps. To Beauregard he tendered the immediate command of the army in the impending battle. Though General Beauregard declined the offer, he evidently misinterpreted its spirit and intention. He imagined it was a confession of inadequacy for the duty, in which case he ought to have accepted it. The truth was that, coming into this district which he had assigned to Beauregard, Johnston felt disinclined to deprive him of any reputation he might acquire from a victory. He had not the


¶ For part of his much-quoted letter of March 18th to President Davis, written at Decatur, in regard to the loss of Donelson, see foot-note, page 399.—EDITORS.

slightest idea, however, of abdicating the supreme command, and said to friends who remonstrated with him: "I will be there to see that all goes right." He was willing to yield to another the glory, if thereby anything was added to the chance of victory. The offer was rather quixotic, but characteristic; he

had done the same thing in his victories on the Neches in 1840. He then gave General Beauregard the position of second in command, without special assignment. Indeed, as is shown by his own frequent statements, General Beauregard was, from severe and protracted ill-health, inadequate to any more serious duty.

General Grant's army had been moved up the Tennessee River by boat, and had taken position on its left bank at Pittsburg Landing. It had been landed by divisions, and Bragg had proposed to Beauregard to attack Grant before he assembled his whole force. Beauregard forbade this, intending to await events, and attack him away from his base if possible, though he now insists that his plan of campaign was offensive. Grant's first object was to destroy the railroads which centered at Corinth, and, indeed, to capture that place if he could. But his advance was only a part of a grand plan for a combined movement of his own and Buell's army. With Pittsburg Landing as a base, this army was to occupy North Mississippi and Alabama, command the entire railroad system of that section, and take Memphis in the rear, while Halleck forced his way down the Mississippi River. General Johnston divined the movement before it was begun, and was there to frustrate it. Indeed, Grant's army was assembled at Pittsburg Landing only one week before Johnston completed the concentration.

Grant has been severely criticised for placing his army with the river at its back. But he was there to take the initiative. He had the larger army, under cover, too, of his gun-boats; he was expecting Buell daily; and the ground was admirable for defense. Indeed, his position was a natural stronghold. Flanked by Owl and Lick creeks, with their marshy margins, and with his front protected by a swampy valley, he occupied a quadrilateral of great



FROM THE "LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON & CO.)

strength. His troops were stationed on wooded heights, generally screened by heavy undergrowth and approached across boggy ravines or open fields. Each camp was a fortress in itself, and the line of retreat afforded at each step some like point to rally on. He did not fortify his camps, it is true; but he was not there for defense, but for attack. It must be admitted that he undervalued his enemy's daring and celerity; but he was a young general, exultant in his overwhelming victory at Donelson; and his generals and army shared his sense of security. He had an army of 58,000 men in camp, nearly 50,000 of whom were effectives. Buell was near at hand with 37,000 more, and Mitchel was moving against the railroad at Florence, Alabama, not far distant, with an additional force of 18,000. In all Grant had 105,000 effectives. Opposed to him were 50,000 Confederate troops, less than 40,000 of whom were available for combat. General Johnston's aggregate was 60,000 men, opposed to about 200,000 Federals in all, but the effective forces were as above. As these figures are disputed I invite a rigid examination of the Official Records. \

Such was the position on April 2d, when General Johnston, learning that Buell was rapidly approaching, resolved to advance next day and attack Grant before his arrival. His general plan was very simple in outline. It seems to have been to march out and attack the Federals by column of corps, to make the battle a decisive test, and to crush Grant utterly or lose all in the attempt; this effected, to contend with Buell for the possession of Tennessee, Kentucky, and possibly the North-west.

General Beauregard also, it seems, had a plan, which, however, must have differed widely from that of General Johnston, as it was evidently tentative in its nature,—“a reconnoissance in force,” with a retreat on Corinth as one of its features,—and which admitted the possibility of finishing on Monday a battle which had to be won on Sunday or never. This was not in any sense General Johnston's plan, and much useless discussion has arisen from a confusion of the two. But, as General Johnston intended to fight, and did fight, on his own plan as long as he lived, the battle may be considered his until Beauregard's order of retreat, about 5 o'clock Sunday evening, substituted “the reconnoissance in force” in place of the decisive test of victory or defeat.

General Beauregard had been on the ground some six weeks, and his prestige as an engineer and a victor of Bull Run warranted General Johnston in committing to him the elaboration of the details of the march and order of battle. Unfortunately he changed what seems evidently General Johnston's original purpose of an assault by columns of corps into an array in three parallel lines of battle, which produced extreme confusion when the second and third lines advanced to support the first and intermingled with it. Johnston's original plan is summed up in the following dispatch to President Davis:

“CORINTH, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion thirty thousand strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchel behind him with ten thousand. Confederate forces—forty thousand—ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main

\ By careful and thorough examination of the Official Records we have not been able to verify Colonel Johnston's estimates of forces. In important particulars the Records are not explicit, and in places they indicate that Colonel Johnston

greatly overestimates the Union strength. Before January, 1863 (when a new form was adopted), the Union returns did not show the number of *effectives* separate from the “present for duty,” a term that included the non-combatants.—EDITORS.

body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command, Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve. *Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.*"

In the original dispatch, the words italicised are in General Johnston's own handwriting. The words, "the left," "the center," "the right wing," "the reserve," clearly point to a formation by columns of corps. Moreover, owing to ignorance of the country, the march was so ordered that the corps interfered with each other in their advance, and by a detention the battle was delayed an entire day, an almost fatal loss of time.

If it be asked why General Johnston accepted and issued an order of march and battle which he had not contemplated, the reply is that it had been prepared by his second in command, who was presumably more familiar with the country and the roads than himself, and hence with the necessities of the case. But the overruling reason was the question of *time*. Buell was at hand, and Johnston's plan was not to manœuvre, but to attack; and *any* plan which put him front to front with Grant was better than the best two days later. Besides, the written orders were not shown him until the morning of the 4th, after he had mounted to start to the front, and when his advance was near its position on the field. It was then obviously too late to apply a remedy.

General Johnston did not undervalue the importance of details. No man regarded more closely all the details subsidiary to a great result than he. But, important as were the preliminaries,—the maps, the roads, the methods of putting his army face to face with the enemy, which General Johnston had to take on trust,—he knew that the chief *strategy* of the battle was in the decision to fight. Once in the presence of the enemy, he knew that the result would depend *on the way in which his troops were handled*. This was his part of the work, and he felt full confidence in his own ability to carry it out successfully. The order was issued, as elaborated by Beauregard, and the army was moved against the enemy, April 3d, 1862. Said General Bragg:

"The details of that plan, arranged after General Sidney Johnston decided on delivering battle, and had given his instructions, were made up and published to the army in full from the adjutant-general's office. My first knowledge of them was derived from this general order, the authorship of which has been claimed by General Beauregard. . . . In this case, as I understood then, and still believe, Johnston gave verbal instructions for the general movement. . . . Over his [Colonel Jordan, the adjutant-general's] signature, they reached the army. The general plan (General Johnston's) was admirable—the elaboration simply execrable.

"When the time arrived for execution, you know well what occurred. In spite of opposition and prediction of failure, Johnston firmly and decidedly ordered and led the attack in the execution of his general plan, and, notwithstanding the faulty arrangement of troops, was eminently successful up to the moment of his fall. *The victory was won*. How it was lost, the official reports will show, and history has recorded." [Bragg to W. P. Johnston, December 16th, 1874.]



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL W. J. HARDEE, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The President of the Confederate States has repeatedly and positively asserted that he received from General Johnston a dispatch which gave the plan of battle, exactly as it was fought, and that this dispatch was not that of April 3d already quoted, but was lost. General Beauregard and his staff-officer, Colonel Jordan, have taken issue with Mr. Davis on this point, vehemently insisting that no such dispatch was, or could have been, sent. Their denial rests merely upon *a priori* objections to the probability of Mr. Davis's assertion. On the other hand, Mr. Davis's clear and positive statement made many years ago, and often repeated since, is confirmed by contemporary documentary evidence. On April 5th he sent a telegram to General Johnston, in which he acknowledges his telegram of "yesterday," April 4th. This telegram of "yesterday" was plainly the "lost dispatch," for "yesterday" was April 4th, not April 3d. If, as I have sought to show, important changes had occurred in the plan of battle, nothing could be more natural and proper for the commanding general than instantly to inform his friend and commander-in-chief; and even if no change had occurred, still it would have been right for him to keep his chief fully advised of the progress of the movement. I have always said that General Johnston's *original* plan was probably to attack by columns of corps, as indicated in his telegram of April 3d. Special Orders, No. 8 directed an attack in three lines parallel to the enemy's front. Jordan tells us General Johnston did not see these orders as published until the morning of the 4th. What more natural than that he should then communicate the changes made, and add his purpose to turn the enemy's left, not mentioned in the telegram of April 3d. A curious corroboration, hitherto unobserved, occurs in Mr. Davis's telegram of April 5th, that it was in reply to a lost dispatch. On April 2d General Beauregard wrote to General Johnston, saying that he had telegraphed to the War Department for generals, and adding, "Would it not be well for you to telegraph also for the generals you may require?" We have no record of any such request made upon this suggestion, but Mr. Davis, in his telegram of April 5th, says: "Brigadiers have been recently appointed; among them, Bowen. Do you require others?" This seems to be a response to a request; Bowen was commanding a brigade in General Johnston's army. But as there was no request in General Johnston's telegram of April 3d, it is reasonable to suppose that it was contained in one of the 4th, which has been lost. But I am giving an importance to this question which it would not merit except for the prominence given it in the pages of "The Century Magazine." Whether sent or not, it is entirely irrelevant to the main issue. Its whole importance consists in showing, not who made the plan of battle, but that the plan having been given to his subordinates, General Johnston, so long as he lived, held them to the steady and successful execution of it. When General Beauregard succeeded to the command he abandoned the vital principle of that plan, which was to push the contest to a final decision that day, and took a course of his own, not embraced or contemplated in General Johnston's designs — a policy of withdrawal and delay which led to defeat instead of victory.


General Johnston gave orders about 1 o'clock on the night of Wednesday, the 2d of April, for the advance. But much time was spent in their elaboration, and the troops did not receive them from the adjutant-general's office until the next afternoon. When the soldiers learned that they were going out to fight, their long-restrained ardor burst into a blaze of enthusiasm, and they did all that was possible for inexperienced troops in both marching and fighting. Some of the arms were not distributed till that afternoon. With hasty preparations the movement began, and Hardee's corps was at Mickyey's, within four or five miles of Pittsburg, next morning. But some of the troops did not move until the morning of Saturday, the 5th, owing to a still further delay in the delivery of orders by the adjutant-general's office, and all were impeded by the heavy condition of the roads, through a dense forest, and across sloughs and marshes.

The order was to attack at 3 o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the 5th; but the troops were not in position until late that afternoon. All day Friday the advancing columns had pushed on over the tangled, miry roads, hindered and embarrassed by a pelting rain. After midnight a violent storm broke upon them as they stood under arms in the pitch darkness, with no shelter but the trees. From detention by the rain, ignorance of the roads, and a confusion produced by the order of march, some divisions failed to get into line, and the day was wasted.

As they were waiting the disposition of troops late Saturday afternoon, a council of war occurred, in which Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, Polk, Breckinridge and Gilmer took part, which added greatly to General Johnston's responsibilities, and the heavy burden he had already incurred by his experiment of concentration, and his resolve to fight a pitched battle. The Confederate army was in full battle array, within two miles of Shiloh Church and Grant's line, when General Beauregard suddenly proposed that the army should be withdrawn and retreat to Corinth. He maintained that the delay and noise must have given the enemy notice, and that they would be found intrenched "to their eyes" and ready for attack. General Johnston seemed to be much surprised at the suggestion. Polk and Bragg differed with Beauregard, and a warm discussion ensued between him and Polk, in which General Johnston took little part, but closed it with the simple remark, "Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow," which he uttered with great decision. Turning to one of his staff-officers, he said, "I would fight them if they were a million. They can present no greater front between these two creeks than we can, and the more men they crowd in there, the worse we can make it for them. Polk is a true soldier and a friend."

General Bragg, in a monograph prepared for the use of the writer, says: "The meeting then dispersed upon an invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same views, and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning, about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops were being put in motion, several generals again met at the camp-fire of the general-in-chief. The discussion was renewed, General Beauregard

again expressing his dissent, when, rapid firing in front indicating that the attack had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking, 'The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our dispositions.' He proposed to move to the front, and his subordinates promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness, confidence,



FROM THE "LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON & CO.)

and determination. Few men have equaled him in the possession and display at the proper time of these great qualities of the soldier."

It will readily be seen how much General Beauregard's urgent opposition to fighting must have added to the weight of General Johnston's responsibility. Beauregard was in the full tide of popular favor, while Johnston was laboring under the load of public obloquy and odium. Nothing short of complete

and overwhelming victory would vindicate him in differing with so famous a general. A reverse, even a merely partial success, would leave him under condemnation. Nevertheless, without a moment's hesitation, he resolved to fight.

The sun set on Saturday evening in a cloudless sky, and night fell calm, clear, and beautiful. Long before dawn the forest was alive with silent preparations for the ensuing contest, and day broke upon a scene so fair that it left its memory on thousands of hearts. The sky was clear overhead, the air fresh, and when the sun rose in full splendor, the advancing host passed the word from lip to lip that it was the "sun of Austerlitz."

General Johnston, usually so self-contained, felt the inspiration of the

scene, and welcomed with exultant joy the long-desired day. His presence inspired all who came near him. His sentences, sharp, terse, and clear, had the ring of victory in them. Turning to his staff, as he mounted, he exclaimed: "To-night we will water our horses in the Tennessee River." It was thus that he formulated his plan of battle; it must not stop short of entire victory. To Randall L. Gibson, who was commanding a Louisiana brigade, he said: "I hope you may get through safely to-day, but *we must win a victory.*" To Colonel John S. Marmaduke, who had served under him in Utah, he said, placing his hand on his shoulder: "My son, we must this day conquer or perish." To the ambitious Hindman, who had been in the vanguard from the beginning, he said: "You have *earned* your spurs as a major-general. Let this day's work win them." With such words, as he rode from point to point, he raised a spirit in that host which swept away the serried lines of the conquerors of Donelson. Friend and foe alike testify to the enthusiastic courage and ardor of the Southern soldiers that day.

General Johnston's strategy was completed. He was face to face with his foe, and that foe all unaware of his coming. His front line, composed of the Third Corps and Gladden's brigade, was under Hardee, and extended from Owl Creek to Lick Creek, more than three miles. (See maps.) Hindman's division of two brigades occupied the center, Cleburne's brigade had the left, and Gladden's the right wing—an effective total in the front line of 9024. The second line was commanded by Bragg. He had two divisions: Withers's, of two brigades, on the right, and Ruggles's, of three brigades, on the left. The brigades were, in order from right to left, as follows: Chalmers, Jackson, Gibson, Anderson, Pond. This second line was 10,731 strong. The third line, or reserve, was composed of the First Corps, under Polk, and three brigades under Breckinridge. Polk's command was massed in columns of brigades on the Bark road near Mickey's, and Breckinridge's on the road from Monterey toward the same point. Polk was to advance on the left of the Bark road, at an interval of about eight hundred paces from Bragg's line; and Breckinridge, to the right of that road, was to give support wherever it should become necessary. Polk's corps, 9136 strong in infantry and artillery, was composed of two divisions: Cheatham's on the left, made up of Bushrod R. Johnson's and Stephens's brigades, and Clark's on his right, formed of A. P. Stewart's and Russell's brigades. It followed Bragg's line at a distance of about eight hundred yards. Breckinridge's reserve was composed of Trabue's, Bowen's, and Statham's brigades, with a total, infantry and artillery, of 6439. The cavalry, about 4300 strong, guarded the flanks or was detached on outpost duty; but, both from the newness and imperfection of their organization, equipment, and drill, and from the rough and wooded character of the ground, they could do little service that day. The effectives of all arms that marched out to battle were about 39,630, or, exclusive of cavalry, 35,330.

The Federal army numbered present 49,232, and present for duty 41,543. But at Crump's Landing, five or six miles distant, was General Lew Wallace's division with 8820 present, and 7771 men present for duty. [See page 538.] General Nelson's division of Buell's army had arrived at Savannah on Satur-

day morning, and was now about five miles distant; Crittenden's division also had arrived on the morning of the 6th. So that Grant, with these three divisions, may be considered as having about 22,000 men in immediate reserve, without counting the remainder of Buell's army, which was near by.†

As General Johnston and his staff were taking their coffee, the first gun of the battle sounded. "Note the hour, if you please, gentlemen," said General Johnston. It was fourteen minutes past 5. They immediately mounted and galloped to the front.

Some skirmishing on Friday between the Confederate cavalry and the Federal outposts, in which a few men were killed, wounded, and captured on both sides, had aroused the vigilance of the Northern commanders to some extent. Sherman reported on the 5th to Grant that two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry were in his front, and added: "I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. . . . I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." In his "Memoirs" he says: "I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demonstration." He said to Major Ricker that an advance of Beauregard's army "could not be possible. Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations and attack us in ours,—*mere reconnoissance in force*." This shows a curious coincidence with the actual state of General Beauregard's mind on that day. And Grant telegraphed Halleck on Saturday night: "The main force of the enemy is at Corinth. . . . One division of Buell's column arrived yesterday. . . . I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us."

Nevertheless, some apprehension was felt among the officers and men of the Federal army, and General Prentiss had thrown forward Colonel Moore, with the 21st Missouri regiment, on the Corinth road. Moore, feeling his way cautiously, encountered Hardee's skirmish-line under Major Harcastle, and, thinking it an outpost, assailed it vigorously. Thus really the Federals began the fight. The struggle was brief, but spirited. The 8th and 9th Arkansas came up. Moore fell wounded. The Missourians gave way, and Shaver's brigade pursued them. Hindman's whole division moved on, following the ridge and drifting to the right, and drove in the grand guards and outposts until they struck Prentiss's camps. Into these they burst, overthrowing all before them.

To appreciate the suddenness and violence of the blow, one must read the testimony of eye-witnesses. General Bragg says, in a sketch of Shiloh made for the writer: "Contrary to the views of such as urged an abandonment of the attack, the enemy was found utterly unprepared, many being surprised and captured in their tents, and others, though on the outside, in costumes better fitted to the bedchamber than to the battle-field." General Preston says: "General Johnston then went to the camp assailed, which was carried between 7 and 8 o'clock. The enemy were evidently surprised. The breakfasts were

† General Grant takes no account of these in his narratives of the battle, and talks as though he were outnumbered instead of outgeneraled. It was his business to get these troops there in time, especially if he was not surprised.—W, P. J.


on the mess tables, the baggage unpacked, the knapsacks, stores, colors, and ammunition abandoned."

The essential feature of General Johnston's strategy had been to get at his enemy as quickly as possible, and in as good order. In this he had succeeded. His plan of battle was as simple as his strategy. It had been made known in his order of battle, and was thoroughly understood by every brigade commander. The orders of the 3d of April were, that "every effort should be made to turn the *left flank of the enemy*, so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River and *throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to surrender.*" It is seen that, from the first, these orders were carried out in letter and spirit; and, so long as General Johnston lived, the success of this movement was complete. *The battle was fought precisely as it was planned.* The first, and almost only, censure of this plan was made by Colonel Jordan, confidential adviser and historian of General Beauregard, who now claims to have made this plan. The instructions delivered to General Johnston's subordinates on the previous day were found sufficient for their conduct on the battle-field. But, to accomplish this, his own personal presence and inspiration and direction were often necessary with these enthusiastic but raw troops. He had personal conference on the field with most of his generals, and led several brigades into battle. The criticism upon this conduct, that he exposed himself unnecessarily, is absurd to those who know how important rapid decision and instantaneous action are in the crisis of conflict.

His lines of battle were pushed rapidly to the front, and as gaps widened in the first lines, they were filled by brigades of the second and third. One of Breckinridge's brigades (Trabue's) was sent to the left to support Cleburne and fought under Polk the rest of the day; and the other two were led to the extreme right, only Chalmers being beyond them. Gladden, who was on Hindman's right, and had a longer distance to traverse to strike some of Prentiss's brigades further to the left, found them better prepared, but, after a sanguinary resistance, drove them from their camps. In this bitter struggle Gladden fell mortally wounded. Chalmers's brigade, of Bragg's line, came in on Gladden's right, and his Mississippians drove the enemy, under Stuart, with the bayonet half a mile. He was about to charge again, when General Johnston came up, and moved him to the right, and brought John K. Jackson's brigade into the interval. Prentiss's left and Stuart's brigade retreated sullenly, not routed, but badly hammered.

With Hindman as a pivot, the turning movement began from the moment of the overthrow of Prentiss's camps. While the front attacks were made all along the line with a desperate courage which would have swept any ordinary resistance from the field, and with a loss which told fearfully on the assailants, they were seconded by assaults in flank which invariably resulted in crushing the Federal line with destructive force and strewing the field with the wounded and the dead. The Federal reports complain that they were flanked and outnumbered, which is true; for, though fewer, the Confederates were probably stronger at every given point throughout the day except at the center called the Hornets' Nest, where the Federals eventually massed

nearly two divisions. The iron flail of war beat upon the Federal front and right flank with the regular and ponderous pulsations of some great engine, and these assaults resulted in a crumbling process which was continually but slowly going on, as regiment and brigade and division yielded to the continuous and successive blows. There has been criticism that there were no grand assaults by divisions and corps. In a broken, densely wooded and unknown country, and with the mode of attack in parallel lines, this was impossible,




FROM THE "LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON & CO.)

but the attack was unremitting and the fact is that there were but few lulls in the contest. The fighting was a grapple and a death-struggle all day long, and, as one brigade after another wilted before the deadly fire of the stubborn Federals, still another was pushed into the combat and kept up the fierce assault. A breathing-spell, and

the shattered command would gather itself up and resume its work of destruction. These were the general aspects of the battle.

When the battle began Hindman, following the ridge, had easy ground to traverse; but Cleburne's large brigade, on his left, with its supports, moving over a more difficult country, was slower in getting upon Sherman's front. That general and his command were aroused by the long roll, the advancing musketry, and the rush of troops to his left, and he got his division in line of battle and was ready for the assault of Cleburne, which was made about 8 o'clock. General Johnston, who had followed close after Hindman, urging on his attack, saw Cleburne's brigade begin its advance, and then returned to where Hindman was gathering his force for another assault. Hardee said of Cleburne that he "moved quickly through the fields, and, though far outflanked by the enemy on our left, rushed forward under a terrific fire from the serried ranks drawn up in front of the camp. A morass covered his front, and, being difficult to pass, caused a break in this brigade. Deadly volleys were poured upon the men from behind bales of hay and other defenses, as they advanced; and after a series of desperate charges they were compelled to fall back.



VICINITY OF THE "HORNETS' NEST."
FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IN 1885.

The stump in the field on the right is said to mark the spot where General Albert Sidney Johnston was killed. The point of woods beyond the field is supposed to be the place which the Confederates called the "Hornets' Nest." The "peach orchard" was a little to the left of the field in the middle ground, and behind the house (in the lower picture) which is across the road from the field in which General Johnston was killed. — EDITORS.


"Supported by the arrival of the second line, Cleburne, with the remainder of his troops, . . . entered the enemy's encampment, which had been forced on the center and right by . . . Gladden's, Wood's, and Hindman's brigades."

While Sherman was repelling Cleburne's attack, McClelland sent up three Illinois regiments to reinforce his left. But General Polk led forward Bushrod R. Johnson's brigade, and General Charles Clark led Russell's brigade, against Sherman's left, while General Johnston himself put A. P. Stewart's brigade in position on their right. Supported by part of Cleburne's line, they attacked Sherman and McClelland fiercely. Polk said: "The resistance at this point was as stubborn as at any other point on the field." Clark and Bushrod R. Johnson fell badly wounded. Hildebrand's Federal brigade was swept from the field, losing in the onslaught 300 killed and wounded, and 94 missing.

Wood's brigade, of Hindman's division, joined in this charge on the right. As they hesitated at the crest of a hill, General Johnston came to the front and urged them to the attack. They rushed forward with the inspiring "rebel yell," and with Stewart's brigade enveloped the Illinois troops. In ten minutes the latter melted away under the fire, and were forced from the field. In this engagement John A. McDowell's and Veatch's Federal brigades, as well as Hildebrand's, were demolished and heard of no more. Buckland retreated and took position with McClelland. In these attacks Anderson's and Pond's Confederate brigades joined with great vigor and severe loss, but with unequal fortune. The former had one success after

another; the latter suffered a series of disasters; and yet an equal courage animated them. Gladden's brigade made a final desperate and successful charge on Prentiss's line. The whole Federal front, which had been broken here and there, and was getting ragged, gave way under this hammering process on front and flank, and fell back across a ravine to another strong position behind the Hamburg and Purdy road in rear of Shiloh. Sherman's route of retreat was marked by the thick-strewn corpses of his soldiers. At last, pressed back toward both Owl Creek and the river, Sherman and McClernand found safety by the interposition on their left flank of W. H. L. Wallace's fresh division. Hurlbut and Wallace had advanced about 8 o'clock, so that Prentiss's command found a refuge in the intervals of the new and formidable Federal line, with Stuart on the left and Sherman's shattered division on the right.

General Johnston had pushed Chalmers to the right and front, sweeping down the left bank of Lick Creek, driving in pickets, until he encountered Stuart's Federal brigade on the Pittsburg and Hamburg road. Stuart was strongly posted on a steep hill near the river, covered with thick undergrowth, and with an open field in front. McArthur was to his right and rear in the woods. Jackson attacked McArthur, who fell back; and Chalmers went at Stuart's brigade. This command reserved its fire until Chalmers's men were within forty yards, and then delivered a heavy and destructive volley; but, after a hard fight, the Federals were driven back. Chalmers's right rested on the Tennessee River bottom-lands, and he fought down the bank toward Pittsburg Landing. The enemy's left was completely turned, and the Federal army was now crowded on a shorter line, a mile or more to the rear of its first position, with many of their brigades *hors de combat*. The new line of battle was established before 10 o'clock. All the Confederate troops were then in the front line, except two of Breckinridge's brigades, Bowen's and Statham's, which were moving to the Confederate right, and soon occupied the interval to the left of Chalmers and Jackson. Hardee, with Cleburne and Pond, was pressing Sherman slowly but steadily back. Bragg and Polk met about half-past 10 o'clock, and by agreement Polk led his troops against McClernand, while Bragg directed the operations against the Federal center. A gigantic contest now began which lasted more than five hours. In the impetuous rush forward of regiments to fill the gaps in the front line, even the brigade organization was broken; but, though there was dislocation of commands, there was little loss of effective force. The Confederate assaults were made by rapid and often unconnected charges along the line. They were repeatedly checked, and often repulsed. Sometimes counter-charges drove them back for short distances; but, whether in assault or recoil, both sides saw their bravest soldiers fall in frightful numbers. The Confederates came on in motley garb, varying from the favorite gray and domestic "butter-nut" to the blue of certain Louisiana regiments, which paid dearly the penalty of doubtful colors. Over them waved flags and pennons as various as their uniforms. At each charge there went up a wild yell, heard above the roar of artillery; only the Kentuckians, advancing with measured step, sang in chorus their war-song: "Cheer, boys, cheer; we'll march away to battle."



SCENE OF GENERAL
ALBERT SIDNEY
JOHNSTON'S DEATH.

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN
IN THE SUMMER OF
1884.

On the Federal
Wallace's and Hurl-
massed, with Pren-

position so impregnable, and thronged with such fierce defenders, that it won from the Confederates the memorable title of the "Hornets' Nest." [See pages 504-5, 510, and 588.] Here, behind a dense thicket on the crest of a hill, was posted a strong force of as hardy troops as ever fought, almost perfectly protected by the conformation of the ground, and by logs and other rude and hastily prepared defenses. To assail it an open field had to be passed, enfiladed by the fire of its batteries. No figure of speech would be too strong to express the deadly peril of assault upon this natural fortress. For five hours brigade after brigade was led against it. Hindman's brigades, which earlier had swept everything before them, were reduced to fragments, and paralyzed for the remainder of the day. A. P. Stewart's regiments made fruitless assaults. Then Bragg ordered up Gibson's brigade. Gibson himself, a knightly soldier, was aided by colonels three of whom afterward became generals. The brigade made a gallant charge; but, like the others, recoiled from the fire it encountered. Under a cross-fire of artillery and musketry it at last fell back with very heavy loss. Gibson asked that artillery should be sent him; but it was not at hand, and Bragg sent orders to charge again. The colonels thought it hopeless; but Gibson led them again to the attack, and again they suffered a bloody repulse.

The brigade was four times repulsed, but maintained its ground steadily, until W. H. L. Wallace's position was turned, when, renewing its forward movement in conjunction with Cheatham's command, it helped to drive back its stout opponents. Cheatham, charging with Stephens's brigade on Gibson's right, across an open field, had been caught under a murderous cross-fire, but fell back in good order, and, later in the day, came in on Breckinridge's left in the last assault when Prentiss was captured. This bloody fray lasted till nearly 4 o'clock, without making any visible impression on the Federal center. But when its flanks were turned, these assaulting columns, crowding in on its front, aided in its capture.

left center W. H. L.
but's divisions were
tiss's fragments, in a

General Johnston was with the right of Statham's brigade, confronting the left of Hurlbut's division, which was behind the crest of a hill, with a depression filled with chaparral in its front. Bowen's brigade was further to the right in line with Statham's, touching it near this point. The Confederates held the parallel ridge in easy musket-range; and "as heavy fire as I ever saw during the war," says Governor Harris, was kept up on both sides for an hour or more. It was necessary to cross the valley raked by this deadly ambuscade and assail the opposite ridge in order to drive the enemy from his stronghold. When General Johnston came up and saw the situation, he said to his staff: "They are offering stubborn resistance here. I shall have to put the bayonet to them." It was the crisis of the conflict. The Federal key was in his front. If his assault were successful, their left would be completely turned, and the victory won. He determined to charge. He sent Governor Harris, of his staff, to lead a Tennessee regiment; and, after a brief conference with Breckinridge, whom he loved and admired, that officer, followed by his staff, appealed to the soldiers. As he encouraged them with his fine voice and manly bearing, General Johnston rode out in front and slowly down the line. His hat was off. His sword rested in its scabbard. In his right hand he held a little tin cup, the memorial of an incident that had occurred earlier in the day. Passing through a captured camp, he had taken this toy, saying, "Let this be my share of the spoils to-day." It was this plaything which, holding it between two fingers, he employed more effectively in his natural and simple gesticulation than most men could have used a sword. His presence was full of inspiration. He sat his thoroughbred bay, "Fire-eater," with easy command. His voice was persuasive, encouraging, and compelling. His words were few; he said: "Men! they are stubborn; we must use the bayonet." When he reached the center of the line, he turned. "I will lead you!" he cried, and moved toward the enemy. The line was already thrilling and trembling with that irresistible ardor which in battle decides the day. With a mighty shout Bowen's and Statham's brigades moved forward at a charge. A sheet of flame and a mighty roar burst from the Federal stronghold. The Confederate line withered; but there was not an instant's pause. The crest was gained. The enemy were in flight.

General Johnston had passed through the ordeal seemingly unhurt. His horse was shot in four places; his clothes were pierced by missiles; his boot-sole was cut and torn by a minie; but if he himself had received any severe wound, he did not know it. At this moment Governor Harris rode up from the right. After a few words, General Johnston sent him with an order to Colonel Statham, which having delivered, he speedily returned. In the meantime, knots and groups of Federal soldiers kept up a desultory fire as they retreated upon their supports, and their last line, now yielding, delivered volley after volley as they sullenly retired. By the chance of war, a minie-ball from one of these did its fatal work. As he sat there, after his wound, Captain Wickham says that Colonel O'Hara, of his staff, rode up, and General Johnston said to him, "We must go to the left, where the firing is heaviest,"

and then gave him an order, which O'Hara rode off to obey. Governor Harris returned, and, finding him very pale, asked him, "General, are you wounded?" He answered, in a very deliberate and emphatic tone: "Yes, and, I fear, seriously." These were his last words. Harris and Wickham led his horse back under cover of the hill, and lifted him from it. They searched at random for the wound, which had cut an artery in his leg, the blood flowing into his boot. When his brother-in-law, Preston, lifted his head, and addressed him with passionate grief, he smiled faintly, but uttered no word. His life rapidly ebbed away, and in a few moments he was dead.

His wound was not necessarily fatal. General Johnston's own knowledge of military surgery was adequate for its control by an extemporized tourniquet had he been aware or regardful of its nature. Dr. D. W. Yandell, his surgeon, had attended his person during most of the morning; but, finding a large number of wounded men, including many Federals, at one point, General Johnston had ordered Yandell to stop there, establish a hospital, and give them his services. He said to Yandell: "These men were our enemies a moment ago; they are our prisoners now. Take care of them." Yandell remonstrated against leaving him, but he was peremptory. Had Yandell remained with him, he would have had little difficulty with the wound.

Governor Harris, and others of General Johnston's staff, promptly informed General Beauregard of his death, and General Beauregard assumed command, remaining at Shiloh Church, awaiting the issue of events.


Up to the moment of the death of the commander-in-chief, in spite of the dislocation of the commands, there was the most perfect regularity in the development of the plan of battle. In all the seeming confusion there was the predominance of intelligent design; a master mind, keeping in clear view its purpose, sought the weak point in the defense, and, by massing his troops upon the enemy's left, kept turning that flank. With the disadvantage of inferior numbers, General Johnston brought to bear a superior force on each particular point, and, by a series of rapid and powerful blows, broke the Federal army to pieces.

Now was the time for the Confederates to push their advantage, and, closing in on the rear of Prentiss and Wallace, to finish the battle. But, on the contrary, there came a lull in the conflict on the right, lasting more than an hour from half-past 2, the time at which General Johnston fell. It is true that the Federals fell back and left the field, making some desultory resistance, and the Confederates went forward deliberately, occupying their positions, and thus helping to envelop the Federal center; but Breckinridge's two brigades did not make another charge that day, and there was no further general direction or concerted movement. The determinate purpose to capture Grant that day was lost sight of. The strong arm was withdrawn, and the bow remained unbent. Elsewhere there were bloody, desultory combats, but they tended to nothing.

About half-past 3 the contest, which had throbbed with fitful violence for five hours, was renewed with the utmost fury. While an ineffectual struggle was going on at the center, a number of batteries opened upon

Prentiss's right flank, the center of what remained of the Federals. The opening of so heavy a fire, and the simultaneous though unconcerted advance of the whole Confederate line, resulted at first in the confusion of the enemy, and then in the death of W. H. L. Wallace and the surrender of Prentiss.

These generals have received scant justice for their stubborn defense. They agreed to hold their position at all odds, and did so until Wallace received



FROM THE "LIFE OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON," BY W. P. JOHNSTON. (D. APPLETON & CO.)

his fatal wound and Prentiss was surrounded and captured with nearly three thousand men. This delay was the salvation of Grant's army.

General Breckinridge's command closed in on the Federal left and rear; General Polk crushed their right center by the violence of his assault, and in person, with Marshall J. Smith's Crescent regiment, received the surrender of many troops. General Prentiss gave up his sword to Colonel Russell. Bragg's troops, wrestling at the front, poured in over the Hornets' Nest, and shared in the triumph. Polk ordered his cavalry to charge the fleeing enemy, and Colonel Miller rode down and captured a 6-gun battery.

His men "watered their horses in the Tennessee River." All now felt that the victory was won. Bragg, Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, all the corps commanders, were at the front, and in communication. Their generals were around them. The hand that had launched the thunder-bolt of war was cold, but its influence still nerved this host and its commanders. A line of battle was formed, and all was ready for the last fell swoop, to compel an "unconditional surrender" by General Grant.

The only position on the high grounds left to the Federals was held by Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, who had collected some twenty guns or more and manned them with volunteers. Soon after 4 o'clock Chalmers and Jackson, proceeding down the river-bank while Prentiss's surrender was going on, came upon this position. The approaches were bad from that direction; nevertheless, they attacked resolutely, and, though repeatedly repulsed, kept up their assaults till nightfall. At one time they drove some gunners from their guns, and their attack has been generally mistaken by Federal writers for the final assault of the Confederate army—*which was never made*. The Federal generals and writers attribute their salvation to the repulse of Chalmers, and the honor is claimed respectively for Webster's artillery and for Ammen's brigade of Buell's army, which came up at the last moment. But neither they nor all that was left of the Federal army could have withstood five minutes the united advance of the Confederate line, which was at hand and ready to deal the death-stroke. Their salvation came from a different quarter. Bragg, in his monograph written for the use of the writer in preparing the "Life of A. S. Johnston," gives the following account of the close of the battle:

"Concurring testimony, especially that of the prisoners on both sides, — our captured being present and witnesses to the demoralization of the enemy, and their eagerness to escape or avoid further slaughter by surrender, — left no doubt but that a persistent, energetic assault would soon have been crowned by a general yielding of his whole force. About one hour of daylight was left to us. The enemy's gun-boats, his last hope, took position opposite us in the river, and commenced a furious cannonade at our supposed position. From the elevation necessary to reach the high bluff on which we were operating, this proved 'all sound and fury signifying nothing,' and did not in the slightest degree mar our prospects or our progress. Not so, however, in our rear, where these heavy shells fell among the reserves and stragglers; and to the utter dismay of the commanders on the field, the troops were seen to abandon their inspiring work, and to retire sullenly from the contest when danger was almost past, and victory, so dearly purchased, was almost certain."

Polk, Hardee, Breckinridge, Withers, Gibson, Gilmer, and all who were there confirm this statement. General Buell says of Grant's army that there were "not more than five thousand men in ranks and available on the battlefield at nightfall. . . . The rest were either killed, wounded, captured, or scattered in inextricable and hopeless confusion for miles along the banks of the river." General Nelson describes them as "cowering under the river-bank, . . . frantic with fright and utterly demoralized."


At this crisis came from General Beauregard an order for the withdrawal of the troops, of which his chief of staff says: "General Beauregard, in the meantime, observing the exhausted, widely scattered condition of his army, directed it to be brought out of battle, collected and restored to order as far

as practicable, and to occupy for the night the captured encampments of the enemy. This, however, had been done in chief part by the officers in immediate command of the troops before the order was generally distributed." For this last allegation, or that the army was exhausted, there is not the slightest warrant. When Beauregard's staff-officer gave Bragg this order he said: "Have you promulgated this order to the command?" The officer replied: "I have." General Bragg then said: "If you had not I would not obey it. *The battle is lost.*"

The concurrent testimony of the generals and soldiers *at the front* is at one on all essential points. General Beauregard at Shiloh, two miles in the rear, with the *débris* of the army surging back upon him, the shells bursting around him, sick with his two months' previous malady, pictured in his imagination a wreck at the front, totally different from the actual condition there. Had this officer been with Bragg, and not greatly prostrated and suffering from severe sickness, I firmly believe his order would have been to advance, not to retire. And this in spite of his theory of his plan of battle, which he sums up as follows, and which is so different from General Johnston's: "By a rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant, it was expected he would be beaten back into his transports and the river, or captured in time to enable us to profit by the victory, and remove to the rear all the stores and munitions that would fall into our hands in such an event before the arrival of General Buell's army on the scene. It was never contemplated, however, to retain the position thus gained and abandon *Corinth, the strategic point of the campaign.*" Why, then, did General Beauregard stop short in his career? Sunday evening it was not a question of retaining, but of gaining, Pittsburg Landing. Complete victory was in his grasp, and he threw it away. General Gibson says: "General Johnston's death was a tremendous catastrophe. There are no words adequate to express my own conception of the immensity of the loss to our country. Sometimes the hopes of millions of people depend upon one head and one arm. The West perished with Albert Sidney Johnston, and the Southern country followed."

Monday was General Beauregard's battle, and it was well fought. But in recalling his troops from the heights which commanded the enemy's landing, he gave away a position which during the night was occupied by Buell's twenty thousand fresh troops, who thus regained the high grounds that had been won at such a cost. Lew Wallace, too, had come up 6500 strong.☆ Moreover, the orders had been conveyed by Beauregard's staff to brigades and even regiments to withdraw, and the troops wandered back over the field, without coherence, direction, or purpose, and encamped where chance provided for them. All array was lost, and, in the morning, they met the attack of nearly thirty thousand fresh and organized troops, with no hope of success except from their native valor and the resolute purpose roused by the triumph of Sunday. Their fortitude, their courage, and the free offering of their lives were equal to the day before. But it was a retreat, not an assault. They retired slowly and sullenly, shattered, but not overthrown, to Corinth, *the strategic point of General Beauregard's campaign.*

☆ General Wallace, in his report to General Halleck, says that his whole command "did not exceed 5000 men of all arms."—EDITORS.



PREACHING AT THE UNION CAMP DICK ROBINSON, KENTUCKY (BEE PAGE 377). SKETCHED FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

THE CAMPAIGN OF SHILOH.†

BY G. T. BEAUREGARD, GENERAL, C. S. A.

ON the 22d of January, 1862, Colonel Roger A. Pryor, a member of the Military Committee of the lower branch of the Confederate Congress, visited my headquarters at Centreville, Virginia, and in his own name, as also for the representatives in Congress of the Mississippi Valley States, urged me to consent to be transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the Confederate forces at Columbus, Kentucky, within the Department of Kentucky and Tennessee, under the superior command of General Albert Sidney Johnston,—a transfer which he said Mr. Davis would not direct unless it was agreeable to me, but which was generally desired at Richmond because of the recent crushing disaster at Mill Springs, in eastern Kentucky: the defeat and death of Zollicoffer. Against the monitions of some of my friends at Richmond, and after much hesitation and disinclination to sever my relations with such an army as that of the Potomac, but upon the assurance that General Johnston's command embraced an aggregate of at least seventy thousand men of all arms, which, though widely scattered, might, by virtue of the possession of the "interior lines," be concentrated and operated offensively, I gave Colonel Pryor authority to inform Mr. Davis of my readiness to be thus transferred. Upon the return of Colonel Pryor to Richmond, I was, on the 26th of January, ordered to proceed at once "to report to General A. S. Johnston at Bowling Green, Kentucky," and thence

† Recast and revised from the "North American Review" for January and February, 1886.—EDITORS.

as promptly as possible to assume my new command at Columbus, "which," said my orders, "is threatened by a powerful force, and the defense of which is of vital importance."

Dispatching Colonel Thomas Jordan, my chief of staff, to Richmond, with a view to secure from the War Department certain aids to the proper organization of the troops I was to command, I left Centreville on the 2d of February and reached Bowling Green about the 5th. General Johnston, whom I had never seen before, welcomed me to his department with a cordiality and earnestness that made a deep impression on me at the time. As he informed me, General Buell's army, fully 75,000 strong, was on the line of Bacon Creek, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, about 40 miles from Bowling Green. General Grant had about 20,000 men in hand at or about Cairo, ready to move either upon Fort Henry or Fort Donelson. General Pope, having a force of not less than 30,000 men in Missouri, was menacing General Polk's positions, including New Madrid, while General Halleck, exercising command over the whole of this force of 125,000 men of all arms, had his headquarters at St. Louis.

On the other hand, General Johnston (as he stated, to my surprise) had an "aggregate effective" of not over 45,000 men of all arms, thus distributed: at Bowling Green, his headquarters, not over 14,000; at Forts Henry and Donelson, 5500; in the quarter of Clarksville, Tennessee, 8000; besides 17,000 under General Polk, chiefly at Columbus, and for the most part imperfectly organized, badly armed and equipped. As may be seen from any map of the region, the chief part of this force occupied a defensive line facing northwardly, the two salient extremities of which were Bowling Green, some 70 miles by railway in advance of Nashville, and Columbus, about 110 miles west of Bowling Green. This line was penetrated, almost centrally, by the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, respectively, at points in Tennessee just south of the Kentucky line, twelve miles apart, at which Fort Henry had been established on the east bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland, thus constituting the reëntering angle of the line. These vital works General Johnston described as defective in more than one respect and unready, but said that he had sent his chief engineer to improve their effectiveness as far as possible. So unpromising was the situation and so different from what had been represented before I left Virginia, that my first impulse was to return at once; but this idea was abandoned at the earnest request of General Johnston. However, after an inspection of the works at and around Bowling Green, I found that while strong against any direct attack, they could be readily turned on their right, and I so stated to General Johnston. His reply was, that in the event of a serious flank movement he must evacuate the position, having no relieving army to support it. In the face of this self-evident military proposition, I recommended the immediate evacuation of a position so salient as Bowling Green, that must fall from its own weight if turned,—leaving there only a cavalry force in observation, and concentrating at once all our available strength at Henry and Donelson, information having just reached us of the aggressive presence of General

Grant on the Tennessee River. That recommendation was not adopted, for the alleged reason that, in the event of a failure to defeat General Grant as proposed, our forces thus assembled might be caught and crushed between the armies of Grant and Buell, and that it would also expose to capture the large stock of military supplies collected so far in advance as Bowling Green and Clarksville, as well as at Nashville. In this decision sight was certainly lost of the facts that, having no pontoon-train, General Buell could not possibly throw his army across the Cumberland, between Donelson and Nashville, so as to prevent the Confederates from falling safely back behind Duck River, or retreating upon Nashville behind the Cumberland, as we would hold the interior or shorter lines.

Fort Henry having fallen after an ineffective but gallant defense of twenty-four hours, immediately thereafter the railroad bridge across the Tennessee, about twelve miles southward of the surrendered fortress, was destroyed. The direct line of communication between our forces eastward of that stream and those at Columbus having thus been broken, on the 7th of February I again urged as imperative the swift concentration of all our then available forces upon Donelson. General Johnston, however, asserting that Fort Donelson was not "tenable," would only support the position by directing the force at Clarksville to cross to the south side of the Tennessee River, and ordered immediate "preparations" to be made for the "removal" of the army at Bowling Green, "to Nashville, in rear of the Cumberland River."‡ He also prescribed that, "from Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become necessary," it should be "made to Stevenson and thence according to circumstances."‡ He further declared that as "the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy, resulting from the fall of Fort Henry, separated the army at Bowling Green from the one at Columbus," henceforth the forces thus sundered must "act independently of each other until they can again be brought together."‡

Fort Henry fell on the 6th of February, but General Grant, failing to press the signal advantage thus gained, did not advance against Fort Donelson until the 12th, and then with but 15,000 men, having dispatched, at the same time, 6 regiments under General Lew Wallace by water. The investment of the position was not completed, however, until early on the 13th of February, the Confederate commander having had a whole week for preparation. On the 6th of February the Confederate garrison at Fort Donelson embraced about 600 artillerymen and 3 regiments of infantry, or at most 2350 officers and men; to this force Heiman's brigade and other troops, some 2500 men, were added that night, having been detached that morning from Fort Henry. Between the morning of the 7th of February and the investment of the position by the Federal army of 15,000 men, on the morning of the 13th, it was further increased from the troops on the east and north side of the Cumberland, under Brigadier-General Floyd, to whom the command of the defense was now intrusted, so as to be, in numbers, about equal to that of the enemy on the land side, until the latter was reënforced by General Wallace's

‡ See p. 487, "Life of General A. S. Johnston," by W. P. Johnston. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

division, nearly 10,000 strong, later in the afternoon of the 14th. By that time the evacuation of Bowling Green, determined upon, as I have said, on the 7th,—and commenced on the 11th of February,—had been completed, the Confederate rear-guard having marched out of the town at 3:30 P. M. on the 14th.

Satisfied, as affairs stood, that Nashville and the Valley of the Cumberland could only be defended successfully at Donelson and by the crushing defeat of General Grant in that quarter, an end to which all other considerations were evidently of minor military importance, I had insisted, as I may repeat, upon that as the one evident exigent operation. That the resolution to give up Bowling Green and to begin such a movement as early as the 11th of February ought to have removed every possible objection on the part of General Johnston to going at once in person with fully ten thousand of his Bowling Green army, I am very sure must be the ultimate professional lesson taught by the history of that most disastrous Confederate campaign! Nothing were easier in the exigency than the transfer from Bowling Green to Donelson by the night of the 13th of February of ten thousand men, after General Johnston had decided that the immediate abandonment of Kentucky was an *imperative necessity*. † Thus, on the morning of the 14th, General Grant's army of 15,000 men could and should have been confronted with nearly if not quite 25,000 men, who, promptly handled, must have so effectually beaten their adversary, taken at such disadvantage, before the advent of Lew Wallace that afternoon, as to have enhanced the victory for the Confederates by the immediate defeat of Wallace also.

What happened from the policy adopted by the Confederate general in chief may be briefly stated: Fort Donelson was surrendered at 2 A. M. on the 16th of February, and with it 11,600 men. In the expressive words of General Johnston's telegram, which reached me at Corinth, "We lost all." And as in the business of war, as in all other material human affairs, "the omission to do that which is necessary seals a commission to a blank of dangers," so was it now. The failure to employ opportunely all possible available resources against General Grant, and the consequent loss of Donelson, with its invaluable garrison, carried immediately in its train the irrevocable loss of Nashville also, with the early abandonment of Middle Tennessee. Another irrevocable consequence was the evacuation of Columbus, with incalculable moral detriments. And had the stroke consummated at Donelson been vigorously pressed to its proper military corollary,—Buell being left to look after the remains of Johnston's army,—General Grant's victorious army of 25,000 men, with the resources of transportation at its disposal, might have been thrown within ten days, at latest, after the fall of Donelson, upon the rear of General Polk's forces at Columbus and their easy capture thus have been assured.

Going no farther in the direction of Columbus than Jackson, in West Tennessee, fifty-seven miles north of Corinth, I there established my headquarters, and called thither Colonel Jordan, my chief of staff, who had gone to Columbus direct from Virginia (with Captain D. B. Harris, my chief engi-

† It is noteworthy that in the movement to Nashville from Bowling Green, Breckinridge's division was marched twenty-seven miles one day. — G. T. B.

neer) to inspect the command. His report upon rejoining me about the 17th of February, and that of Captain Harris, regarding the exaggerated extension of the lines, coupled with a faulty location, imperfect command of the river, and defective organization of the troops, confirmed my opinion that the place could not be evacuated too soon. General Polk, whom I also called to Jackson, I found possessed with a belief in the defensive capacity of the position and averse to its abandonment. However, upon my exposition of its saliency, and the ease with which its communications, both by railway and water, might be broken, he changed his views. As, meanwhile General Johnston had telegraphed that I must do with respect to Columbus as my "judgment dictates"; and also, that "the separation of our armies is now complete"; and further, as upon my report of the situation at Columbus the Confederate War Department had consented, on the 19th of February General Polk was directed to prepare to evacuate the position without delay. It was only to be held long enough to remove its invaluable ordnance to the batteries erected or under construction at Island Number Ten and Madrid Bend, to New Madrid and to Fort Pillow, upon which the ultimate defense of the Mississippi River must depend thereafter. The preparation of these works for the vital service hoped from them was now intrusted to Captain D. B. Harris, who subsequently left so brilliant a record as a consummate engineer at Charleston and Savannah, Drewry's Bluff and Petersburg.

On the 25th of February commenced the evacuation of a position the attempt to hold which must have resulted in the loss by capture of the corps of at least 13,000 men thus isolated, or, on the other hand, if left intact or unassailed by the enemy, must have been rendered wholly unavailable in the formation of a Confederate army for the recovery of what had been lately lost,—a corps without which no such army could have been possibly assembled at Corinth as early as the 1st of April, 1862.

Because of a severe bronchial affection contracted by exposure before leaving Bowling Green, I had not assumed formal command of the military district assigned to me, though virtually directing all the movements within it, and arduously endeavoring to become acquainted with the chief points within its limits,—a course specially requested of me by General Johnston through his adjutant-general, in the event that I should not feel "well enough to assume command."

Meanwhile, threatened by Buell's presence with a large army in front of Nashville, General Johnston, following the line of retreat (marked out as early as February 7th) to Stevenson, in north-eastern Alabama, had moved as far in that direction as Murfreesboro', where he assembled about 17,000 men by the 23d of February, who were there subdivided into 3 divisions each of 2 brigades, with a "reserve" under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, and several cavalry regiments unattached.

As the system of the "passive defensive" hitherto pursued had only led us to disaster,—the natural fruits, in fact, of the system,—encouraged by the latitude that was given me in General Johnston's telegram of February 18th,

I resolved to exert myself to the utmost, despite all that was so unpromising, to secure the means for an aggressive campaign against the enemy, of whose early movement up the Tennessee there were already such indications that there should be no doubt as to its objective.

But as General Johnston's projected line of retrograde upon Stevenson must with each day's march widen the distance between that army and the corps of General Polk, while General Grant, naturally flushed with his recent signal successes, would be left free at any moment to move up the Tennessee to Hamburg or, indeed, to Eastport, and thus, by seizing the Memphis and Charleston railroad, effectually separate and virtually neutralize the two Confederate armies,—my sole force left available for the protection of that important railway, exclusive of General Polk's forces at Columbus and elsewhere, would be but 2500 men under Chalmers, in the quarter of Iuka, with 3000 men recently arrived at Corinth from New Orleans, under Ruggles.

With a view to avoiding such a catastrophe as the enforced permanent separation of our two armies, I urged General Johnston, about the 22d of February, to abandon his line of march toward Stevenson, and to hasten to unite his army with such troops as I might be able to assemble, meanwhile, at the best point to cover the railroad center at Corinth together with Memphis, while holding Island Number Ten and Fort Pillow. This plan, of course, required more troops than our united armies would supply. Therefore, on the 22d of February, I dispatched staff-officers with a circular addressed to the governors of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee respecting the supreme urgency and import of the situation, in all its phases, and invoking their utmost exertions to send me, each of them, from 5000 to 10,000 men as well armed and equipped as possible, enrolled for 90 days, within which period, by timely, vigorous action, I trusted we might recover our losses, and assure the defense of the Mississippi River. ¶ At the same time I appealed to General Bragg for such troops as he could possibly spare temporarily in such an exigency, from Mobile and Pensacola; and to General Lovell for the like aid from New Orleans. To General Van Dorn, represented to have an army twenty thousand strong in Arkansas, I likewise sent, on the 21st of February, a most pressing invitation to come in haste to our aid with as many men as possible, by way of New Madrid. To him I wrote ("O. R.," VII., 900): "The fate of Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defense of Columbus and of Island Number Ten; hence we must, if possible, combine our operations not only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive as soon as practicable to recover some lost ground."

General Johnston acceded to my views and request, though he did not put his troops in motion until the 28th of February, and although he regarded the projected attempt to unite his army with mine a "hazardous experiment." ¶

¶ See "Military Operations of General Beauregard" (N. Y.: Harper & Brothers), I., 240-241.

¶ "If I join this corps to the forces of Beauregard (I confess a hazardous experiment), then

those who are declaiming against me will be without an argument."—"Life of General A. S. Johnston."

Letter dated Decatur, Alabama, March 18th, 1862, p. 521.—G. T. B.

The evacuation of Columbus was successfully completed on the 2d of March, apparently without any suspicion on the part of our adversary in that quarter that such an operation had been going on, or without the least show of that vigilance and vigor that were to be apprehended from him after the series of most serious disasters for the Confederate arms which had characterized the month of February, 1862. About seven thousand men were now placed at New Madrid, and in the quarter of Island Number Ten, under the command of General McCown, while the rest of General Polk's force was withdrawn along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad as far south as Humboldt, and there held in observation, with a small detachment of infantry left at Union City, and some five hundred cavalry thrown well out toward Hickman, on the Mississippi below Columbus, and extending across to the Tennessee River in the quarter of Paris, to watch and report all material movements upon either river.


Reliable information reached me that while General Pope was on his march on the Missouri side of the Mississippi, to strike at New Madrid, such was the urgency of the danger impending by way of the Tennessee River that it threatened the fatal hindrance of the conjunction of our forces, as already arranged about the 23d of February, in response to my dispatch through my aide-de-camp, Captain Ferguson. Growing profoundly apprehensive, on the 2d of March I dispatched Captain Otey, an assistant adjutant-general on my staff, with a note to General Johnston which contained these words: "I send herewith inclosed a slip showing intended movements of the enemy, no doubt against the troops in Western Tennessee. I think you ought to hurry up your troops to Corinth by railroad, as soon as practicable, for [t]here☆ or thereabouts will be fought the great battle of this controversy."

I thus fixed upon Corinth as the Confederate base, because the recent movements of our enemy up the Tennessee could only be intelligently construed as having the Memphis and Charleston railroad primarily, and such a railway center as Corinth later, as their immediate objectives.‡

☆ Evidently the word "here," as it appears in the original letter as it reached General Johnston, did not refer and could not possibly have referred to Jackson, but to Corinth, as is shown by the context of that letter and of others relative to Corinth as the evident Federal objective.—G. T. B.

‡ To say, as has been done, with apparent seriousness, by Colonel W. P. Johnston [see p. 549 of the present work], that his father "sent" me at any time, "with instructions to concentrate all available forces near Corinth,—a movement previously begun,"—is a sheer invention that is twin-born with the fable concerning General Johnston and the map upon which in January, 1862, it is alleged, he pointed out a position which had been marked by the engineers "Shiloh Church," and said in effect: "Here the great battle of the South-east will be fought" ("Life of General A. S. Johnston," by W. P. Johnston, pp. 488-490). Now, to be able

to foretell in January, 1862, that a battle would be fought at "Shiloh Church," General Johnston must also have foreseen at that moment that within the next thirty days General Grant would strike and capture the Confederate center at Forts Henry and Donelson, with one-fourth of the entire force under General Johnston's command at the time, as also obtain the control of both the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers as far as navigable; thus forcing the immediate loss by abandonment of the Confederates in turn of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus; foreseen also that General Grant would straightway establish himself at so unfavorable a base of operations as Pittsburg Landing rather than at Hamburg, which was really about to be made the Federal base of operations when the battle of Shiloh interrupted the movement. Under no other conditions could there have been a battle at Shiloh Church, a mere log-cabin, unmarked on any map existing in January, 1862.—G. T. B.




LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, U. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH. (SEE ALSO PAGE 377.)

On the 5th of March I formally assumed command of the district, retaining my headquarters for the time at Jackson as the most central point of observation and the junction of two railroads. General Bragg's forces began to arrive at Corinth on the 6th, when they, with the other troops reaching there from other quarters, were organized as fast as possible into brigades and divisions.

As a material part of the history of the campaign, I might here dwell upon the perplexing, inexplicable lack of cordial coöperation, in many ways, in the essential work of organizing the Confederate army being assembled at Corinth, as efficiently and speedily as possible for the work ahead, that was manifested by the War Department at Richmond, but it must suffice to say that a drawback was encountered from

that quarter which served to delay us, while helping to make the operation which we finally took in hand fall greatly short of its momentous aim.

Five Federal divisions (reënforced a few days later) had reached Savannah, twelve miles below Pittsburg Landing, on the east bank of the Tennessee, by the 13th of March. This force, aggregating some 43,000 men of all arms, was under the direct command of General C. F. Smith, and embraced the greater part of the army that had triumphed at Donelson. One division, without landing at Savannah, was dispatched, under General W. T. Sherman, to endeavor to land, and to reach and cut some trestle-work near Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Effecting a landing, short, however, of Eastport, the intervening country was found so inundated as to be seemingly impracticable. So, this expedition, hardly characterized by a really vigorous effort to reach the railroad, was abortive — a result aided somewhat by the opportune presence on the ground of Brigadier-General Chalmers with a Confederate force of 2500 infantry. On his way upon this expedition, General Sherman had wisely sent back from Pittsburg Landing a request that a Federal division should be dispatched at once to that point, to prevent the Confederate forces from occupying it and obstructing his return; consequently Hurlbut's division was sent thither, and it was found on its transports at that point by Sherman on his return that far down the river on the 16th of March. Sherman, landing there his own division, made an apparently objectless short march into the interior and back on the 17th of March. Making his report the same day to General Grant, who had just reached Savannah, General Sherman stated that he was "strongly impressed with the position" of Pittsburg Land-



SLAVES LABORING AT NIGHT ON THE CONFEDERATE EARTHWORKS AT CORINTH.

ing, "for its land advantages and its strategic character. The ground itself admits of easy defense by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for one hundred thousand men." Unquestionably, it was upon this report that Pittsburg, rather than Hamburg, was made the Federal base; for Hurlbut's and Sherman's divisions were immediately ordered ashore to encamp upon a prescribed line, while, on the same day General Grant directed all the other troops at Savannah except one division to be immediately sent to the same point; Wallace's division being left, however, at Crump's Landing. About the position thus taken by the Federal army, there can hardly be two professional opinions. It gave their adversary an opportunity for an almost fatal counterstroke such as has rarely been afforded to the weaker of two belligerents in all the sinews and resources of war. A narrow *cul de sac*, formed by Snake Creek and Lick Creek, with the broad bank-full river forming its bottom, tactically as well as strategically it was a false position for an invading army, and I may add that, having been occupied, the exigent precaution, under the circumstances, of making a *place d'armes* of it was wholly overlooked, though it was barely twenty-three miles distant from Corinth, where, according to the Federal general's reports of the period, a supposed Confederate army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men were concentrated.

Previously, or as early as the 3d of March, Pope, with about 19,000 "present for duty," had appeared before New Madrid, in Missouri, the essentially weak or most vulnerable point of our upper Mississippi defenses.‡ Delaying

‡ Five divisions each of 2 brigades, 3 regiments of cavalry, a body of unattached troops, including some "regulars," and 11 batteries of field-artillery. "Official Records," VIII., 94.—G. T. B.

his attack, however, until the 12th,—until siege-guns could be brought up,—the works there were easily made so untenable that General McCown abandoned them and transferred his forces, at night, across the river to support the heavy batteries at Madrid Bend and Island Number Ten.

About the time Pittsburg Landing was made General Grant's base, I had collected within easy marches of Corinth about 23,000 men of all arms of the service, independent of the forces of General Polk,—giving, with his troops and including those at Forts Pillow and Madrid Bend, an aggregate of at most 44,000 men, of excellent personality but badly armed—particularly the cavalry, some of whom had no arms at all. The new forces, with the exception of those from Mobile, Pensacola, and New Orleans, were raw and undisciplined. Made aware by the great number of transports↓ that were now plying up and down the Tennessee of the magnitude of the invasion that clearly threatened the seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, the delay on the part of the Bowling Green forces filled both General Bragg and myself with great solicitude. Meanwhile, on the 15th of March, General Johnston addressed me by telegraph: "Have you had the south bank of the Hatchee examined near Bolivar? I recommend it to your attention. It has, besides the other advantages, that of being further from the enemy's line,"—that is, Pittsburg Landing. As the essential point for us, however, was to strike a blow at General Grant so soon as General Johnston's troops were united with mine, but before Buell's junction with the exposed army at Pittsburg, I could see no possible advantage in the least increase of distance from our real objective so soon as the advent of General Johnston's troops should give us the power to undertake the offensive. Exposing these features of the situation, I again urged General Johnston to hurry his forces forward.

On the 22d of March he reached Corinth with his staff, and I went down from Jackson to meet him. Proceeding at once to explain to him what resources had been collected and all that was known of the position and numbers of our adversary at Pittsburg, as also my views of the imperative necessity for an immediate movement against that adversary lest Buell's forces should become a fatal factor in the campaign, to my surprise General Johnston, with much emotion, informed me that it was his purpose to turn over to me the command of the entire force being assembled at Corinth, and thereafter confine himself to the duties of department commander, with his headquarters either at Memphis or Holly Springs, in Mississippi. This course, as he explained, he felt called upon to take in order to restore confidence to the people and even the army, so greatly impaired by reason of recent disasters. Thoroughly understanding and appreciating his motives (and about these and his words there could be no possible misinterpretation), I declined as altogether unnecessary the unselfish tender of the command, but agreed, after some further exchange of views touching the military situation, to draw up a plan for the organization of our forces, and, as second in command, to supervise the task of organization.


↓ Sixty-one of these transports were reported to have passed by a point known as Coffee.— G. T. B.

By the 27th of March the last of General Hardee's corps reached the vicinity of Corinth,—about 8000 men,—while Crittenden's division of 5000 men was halted at Burnsville and Iuka, eastward of Corinth. The order of organization, signed by General Johnston, was published on the 29th of March. Based on my notes, it had been drawn up by Colonel Jordan, and subdivided the armies of Kentucky and Mississippi, now united, into three army corps, with reserves of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, the corps under Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee respectively, and the reserve (two brigades) under Major-General G. B. Crittenden. On the 30th of March, Colonel Mackall having been promoted and assigned to the command of the river defenses at Madrid Bend, Colonel Jordan was formally announced as the adjutant-general of the "Army of the Mississippi," and on the following day Brigadier-General Breckinridge was substituted for General Crittenden in the command of the reserve.

So much longer time than I had anticipated had been taken in effecting the junction of the "Central Army" with mine, agreed upon as far back as the 23d of February, that we were scarcely as ready for assuming the offensive as I had hoped to be, at latest by the 1st of April.


However, on the night of the 2d of April, after 10 o'clock, a dispatch from Brigadier-General Cheatham, in command at Bethel Station, twenty odd miles north of Corinth, reached me through General Polk, to the effect that he was being menaced by General Lew Wallace's division. Assuming that the enemy had divided his forces for an operation against the Mobile and Ohio railroad at Bethel, I thus indorsed the dispatch: "Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing." Colonel Jordan was then asked to carry it at once to General Johnston, who, after reading both dispatch and indorsement, accompanied by Colonel Jordan, went to General Bragg's quarters near by. That officer, already in bed, immediately agreed with my recommendation. General Johnston presented objections in effect that our forces were not as yet ready for the movement, and that we could not move up our reserve in time. Colonel Jordan, however, was able to reassure him on these points by expressing my conviction that we were as ready now as we could hope to be for some time to come, whereas the union of Buell's forces with Grant, which might be anticipated at an early day, would make any offensive operation on our side out of the question. Thereupon, General Johnston instructed Colonel Jordan to issue the orders for the movement. This was done in General Bragg's bed-chamber, in a "circular" to the three corps commanders directing them "to hold their commands in hand, ready to advance upon the enemy in the morning by 6 A. M., with 3 days' cooked rations in haversacks, 100 rounds of ammunition for small arms, and 200 rounds for field-pieces. Carry 2 days' cooked subsistence in wagons and 2 tents to the company." These orders reached the hands of Generals Polk and Hardee by 1:30 A. M., and General Breckinridge was notified to the same effect by telegraph that night.

As it had been agreed between General Johnston and myself, the day after his arrival at Corinth, that all orders relating to our operations in that



quarter, as, also, touching reorganization, should be left in my hands, during the night of the 2d of April I had made notes regulating the order of march from Corinth to Pittsburg, and the manner of bring-

ing on the battle, which I handed to Colonel Jordan soon after daylight the next morning. Those notes served as the basis of Special Orders, No. 8 of that date, issued in the name of General Johnston. However, before these orders were finally



CORINTH DWELLINGS.

1. Bragg's headquarters, afterward Halleck's, later Hood's. 2. Beauregard's headquarters. 3. Grant's headquarters, June, 1862. 4. Rosecrans's headquarters, October, 1862. 5. House in which Albert Sidney Johnston's body lay in state after the battle of Shiloh.

written, all the details were explained to and discussed by me with General Johnston, who came early to my headquarters; next, before 10 A. M., I explained to and instructed Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, also, at my headquarters, in the presence of General Johnston and of one another, precisely what each of them had to do with their respective corps that day, and they were severally directed to put their corps in motion by the described roads in the direction of the enemy, by 12 meridian, without further order.

Though the distance to be traversed was barely twenty-three miles, it was no easy matter to move an army of thirty odd thousand essentially raw troops, with their artillery, through so densely wooded a country as that intervening between Corinth and our objective. Of the two narrow country roads that existed, the shorter was assigned to Bragg's corps, because it was the one immediately contiguous to it; while to Hardee's corps was given the initiation of the movement, with the longest line of march as well as the front line in the approaching onset, because it was made up of troops most hardened by long marches, and the best trained in field service. Polk's corps followed Hardee's necessarily, because there was no other way for it, ¶

¶ As for marching upon Pittsburg in three separate columns of corps, as would seem to be indicated in the cipher dispatch to Mr. Davis of the 3d of April, the *terrain* to be passed over made such a movement an absolute impossibility. And I must add, that another pretension set up by Colonel Johnston, supported by Mr. Davis, is flatly contradicted by the official reports of the corps commanders, which show that they entered battle exactly as prescribed in Special Orders, No. 8.

Apropos of the alleged missing dispatch of April 4th, Mr. Davis has asseverated as recently as the spring of 1887, that it was in a different cipher from that of April 3d, which erroneously described the manner of march, not only in date and matter, but in the character of cipher used, being in a cipher that he had sent General Johnston specially for such a dispatch: a fatal statement in view of the fact that there is to be found (p. 365, Vol. X., Part II., "Official Records") this *postscriptum* to a letter from Mr. Davis to General Johnston, dated as late as March 26th, 1862:

"I send you [by Mr. Jack] a dictionary, of which I have the duplicate, so that you may communicate with me by cipher, telegraphic or written, as follows: First give the page by its number; second, the column by the letter L, M, or R, as it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-hand column; third, the number of the word in the column, counting from the top. Thus, the word junction would be designated by 146, L, 20."

That is, Mr. Davis sent him the very dictionary which supplied the cipher into which the original of General Johnston's dispatch to Mr. Davis of April 3d was translated, by one of my staff, for transmission, having been handed over to me for that purpose by General Johnston; and a copy of the translation into that cipher is to be seen, in its due order of date, in my telegraph-book of the period. That Captain Jack reached Corinth before General Johnston advanced against Pittsburg is stated, page 522 of Col. Johnston's Life of

his father, on which page, I may notice, is the very letter from Davis of the 26th of March, but with the material *postscriptum* omitted. After General Johnston's death, the original of the telegram of April 3d was found, but no record of another later one, which Mr. Davis claims to have received, basing that claim, manifestly, only on the fact that in his own reply, dated April 5th, he had referred to a telegram "of yesterday," which plainly could only be that of April 3d, received, however, on the 4th, which he erroneously supposed to be of that date. That Mr. Davis's telegram was an answer to no other dispatch than that of the 3d of April is plain from the text of that answer, for it clearly echoes its language. For the clear understanding of this much-mooted matter, I give the exact cipher text of the dispatch of April 3d, as it reached Mr. Davis, as I insist, not until April 5th, and as it is of record in my official telegram-book in its regular order of date as follows:

"CORINTH, April 3d, 1862, 3 P. M.

"TO THE PRESIDENT, RICHMOND, VA.

"General Buell 132. R. 5—166 L. 26—250. M 20—250 R g—239 M 32—111 M 28—Columbia 43 M. 6—Clifton 252 M. 6—218 M. 26. Mitchell 32. R. 22—124. R. 32—276 R. 27—248 M. 1—250 R. 9—59 R. 17—108—M. 20—109. R. 16—175 R. 6 ed—109 R. 18—252. M. 6—174 L. 28—31 M. 10—69. L. 12—Pittsburg—84 M. 4—111. M. 28—Bethel—156 M. 4—37 M. 20—111. M. 28 Corinth—210 M. 16 111 M. 28—Burnsville—63 R. 25—252 R. 11—169. L. 12—Monterey—174. R. 14—Pittsburg. Beauregard, 221 R. 10—132 R. 5—56. M. 14—Polk 150. M. 7—Hardee, 48. M. 3—Bragg 213 M. 6—276. M. 22. Breckinridge 210 M. 16—126 M. 4—92. R. 18—32. M. 28—Buell 44. M. 13—109 M. 6—146. L. 20—(Signed) A. S. JOHNSTON, General C. S. A."

The translated text, as given both by Mr. Davis

and next to Hardee's troops those under Polk had been most seasoned by marching.

Although our troops were under arms at an early hour on the 3d of April, as prescribed in the "circular" order, it is a part of the history of the campaign that the commanders of the two leading corps not only failed to put their troops in motion at least as early as meridian on the 3d of April, but did not move until so late in the afternoon as in effect to cause our army to reach the presence of its objective twenty-four hours later than there was every reason to expect, considering the shortness of the distance to be overcome. What led to this delay of the outset of the Second and Third corps has certainly never been explained in any official document which has yet seen the light. Their preparations necessary for such a movement were of the slightest, or only to cook five days' rations, and to load a few wagons, for the amount of ammunition to be carried was no more than they had been directed some days previously to have and keep in possession of the troops. Moreover, Hardee's corps (Polk's also), "with all detached brigades," had been under orders of "readiness for a field movement" ever since the 1st of April ("Official Records," Vol. X., Part II., p. 381). Be this as it may, Bragg's corps did not quit the vicinage of Corinth until so late that afternoon that none of it reached Monterey, twelve miles away, until the next morning at 8:30, and one division (Withers's) was not there until late on the 4th of April. Hardee's corps, though dilatory in quitting Corinth, would have easily reached its destination early enough on the second day's march to have been deployed on the same ground that it occupied on the night of the 5th, twenty-four hours later, had not General Bragg interposed his authority to check its advance. The march on the 4th was unaccountably slow and confused, especially that of the Second Corps, in view of the numerous staff attached to the headquarters of each corps. The roads were extremely narrow and rendered excessively bad for artillery in some places by the rains, while the Second Corps was unused to marching; but all this hardly made it out of the power of that army to reach its objective by the night of April 4th, had there been a closer personal attention given to the movement during that day by those whose duty it was to execute Special Orders, No. 8. And the cost was an irreparable loss of twenty-four hours. Another misadventure, that might have brought us sore disaster, was a cavalry reconnoissance with two pieces of artillery pushed forward without authority on the 4th, from Bragg's corps into

and Colonel Johnston, is in these words: "CORINTH, April 3d, 1862. General Buell in motion 30,000 strong, rapidly from Columbia by Clifton to Savannah. Mitchel behind him with 10,000. Confederate forces—40,000—ordered forward to offer battle near Pittsburg. Division from Bethel, main body from Corinth, reserve from Burnsville, converging to-morrow near Monterey on Pittsburg. Beauregard second in command. Polk the left, Bragg the center, Hardee the right wing, Breckinridge the reserve. Hope engagement before Buell can form junction.

"TO THE PRESIDENT, RICHMOND."

In publishing it as found among his father's papers, the son presents this telegram as "containing the plan of battle as General Johnston had originally devised, but not as he had fought it; doubtless in deference to General Beauregard's opinion in the matter, and for reasons which seemed sufficient at the time." On the other hand, Mr. Davis gives it not as a plan of battle, but merely of the march from Corinth to the field,—while the alleged missing dispatch of the 4th of April gave not only the plan of battle as devised, but as it was fought up to the moment of General Johnston's death.—G. T. B.

collision with the enemy with such aggressiveness that it ought to have given the Federal general full notice that an offensive army was close behind it, and led to immediate preparation for our onset, including intrenchments.

After the Third Corps had reached its assigned position, on the afternoon of the 5th of April, and the other corps were in supporting distance, including the reserve that had encountered a much more difficult road between Burnsville and Monterey than had been traversed by the other troops, naturally their commanders were called together at a point not two miles distant from Shiloh Church,—as it turned out, not far in the rear of Hardee's line.

Of course, it was recognized to be too late for an attack that day. Moreover, it was reported that the First Corps was already nearly out of provisions, and that the ammunition train was still so far to the rear as to be unpromising. The loss of twenty-four hours, when every hour was precious because of the imminent danger of Buell's conjunction, the maladroit manner in which our troops had been handled on the march, and the blunder of the noisy, offensive reconnoissance, coupled with these reports of corps commanders, served to satisfy me that the purpose for which we had left Corinth had been essentially frustrated and should be abandoned as no longer feasible. The military essence of our projected operation was that it should be a surprise, whereas, now, I could not believe the enemy was still ignorant of our near presence with an aggressive intention, and if now attacked would be found intrenched beyond the possibility of being beaten in assault by so raw and undisciplined an army as ours was, however intrepid. Hence, an imperative prudence that included the necessity for preserving that army essentially intact for further operations forced me to advise against any attempt now to attack the enemy in position and to retrace our steps toward our base with the possible result of leading him to follow us away from his own and thus giving us a probable opening to the retrieval of the present lost opportunity.

General Johnston listened heedfully to what I said, but answered that he hoped not only we should find our enemy still unready for a sudden onslaught, but that there was yet time for it before Buell could come up; therefore, he should decide to adventure the enterprise as early after dawn the next day as possible, adding his opinion that now our troops were partly in line of battle it were "better to make the venture." The opinions of the corps commanders, I may add, were neither asked nor given. That my views were based on sound military principles it seems to me could be readily deduced from what followed at the battle of Shiloh itself, were this the place for such a discussion.

So soon as General Johnston's decision was announced, the conference ended with the understanding on all sides that the battle should be ventured at dawn on the 6th of April, according to the manner already prescribed in Special Orders, No. 8, to which end every exertion should be made to place our troops in the best shape possible for the attack. No further conference was held that night by General Johnston with myself, or with the reserve

or corps commanders; nor did he issue any order at all concerning the impending battle.

At the first flush of dawn on the 6th, the Confederate army was promptly formed in the three lines directed in Special Orders, No. 8, except that untowardly the left of Hardee's corps, which, reënforced by Gladden's division of Bragg's corps, constituted the advance, did not rest on Owl Creek, as prescribed. Nine thousand and twenty-four men were in this line, deployed for battle, and formed, as it were, a heavy skirmish line thrown forward to embrace the whole Federal front. Five hundred yards rearward was Bragg's corps (less Gladden's division), 10,731 men, exclusive of cavalry, in a line, as far as the nature of the ground admitted, of regiments massed in double column at half distance—not deployed in line of battle, as some writers have stated, coupled with criticisms based thereon. General Polk's corps of 9036 men, exclusive of cavalry, came next, some 800 yards behind Bragg in a column of brigades deployed in line of battle on the left of the Pittsburg road, each brigade having its own battery, and there was cavalry protecting the left of his line. The reserve, under Breckinridge, of 7062 men, exclusive of cavalry, marched in the rear of Bragg's right or between the Pittsburg road and Lick Creek. The troops of the third line were to be thrown forward according to the exigencies of the battle. The total force thus sent forward against the Federal position numbered 40,335 rank and file, of all arms, including 4382 cavalry, more than half of whom were of no other military value except for observation or outpost service that did not involve skirmishing. [See estimates, page 557.]

On the other hand, the force to be assailed occupied "a continuous line from Lick Creek, on the [Federal] left, to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the [Federal] right, facing nearly south, and possibly a little west," says General Grant. Their first line, reaching from the bridge on Owl Creek to the Lick Creek ford, was held by the divisions of Generals Sherman and Prentiss; three of Sherman's brigades holding the Federal right, while the other (Stuart's) was on the extreme left, with its left resting on Lick Creek. This division had from 16 to 18 guns, and also a cavalry support. Prentiss occupied the intervening space. These two divisions numbered at least seventeen thousand men, exclusive of cavalry.^λ

About half a mile behind Sherman and Prentiss came McClernand's division of 7028 effectives; nearer the river were the divisions of C. F. Smith, (under W. H. L. Wallace) and of Hurlbut, aggregating 16,000 men with 34 guns. There was also a cavalry force including detachments from two "regular" regiments. Thus the force encountered must have numbered forty thousand men, infantry and artillery, supported by sixty odd guns. The ground occupied was an undulating table-land embraced between Owl Creek and Lick Creek, that run nearly in the same general direction and are about four miles apart at their mouths. This area, rising in some places about one hundred feet above the low-water level of the river, was from three to five miles

^λ Prentiss's division is reported ("Official Records," Vol. X., Part I., 112) as numbering but 5463 men "present for duty" April 5th, but 2 regiments and a battery joined during the battle.—G. T. B.

broad. Interlaced by a network of ravines, which, near the river, are deep, with abrupt sides, the ground rises somewhat ridge-like in the quarter of Lick Creek, and recent rains had made all these depressions boggy and difficult for the movement of artillery across them. A primitive forest, dense with undergrowth, spread over the whole space except a few scattered farm fields of from fifty to seventy-five acres.

Pittsburg Landing, near the mouth of Snake Creek, was about three miles from that of Lick Creek. The two roads from Corinth, while crossing Lick Creek about a mile asunder, come together two miles from Pittsburg. A road from Purdy, crossing Owl Creek by a bridge near Sherman's right, gave one way to reach the field from Crump's Landing, but the shortest road between the two landings was one near the river leading over a bridge across Snake Creek.



MAJOR-GENERAL BUSHROD R. JOHNSON, U. S. A.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH

As it has been denied in the highest quarters that the Confederate attack on the 6th of April was of the nature of a surprise, it belongs to the history of the day's operations to give here these words of a note from General Sherman to his chief, in the afternoon of the 5th. The "enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday. . . . I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position." General Grant thereupon wrote to his superior, General Halleck: "Our outposts have been attacked in considerable force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet. . . . I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack upon us." Moreover, at 3 o'clock P. M., having visited the encampment of Colonel Ammen near Savannah, General Grant informed that officer that water transportation would be furnished for his brigade of Nelson's division, Army of the Ohio, on the 7th or 8th of April, or some time early in the week, and also that there would be "no fight" at Pittsburg, but at "Corinth, where the rebels were

fortified."☆ Further, even when leaving Savannah the next morning, General Grant scarcely at first can have believed that his army was being seriously attacked, for instead of dispatching to the field the whole of Nelson's division by steamers, he ordered it to march thither by a wretched road, a march that occupied nearly the whole day. Aside, however, from such documentary evidence, or did none exist, the absence of all those ordinary precautions that habitually shield an army in the field must forbid the historian from regarding it as other than one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved.

About 5 A. M. the Confederate lines were set in motion. The first collision was in the quarter of Gladden's brigade, on our right, and with a battalion of five companies of the 21st Missouri of Prentiss's division dispatched well to the front by General Prentiss, of his own motion, as early as 3 A. M. But for this incident, due solely to the intelligent, soldierly forethought of an officer not trained to the business of war, the whole Federal front would have been struck wholly unawares, for nowhere else had such prudence been shown.

Exactly at 6 A. M. Prentiss's whole division was under fire, and the battle of Shiloh began in earnest.

As soon as the outburst of musketry and artillery gave notice that Hardee's line was engaged, General Johnston said that he should go to the front, leaving me in the general direction, as the exigencies of the battle might arise.† Then he rode forward with his personal staff and the chief engineer of the army, Colonel Gilmer, the only officer of the general staff in his suite, Colonel Jordan, remaining with me. At 7:30 A. M., by which time the battle was in full tide, as was evident from the play of artillery and the heavy, continuous rattle of small arms, I ordered Generals Polk and Breckinridge to hasten forward, the first to the support of our now engaged left, and the latter in a like service affecting our right. Adjutant-General Jordan, whom I had early in the morning directed to impress personally on the corps commanders the value of fighting their artillery massed twelve guns at a point, was also now dispatched forward to overlook the field and urge on the attack continuously at as many points as possible.

When our attack reached Sherman's division, owing to the failure of Hardee to keep his left near Owl Creek as was intended, only the left brigade of that division on the Federal right was struck, leaving intact the other two to the left of our left flank, which were swiftly formed by General Sherman on strong ground with a small watercourse in his front. But the other stricken brigade was swept out of its encampment, scattered, and took no further part as an organization in the battle of either day.

While Hardee's left failed to touch the enemy's right, on his own right there was left a vacant space between it and Lick Creek, to fill which Chalmers's brigade of Withers's division, Bragg's corps, was ordered up from the second line, with a battery; and a hot, urgent conflict ensued in that quarter, in which General Johnston was present, after Chalmers had carried at least

☆ Diary of Col. Jacob Ammen, "Official Records," Vol. X., Part I., p. 331.

† See report of Col. Thompson, A. D. C., p. 570, "Life of General A. S. Johnston," by W. P. Johnston.

one encampment. In the same quarter of the field all of Withers's division, including Gladden's brigade, reënforced by Breckinridge's whole reserve, soon became engaged, and Prentiss's entire line, though fighting stoutly, was pressed back in confusion. We early lost the services of the gallant Gladden, a man of soldierly aptitudes and experience, who, after a marked influence upon the issue in his quarter of the field, fell mortally wounded. His immediate successor, Colonel D. W. Adams, was also soon seriously disabled. Meantime, on our left (Federal right) Ruggles's division of Bragg's corps was so strenuously pressing the two brigades of Sherman's division, that at the moment McClernand's division came up, Sherman was giving way with the loss of five or six guns. McClernand could not stay the retrograde, and the Federal right was forced back to the line of the road from Purdy to Hamburg. There a foothold was gained on a thickly wooded ridge, with a ravine in front, from which two favorably posted batteries were used with deadly effect for a time upon our assailing force, now composed of Ruggles's three brigades reënforced by several of Polk's. Here, again, the Federal line had to give way, with the loss of some guns.

By 7:30 Hurlbut, sending Veatch's brigade of his division to the help of Sherman and McClernand, had gone, in person with his two other brigades, to the support of Prentiss, and with him went 8 companies of cavalry and 3 batteries. Prentiss's division was met, however, in a somewhat fragmentary condition, but was rallied in the immediate rear of a line which Hurlbut formed along the edge of a field on favorable ground on the Hamburg road, southward of the position last taken up by McClernand. Meanwhile (9:30 A. M.) I had advanced my headquarters to a point about a quarter of a mile in advance of the Shiloh Meeting House, whence I dispatched my staff in all directions to gather reports of the progress of the battle with its exigencies and needs on our side, as, also, in quest of stragglers, whose numbers had become dangerously large under the temptations of the abundant stores of food and other articles left in the abandoned Federal camps.‡ In the work of cleaning these encampments of stragglers and dispatching them to the front, my cavalry escort was also effectively employed.

As designated by Special Orders, No. 8, Hardee's corps having developed the enemy's position, Bragg's troops first and then Polk's on our left and left center, Withers's division of Bragg's corps and Breckinridge's reserves on the right, had been thrown forward to fill intervening gaps and to aid the onset. At all points from the right to the left, the opposing forces had been stoutly engaged on ground in rear of the line of McClernand's encampment since 9 A. M., when W. H. L. Wallace had carried forward his division into action; a division that, trained by so thorough a soldier as General C. F. Smith, had done most soldierly work at Donelson, and which Wallace now handled with marked vigor. Its influence seemed to stiffen the Federal

‡ At the conference in the afternoon of April 5th, I had said in support of my recommendations to retire without attacking the enemy: "Nature has claims that cannot be disregarded, The best-disciplined troops do not fight well on empty stomachs. And this is all the more true of raw troops unaccustomed to the hardships of war."—G. T. B.



WOOD AND UNDERBRUSH CALLED THE "HORNETS' NEST." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.

center and left center. Stuart, commanding one of Sherman's brigades strongly posted on the extreme Federal left, also, had made so obstinate a stand that he was not forced from the position until three times his numbers, of Withers's division, diverted from the main current of the attack, were brought to bear against him. For some time General Johnston was with that division, but he shifted to Breckinridge's division about 11 A. M., and remained closely in rear alternately of either Bowen's or Statham's brigade until mortally wounded near the latter, a little after 2 P. M. He took post and remained on our extreme right, and at no time does it appear from the reports of subordinates in any other part of the field that, either personally or by his staff, General Johnston gave any orders or concerned himself with the general movements of our forces. In fact, engrossed as he soon became with the operations of two or three brigades on the extreme right, it would have been out of his power to direct our general operations, especially as he set no machinery in motion with which to gather information of what was being done elsewhere, or generally, by the Confederate army, in order to enable him to handle it intelligently from his position on the field.

Learning about 1 P. M. that the Federal right (Sherman and McClernand) seemed about to give way, I ordered General Hardee to employ his cavalry (Wharton's Texas Rangers) to turn their flank and cut off their retreat to the river, an operation not effected because a proper or sufficient détour to the left was not made; and the gallant Texans under a heavy fire became involved in ground impracticable for cavalry, and had to fall back. But Colonel Wharton soon afterward dismounted half of his regiment and, throwing it forward on foot, drove his adversary from the position.

The falling back of Sherman's and McClernand's troops under stress from several brigades of Hardee's corps with a part of Ruggles's division of Bragg's, aided by some of Polk's troops, left Wallace (W. H. L.) on the advanced Federal right, where, with Hurlbut and Prentiss on his left, in a strong, sheltered

position, well backed by artillery, and held with great resolution, they repulsed a series of uncombined assaults made against them. Here General Bragg was directing operations in person; and it was here that, after Hindman had suffered severely in several ineffectual efforts, Gibson's brigade of Bragg's own corps was employed in four unavailing assaults, when finding himself unable to carry the position, General Bragg, as he reports, desisted from any further attempt, leaving that part of the field in charge of a staff-officer with authority to act in his name, and going farther to the right to find that General Johnston was dead. However, having previously learned, from his aide-de-camp, Colonel Urquhart, that Adjutant-General Jordan was near by, he requested that officer, through Colonel Urquhart, to collect and employ some of our troops to turn the left of the position that obstructed his advance toward the river, as just described. Upon that service Colonel Jordan, in a few moments, employed Statham's brigade, which was fortunately found near by, resting at ordered arms, General Breckinridge, to whom the order was given, being with it at the time. This happened, be it noted, at 2:30 P. M., or about the moment that General Johnston was bleeding to death in the covert of a deep ravine a very short distance from Statham's brigade, in the immediate rear of which it was that his wound had been inflicted. ↓

General Breckinridge quickly became engaged with the enemy in his front, covered by a thick underbrush that edged an open field over which the Confederate advance was made. The conflict was sharp for a few moments, but the Federals had to give way. ↓ About this time, under my orders, Cheatham came up with his Second Brigade on the left of Breckinridge. Moreover, a few moments later, or as early as 3 P. M., Withers, of Bragg's corps, having found that his adversary (Stuart's brigade) which had so long occupied him on the extreme right had disappeared toward Pittsburg Landing, and having moved across the intervening ravines and ridges with his division to where the sound of artillery and musketry showed the main battle was now raging,—was brought opportunely into coöperation with Cheatham's and Breckinridge's operations directly upon Hurlbut's left flank—a movement which Hurlbut resisted stoutly until, justly apprehensive of being cut off, he fell back, after 4 P. M., upon Pittsburg Landing. \ This left Prentiss's left flank exposed; Wallace, whose unflinching handling of his division had done so much to keep the Federal army from being driven to the river-side by midday, now also, to

↓ General Johnston was not wounded while leading a charge, as has been so frequently asserted, but while several hundred yards in the rear of Statham's brigade after it had made a successful advance, and during the absence of Governor Harris of his staff, whom he had dispatched to Colonel Statham, some two hundred yards distant, with orders to charge and take a Federal battery on his left. (See letter of Isham G. Harris, April 13th, 1876, p. 537, Vol. I. "The Military Operations of General Beauregard.")—G. T. B.

↓ Colonel W. P. Johnston has sought to make it appear that immediately upon the death of his father [see page 565], and in consequence of

that event, there was in effect a lull in the operations on the Confederate right of which General Johnston had hitherto been the soul—a lull of an hour; whereas it is manifest there cannot have been a cessation of the operations of General Breckinridge's troops for more than fifteen minutes at most,—the only troops whom General Johnston had been directing in any way since 11 A. M.—G. T. B.

∧ This saved him from sharing the fate of Prentiss, for the strength of the Confederate force that had now been brought to bear upon the remains of Wallace's, Hurlbut's, and Prentiss's divisions was sufficient to assure their environment and capture,—G. T. B.

avoid being surrounded, gave orders for it to retire, and soon fell mortally wounded; but a part of his division remained with Prentiss.

Sometime previously I had ordered General Hardee to gather all the forces he could and press the enemy on our own left. Stragglers that had been collected by Colonels Brent and Chisolm and others of my staff, were also sent forward extemporized into battalions, and Colonel Marshall J. Smith with the New Orleans Crescent Regiment was added, with orders to "Drive the enemy into the Tennessee."

Meantime, or shortly after 3 P. M., Governor Harris and Captain Wickliffe, both of General Johnston's staff, had reached me with information of his death. Staff-officers were immediately dispatched to acquaint the corps commanders of this deplorable casualty, with a caution, however, against otherwise promulgating the fact. They were also urged to push the battle with renewed vigor and, if possible, to force a speedy close, to which end my staff were energetically employed in pushing up the stragglers or regiments or parts of regiments that had become casually separated from their organizations because of the nature of the battle-field.

As I have said, by five o'clock the whole Federal army except Prentiss's division, with a part of Wallace's, had receded to the river-bank, and the indomitable force which under Prentiss still contested the field was being environed on its left by brigades from the divisions of Breckinridge, Cheatham, and Withers in that quarter. It remains to be said that Prentiss was equally encompassed on the other flank by a part of Ruggles's division, together with some of General Polk's corps. Thus surrounded on all sides, that officer, whose division had been the first to come into collision with us that morning, stoutly keeping the field to the last, was now forced to surrender in person, just after 5:30 P. M., with some 2200 officers and men.

We had now had more than eleven hours of continuous fighting, fighting without food except that hastily snatched up in the abandoned Federal encampments. In the meantime Colonel J. D. Webster, the Federal chief of staff, had massed his reserve artillery, some sixty guns, on a ridge about three hundred yards in advance of the landing which commanded all the approaches thereto from the landward, with a deep ravine on the side facing the Confederates. Moreover, much of the ground in front of this position was swept by the guns of the steamers *Lexington* and *Tyler*, properly posted for that purpose. Near by had gathered the remnants of Wallace's, Hurlbut's, and McClernand's divisions, from which gunners had been taken to man the artillery. At this critical instant, Colonel Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division of Buell's army was brought across the Tennessee and placed as a support, on the ridge, in a position selected by General Buell himself, just at the instant that the Confederates attempted to storm this last foothold to which they had finally driven their adversary after eleven hours of unceasing battle.

This was the situation at 6 P. M., and that the Confederate troops were not in a condition to carry such a position as that which confronted them at that late hour becomes clearly apparent from the official reports. After the capture of General Prentiss no serious effort was made to press the

victory by the corps commanders. In fact the troops had got out of the hands either of corps, divisional, or brigade commanders, and for the most part, moreover, at the front, were out of ammunition. Several most gallant uncombined efforts (notably by Chalmers) were made to reach and carry the Federal battery, *but in every instance the effort failed.*

Comprehending the situation as it was, at six p. m. I dispatched staff-officers with orders to cease hostilities, withdraw the troops from under fire of the Federal gun-boats, and to sleep on their arms. However, before the order was received many of the regiments had already been withdrawn out of action, and really the attack had practically ceased at every point. ☆

My headquarters for the night were established at the Shiloh Meeting House, in the tent that General Sherman had occupied. There several of the corps and division commanders called for orders, and all evinced and expressed much satisfaction with the results, while no one was heard to express or suggest that more might have been achieved had the battle been prolonged. All seemed to believe that our troops had accomplished as much as could have been hoped for.


Of the second day's battle my sketch shall be very brief. It began with daylight, and this time Buell's army was the attacking force.

Our widely scattered forces, which it had been impossible to organize in the night after the late hour at which they were drawn out of action, were gathered in hand for the exigency as quickly as possible. Generals Bragg, Hardee, and Breckinridge hurried to their assigned positions,—Hardee now to the extreme right, where were Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades of Bragg's corps; General Bragg to the left, where were assembled brigades and fragments of his own troops, as also of Clark's division, Polk's corps, with Trabue's brigade of Kentuckians; Breckinridge was on the left of Hardee. This left a vacant space to be occupied by General Polk, who during the night had gone with Cheatham's division back nearly to Hardee's position on the night of the 5th of April. But just at the critical time, to my great pleasure, General Polk came upon the field with that essential division.

By 7 p. m. the night before, all of Nelson's division had been thrown across the Tennessee, and during the night had been put in position between General Grant's disarrayed forces and our own; Crittenden's division, carried from Savannah by water and disembarked at midnight, was forced through the mob of demoralized soldiers that thronged the river-side and established half a mile in advance, to the left of Nelson. Lew Wallace's division of General Grant's army also had found its way after dark on the 6th across Snake Creek from Crump's Landing to the point near the bridge where General Sherman had rallied the remains of two of his brigades. Rousseau reached the field by water, at daylight, while two other brigades of the same division

☆ Colonel William Preston Johnston has in effect asserted [see page 567] that my order to retire out of action prevented a concentrated organized operation on the part of the corps commanders about to be launched at the Federal

position, a statement that flies in the face of all the reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders but one (Withers), as may be readily seen from the official documentary history of the battle.—G. T. B.



THE UNION GUN-BOATS AT SHILOH ON THE EVENING OF THE FIRST DAY. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

(McCook's) were close at hand. Thus, at the instant when the battle was opened we had to face at least 23,000 fresh troops, including 3 battalions of regulars, with at least 48 pieces of artillery.] On the Confederate side there was not a man who had not taken part in the battle of the day before. The casualties of that day had not been under 6500 officers and men, independent of stragglers; consequently not more than 20,000 infantry could be mustered that morning. The Army of the Ohio in General Buell's hands had been made exceptionally well-trained soldiers for that early period of the war.

The extreme Federal right was occupied by General Lew Wallace's division, while the space intervening between it and Rousseau's brigade was filled with from 5000 to 7000 men gathered during the night and in the early morning from General Grant's broken organizations.

After exchanging some shots with Forrest's cavalry, Nelson's division was confronted with a composite force embracing Chalmers's brigade, Moore's Texas Regiment, with other parts of Withers's division, also the Crescent Regiment of New Orleans and the 26th Alabama, supported by well-posted batteries, and so stoutly was Nelson received that his division had to recede somewhat. Advancing again, however, about 8 o'clock, now reënforced by Hazen's brigade, it was our turn to retire with the loss of a battery. But rallying and taking the offensive, somewhat reënforced, the Confederates were

]General Lew Wallace's division numbered "5000 men of all arms," with 12 guns; Nelson's division, "4541 strong," officers and men, with 18 guns. The strength of Crittenden's division may be estimated at 6750, rank and file, and Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division at 2250.—G. T. B.

able to recover their lost ground and guns, inflicting a sharp loss on Hazen's brigade, that narrowly escaped capture. Ammen's brigade was also seriously pressed and must have been turned but for the opportune arrival and effective use of Terrill's regular battery of McCook's division.

In the meantime Crittenden's division became involved in the battle, but was successfully kept at bay for several hours by the forces under Hardee and Breckinridge, until it was reënforced by two brigades of McCook's division which had been added to the attacking force on the field, after the battle had been joined, the force of fresh troops being thus increased by at least five thousand men.† Our troops were being forced to recede, but slowly; it was not, however, until we were satisfied that we had now to deal with at least three of Buell's divisions as well as with General Lew Wallace's, that I determined to yield the field in the face of so manifestly profitless a combat.

By 1 o'clock General Bragg's forces on our left, necessarily weakened by the withdrawal of a part of his troops to reënforce our right and center, had become so seriously pressed that he called for aid. Some remnants of Louisiana, Alabama, and Tennessee regiments were gathered up and sent forward to support him as best they might, and I went with them personally. General Bragg, now taking the offensive, pressed his adversary back. This was about 2 P. M. My headquarters were still at Shiloh Church.

The odds of fresh troops alone were now too great to justify the prolongation of the conflict. So, directing Adjutant-General Jordan to select at once a proper position in our rear, and there establish a covering force including artillery, I dispatched my staff with directions to the several corps commanders to prepare to retreat from the field, first making a show, however, at different points of resuming the offensive. These orders were executed, I may say, with no small skill, and the Confederate army began to retire at 2:30 P. M. without apparently the least perception on the part of the enemy that such a movement was going on. There was no flurry, no haste shown by officers or men; the spirit of all was admirable. Stragglers dropped into line; the caissons of the batteries were loaded up with rifles; and when the last of our troops had passed to the rear of the covering force, from the elevated ground it occupied and which commanded a wide view, not a Federal regiment or even a detachment of cavalry was anywhere to be seen as early as 4 P. M.

General Breckinridge, with the rear-guard, bivouacked that night not more than two miles from Shiloh. He withdrew three miles farther on the 8th, and there remained for several days without being menaced.

Our loss in the two days was heavy, reaching 10,699. [See page 539.]

The field was left in the hands of our adversary, as also some captured guns, which were not taken away for want of horses, but in exchange we carried off at least 30 pieces of his artillery with 26 stands of colors and nearly 3000 prisoners of war, also a material acquisition of small arms and accouterments which our men had obtained on Sunday instead of their inferior weapons.

† The fresh Federal troops now engaged aggregated at least 25,000 rank and file, further increased, about 1 o'clock, by Wagner's brigade of Wood's division, say 2500 strong.—G. T. B.

NOTES OF A CONFEDERATE STAFF-OFFICER AT SHILOH.

BY THOMAS JORDAN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL (AT SHILOH, ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY).



A CONFEDERATE PRIVATE OF THE WEST.
FROM A TINTYPE.

AFTER 10 o'clock at night, on the 2d of April, 1862, while in my office as adjutant-general of the Confederate army assembled at Corinth, a telegram was brought to me from General Cheatham, commanding an outpost on our left flank at Bethel, on the Mobile and Ohio railway, some twenty odd miles northward of Corinth. General Cheatham had addressed it to General Polk, his corps commander, informing him that a Federal division, under General Lew Wallace, had been manœuvring in his proximity during the day. General Polk had in due course sent the message to General Beauregard, from whom it came to me with his indorsement,

addressed to General A. S. Johnston, in substance: "Now is the time to advance upon Pittsburg Landing." And below were these words, in effect, if not literally: "Colonel Jordan had better carry this in person to General Johnston and explain the military situation.—G. T. B."

At the time Colonel Jacob Thompson, formerly Secretary of the Interior of the United States, was in my office. I read the telegram aloud to him and immediately thereafter proceeded to General Johnston's quarters, nearly a quarter of a mile distant, where I found the general surrounded by his personal staff, in the room which the latter habitually occupied. I handed him the open dispatch and the indorsements, which he read without comment. He then asked me several questions about matters irrelevant to the dispatch or what might naturally grow out of it, and rose, saying that he would cross the street to see General Bragg. I asked if I should accompany him. "Certainly," was his answer. We found that General Bragg had already gone to bed, but he received us in dishabille, General Johnston handing him the dispatch at once, without remark. Bragg, having read it, immediately expressed his agreement with Beauregard's advisement. General Johnston thereupon very clearly stated strongly some objections, chiefly to the effect that as yet our troops were too raw and incompletely equipped for an offensive enterprise, such as an attack upon the Federal army in a position of their own choosing, and also that he did not see from what quarter a proper reserve could be assembled in time.

As General Beauregard had discussed with me repeatedly within a week the details of such an offensive operation in all its features, and the necessity for it before the Federal army was itself ready to take the offensive, I was able to answer satisfactorily the objections raised by General Johnston, including the supposed difficulty about a reserve—for which use I pointed out that the Confederate forces posted under General Breckinridge at several points along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, to the east-

ward of Corinth, could be quickly concentrated at Burnsville, and be moved thence direct to Monterey, and there effect a junction with our main force. General Johnston at last assented to the undertaking. Thereupon I turned to a table in General Bragg's chamber, and wrote a circular order to the three corps commanders, Major-Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, directing that each should hold his corps under arms by 6 A. M., on the 3d of April, ready to march, with one hundred rounds of ammunition; three days' cooked provisions per man in their haversacks, with two more to be transported in wagons. This circular also prescribed the ammunition for the artillery, and the number of tents each company should be provided with; all of which was approved by General Johnston when I read the rough draught of it. Afterward the copies were made by an aide-de-camp on the staff of General Bragg.

These orders were delivered to Generals Polk and Hardee by 1:40 A. M., as shown by their receipts, which I required to be taken. The orders to General Breckinridge were given by telegraph, he having been called by me to the military telegraph office nearest his headquarters to receive them and to answer queries regarding his command.† Thus did it happen that the Confederate army was brought to undertake the offensive at Pittsburg Landing.

II.

UPON quitting General Bragg's quarters I proceeded immediately to the tent of Colonel A. R. Chisolm, aide-de-camp to General Beauregard, separated from my office by some thirty or forty yards, roused him from sleep, and asked him to inform the general at daylight that the order to advance at midday had been issued.

Soon after sunrise I was called to the quarters of General Beauregard, whom I found with the notes of the plan of operations and orders of engagement. These, I may add, had just been copied by Colonel Chisolm from the backs of telegrams and envelopes upon which the general had made them during the night while in bed. Taking these notes and the general's sketch-map of the roads leading from all surrounding quarters to Monterey and thence to Pittsburg Landing, I returned to my office and began to draw up the order for the battle (Special Orders, No. 8), which will be found in the "Official Records," X., 392-395.‡

Called to my breakfast before the order could be framed, I met General Johnston en route for General Beauregard's quarters, where I said I would meet him as quickly as possible, and where I soon joined him. General Beauregard was explaining the details as to the roads by which the several corps would have to move through the somewhat difficult, heavily wooded country, both before and after leaving Monterey; and to make this clear, as

† As I find from a paper officially signed by me April 21st, 1862, this reserve consisted of 6436 rank and file effectives. ("Official Records," Series I., Vol. X., p. 396.)—T. J.

‡ As I framed this order, I had before me Napo-

leon's order for the battle of Waterloo, and, in attention to ante-battle details, took those of such soldiers as Napoleon and Soult for model—a fact which I here mention because the ante-Shiloh order has been hypercriticised.—T. J.

I had from General Beauregard the only sketch extant, General Beauregard drew a rough sketch on his camp-table top. Meanwhile, General Bragg and afterward Generals Polk and Hardee had joined the conference. As I remarked that it would take me some time to formulate the order and issue all the requisite copies, General Beauregard explained orally to the three generals their routes of march for the first day, so that they might not wait for receipt of the written orders, which would be in all proper hands before night. Accordingly, these explanations were carefully made, and the corps commanders went away with distinct instructions to begin the movement at midday, as prescribed in the written orders subsequently issued. Pursuant to the terms of the circular order which I had written and issued from General Bragg's headquarters the night before, the troops were brought under arms before noon, by which time the streets and all approaches to the railway station, as well as the roads leading from Corinth, were densely packed with troops, wagons, and field-batteries ready for the march. But no movement was made; General Polk's corps in some way blocked the line of march,—as was reported to General Beauregard at a late hour in the afternoon by General Hardee in person. Thereupon, an aide-de-camp was sent to General Polk, who, to the surprise of all, explained that he had kept his corps at a stand awaiting the written order. Thus it was so late before the movement actually began, that, coupled with the really inexplicable tardiness with which Bragg's corps was moved, it caused the arrival of the Confederate army in the near presence of their adversary twenty-four hours later than was intended, as, by reason of this tardiness, it was not until the late afternoon of the 5th of April that the head of the Confederate column reached a point within less than two miles of the Federal lines, instead of on the 4th, in which case the battle would have been fought with General Grant alone, or without the material and moral help derived from the advent of Buell on the field, as happened on the night of April 6th and morning of the 7th.

III.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD with his staff left Corinth the afternoon of the 4th of April, and reaching Monterey, twelve miles distant, found the Confederate corps massed in that quarter. He was hardly encouraged, however, by the manner in which they had been handled to that stage in the operation. General Johnston and his staff were already at the same point, in occupation of a house at which we dismounted just as some cavalry brought from the front a soldierly young Federal volunteer officer, Major Le Roy Crockett, of the 72d Ohio, who had been captured a few hours before in a sharp skirmish in close proximity to the Federal lines, brought on by a Confederate reconnoitering force pressed most indiscreetly from General Bragg's corps almost upon the Federal front line. As this officer rode beside his captors through the mass of Confederate infantry and batteries, and his eyes rested intelligently on the warlike spectacle, he exclaimed, "This means a battle"; and he involuntarily added, "They don't expect anything of this kind back yonder." He was taken

in charge by myself, and, assisted by Major Gilmer, chief engineer on the staff, I interrogated him with the least possible semblance of so doing, with the result of satisfying me, as I reported to Generals Johnston and Beauregard, that we should have no earth-works to encounter, and an enemy wholly unaware of what was so near at hand.

IV.

It has more than once been represented with pencil, as well as with pen, that there was a somewhat dramatic conference of the Confederate generals around the camp-fire the night before the battle of the 6th of April. The simple fact is this: Hardee, whose corps was to be in the advance in the attack, having reached a point known to be somewhat less than two miles from our adversary, was halted and deployed in line of battle across the Pittsburg road to await the arrival and formation in his rear of the rest of the army as prescribed in the battle order. As this was not effected until after 3 o'clock, it was too late to make the attack that day. As a matter of course in such a contingency, the corps commanders were called to meet Generals Johnston and Beauregard, who, having gone from Monterey together with the general staff and their respective personal staffs, had taken a position, dismounted, on the Pittsburg road, somewhat to the rear of Hardee's corps. The meeting took place about 4 o'clock. General Polk now reported that his men were almost destitute of provisions, having either already consumed or thrown them away. General Bragg reported that his own men had been more provident, and therefore could spare enough for the emergency. Deeply dissatisfied with the inexplicable manner in which both Bragg's and Polk's corps had been delayed, both before reaching and after leaving Monterey, as well as by the injudicious manner in which a reconnoissance had been made with such aggressiveness and use of artillery as ought to have apprised any sharp-sighted enemy that an offensive army was not far distant, General Beauregard — though it had been upon his urgent instance that the advance had been made — did not hesitate to say that, inasmuch as it was scarcely possible for the enemy to be unaware of our presence and purpose, should we attack next morning we would find the Federals ready for us intrenched to the eyes; whereas the whole success of the movement had depended on our ability to assail our enemy unexpectedly. Therefore he advised the return of the Confederate army to Corinth, as it assuredly was not in a condition to attack an army superior in numbers and behind the intrenchments that would now be thrown up in expectation of our approach.

General Johnston listened attentively to what General Beauregard said, and at length replied in substance that he recognized its weight; nevertheless, as he hoped the enemy was not suspecting our proximity, he felt bound, as he had put the army in motion for a battle, to venture the hazard. Whereupon the officers rapidly dispersed to their respective commands for that venture. As I have seen it intimated, among others by General Bragg, that this conference was a mere casual or "partly accidental meeting of general



A UNION BATTERY TAKEN BY SURPRISE. (SEE PAGE 601.)

officers," it may not be amiss to recall that such a conference was the inevitable consequence of the arrival of the Confederate army at the point from which it was to spring upon the enemy, as it were from an ambush. Naturally, moreover, by a conference with their corps commanders, Johnston and Beauregard could best ascertain the condition of all the troops and determine the best course to be pursued. It was after the reports thus made with the mutual blame of each other of two of the corps commanders for the delay, that Beauregard, confirmed in his apprehension that the campaign had miscarried, urged that its objective should be given up,—much as Wellington once, in Spain, after taking the field to attack Massena, finding the latter more strongly posted and prepared than he had been misled to believe, had not hesitated to retire without fighting. The course of events demonstrated the correctness of Beauregard's judgment.

V.

THAT night, soon after supper, an aide-de-camp from General Johnston informed me of the general's desire to see me, and guided me to where he was bivouacking in the open air. I was wanted to issue the order for the immediate transfer of Maney's regiment of Tennessee infantry from a brigade in

Bragg's corps to a certain brigade in Polk's corps, of which Colonel Maney would have the command as senior officer, which order I wrote, in the absence of any table or other convenience, outstretched upon General Johnston's blankets, which were spread at the foot of a tree. After this was done, and the order dispatched by a special courier so that the transfer might be made in time to place Colonel Maney at the head of the brigade in the coming battle, something led us to talk of the Pacific Coast, in which quarter I had served eight years. Having been at Washington during the momentous winter of 1860-61, I spoke of the fact that when Colonel Sumner had been sent *via* the Isthmus of Panama to supersede him (Johnston) in the command of the Department of the Pacific in April, 1861, Sumner's berth in the steamer had been taken under an assumed name, so that the newspapers might not get and divulge the fact of his departure on that errand in time for intelligence of it to reach the Pacific Coast by the overland route, and lead General Johnston to act with a supposed powerful disunion party in California in a revolt against the Federal authority before Sumner's arrival. "Yes," answered the general, with much quiet feeling in his manner, "while distrusting me sufficiently to act thus toward me, my former adjutant-general, Fitz John Porter, was induced to write me of their great confidence in me, and to say that it was their purpose to place me in command of the Federal army, immediately next to General Scott." He had evidently been deeply hurt that his personal character had not shielded him from the suspicion of doing aught while holding a commission that could lead his superiors to suppose it necessary to undertake his supersedure by stealth. [See p. 541.]

VI.

THE next morning, as the Confederate army, deployed in the three lines prescribed in the order of march and battle, moved before sunrise down the gentle wooded slope toward Shiloh Chapel, Generals Johnston and Beauregard, with the general staff as well as aides-de-camp, stood upon a slight eminence, delighted with the evident alacrity, animated faces, and elastic gait with which all moved forward into action. Hardly had the last line passed them before the rattle of musketry announced that Hardee's corps was engaged. General Johnston now informed General Beauregard that he would go to the front with the troops engaged, leaving General Beauregard to take the proper central position from which to direct the movement as the exigencies of the battle might require. Then General Johnston rode off with his personal staff exclusively, except possibly Major Gilmer, the chief engineer. Soon the sound of battle became general; and, as during the battle of Manassas, I had been left at headquarters to send reënforcements into action as they came up by rail, I reminded General Beauregard of the fact, and requested to be dispatched to join General Johnston. He assented, and I set off, accompanied by my friend Colonel Jacob Thompson. In a little time I found that the corps commanders were ahead of or separated from a material part of their troops, whom I repeatedly found halted for want of orders. In all



THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE CONFEDERATE LINE.

General Beauregard at Shiloh Chapel sending his aides to the corps commanders with orders to begin the retreat. This was at two o'clock on Monday (see page 603). The tents are part of Sherman's camp, which was reoccupied by him Monday evening.

such cases, assuming the authority of my position, I gave the orders in the name of General Johnston. At one time I had with me the chiefs-of-staff of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, Colonel David Urquhart, the chief aide-de-camp of Bragg, and Colonel William Preston, the chief aide-de-camp of General Johnston, all of whom I employed in assisting to press the Confederate troops toward the heaviest firing, and to keep the batteries advancing. Colonels Preston and Urquhart remained with me the longer time and assisted greatly. Finally, however, Urquhart, learning from some of the troops encountered that he was in proximity to his chief, General Bragg, left me to join him,

while I, accompanied by Colonel Preston, rode to the right wing in the direction of sharp battle. Soon we came in near view of a deserted Federal encampment in an open field, with a Federal battery of four or six guns unlimbered and horseless, while in advance of it were to be seen a brigade of Confederate troops at a halt. Urquhart now galloped up and informed me that General Bragg had sent him to me with the request that I should find and order forward some troops to turn and capture some batteries just in his front which obstructed his advance. I at once pushed across a deep ravine with Urquhart and Preston to the troops in view, which proved to be Statham's brigade of the reserve under General Breckinridge; but because it belonged to the reserve, I hesitated to take the responsibility to employ it, and said so; however, asking Colonel Preston—the brother-in-law as well as aide-de-camp of General Johnston—the hour, he replied, from his watch, twenty minutes after 2 o'clock. I then said that the battle ought to be won by that time, and "I think the reserve should be used." Colonel Preston expressed his agreement with me, and I rode at once to General Breckinridge, who was not far to the rear of his troops, surrounded by a number of officers.

Accosting him, I said, "General Breckinridge, it is General Johnston's order that you advance and turn and take those batteries," pointing in the direction indicated by Urquhart, and where was to be heard the din of their discharges. As the order was given, General Breckinridge, clad in a well-fitting blouse of dark-colored Kentucky jeans, straightened himself in his stirrups. His dark eyes seemed to illuminate his swarthy, regular features, and as he sat in his saddle he seemed to me altogether the most impressive-looking man I ever had seen.

I then turned, accompanied both by Urquhart and Preston, with the purpose of going to the camp and battery previously mentioned, and from that point to observe the movement. On reaching the ravine, which we had crossed, Colonel Preston, who possibly had just heard from some of the officers of the command just set in motion of General Johnston's recent presence with them, said to me, "I believe I will make another attempt to find General Johnston," and rode down the ravine toward the left, and as it so happened, did find General Johnston, but already unconscious, if not dead.

General Johnston had received his death-wound near the very troops I had found standing at ordered arms, but who were unaware of the fact, and therefore were not, as has been written, brought to a stand-still by reason of that catastrophe, and who undeniably were put in effective forward movement by me within twenty minutes after his wounding.

A striking incident of the first day's battle may be here mentioned for its novelty on battle-fields. A completely equipped Federal battery was so suddenly turned and environed by the Confederates, that it was captured with all the guns limbered up *en règle* for movement as upon drill, before its officers could possibly unlimber and use its guns in self-defense. The drivers were in their saddles, the gunners seated side by side in their

places upon the ammunition-boxes of the caissons, grinning over the situation, and the officers with their swords drawn were mounted on their horses. Not a horse had been disabled.

VII.

At the time of the reception of the order given as the sun was setting on the 6th of April by General Beauregard for his greatly disarranged and scattered troops to withdraw from action and reorganize for the next day's operations, I had reached a point very close to the Tennessee River where it was densely wooded. The large ordnance of the gun-boats was raking this position, creating more noise in some quarters than harm to the Confederates, as the heavy projectiles tore and crashed in all directions through the heavy forest.

Riding slowly backward to the point at which I understood I should find General Beauregard, it was after sunset when I dismounted at the tent of a Federal officer, before which the general was standing with some of his staff and with an officer in the uniform of a Federal general, to whom I was introduced. It was General Prentiss. Several hours previously a telegraphic dispatch addressed by Colonel Helm to General Johnston (as well as I now remember, from the direction of Athens, in Tennessee) was brought me from Corinth by a courier, saying that scouts employed in observing General Buell's movements reported him to be marching not toward a junction with Grant, but in the direction of Decatur, North Alabama. This assuring dispatch I handed to General Beauregard, and then, at his order, I wrote a telegraphic report to the Confederate adjutant-general, Cooper, at Richmond, announcing the results of the day, including the death of Johnston.

Meanwhile, it had become so dark that I could barely see to write, and it was quite dark by the time Generals Hardee and Breckinridge came to see General Beauregard for orders for the next day's operations. General Bragg, who had also come from the front, had taken up his quarters for the night in a tent which General Sherman had previously occupied at the Shiloh Chapel. This chapel, a rude log-hut of one story, was only two or three hundred yards distant from the spot at which I had found General Beauregard. Leaving General Prentiss in my charge, General Beauregard soon after dark took up his quarters for the night with General Bragg. The corps commanders had meanwhile been personally directed to assemble their respective commands at the earliest possible moment in the morning to be ready for the final stroke.

Colonel Thompson and myself, with General Prentiss sandwiched between us, shared a rough makeshift of a bed made up of tents and captured blankets. Prentiss and Thompson had been old acquaintances, and the former talked freely of the battle, as also of the war, with a good deal of intelligence and good temper. With a laugh, he said: "You gentlemen have had your way to-day, but it will be very different to-morrow. You'll see! Buell will effect a junction with Grant to-night, and we'll turn the tables on you in the morning."

This was said evidently with sincerity, and was answered in the same pleasant spirit, and I showed him the dispatch that had reached me on the field. He insisted, however, that it was a mistake, as we would see. Tired as we were with the day's work, sleep soon overtook and held us all until early dawn, when the firing first of musketry and then of field-artillery roused us, and General Prentiss exclaimed: "Ah! didn't I tell you so! There is Buell!" And so it proved.

VIII.

Up to half-past two o'clock on the 7th of April, or second day's conflict, General Beauregard had his headquarters at the Shiloh Chapel, or immediately at Sherman's former headquarters. The Confederate troops, now hardly 20,000 men, were all either directly in advance of that position, or, to the right and left of it, somewhat in advance, hotly engaged, having only receded from the places occupied during the night sufficiently to be better massed and organized for fighting. But our losses were swelling perilously, and the straggling was growing more difficult to restrain. A little after two o'clock, Governor Harris of Tennessee, who, after the death of General Johnston, had joined the staff of Beauregard in action, taking me aside, asked if I did not regard the day as going against us irremediably, and whether there was not danger in tarrying so long in the field as to be unable to withdraw in good order. I answered that I thought it would soon be our proper course to retreat. Having an opportunity a moment later to speak to General Beauregard in private, I brought the subject before him in almost these words:

"General, do you not think our troops are very much in the condition of a lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its original shape, though ready to dissolve? Would it not be judicious to get away with what we have?"

"I intend to withdraw in a few moments," was his reply.

Calling upon his aides-de-camp present, he dispatched them with orders to the several corps commanders to begin the rearward movement. He also directed me to collect as many of the broken organizations as I could,—both of infantry and artillery,—post them in the best position I might find, and hold it until the whole army had passed to the rear of it. Such a position I quickly found on an elevated ridge in full view of the chapel and the ground to the right and left of it, and also somewhat more elevated, rising abruptly toward the enemy but receding gently toward Corinth. There I collected and posted some two thousand infantry, making them lie down at rest. I also placed in battery some twelve or fifteen guns, so as to command and sweep the approach from the direction of the enemy. There also I remained until after 4 o'clock, or until the entire Confederate force had retired, General Breckinridge's troops being the last, and without seeing a single Federal soldier within the wide range of my eyes. I then retired, carrying from the field the caissons loaded down with muskets and rifles picked up on the field,

SURPRISE AND WITHDRAWAL AT SHILOH.

BY S. H. LOCKETT, COLONEL, C. S. A. (AT SHILOH GENERAL BRAGG'S CHIEF ENGINEER).



AT the time of the battle of Shiloh I was on General Bragg's staff as his chief engineer, with the rank of captain. On the night of April 5th I accompanied him to General Johnston's headquarters, where the last council of war was held. I was not present at the meeting of the generals, but with a number of other staff-officers remained near by. We could hear the low, earnest discussion of our superiors, but could not distinguish the words spoken.

When the council closed, and General Bragg started to his own bivouac, I joined him, and received the following instructions: That as the attack would be made at daylight, the next morning at 4 o'clock I should proceed to the front along the Bark road, with Lieutenant Steel, of the engineers, and a squad of cavalry, until I came to the enemy's camp; that I should very carefully and cautiously reconnoiter the camp from where I struck it toward the enemy's left flank; that I should by no means allow any firing by my little force, or do anything to attract attention; that my duty was to get all the information possible about the enemy's position and condition, and send it back by couriers from point to point, as my judgment should suggest. Those orders I carried out the next morning. Lieutenant S. M. Steel, now Major Steel, of Nashville, Tenn., had been a civil engineer and surveyor in that section of the country, had already made several daring and valuable reconnoissances of the Federal camps, and knew the country thoroughly. He was a splendid scout, and as brave a man as ever lived. Under his skillful guidance I reached in safety a point which he said was not more than a few hundred yards from the Federal camps. Here our cavalry escort and our own horses were left, and we two, leaving the road, passed down a narrow valley or gorge, got beyond the Federal pickets, and came within a few rods of a sleepy camp sentinel leaning against a tree. In front of us was a large camp as still and silent as the grave; no signs of life except a few smoldering fires of the last night's supper. Noting these facts and without disturbing the man at the tree, we returned to our cavalry squad, and I dispatched a courier to General Bragg with a note telling what I had seen. We then moved by our right flank through the woods, from a quarter to half a mile, and repeated our former manoeuvre. This time we found the cooks of the camp astir preparing breakfast. While we were watching the process reveille was sounded, and I saw one or two regiments form by companies, answer to roll-call, and then disperse to their tents. Once more I returned to my cavalry and dispatched a courier.

A third time I made a descent from the hills, down a narrow hollow, still farther to our right, and saw Federal soldiers cleaning their guns and accouterments and getting ready for Sunday morning inspection. By this time firing had begun on our left, and I could see that it caused some commotion in the camps, but it was evident that it was not understood. Soon the firing became more rapid and clearer and closer, and I saw officers begin to stir out of their tents, evidently anxious to find out what it all meant. Then couriers began to arrive, and there was great bustle and confusion; the long roll was beaten; there was rapid falling in, and the whole party in front of me was so thoroughly awake and alarmed that I thought my safest course was to retreat while I could and send another courier to the rear.

How long all this took I cannot now recall, but perhaps not more than an hour and a half or two hours. When I reached my cavalry squad I knew that the battle had opened in earnest, but I determined to have one more look at the Federal position, and moved once more to the right. Without getting as near as our former positions, I had a good view of another camp with a line of soldiers formed in front of it. Meantime the Confederate troops had moved on down the hills, and I could plainly see from the firing that there was hot and heavy work on my left and in advance of my present position. I then began to fear that the division in front of me would swing around and take our forces in flank, as it was manifest that the Federal line extended farther in that direction than ours. I therefore disposed my little cavalry force as skirmishers, and sent a courier with a sketch of the ground to General Bragg, and urged the importance of having our right flank protected. How long I waited and watched at this point it is hard to say. Finally, becoming very uneasy at the state of affairs, I left Lieutenant Steel with the cavalry and rode to the left myself to make a personal report. In this ride I passed right down the line of battle of the Confederate forces, and saw some splendid duels both of artillery and infantry. Finally, as I have always thought about 11 o'clock, I came to General A. S. Johnston and his staff standing on the brow of a hill watching the conflict in their front. I rode up to General Johnston, saluted him, and said I wished to make a report of the state of affairs on our extreme right. He said he had received that report and a sketch from Captain Lockett, of the engineers. I told him I was Captain Lockett. He replied, "Well, sir, tell me as briefly and quickly as possible what you have to say." When my report was finished he said, "That is what I gathered from your note and sketch, and I have already ordered General Breckinridge to send forces to fill up the space on our right. Ride back, sir, toward the right, and you will probably meet General Breckinridge; lead him to the position you indicate, and tell him

to drive the enemy he may find in his front into the river. He needs no further orders." The words are, as near as I can remember them, exactly the ones General Johnston used. I obeyed the order given, met General Breckinridge, conducted him to the place where I had left my cavalry, but found both them and the Federal division gone. I rode with General Breckinridge a few hundred yards forward, and we soon received a volley which let us know that the Federal forces had retired but a very short distance from their original position. General Breckinridge deployed Bowen's and Statham's brigades, moved them forward, and soon engaged the Federal forces. I bade the General good-day and good luck, and once more rode down the line of battle until I found General Bragg. With him I remained, excepting when carrying orders and making reconnoissances, until the close of the first day's fight.

I witnessed the various bloody and unsuccessful attacks on the "Hornets' Nest." During one of the dreadful repulses of our forces, General Bragg directed me to ride forward to the central regiment of a brigade of troops that was recoiling across an open field, to take its colors and carry them forward. "The flag must not go back again," he said. Obeying the order, I dashed through the line of battle, seized the colors from the color-bearer, and said to him, "General Bragg says these colors must not go to the rear." While I was talking to him the color-sergeant was shot down. A moment or two afterward I was almost alone on horseback in the open field between the two lines of battle. An officer came up to me with a bullet-hole in each cheek, the blood streaming from his mouth, and asked, "What are you doing with my colors, sir?" "I am obeying General Bragg's orders, sir, to hold them where they are," was my reply. "Let me have them," he said. "If any man but my color-bearer carries these colors, I am the man. Tell General Bragg I will see that these colors are in the right place. But he must attack this position in flank; we can never carry it alone from the front." It was Colonel H. W. Allen, afterward Governor Allen of Louisiana. I returned, miraculously preserved, to General Bragg, and reported Colonel Allen's words. I then carried an order to the same troops, giving the order, I think, to General Gibson, to fall back to the fence in the rear and reorganize. This was done, and then General Bragg dispatched me to the right, and Colonel Frank Gardner (afterward Major-General) to the left, to inform the brigade and division commanders on either side that a combined movement would be made on the front and flanks of that position. The movements were made, and Prentiss was captured.

As Colonel William Preston Johnston says, that capture was a dear triumph to us—dear for the many soldiers we had lost in the first fruitless attacks, but still dearer on account of the valuable time it cost us. The time consumed in gathering Prentiss's command together, in taking their arms, in marching them to the rear, was inestimably valuable. Not only that; the news of the capture spread, and grew as it spread; many soldiers and

officers believed we had captured the bulk of the Federal army, and hundreds left their positions and came to see the "captured Yanks." But after a while the Confederates were gotten into ranks, and a perfect line of battle was formed, with our left wing resting on Owl Creek and our right on the Tennessee River. General Polk was on the left, then Bragg, then Hardee, then Breckinridge. In our front only one single point was showing fight, a hill crowned with artillery. I was with General Bragg, and rode with him along the front of his corps. I heard him say over and over again, "One more charge, my men, and we shall capture them all." While this was going on a staff-officer (or rather, I think, it was one of the detailed clerks of General Beauregard's headquarters, for he wore no uniform) came up to General Bragg, and said, "The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is needless to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats." General Bragg said, "My God, was a victory ever sufficiently complete?" and added, "Have you given that order to any one else?" "Yes, sir," was the reply, "to General Polk, on your left; and if you will look to the left, you will see that the order is being obeyed." General Bragg looked, and said, "My God, my God, it is too late!" and turning to me, he said, "Captain, carry that order to the troops on the right"; and to Captain Frank Parker, "You carry it to the left." In a short time the troops were all falling back—and the victory was lost. Captain Parker and myself were the only members of General Bragg's staff who were with him at that time. Captain Parker, I think, is still living in South Carolina, and will surely remember all that I have narrated.

In this hasty sketch I have intentionally omitted everything but the beginning and end of that day's operations, to throw what light I can upon the two great points of dispute: Was the Federal army surprised by our attack? and whose fault was it that the victory was not sufficiently complete on the first day?

In regard to the second day's fight, I will touch upon but one point. I, as a great many other staff-officers, was principally occupied in the early hours of the second day in gathering together our scattered men and getting them into some sort of manageable organization. In this duty I collected and organized a body of men about a thousand strong. They were composed of men of at least a half-dozen different regiments. The 7th Kentucky, with a tattered flag, and the 9th Arkansas were the most numerous represented. We had not one single field-officer in the command. When I reported to General Beauregard that I had the troops divided into companies, had assigned a captain to duty as lieutenant-colonel and a first lieutenant as major, he himself put me in command of them as colonel. In order that my command might have a name, I dubbed it the "Beauregard Regiment,"—a name that was received with three rousing cheers. Not long after my regiment was thus officered and christened, a message came from General Breckinridge on our

extreme right that he was hard pressed, and needed reinforcements. My regiment, which was at the time just behind General Beauregard, held in reserve by his orders, was sent by him to General Breckinridge's assistance. We marched down the line of battle to the extreme right, passed beyond General Breckinridge's right, wheeled by companies into line of battle, and went in with the "rebel yell." The men on our left took up the yell and the charge, and we gained several hundred yards of ground. From this point we fought back

slowly and steadily for several hours, until word came that the army was ordered to retreat, that the commands would fall back in succession from the left, and that the right wing would be the rearguard. This order was carried out, and when night came the right wing was slowly falling back with face to the foe. We halted on the same ground we had occupied on the morning of the 6th, just before the battle began. If there was any "breaking" and "starting," as General Grant expresses it, I did not witness it.

THE SHILOH BATTLE-ORDER AND THE WITHDRAWAL SUNDAY EVENING.

BY ALEXANDER ROBERT CHISOLM, COLONEL, C. S. A. (AT SHILOH ON GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S STAFF).

In the paper published in "The Century" for February, 1885, Colonel William Preston Johnston, assuming to give the Confederate version of the campaign and battle of Shiloh, at which he was not present, has adventured material statements regarding operations on that field, which must have been based on misinformation or misunderstanding in essential particulars, as I take occasion to assert from personal knowledge acquired as an eyewitness and aide-de-camp on the staff of General Beauregard. My personal knowledge runs counter to many of his statements and deductions, but I shall here confine myself to two points.

First, I must dispute that the battle-order as promulgated was in any wise different from the one submitted by General Beauregard at his own quarters at Corinth, early in the morning of the 3d of April, to General A. S. Johnston, and which was accepted without modification or suggestion. This assertion I base on these facts: About 1 o'clock in the morning the adjutant-general of the Confederate forces, Colonel Jordan, aroused me from sleep in my tent, close by General Beauregard's chamber, and desired me to inform the general at dawn that General Johnston had agreed to his recommendation to move offensively against Pittsburg Landing early that same day, and that the circular orders to the corps commanders had been already issued by Colonel Jordan to that effect. Acting upon this request, I found that General Beauregard had already during the night made full notes on loose scraps of paper of the order of march and battle, from which he read aloud for me to copy—my copy being given to Colonel Jordan as soon as completed, as the basis of the official order which he was to frame, and did frame and issue in the name of General Johnston. And that is the order which Colonel Johnston erroneously alleges upon the posthumous authority of General Bragg to differ essentially from the plan settled upon by General Johnston for the battle. This allegation I know to be unfounded, as the order as issued varies in no wise from the notes dictated to me by General Beauregard, excepting the mere wording and some details relating to transportation and ordnance service added by Colonel Jordan; that is to say, the plan explained by General Beauregard and accepted by General Johnston at the quarters of the former.

Being limited as to space, I shall pass over a throng of facts within my personal knowledge,

which would establish that General Beauregard was as actively and directly handling the Confederate forces engaged in their general conduct of the battle before the death of General Johnston as he was after that incident. I shall confine myself on this occasion to relating that after General Beauregard became cognizant of the death of General Johnston, he dispatched me to the front with orders that led to the concentration of the widely scattered and disarrayed Confederate forces, which resulted in the capture of General Prentiss and so many of his division after 5 o'clock on the 6th.

I also, later in the day, carried orders to Hardee, who was engaged on our extreme left, or Federal right, where I remained with that officer until almost dark, up to which time no orders had reached him to cease fighting. On the contrary, he was doing his best to force back the enemy in his front. As he was without any of his staff about him, for the nonce I acted as his aide-de-camp. Meantime the gun-boats were shelling furiously, and their huge missiles crushed through the branches of the trees overhead with so fearful a din, frequency, and closeness that, despite the excitement of our apparently complete victory, there was room left in our minds for some most unpleasant sensations, especially when the top of some lofty tree, cut off by a shell, would come toppling down among the men.

Possibly, had Colonel Johnston been present on the field at that last hour of the battle of the 6th, a witness of the actually fruitless efforts made to storm the last position held by the enemy upon the ridge covering the immediate landing-place, known as Pittsburg, he might be better informed why it was that that position was not carried, and be less disposed to adduce such testimony as that of General Bragg, to the effect that but for the order given by Beauregard to withdraw from action he would have carried all before him.

It so happened that I rejoined General Beauregard at a point near Shiloh Chapel (having escorted General Prentiss from the field to General Beauregard), when General Bragg rode up from the front, and I heard him say in an excited manner: "General, we have carried everything before us to the Tennessee River. I have ridden from Owl to Lick Creek, and there is none of the enemy to be seen." Beauregard quietly replied: "Then, General, do not unnecessarily expose your command to the fire of the gun-boats."

THE MARCH OF LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION TO SHILOH.

CIRCUMSTANCES AND CHARACTER OF THE ORDER.

AS GENERAL GRANT passed up from Savannah on the *Tigress* on the 6th of April to the battle-field of Shiloh, he found General Lew Wallace awaiting him at Crump's Landing, the troops of his division having been ordered under arms at the sound of the battle. [For General Grant's statements, see pages 467-8.] General Wallace in his official report places the hour at which General Grant reached Crump's at about 9, while General Grant gives the hour of his arrival at Pittsburg Landing as about 8. Grant left Wallace a direction to hold himself in readiness for orders. In anticipation of the receipt of them, a horse was saddled at Crump's for the use of the expected messenger, the First Brigade having been already sent from Crump's to join the Second at Stony Lonesome (marked A on the map), General Wallace following about 9:15. To this point, at an hour which has been variously stated by the officers of the command at from 11 o'clock to noon (Wallace says, "exactly 11:30"), came Captain A. S. Baxter, quartermaster on Grant's staff, with the order. Concerning the time, dispatch, and character of this order there is much disagreement. General Grant says that the order was verbal; that it was given after riding out to the front, and that Baxter made a memorandum of it, though he does not say that he saw Baxter. Furthermore Rawlins says that the order was taken by him back to the Landing, half a mile away, and given verbally to Baxter, and afterward dictated to him, at the latter's request, and that Baxter started on the steamer not later than 9 o'clock. Rowley states that Grant gave the order verbally and in person to Baxter at once upon arriving at the Landing, and then rode immediately to the front. Wallace states that Baxter delivered an unsigned order and said that "it had been given to him verbally, but that in coming down the river he had reduced it to writing."

Concerning the circumstances and character of the order Captain Baxter made the following statement in the New-York "Mail and Express" for November 4th, 1886:

"I will give my own recollection of the event at Pittsburg Landing. On Sunday, between the hours of 8 and 9 o'clock A. M., April 6th, 1862, Adjutant-General Rawlins, of General Grant's staff, requested me to go to Crump's Landing (five miles below) and order General Lew Wallace to march his command at once by the River Road to Pittsburg Landing, and join the army on the right. At the same time General Rawlins dictated the order to General Wallace, which was written by myself and signed by General Rawlins."

"On meeting General Wallace I gave the order verbally, also handed to him the written order. General Wallace said 'he was waiting for orders, had heard the firing all the morning, and was ready to move with his command immediately—knew the road and had put it in good order.'"

"My stay with Lew Wallace did not exceed three minutes. I had no further conversation with him, and I returned immediately to Pittsburg Landing."


As to the character of the order: General Grant's

statement (see page 468) is that the order as given was "to march immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river." Captain Rowley says, "to march with his division up the river, and into the field on the right of our line, as rapidly as possible." Rawlins says it read "substantially as follows: 'Major-General Wallace: You will move forward your division from Crump's Landing, leaving a sufficient force to protect the public property at that place, to Pittsburg Landing, on the road nearest to and parallel to the river, and form in line at right angles with the river, immediately in rear of the camp of Major-General C. F. Smith's division on our right [W. H. L. Wallace's], and there wait further orders.'" General Wallace says, that as received, it directed him "to come up and take position on the right of the army, and form my line of battle at a right angle with the river," and "to leave a force to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing." Colonel James R. Ross says, "I very distinctly remember that this order directed you to move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy Road, and form your line of battle at right angles with the river, and then act as circumstances would dictate." ☆ General Fred. Knefler says, "It was a written order to march and form a junction with the right of the army." ¶ Captain Addison Ware says it was "to move your division up and join General Sherman's right on the road leading from Pittsburg Landing to Purdy." † General Knefler adds, "The order was placed in my hands as Assistant Adjutant-General; but where it is now, or what became of it, I am unable to say. Very likely, having been written on a scrap of paper, it was lost." ¶

ROUTE AND LIMIT OF THE MARCH.

All reports agree that the march of the two brigades began at 12 o'clock, along the road A B C. Wallace not arriving at Pittsburg Landing, General Grant sent Captain Rowley of his staff to hurry him forward. Rowley went by the River Road almost to Crump's Landing, and then "a distance of between five and six miles," when he reached the rear of Wallace's division by the road A B C, and passing the resting troops continued to the head of the column, where he found Wallace and delivered the orders, and gave him the first information that the right of the army had been driven back. Wallace then ordered a counter-march of the troops. The point at which this turning took place is fixed by General Wallace at D, half-way between the Purdy crossing and the Owl Creek bridge. (This identification is fully confirmed by letters of October 5th and 6th, 1887, written by Generals Fred. Knefler and G. F. McGinnis, Captains Thomas C. Pursel and George F. Brown, and Dr. S. L. Ensminger, all of whom took part in the march, and the last two of whom examined the ground in 1884 to determine the point.) In the "Official Records" is a sketch map, without scale, by Colonel James B. McPherson, placing the

☆ Ross to Wallace, January 25th, 1868. ¶ Knefler to Wallace, February 19th, 1868. † Ware to Wallace [1868].



MAP OF THE ROUTES BY WHICH GENERAL GRANT WAS REINFORCED AT PITTSBURG LANDING.

Authorities: (1.) The Official or Thom map (p. 508), for roads and distances on the south side of Snake Creek; (2.) the Union Camp map (pp. 496-7), for the location of camps morning of April 5th, 1862; (3.) the Shiloh map in General Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant," for the main roads on the north side of Snake Creek, that map also agreeing with General McPherson's sketch map without scale in "Official Records," Vol. X., p. 183; (4.) General Wallace's statement to the editors, 1887, based on investigations and measurements in 1884,

by Captain George F. Brown and Dr. S. L. Enslinger, for the roads from G to C and from C to E, and for the point D as the limit of the march toward Owl Creek. N. B.—No detailed survey appears to have been made.

Key to routes of Wallace's division:

Route of First Brigade, morning of April 6th—F A.

Route of First and Second brigades to the battlefield, afternoon—A B C D C H E K.

Route of Third Brigade, afternoon—G C H E K.

limit of march at C. This was probably intended for the point where Rowley came up with the rear of the column, which must have covered a distance of two miles or more; but if intended for the limit of the advance, it could not have been fixed on McPherson's own knowledge, for when Rawlins and McPherson, who were also sent by General Grant (McPherson says at 2:30) to hasten the movement, following Rowley's course, came up with the division (Rawlins says about 3:30), the First Brigade had passed across toward E and the Second was passing. Some mystery attaches to the inaction of the Third Brigade during the morning. General Wallace states in his report that it was concentrated on the Second, meaning, as he explains to the editors, that the order for the concentration had been sent, and, he presumed, obeyed. Colonel Ross delivered the order to Colonel Charles R. Woods, then in command at Adamsville, and Captain Ware, Wallace's second aid, carried a repetition of it—both during the morning. [Ross to Wallace, January 25th, 1868, and Ware to Wallace, 1868.] Yet Colonel Whittlessey, who during the day, by seniority of commission, succeeded to the

command of the brigade, says in his report that three of the four regiments "received orders to march with their trains about 2 P. M., and to advance toward Pittsburg Landing in advance of the trains at 4 P. M." This they did (General Wallace informs us) by the route shown on the map. The fourth regiment went to Crump's to guard the public property.

The "Official Records" (Vol. X., p. 177) also contain a rough sketch map, submitted by General Wallace to General Halleck, accompanying a memorandum dated March 14th, 1863. That map is manifestly imperfect in representing but one bridge between A and the right of the army, the junction of Owl and Snake creeks being placed above the upper Snake creek bridge, instead of below it. General Wallace himself has informed the editors that that map is incorrect, and that its inaccuracy arose from a prevalent confusion of the names of Snake and Owl creeks. That map, however, faithfully represents General Wallace's claim that the head of his column advanced to within a mile of what had been the right of the army. This confusion of the two creeks has given ambiguity to General Wallace's statement in his re-

port, made five days after the battle, which he informs us should read as bracketed:

"Selecting a road that led directly to the right of the lines, as they were established around Pittsburg Landing on Sunday morning, my column started immediately, the distance being about six miles. The cannonading, distinctly audible, quickened the steps of the men. Snake Creek [Owl Creek], difficult of passage at all times on account of its steep banks and swampy bottoms, ran between me and the point of junction. Short way from it [Owl Creek] Captain Rowley, from General Grant, . . . overtook me. . . . It seemed, on his representation, most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the 'River Road.' . . . This movement occasioned a counter-march, which delayed my junction with the main army until a little after nightfall."

CHARACTER OF THE MARCH.

Rowley, McPherson, and Rawlins report that they represented the need of haste, and that the march was slow:

"Of the character of the march, after I overtook General Wallace, I can only say that to me it appeared intolerably slow, resembling more a reconnaissance in the face of an enemy than a forced march to relieve a hard-pressed army. So strongly did this impression take hold of my mind, that I took the liberty of repeating to General Wallace that part of General Grant's order enjoining haste." [Rowley.]

"After I had reached the head of the column, I must say it seemed to me that the march was not as rapid as the urgency of the case required. Perhaps this arose in a great measure from my impatience and anxiety to get this force on the field before dark. . . ." [McPherson.]

"Colonel McPherson and I came up to him about 3:30 o'clock P.M. He was then not to exceed four or four and a half miles [two and a half miles] from the scene of action; the roads were in fine condition; he was marching light; his men were in buoyant spirits, within hearing of the musketry, and eager to get forward. He did not make a mile and a half an hour, although urged and appealed to, to push forward. Had he moved with the rapidity his command were able and anxious to have moved after we overtook him, he would have reached you [Grant] in time to have engaged the enemy before the close of Sunday's fight." [Rawlins.]

General Wallace denies this last conclusion and the statement about the condition of the road. General Kneller says [letter to Wallace]: "After some hard marching over execrable roads, we reached our position about dusk." Col. James R. Ross says [letter to Wallace, January 25th, 1868]: "We had to march over the worst road I ever remember to have seen. In many places it was almost impossible to get artillery through."

The head of the column did not arrive at K until after dark, probably at 7:15, sunset being at 6:30. The total time of the march was about 7 hours. The total distance traveled to the lower bridge (K) was, according to our map, 11 miles. It is possible that a detailed survey of the field would indicate the distance as somewhat greater. General Wallace estimates it as "over 14 miles, of which quite 5 miles were through mire so deep that the axles of my guns left wakes behind them as if mud-scows had been dragged that way." Captain Brown, who studied the route in 1884, estimates it at between 13 and 14 miles. Not considering the comparative difficulties of the two marches, the map indicates little difference in the

speed of Wallace's division and that of Nelson's leading brigade (Ammen) from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing (1:30 to 5). Ammen in his diary dwells on the extreme difficulties of his route, which lay largely through swamps impassable by artillery.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY GENERAL WALLACE.

I.—Letter found on the person of General W. H. L. Wallace, after he had received a mortal wound at Shiloh, and sent by his widow to General Grant [see foot-note, page 468; printed also in *THE CENTURY* and in the "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant"]:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, ADAMSVILLE, April 5th, 1862. GENERAL W. H. L. WALLACE, commanding Second Division. SIR: Yours received. Glad to hear from you. My cavalry from this point has been to and from your post frequently. As my Third Brigade is here, five miles from Crump's Landing, my Second two and a half miles from it, I thought it would be better to open communication with you from Adamsville. I will to-morrow order Major Hayes, of the 5th Ohio Cavalry, to report to you at your quarters; and, if you are so disposed, probably you had better send a company to return with him, that they may familiarize themselves with the road, to act in case of emergency as guides to and from our camps.—I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, LEWIS WALLACE, General Third Division."

General Wallace says: "As I was ignorant of the position of W. H. L. Wallace's camp, this letter was sent by way of Owl Creek. I knew Wallace, and did not know Sherman, whose camp was nearer."

II.—Letter from General Grant to General Lew Wallace, in 1868, after examining statements by the latter and by the following officers of his command, touching the character of the order and march: Generals Fred. Kneller, George F. McGinnis, Daniel Macauley, Silas A. Strickland, John M. Thayer, Colonel James R. Ross, and Captain Addison Ware:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., March 10th, 1868. MY DEAR GENERAL: Inclosed herewith I return you letters from officers of the army who served with you at the battle of Shiloh, Tennessee, giving their statement of your action on that occasion. I can only state that my orders to you were given verbally to a staff-officer to communicate, and that they were substantially as given by General Badeau in his book. I always understood that the staff-officer referred to, Captain Baxter, made a memorandum of the orders he received, and left it with you. That memorandum I never saw."

"The statements which I now return seem to exonerate you from the great point of blame, your taking the wrong road, or different road from the one directed, from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing. All your subsequent military career showed you active and ready in the execution of every order you received. Your promptness in moving from Baltimore to Monocacy, Maryland, in 1864, and meeting the enemy in force far superior to your own when Washington was threatened, is a case particularly in point. There you could scarcely have hoped for a victory, but you delayed the enemy, and enabled me to get troops from City Point, Virginia, in time to save the city. That act I regarded as most praiseworthy. I refer to my report of 1865, touching your course there. In view of the assault made upon you now, I think it due to you that you should publish what your own staff and other subordinate officers have to say in exonerations of your course.—Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, General."

"TO MAJOR-GENERAL L. WALLACE."

III. — Letter from General Wallace to General Grant, in 1884, referring to the whole controversy. The omissions are made by the editors, for lack of space :

"CRAWFORDSVILLE, IND., September 16th, 1884. DEAR GENERAL: The Century Co. people inform me that they have engaged you to write a paper for them on Pittsburg Landing. Such a contribution from your hand will be important as well as most interesting. Probably I ought not to trouble you touching the subject; still, I trust you will appreciate the anxieties natural to one who has been so bitterly and continuously criticised in the connection, and pardon me a few lines of request.

"The letter of exoneration you gave me some years ago is not permitted to be printed in the volume of reports published by the Government, though I earnestly sought the favor of the Secretary of War. The terrible reflections in your indorsement on my official report of the battle, and elsewhere, go to the world wholly unqualified. It is not possible to exaggerate the misfortune thus entailed upon me. But now you have it in power to make correction, in a paper which will be read far more generally than the compilation of the department. May I hope you will do it?

"Since my return from Europe I have for the first time read the reports of Generals Rawlins and McPherson, and Major Rowley, touching my march the first day of the battle. I shall regret all my remaining days not previously knowing their tenor; for I think I could have explained to the satisfaction of those gentlemen every mystery of my conduct during their ride with me the afternoon of the 6th April. They did not understand that there was a mistake in your order as it was delivered to me, and while with them I supposed they knew why I was where they found me. Consequently, no explanation took place between us. I see now, they really supposed me lost, and wandering aimlessly about. Had the correctness of the order been mooted, no doubt the order itself could have been produced. I would not have rested until my adjutant-general had produced it. Is it to be supposed for an instant that, knowing their thoughts of me during the hours of that ride, I could have been indifferent to them? As it is, you will observe that neither of them pretends to explain my behavior. Neither makes allusion to a theory of explanation. The truth is, I all the time supposed the necessity for the change of direction in my movement was simply due to the bad turn of the battle after the order was dispatched to me. The whole time I was in their company I thought myself entitled to credit for the promptness with which I was obeying your orders. It never occurred to me that there was anything to explain, and I was wholly given up to the movement of the division, which was urgent business in hand.

"With reference to Major Rowley's statement, that I had no knowledge of any other road than that by the old mill, and his other statement, that I retained him as a guide, the explanation is that I was speaking of a cross-road to the River Road. I had no knowledge of such a road. In hopes of finding one, I countermarched instead of facing column to the rear. One of my captains of artillery has since gone over the entire route we took, from Stony Lonesome, the place at which I received your order to march, to Pittsburg Landing, and he finds me mistaken in saying we countermarched back nearly to the initial point of movement. He not only found the cross-road taken, but measured the whole march, chain in hand, making it a little more than fifteen miles. . . .

"As to my requiring a written order from you, I repeat my absolute denial of the statement. The order I acted upon was *unsigned*, and it is susceptible of proof that when the young Illinois cavalryman overtook me I was already on the march.

"As to the slowness referred to by McPherson, Rawlins and Rowley, please try that point by comparisons. . . . From 11:30 o'clock till just dusk my march was quite fifteen miles. I refer the argument to your calm judgment. I do not wonder my movement

seemed slow to your officers. With their anxieties quickened by what they had seen on the field, it must have seemed intolerable to them. They describe me correctly as *at the head of the column*, and I did several times dismount, but only to wait the closing up of the division and reports of my own staff-officers, who were kept urging the column through the mud and mire.


"There is another point your officers seem not to have understood, and that was my determination not to send the division piecemeal into the battle. The *whole* division was what I supposed you wanted, and I was resolved to bring you the whole division. I paid no attention to contrary suggestions from anybody. I think you will justify this pertinacity of purpose by the fact that it was impossible to tell the moment I might be attacked *en route*. The chances of such an occurrence grew sharper as I drew nearer Pittsburg Landing. For you must remember, general, that from the moment Major Rowley overtook me with the information, then first received, that our army had been driven from the line it occupied in the morning, and was back far towards the river, I supposed it utterly unable to help me. Then whether the enemy attacked me or I them, it was only my *division*, and not a part of it, that could have achieved your desires. . . .

"At your table at City Point we one day sat listening to the comments of some officers upon the battle of Pittsburg Landing. After a while you remarked to me in a low tone, 'If I had known then what I know now, I would have ordered you where you were marching when stopped.' The remark was made at your table, and in a confidential manner, so that I have never felt at liberty to repeat, much less publish, it. But times innumerable since then I have wished that Rowley had not overtaken me for another hour that afternoon. The enemy had used the last of his reserves. I would have taken the bluff on which Sherman had been camped in the morning and, without opposition, effected my deployment. The first of the rebels struck would have been the horde plundering the sutlers and drinking in the streets of the camp. Their fears would have magnified my command, and rushing to their engaged lines they would have carried the word that Buell's army was up and on their lines of retreat. For your sake and my own, general, and for the cause generally, it was unfortunate that Rowley had not lost his way, as it was said I had mine.

"Finally, general, did you ever ask yourself what motive I could have had to play you falsely that day? It couldn't have been personal malice. Only a few weeks before I had been promoted major-general on your recommendation. It couldn't have been cowardice. You had seen me under fire at Donelson, and twice the second day at Pittsburg Landing you found me with my division under fire. It couldn't have been lack of resolution. I certainly showed no falling of that kind at Monocacy Junction, where my situation was quite as trying as at any hour of the 6th of April of which I am writing. The fact is, I was the victim of a mistake. Captain Baxter's omission from the order you gave him for transmission to me—the omission of the road you wanted me to take in coming up—viz., *the lower or River Road to Pittsburg Landing*, was the cause of my movement at noon. It is also the key of explanation of all that followed. That I took the directest and shortest road to effect a junction with the right of the army, and marched promptly upon receipt of the order, are the best evidence I could have furnished of an actual desire to do my duty, and share the fortunes of the day with you, whether they were good or bad.

"In all the years that have followed I have been patient and uncomplaining, because, as you had shown the will to exonerate me, I believed you would follow it up on all proper occasions. And I submit to you if this is not one of them. For the sake of the hundreds of survivors of my old division, as well as that justice may be finally and completely done to me individually, I presume to present the matter to you in this letter.

"Very respectfully, your friend, LEW WALLACE."



A FRIGATE OF THE OLDEN TIME — THE "INDEPENDENCE," BUILT IN 1814. RECEIVING-SHIP AT THE MAHE ISLAND NAVY YARD IN 1872.

THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES.


BY JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, PROFESSOR, U. S. N.

IN order to understand the condition of the United States navy in 1861, it is necessary to glance at the state of affairs during the twenty years before the war. Until the year 1840, naval science during a long period had made but little progress. The various improvements in construction, in equipment, and in ordnance that had been introduced before this date had come about very slowly and gradually, and though numerous small mechanical devices had been adopted from time to time, and old ones had been rendered more efficient, no marked changes had taken place in the art of naval war. Ships were essentially what they had been for two hundred years, and they were rigged, propelled, armed, and fought upon essentially the same principles. But toward the year 1840, the introduction of steam as a motive power marked the beginning of a new era,—an era of developments so rapid and of changes so radical that only the most progressive and elastic minds could follow them. The sailing vessel was about to be laid aside, except for purposes of training. In the next few years it was replaced, first by the paddle-wheel steamer, then by the screw, then by the twin-screw. The rig of the ship was next altered, and her spars and sail-spread reduced until they were merely auxiliary. Gradually it was realized that the danger from falling spars in an engagement was a disadvantage often out of all proportion to the benefits of auxiliary sail-power, and vessels were built with no


spars above the deck but a signal-pole forward and aft. Steam brought with it also a new weapon. The ram, which had been the principal engine of naval warfare in the Greek and Roman galleys, had disappeared in the Middle Ages when galleys were superseded by sailing ships. The latter, being dependent upon the wind for their motive power and direction, could not attack an enemy end-on, and hence the ram became useless. Soon after the introduction of steam a few men of inquiring and fertile minds, among them Commodore Matthew Perry and Mr. Charles Ellet, a distinguished civil engineer, perceived that the steam-engine placed a ship-of-war in the same situation as the galleys of the classical period, and that the ram might be employed on the modern vessel to much greater advantage than in ancient times. Presently, the whole system of naval tactics underwent a change, due to the same cause. The close-hauled line ahead, the order of battle for two hundred years and more, gave place to the direct attack in line abreast. To utilize the guns in this new order of battle, they must no longer be mounted in broadside, but upon elevated citadels, giving them a wider sweep around the horizon. Meantime the guns had undergone a change, and were becoming vastly more powerful. First they were adapted to fire shells, which had hitherto been confined to mortars; next the calibers were increased, then rifling was adopted, giving greater range, accuracy, and penetration, and finally breech-loaders came into use. Following closely upon the improvements in guns, came the idea of protecting the sides of vessels with a light armor, at first of bar iron or of two-inch plates, developed by experiment after experiment into masses of solid steel, twenty-two inches in thickness. Last of all came the torpedo, of which a slight and tentative use had been made as early as 1776, but which only made its way into successful and general employment in the war of 1861.

There were signs of the dawn of this revolution before 1840, and its culmination was only reached during the war. But the twenty years between 1840 and 1860 were those in which the movement was really accomplished. During this period the naval administration had endeavored to follow the changes that were taking place, but it had not fully caught up with them. It had begun by building heavy side-wheelers, first the *Mississippi* and *Missouri* and next the *Powhatan* and *Susquehanna*. Efficient as these latter vessels were considered in 1847, when they were begun, and even in 1850, when they were launched, their model was promptly dropped when the submarine screw was introduced in place of the vulnerable paddle-wheel. The six screw-frigates were accordingly built in 1855, and they were regarded with admiration

by naval men abroad as well as at home. The *Niagara*, the largest of these, was a ship of 4500 tons. The other five, the *Roanoke*, *Colorado*, *Merrimac*, *Minnesota*, and *Wabash*, had a tonnage somewhat over 3000. All of them were heavily armed, and they formed, or were supposed to form,



ROMAN WAR-GALLEY.
FROM ANCIENT TERRA-COTTA MODEL.



LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIP OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

the chief element of naval strength of the United States. This reliance of the Government upon its large frigates would seem to have been well grounded, and if a war had arisen with a maritime enemy supplied with vessels of the same general type, they would have given a good account of themselves. In the civil war, however, the enemy had no ordinary vessels of war to be met and conquered in ocean duels, and the waters upon his coast at points vulnerable to naval attack were too shallow to admit the frigates. Hence none of them performed any service at all proportionate to their size and cost of maintenance, except in two or three isolated cases of bombardment, as at Hatteras Inlet, Port Royal, and Fort Fisher.

Of a much more useful type for general service were the twelve screw sloops-of-war built in 1858. There were five of these of the first class, among them the *Hartford*, *Brooklyn*, and *Richmond*, which gave and took so many heavy blows while fighting in Farragut's West Gulf Squadron. Hardly less important were the sloops of the second class, of which the *Iroquois* and *Dacotah* were the largest and most typical examples. To the same group belonged the *Pawnee*, a vessel of peculiar construction, whose constant service was hardly surpassed in efficiency and importance by any other ship of her size on the Atlantic coast. Besides the sloops, there were a few other steamers of miscellaneous dimensions and character, some of which had been purchased and altered for naval use; and these comprised all that the Government had secured toward the creation of a modern steam fleet.


The normal strength of the United States navy, if it is to be a navy at all, cannot be figured at much less than from 80 to 100 vessels, and this was the number in 1861. But of the actual total of 90, as shown by the navy list, 50 were sailing ships,—line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and brigs,—which,

splendid vessels as they had been in their day, were now as obsolete as the galleys of Themistocles. It was in placing a false reliance upon these vessels that the Government was at fault: it should have recognized in the course of twenty years that their day was gone forever, that they were of no more use than if they did not exist, that they would only be the slaughter-houses of their gallant crews in an encounter with a modern antagonist; and it should by that time have replaced every one of them by war-ships of the period.

At the beginning of President Lincoln's administration, out of the forty vessels composing the steam-fleet, one, the *Michigan*, was stationed on the lakes, and five were from one cause or another unserviceable. The remaining thirty-four, which comprised the whole of the effective force, were in the scattered situation that is usual in time of profound peace. Nine were laid up in ordinary, and with the traditional methods prevailing at the Navy Department, it would have taken some months to fit them out for sea. No orders had been issued for the general recall of the seventeen ships on foreign service, an operation requiring considerable time in those days, when no submarine cable existed. In the Home Squadron there were seven steamers, two of which, the sloop-of-war *Brooklyn* and the small steamer *Wyandotte*, were at Pensacola; two others, the gun-boats *Mohawk* and *Crusader*, were at New York; the *Pawnee*, a second-class sloop, was at Washington; and the *Powhatan*, a side-wheeler of 1850, was on her way home from Vera Cruz in company with the gun-boat *Pocahontas*. Five sailing ships were also attached to this squadron,—the frigate *Sabine* and the sloop *St. Louis*, at Pensacola; the sloops *Cumberland* and *Macedonian*, at Vera Cruz or returning thence, and the store-ship *Supply*, at New York. These twelve vessels, together with the *Anacostia*, a small screw-tender, at the Washington Navy

Yard, were all that could be said to be at the immediate disposal of the Administration.

When the vessels abroad were gathered in, and those in ordinary were fitted out, the Government had a little squadron of about 30 steamers, of which the most important were 5 screw-frigates (the sixth, the *Merrimac*, having been abandoned at Norfolk), 6 sloops of



THE UNITED STATES FRIGATE "MERRIMAC" BEFORE
AND AFTER CONVERSION INTO AN IRON-CLAD.



the first or *Hartford* class, 4 large side-wheelers, and 8 sloops of the second or *Iroquois* class. All these were exceedingly valuable as the nucleus of a fleet, but for the war which the Government had now on hand they could be considered as nothing more than this. According to the position which the Administration was very soon compelled to take, the struggle was one *à outrance*. In a foreign war the conflict usually springs from a collision of rights or of interests, involving only a particular branch of the relations of the two contestants, and the question is ultimately settled by some form of compromise, as soon as financial or military exhaustion leads one party or the other to conclude that a protraction of the contest is not worth its while. In the civil war, however, no compromise was possible, and with the resolution shown by the Southern people, nothing short of complete subjugation would insure the restoration of the Union. In such a war, a little fleet capable of raids upon the enemy's commerce or sea-ports might be advantageous to the insurgents, but the Federal Government required materials and methods of a totally different character. No mere raids would profit it a jot. It must blockade the insurgent territory; and to do this it was not enough to keep a few ships cruising in neighboring waters, but a cordon of fast and efficient steamers must be stretched from end to end, without so much as a gap in the whole four thousand miles of coast. The reduction or even the passage of fortifications required powerful and well-equipped fleets engaged solely in these enterprises. The vast net-work of interior waterways in which the army's base and communications must be protected, could only be occupied successfully by another and equally numerous fleet. Finally, the protection of commerce demanded, from the very nature of things, far more vessels than its destruction.

Had the material of the navy of 1861 been such as it ought to have been,—composed, let us say, of ninety modern war-steamers of fair quality; with such an organization that those laid up in ordinary could have been fitted out in two weeks at farthest, as should always be the case; with a reserve of a hundred, or even of fifty merchant-steamers, constructed with a view to conversion into war-vessels at short notice, which is an easy matter to accomplish; with some system by which the latest problems in naval science, especially in reference to iron-clads, had been considered and, in part at least, carried to solution; and finally, with a corps of officers graded more or less by merit, or the promise of growing fitness for command, instead of by age, or the promise of growing unfitness,—had all these plain, practicable, and sensible measures found a place in the naval administration, it is perfectly safe to say that a single year would have seen the opening of the Mississippi, the occupation of North Carolina, the fall of Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile, and probably the end of the Confederacy. During the first six months of the war, there was really nothing to oppose the vigorous attack of such a force, and there was little more during the six months following.

As the naval material was not on a respectable peace-footing, and as no provision had been made for its conversion to a war-footing, the measures adopted for its increase were chiefly makeshifts to which the Government was driven by the exigencies of the moment. The vessels purchased by the


Department during the war amounted to 418, and included every variety of merchantman and river steamboat roughly adapted in the navy yards for war service. Three types of wooden vessels were built: 14 screw sloops of the *Kearsarge*, *Shenandoah*, and *Ossipee* classes; 23 screw gun-boats, called from the rapidity of their construction the "ninety-day" gun-boats; and 47 side-wheel steamers, known as "double-enders," for service in narrow channels, where they could move ahead or astern without turning.} Later in the war forty-eight additional sloops or corvettes of various sizes were projected, but few of these were ever finished, and hardly any before the close of the struggle.

In the matter of iron-clads, the extreme slowness with which the Navy Department moved shows that it failed to comprehend the magnitude of the struggle, and that it was unfamiliar with the recent progress of naval warfare. The advantages of a light armor-plating for vessels-of-war had been demonstrated by the experience of the French floating batteries *Devastation*, *Lave*, and *Tonnante*, in the attack on Kinburn in 1855, during the Crimean war. These vessels were protected by 4½-inch plates, and the experiment had been deemed so conclusive that both France and England had already constructed new war-ships incased in armor. It was to be expected that a navy with a war on its hands would have directed its attention from the first moment when it was convinced of the probability of hostilities to securing some of these formidable vessels; and if a hesitation due to the want of statutory authority had led the Department to defer building until after Congress met, it would at least by that time have digested its plans so thoroughly that the work could begin at once. Nevertheless, for four months after Mr. Welles entered upon his office no steps were taken, even of the most elementary character, toward procuring iron-clads. In his report of July 4th, 1861, at the opening of the special session of Congress, the Secretary, by way of calling attention to the subject, makes the following somewhat ponderous observations:

"Much attention has been given within the last few years to the subject of floating batteries, or iron-clad steamers. Other governments, and particularly France and England, have made it a special object in connection with naval improvements; and the ingenuity and inventive faculties of our own countrymen have also been stimulated by recent occurrences toward the construction of this class of vessel. The period is, perhaps, not one best adapted to heavy expenditures by way of experiment, and the time and attention of some of those who are most competent to investigate and form correct conclusions on the subject are otherwise employed. I would, however, recommend the appointment of a proper and competent board to inquire into and report in regard to a measure so important; and it is for Congress to decide whether, on a favorable report, they will order one or more iron-clad steamers, or floating batteries, to be constructed, with a view to perfect protection from the effects of present ordnance at short range, and make an appropriation for that purpose."

In consequence of this recommendation, which, it must be confessed, was hardly such as the urgency of the measure demanded, Congress, a whole month later, on the 3d of August, passed an act authorizing the Secretary to appoint a board of officers to investigate the subject, a thing which was certainly within the scope of ministerial powers without any special legislation,

} Eight of the "double-enders" were built of iron.



THE NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON, IN 1861.

and appropriating \$1,500,000 for the work. After another delay of five precious days, on the 8th of August the board was appointed, composed of Commodores Smith and Paulding and Commander Davis. The board took occasion to remark that it approached the subject "with diffidence, having no experience, and but scanty knowledge in this branch of naval architecture." Inconceivable as it seems, this statement was literally true; for although five months had elapsed since the new administration had come in; although it knew, or should have known, what the Confederates were doing at Norfolk, and that time was of vital moment, the very best men whom it could select took six weeks to reach a conclusion on the subject. Even at the close of its protracted deliberations, so little did the board understand the tremendous importance of its work that in its final report it sagely remarked:

"Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of adopting the iron armature for ships-of-war. For coast and harbor defense they are undoubtedly formidable adjuncts to fortifications on land. As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their advantages and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are endeavoring to perfect them, we must not remain idle. . . . We, however, do not hesitate to express the opinion, notwithstanding all we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship or floating battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope successfully with a properly constructed fortification of masonry."

The same inability to understand the situation is shown in the Secretary's report transmitted to Congress in December, in which he contents himself with this perfunctory utterance:


"The subject of iron armature for ships is one of great general interest, not only to the navy and country, but is engaging the attention of the civilized world."

The board selected three plans, offered respectively by Bushnell & Co., of New Haven, Merrick & Sons, of Philadelphia, and John Ericsson, of New York, from which were subsequently built the *Galena*, the *New Ironsides*, and

the *Monitor*. The choice of plans was wise, although the *Galena* totally failed to accomplish what was expected of her, and neither she nor the *Iron-sides* was afterward duplicated. The *Ironsides*, however, proved a very efficient vessel within her sphere of action; but so overwhelming was the success of the *Monitor* that hardly any other model was afterward adopted.

The main features of the *Monitor* were the revolving turret, the low freeboard, and the projecting overhang. By means of these devices the ship was made to present a very small target, and her engines, battery, screw, rudder, and anchor, as well as her crew, were thoroughly protected, and neither rams nor guns could make much impression on her. On the other hand, the low freeboard had also one distinctive disadvantage, in that it reduced the vessel's reserve of flotation, thus making it possible for a small influx of water to sink her. The idea of mounting guns in a revolving circular turret had been suggested before at various times, but had never been carried to the point of useful application. In 1842 Timby had proposed a system of coast fortification based on this idea, but the plan had been found defective, and had been rejected. In 1854 Captain Ericsson had submitted to the Emperor Napoleon III. a design of an iron-clad battery with a hemispherical turret. In the next year Captain Cowper Coles, R. N., had suggested a vessel in the form of a raft with a stationary shield for protecting the guns; and in 1859 he had improved upon this design by adding a revolving cupola. But it was left to the genius of Ericsson to develop by itself the perfected application of the principle, and to construct a navigable turret iron-clad which should be nearly invulnerable to every weapon but the torpedo.

When the Navy Department finally understood Ericsson's plan, it immediately adopted it. According to Captain Ericsson, "The Committee of Naval Commanders . . . occupied me less than two hours in explaining my new system. In about two hours more the committee had come to a decision. After their favorable report had been [made] to the Secretary I was called into his office, where I was detained less than five minutes. In order not to lose any



THE OLD NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING, WASHINGTON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


time, the Secretary ordered me to 'go ahead at once.' Consequently, while the clerks of the department were engaged in drawing up the formal contract, the iron which now forms the keel-plate of the *Monitor* was drawn through the rolling-mill."

The contract for the *Monitor* was finally signed on the 4th of October. The extraordinary energy of the contractors when they had once undertaken the work pushed it to completion with unexampled speed. But the time which had been of the greatest value, namely, the six months from March to September, had been lost, and thus it happened that the new iron-clad was not finished in season to prevent the raid of the *Merrimac* in Hampton Roads, and the obliteration of the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*. In the battle of the 9th of March the presence of the *Monitor*, which had arrived late the night before, saved the rest of the fleet from a like fate, to say nothing of other disasters whose magnitude can only be conjectured.

It must be remembered that the Navy Department had possessed from the beginning five frigates, sister ships of the *Merrimac*, any one of which could have been armored more efficiently than she was, in half the time and with half the money, and without waiting for congressional action. Evidently the department little imagined, while it was dallying for six months with the question of iron-clads, that the first twenty-four hours of the *Monitor's* career would be so big with fate.

In addition to the three vessels selected by the board of 1861, there were built or projected during the war nearly sixty iron-clads, all of which were of the *Monitor* type except three,—the huge ram *Dunderberg*, which was sold to the French Government, and afterward called the *Rochambeau*; the *Keokuk*, which sank off Charleston, immediately after the battle of April 7th, 1863, and the converted frigate *Roanoke*. Of the fourteen double-turreted monitors, including the *Puritan*, the *Onondaga*, the *Kalamazoo* class, the *Monadnock* class, and the *Winnebago* class, only six were finished in time to take part in the war. The single-turreted monitors which saw the most service were those of the *Passaic* class, most of which were stationed in the South Atlantic Squadron. Besides these there were the *Dictator*, the nine vessels of the *Canonicus* class, and the twenty light-draft monitors. The last were never of any use, the calculations for their displacement having been so faulty that they could not float their guns and coal.

Hitherto we have been speaking of vessels for service on the coast or in the waters adjacent to the coast. The Mississippi flotilla deserves a place by itself. This force, which included all the vessels operating on the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Red River, and their tributaries, comprised altogether over a hundred vessels, of the greatest variety in construction and character,—proPELLERS, side-wheelers, stern-wheelers, rams, iron-clads, "tin-clads," unarmored boats, mortar-vessels. As the first demand for a flotilla came from the army, its early organization was directed by the War Department, although a naval officer was placed in command. The complications resulting from this arrangement, under which, as Foote said, "every brigadier could interfere with him," were obviated, October 1st, 1862, by the transfer of the force to the Navy Department.



LAUNCH OF THE "DICTATOR" FROM THE DELAMATER IRON WORKS, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 27, 1863.


The first step in the creation of the Mississippi flotilla was taken in May, 1861, by Commander John Rodgers, who, acting under the authority of the War Department, purchased at Cincinnati three river-steamboats, the *Conestoga*, *Lexington*, and *Tyler*, and altered them into gun-boats by strengthening their frames, lowering their machinery, and protecting their decks by heavy bulwarks. In August, the War Department made a contract with James B. Eads [see page 338], the famous engineer of the Mississippi jetties, to build in two months seven gun-boats, propelled by a central paddle-wheel, and covered with armor two and a half inches thick, on the forward end of the casemates and on the sides abreast of the engines. These may be said to have been our first iron-clads, light as their plating was, and imperfectly as it covered the vessels. In spite of all their defects, they performed constant service of incalculable importance throughout the war; and there is not one among them all—the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburgh*, and *St. Louis* or *De Kalb*—which failed to make her name famous in the incessant conflicts of the Mississippi. Two larger vessels purchased by the Government, the *Benton* and the *Essex*, of one thousand tons each, and somewhat more heavily armored, together with thirty-eight mortar-boats, complete the list of

vessels of the Mississippi flotilla during the period of Foote's command, which extended to the summer of 1862. [See pages 358 and 430.]

During the following year important additions were made to the flotilla. These were of two classes, light-draft boats and iron-clads. The light-drafts were small stern-wheel boats armed with howitzers, which were peculiarly useful for vedette and other light, flying service, but which in addition took their full share of the brunt of battle in the numerous contests that took place in the shoal waters of the Yazoo and the Red River. Drawing less than two feet of water, they could go almost anywhere, and with their howitzer batteries, and their light, bullet-proof plating, they were efficient vessels for clearing the river-banks of field batteries and sharp-shooters. Their armor, less than an inch in thickness, gave them the colloquial name of "tin-clads." Many of them, such as the *Forest Rose*, *Juliet*, *Marmora*, *Rattler*, *Romeo*, and *Signal*, became famous in the annals of the squadron, and the tiny *Cricket*, under Gorringe, fought in the Red River one of the hottest and most gallant little battles of the Western campaign.

The second class of new acquisitions, which may be called by comparison the heavily armored vessels, though more pretentious than their older consorts, were hardly, as a whole, more efficient. Three of them, the *Tuscomb*, *Indianola*, and *Chillicothe*, were side-wheel casemate iron-clads, carrying a somewhat thicker plating than the earlier boats and a much more formidable armament, but owing to poor and hasty workmanship they were occasionally found unequal to the demands that were made upon them. Of a more satisfactory performance were two large steamers, the *Lafayette* and *Choctaw*, of one thousand tons each, well-built side-wheelers, which the Government purchased and altered into casemate iron-clads fitted with rams. Still later, three turreted iron-clads of light draft, the *Osage*, *Ozark*, and *Neosho* [see page 342], were added to the squadron. The above, together with a number of captured gun-boats, the foremost of which was the *Eastport*, and a few wooden steamers of various size and miscellaneous description, made up the force with which Admiral Porter conducted his wonderful series of operations from the autumn of 1862 until his transfer to the North Atlantic Squadron in 1864.

In addition to these vessels, which constituted the regular naval force, special mention must be made of the Ram Fleet, as it was called. This fleet was the really brilliant conception of Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer who, as has been already said, had called attention, some years before the war, to the renewed importance of the ram as a naval weapon. Having been vested with rank and authority by the War Department, Colonel Ellet, who was no less ready in execution than brilliant in conception, bought nine river-boats, which he strengthened and altered into rams on a plan of his own. They were called the *Queen of the West*, *Monarch*, *Samson*, *Lioness*, *Switzerland*, *Lancaster*, *Mingo*, *T. D. Horner*, and *Dick Fulton*. Though they were hastily and imperfectly prepared, yet under the leadership of Ellet and other members of his remarkable family, who shared with him a native military instinct that was little short of genius, and a superb courage



MONITOR "WEEHAWKEN" IN A STORM.

that bordered upon recklessness, they performed services that gave them a place apart in the history of the river operations. [See page 453.]

In its personnel, the navy was by no means so well prepared for war as it should have been. Several circumstances combined to weaken the strength of the corps. As there was no system of retirement, and as promotion for many years had been made solely on the basis of seniority, the upper part of the list was filled with officers who had grown too old for active service, but who nevertheless felt that their position entitled them to important commands at sea, or to high places in council or in administration. For these duties most of them were peculiarly unfitted. At a time when conservatism meant stagnation, the seventy-eight commodores and captains who were the senior officers of the navy, through long adherence to routine, had, with few exceptions, become doubly conservative, and owing to the rapid development of their profession, those whose early training belonged to the sail period seemed almost the relics of a bygone age.

The consciousness of ignorance in some men begets modesty, but it seldom has this effect upon the older members of a military hierarchy. Obedience to the orders of a superior is, of course, the essence of military discipline, without which it could not exist, and rank is the primary source of authority. But a system which combines reliance upon rank as the sole source of authority, and reliance upon age as the sole qualification for rank, contains essential elements of weakness. Its tendency is to make the seniors grow less capable and more despotic, while the juniors gradually lose all sense of responsibility and all power of initiative, and when they at last reach a position of command, their faculties have become paralyzed from long disuse. Especially is this the case in a long period of peace, such as followed the war of 1812, and lasted, with only a brief intermission, until 1861. During this time the navy was always grasping at the shadow and losing the

substance. The commodore of the period was an august personage, who went to sea in a great flag-ship, surrounded by a conventional grandeur which was calculated to inspire a becoming respect and awe. As the years of peace rolled on, this figure became more and more august, more and more conventional. The fatal defects of the system were not noticed until 1861, when the crisis came and the service was unprepared to meet it; and to this cause was largely due the feebleness of naval operations during the first year of the war.

In addition to the other elements of weakness, the junior grades at this time were short of officers, owing to the recent establishment of the Naval Academy and the limitation of the power of appointment; and at the very moment when stress was put upon the service, it lost through resignation a large number of its members, many of them men of high professional reputation. To fill these gaps, the course at the Academy was for the moment curtailed, and the upper classes were ordered into active service. On the 1st of August, 1861, the total number of officers of all grades and corps holding regular appointments in the navy was 1457. This number was inadequate to supply the demands of the newly expanded fleet, and it became necessary to employ volunteer officers, 7500 of whom were enrolled in the navy during the war. These came chiefly from the merchant marine. Many of them were brave and capable, but their want of naval (as distinguished from merely nautical) training delayed their development. A still larger increase took place in the force of enlisted men. The normal strength of the corps of seamen was 7600, which rose during the war to 51,500, although the utmost difficulty was found in obtaining recruits, and it became necessary toward the end of the war to offer enormous bounties. The same want of training was apparent in the blue-jackets as in the volunteer officers, and while the army was able to rely from the beginning upon a trained militia, the navy was compelled to create its militia after the war had begun. Although the organization of a trained naval reserve presents no serious difficulties, and although it is evident that such a reserve is of prime importance in any considerable war, no steps had ever been taken to form it.

This was, however, only one of the many points in which the workings of the department were defective. There seems to have been a total want of information at the central office of administration in reference to the existing demands of naval war, and the measures necessary to put the machine into efficient operation. Everything in relation to the plan of a campaign, to the vulnerability of points on the coast,—and it must be remembered that this was our own coast, whose capacity for resisting attack should have been better known to the Navy Department than any other,—to the increase of the force of officers and men, to the expansion of the fleet, to the acquisition of the most modern instruments of warfare,—in short, all problems relating to the conduct of hostilities, the only purpose for which a navy really exists, had to be worked out and solved after the war had begun. Indeed, it would seem that the one subject with which the direction of naval affairs had never concerned itself was the subject of making war.

These circumstances placed the Secretary, at the opening of his adminis-

tration, in a situation of peculiar difficulty. Although Mr. Welles had at one time been connected with the Navy Department, having been the civil chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing from 1846 to 1849, he was in no sense a naval expert, and he was obliged to rely upon others for expert advice and assistance in his office. There was no one, however, at his office to give such advice and assistance, except the five chiefs of bureau, who were concerned only with the business of supplying materials, and who had really nothing to do with the general direction of the fleet,—meaning thereby the working force of ships, officers, and men actually employed in naval operations. To meet this difficulty, the Secretary wisely called Captain Gustavus V. Fox to the post of chief professional adviser. Captain Fox had formerly been an officer of the navy, and had borne a high reputation for professional skill. His connection with manufacturing enterprises during the few years preceding the war had emancipated him from the slavery of routine and had given him a knowledge of affairs which naval officers in general could not easily acquire. He had shown great intelligence and zeal in the second relief-expedition to Fort Sumter, where he acted in a semi-private capacity, and Mr. Welles decided to take him into the department. The duties for which he was wanted, and which he ultimately performed with such success, were those which are commonly assigned to an officer known as the chief of staff, namely, the disposition and direction of the fleet, and the conduct of naval operations. It is hardly necessary to add that without his previous experience as a naval officer he could not have performed these duties for a day. A temporary place was made for him on May 9th, 1861, as chief clerk. When Congress met in July, it created the office of Assistant Secretary, to which Fox was appointed on August 1st, and which he retained until after the close of the war. He was succeeded in the chief clerkship by William Faxon.

THE South entered upon the war without any naval preparation, and with very limited resources by which its deficiencies could be promptly supplied. Indeed, it would hardly be possible to imagine a great maritime country more destitute of the means for carrying on a naval war than the Confederate States in 1861. No naval vessels, properly speaking, came into their possession, except the *Fulton*, an old side-wheeler built in 1837, and at this time laid up at Pensacola, and the sunken and half-destroyed hulks at Norfolk, of which only one, the *Merrimac*, could be made available for service. The seizures of other United States vessels included six revenue-cutters, the *Duane* at Norfolk, the *William Aiken* at Charleston, the *Lewis Cass* at Mobile, the *Robert McClelland* and the *Washington* at New Orleans, and the *Henry Dodge* at Galveston; † three coast-survey vessels, the schooners *Petrel* and *Twilight*, and the steam-tender *Firefly*; and six or eight light-house tenders. As all of these were small, and most of them were sailing vessels, they were of little value.

Several coasting or river steamers belonging to private owners, which were lying in Southern waters when the war broke out, were taken or pur-

† The *James C. Dobbin* was also seized at Savannah, but was soon afterward released.—J. R. S.

chased by the Confederate Government. The most important were the *Jamestown* and the *Yorktown* (afterward the *Patrick Henry*) at Richmond; the *Selden* at Norfolk; the *Beaufort*, *Raleigh*, *Winslow*, and *Ellis*, screw-tugs plying on the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal; the side-wheel passenger boats *Seabird* and *Curlew*, in the North Carolina Sounds; the *Nashville* at Charleston, and the *Everglade* at Savannah.

The *Star of the West*, whose name had been on everybody's lips after the attack made upon her in January, 1861, while she was attempting to relieve Fort Sumter, had subsequently sailed on transport service to Indianola, Texas, where she was seized in April by a party of Texan volunteers. In the Confederate navy she became the *St. Philip*. She was stationed at New Orleans as a receiving-ship when Farragut passed the forts, and fled with other vessels up the Mississippi River, taking refuge finally in the Yazoo. In March, 1863, when the ships of the Yazoo Pass expedition descended the windings of the Tallahatchie to attack Fort Pemberton, they found the river barricaded by the hull of a sunken vessel, which was no other than the once-famous *Star of the West*.

The purchases and seizures made at New Orleans enabled the Confederate Government to equip at that point its only considerable fleet. The vessels fitted out successively by Commodores Rousseau and Hollins included the *Habana*, afterward the *Sumter*, in which Semmes made his first commerce-destroying cruise; the *Enoch Train*, which was altered into a ram and called the *Manassas*; the *Florida* and *Pamlico*, employed on Lake Pontchartrain; the *Marques de la Habana* (*McRae*), the *Webb*, *Yankee* (*Jackson*), *Gros-tête* (*Maurepas*), *Lizzie Simmons* (*Pontchartrain*), *Ivy*, *General Polk*, and a few others of smaller size. The State of Louisiana and the citizens of New Orleans also made purchases of vessels on their own account. Thus the *Governor Moore* and the *General Quitman*, which took part in the action at the forts, were State vessels; and the *Enoch Train* was originally purchased by private subscription. There were also a large number of flat-boats or coal-



GIDEON WELLES, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY DURING THE WAR. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

barges, destined for use as fire-ships, upon which Commodore George N. Hollins placed great reliance.

Another measure of defense adopted by the Confederate Government deserves mention here, although the navy was in no way connected with it. On the 14th of January, 1862, Secretary Benjamin, of the War Department, telegraphed orders to General Lovell, who was in command at New Orleans, to impress certain river steamboats, fourteen in number, for the public service. On the 15th the vessels designated were seized. They were intended to form a flotilla of rams for the defense of the Mississippi, in accordance with a plan suggested by two steamboat captains, Montgomery and Townsend, who had secured the adoption of their project at Richmond through the influence of political friends in Congress. In the words of Secretary Benjamin, they were "backed by the whole Missouri delegation." The scheme had its origin partly in jealousy or distrust of the navy, and the direction of the "River Defense Fleet," as it was called, was therefore intrusted to the army. The projectors

of the enterprise had taken care, however, to limit the authority of the army officers over the fleet, and the War Department wrote that when it sailed it would be "subject to the orders of General Beauregard, as regards the service required of it, but of course without any interference in its organization." The original cost of the vessels was \$563,000, and the cost of equipping and fitting them out was \$800,000.

The River Defense Flotilla hardly accomplished results that justified this heavy outlay. Its organization, as might have been expected, was seriously defective. In January, Lovell was apprehensive that "fourteen Mississippi River



GUSTAVUS V. FOX, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, UNITED STATES NAVY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

captains and pilots will never agree about anything after they once get under way." These fears were afterward realized. April 15th, Lovell wrote:

"The river pilots (Montgomery and Townsend), who are the head of the fleet, are men of limited ideas, no system, and no administrative capacity whatever. I very much fear, too, that their powers of execution will prove much less than has been anticipated,—in short, unless some competent person of education, system, and brains is put over each division of this fleet, it will, in my judgment, prove an utter failure. No code of laws or penalties has been established, and it is difficult to decide how deserters from the fleet are to be tried and punished. There is little or no discipline or subordination—too much 'steamboat' and too little of the 'man-of-war' to be very effective."

When the River Defense Fleet was ready, eight of the vessels, commanded by Captain J. E. Montgomery, were sent up the river to meet the Union fleet, then on its way down, under Flag-Officer Davis. After a gallant but ineffectual brush near Fort Pillow, Montgomery's flotilla had a pitched battle at Memphis, on the 6th of June, with the Union force, now strengthened by the addition of Colonel Ellet's ram-fleet, and was literally wiped out of existence,—four of the vessels being captured and three destroyed. The *Van Dorn* alone escaped, and fleeing to the Yazoo River was soon afterward burnt. The six vessels of the River Defense Fleet, which had been retained by General Lovell at New Orleans, were sent down to assist in the defense of the forts, but the only part they took in the battle was to get out of the way as quickly as possible. All of them were captured or destroyed.



WILLIAM FAXON, CHIEF CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES
NAVY DEPARTMENT DURING THE WAR.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

In addition to the vessels purchased and altered, the Confederate authorities built several new ones at New Orleans. Of these there were three wooden boats, the *Livingston*, *Bienville*, and *Carondelet*, and two iron-clads, the *Louisiana* and the *Mississippi*. The *Bienville* and *Carondelet* were substantially built side-wheelers of light draft, built on the lakes, and were only finished in March and April, 1862. They were unable to fill up their crews, and hence took no part in the action at the forts. § The *Livingston*, which had been attached some time before to the flotilla in the upper Mississippi, made its way to the Yazoo River, and was burnt there with the *Polk* and *Van Dorn*. The two new iron-clads, however, were intended to be by far the most important factors in the defense of New Orleans. If they had been finished in time, this intention would doubtless have been realized. The *Louisiana*, built by contract with E. C. Murray, was not begun until the middle of October, and her machinery was transferred from the steamer *Ingomar*, which the contractors had bought for the purpose. She was 264 feet long, and from 400 to 500 tons of railroad iron were used in plating her with armor. The ship was in several ways badly designed, and on the 20th of April, when she was sent from New Orleans down the river to the forts, her engines would not work. During the battle she could only serve as a stationary floating battery, and she was blown up by Captain J. K. Mitchell on the day of the surrender of the forts. The other iron-clad, the *Mississippi*, a still larger and more heavily armored vessel, was constructed by the Messrs. Tift upon a very novel and peculiar design. To obviate the want of ship-builders and designers, she was built

§ Report of Joint Confederate Committee on the affairs of the Navy Department, p. 28.

like a house, in straight lines and with pointed ends. Though there was apparently no lack of steamers to tow the unfinished vessel up the river, she was burnt just before the Federal fleet reached the city.

The total failure of the Confederate fleet on the Mississippi was largely due to bad management and to the want of a proper organization. Authority was divided between the State Government and the Confederate Government, and still further between the army, the navy, and the steamboat captains. The War and Navy Departments at Richmond did not work together. There were some differences of opinion between General Lovell, in command at New Orleans, and General Duncan, in command of the exterior defenses. Four naval officers, Rousseau, Hollins, Mitchell, and Whittle, were successively in command of the "Naval Station," a command of vague and indeterminate limits, and there were plenty of sources of disagreement between them and their colleagues of the army. They were perplexed and worried by confusing orders, and by the presence of independent agents in their own field of operations. They had no authority over the work of building the iron-clads, although constantly urged to hurry their completion. The organization of the River Defense Fleet, under Montgomery, was a direct and intentional blow at their authority, and left them without the aid of reserves whose disposition they could direct. The naval operations suffered from the lack of funds, so much so that on the 26th of February Governor Moore telegraphed to Richmond, "The Navy Department here owes nearly a million. Its credit is stopped." This condition of affairs was all the more remarkable, since the strategic position of New Orleans and the river was of vital importance to the Confederacy, and the post required above all things unity of command,—indeed, one might well say a dictatorship. Had one man of force and discretion been in full command and provided with sufficient funds, the defense would at least not have presented a spectacle of complete collapse.

The construction and equipment of vessels for the Confederate Government at other points were executed with great difficulty, owing to the want of iron and the absence of properly equipped workshops. In 1861 the only foundry or rolling-mill of any size in the Confederacy was the Tredegar Iron Works, at Richmond, and here the principal work in ordnance and armor was done. By dint of great efforts, foundries and rolling-mills were established at Selma, Atlanta, and Macon; smelting-works and a rope-walk at Petersburg; a powder-mill at Columbia, and an ordnance-foundry and chemical works at Charlotte. These works supplied what was needed in the way of ordnance and equipment, but they could not build vessels. The spring of 1862 saw the loss of Norfolk, Pensacola, and New Orleans, and after this date the Confederacy had no well-appointed ship-yard. Nevertheless, numerous contracts were entered into with business firms all over the country, and the construction of small vessels went on actively during the war. On March 15th, 1861, the Provisional Congress had authorized the construction or purchase of 10 steam gun-boats, of from 750 to 1000 tons. By the latter part of 1862 the Navy Department had

purchased and altered 44 vessels, and had built and completed 24, while 32 others were in process of construction.

Most of these vessels were small craft, only suitable for detached local employment in rivers and harbors. Of the more formidable ships, the *Tennessee* and *Arkansas* were built at Memphis in the winter of 1861-62. They were covered with railroad iron. The *Arkansas* was completed and taken to the Yazoo River in April, 1862. After a short and brilliant career under Lieutenant Isaac N. Brown, she finally fell a victim in August to the defects of her engines. The *Tennessee*, being still on the stocks at Memphis when Davis's fleet descended the river, was burnt where she lay. At Mobile, the second *Tennessee*, a much more powerful vessel, but with engines transferred, like those of the *Louisiana*, from a river steamboat, was captured in her first and only engagement, when she attacked single-handed the whole Federal squadron. At Savannah, the *Atlanta*, a converted blockade-runner with a casemate covered with four inches of armor, was disabled and defeated by four shots from the monitor *Weehawken*. At Charleston, four casemate iron-clads were built, the *Palmetto State* and *Chicora* in 1862, the *Charleston* in 1863, and the *Columbia*; the last, however, was still unfinished at the close of the war, and was captured by Admiral Dahlgren at the evacuation of the city. The other three were blown up at the same time. In the sounds of North Carolina two iron-clads were projected, one to be built on the Neuse River, the other on the Roanoke. The first was destroyed before completion, but the second, the *Albemarle*, which the Union forces, through most culpable negligence, suffered to remain undisturbed until she was fully armed and equipped, captured the town of Plymouth, and fought a drawn battle with the squadron of double-enders in the sound. After a career of six months, she was destroyed by the expedition under Lieutenant Cushing.

The last, and in some ways the most useful naval force of the Confederates, was the James River Squadron. After the destruction of the *Merrimac* in May, 1862, and the abortive attempt of the Union vessels to pass up the James River, a fleet was gradually constructed and fitted out for the defense of Richmond. There were still in the river the *Patrick Henry*, which was soon after assigned to the use of the Confederate Naval Academy, and the *Beaufort* and *Raleigh*, which had come to Hampton Roads from the North Carolina Sounds after the battles of Roanoke Island and Elizabeth City. All three had taken part in the first day's engagement off Newport News, when the *Merrimac* (*Virginia*) had destroyed the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*, after which they withdrew to the James River. To these were added the gun-boats *Nansemond*, *Hampton*, and *Drury*. But by far the most important division of the squadron consisted of the three iron-clads *Richmond*, the second *Virginia*, and *Fredericksburg*. Of these the *Fredericksburg* was the weakest and the *Virginia* the strongest. In fact, the *Virginia* was one of the strongest vessels that the Confederates got afloat at any point, having six inches of armor on the sides of her casemate and eight inches on the ends. This fleet was an important element in the military situation in Virginia in 1864-65, though never brought into decisive action. At the evacuation of

Richmond it was burned, and with its destruction the coast navy of the Confederates came to an end.

In order to make war on the commerce of the United States, the Confederacy early resorted to privateering, which was then, as it is now, a legitimate practice with all States not parties to the Declaration of Paris. In accordance with the President's proclamation of April 17th, and the Act of Congress of May 6th, letters of marque were issued by the Confederate Government to owners of private vessels, authorizing them to cruise against the United States. Under this authority, more than twenty privateers were fitted out and made cruises during the summer and autumn of 1861, taking sixty or more prizes. The exact number either of privateers or of prizes will probably never be known. Charleston, New Orleans, and Hatteras Inlet were the principal centers of privateering operations. Three of the privateers were captured,—the *Savannah* by the brig *Perry*, the *Petrel* by the frigate *St. Lawrence*, and the *Beauregard* by the bark *W. G. Anderson*. The cessation of privateering after the first year was brought about by the blockade, which took away the profits of the sale of prizes, and such of the privateers as were not taken into the Government service were converted into blockade-runners.

After privateering came to an end, the Confederate Government depended almost wholly upon Europe for sea-going cruisers. These were not privateers, however, but commissioned ships-of-war of the Confederacy. Captain James D. Bulloch resided in England as the Confederate naval agent, and his skill and enterprise resulted in the acquisition of the *Florida*, *Alabama*, *Georgia* and *Shenandoah*, all of which made successful commerce-destroying cruises. Attempts to secure other vessels, including the *Alexandra*, the *Pampero*, the iron-clad contracted for by Captain North on the Clyde, and the two armored rams built by the Messrs. Laird, failed through the intervention of the British Government. Of the six vessels built in France, including four corvettes and two iron-clads, only one of the latter, *Stonewall*, passed into the hands of the Confederates, and this was acquired so late in the war as to be of no value.

In its personnel, the Confederate navy was more fortunate than in its vessels. The Secretary was Stephen R. Mallory [see p. 106], who had been for several years before the war the chairman of the Naval Committee in the Senate,—a position much better calculated to give its holder a knowledge of the demands of a modern navy than that which Mr. Welles had filled from 1846 to 1849. He entered upon his task with vigor and intelligence, and he was ably seconded by the officers around him, many of whom had been men of conspicuous ability in the old navy. In the branches of ordnance and torpedoes he relied largely upon two men, Commander John M. Brooke and Lieutenant Hunter Davidson. To Brooke were due the banded guns which proved of such signal use during the war, while Davidson did much to develop the torpedo service, which probably contributed more to the defense of the Confederacy than all the vessels of its navy. In 1862, some impatience was shown by the press and the public of the South at the continued succession of naval disasters, and a Congressional committee made an exhaustive investigation of the department. Nothing of importance was disclosed except

the condition of affairs at New Orleans in 1861-62, already referred to, for which the Navy Department was partly responsible, but which was largely owing to the poverty of Confederate resources.

It was especially in his quick perception of the demands of modern naval war, and his prompt and bold action to meet these demands, that Secretary Mallory showed his ability and decision of character. No doubt this was in great part due to good advisers, but it is not every man who has the wisdom to perceive what good advice is, and the courage to act upon it, where his action involves heavy responsibilities. Mr. Mallory's emphatic recommendations in reference to iron-clads contrast favorably with the halting suggestions of Mr. Welles on the same subject. In a letter of May 8th, 1861, to Mr. Conrad, the chairman of the Naval Committee, Mallory presents with precision and force the history of the development of armored vessels, stating accurately the essential facts, which certainly were either not known or not appreciated at Washington. He closes his letter with these remarkable words:

"I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all blockade, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, their entire navy.

"If, to cope with them upon the sea, we follow their example, and build wooden ships, we shall have to construct several at one time, for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to her comparatively numerous steam-frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compensated by invulnerability, and thus not only does economy, but naval success, dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood without regard to first cost.

"Naval engagements between wooden frigates as they are now built and armed will prove to be the forlorn hopes of the sea—simply contests in which the question, not of victory, but who shall go to the bottom first is to be solved.

"Should the committee deem it expedient to begin at once the construction of such a ship, not a moment should be lost."

The result was that early in July the *Merrimac* had been raised and docked, the details of the plan of reconstruction had been completed, and the work had been begun without waiting for an appropriation. This early start enabled her to destroy the *Congress* and the *Cumberland* unopposed.

The number of officers who left the United States navy, either by resignation or dismissal, to join the Southern cause, was 322, of whom 243 were line-officers. In the beginning they were attached to the separate State organizations, but during the spring of 1861 they were gradually enrolled in the navy of the Confederate States. In 1863 a naval academy was established under the command of Captain W. H. Parker, on board the *Patrick Henry* in the James River, which turned out excellent junior officers. The personnel of the Confederate navy was distinguished by enterprise, originality, and resource, and to it were due some of the most gallant episodes of the war.

In seamen the South was deficient, not having a seafaring population. The number of enlisted men in the navy at any given time was probably less than four thousand, but as it took the offensive only in detached enterprises, no very extensive force was required. The four principal commerce-destroyers were chiefly manned by foreign sailors.

EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.

BY RUSH C. HAWKINS, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.



UNIFORM OF HAWKINS'S ZOUAVES,
THE 9TH N. Y.

ONE sultry afternoon in the last third of the month of August, 1861, while stationed at Newport News, Virginia, with my regiment, the 9th New York (Zouaves), a message from General Benjamin F. Butler came through the signal corps station from Fort Monroe asking if I would like to go upon an expedition. An affirmative answer brought General Butler to my headquarters the same afternoon, and he explained the objects of the proposed expedition, which was to be composed of military and naval forces for joint offensive action on the coast of North Carolina.

CAPTURE AND DEFENSE OF HATTERAS ISLAND.

At 11 o'clock in the forenoon of August 26th, 1861, all arrangements having been completed, the combined forces set sail for Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, with Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham in command of the fleet and Major-General B. F. Butler of the land forces. The same afternoon the fleet arrived off Hatteras, and at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 28th began the bombardment of Forts Clark and Hatteras (the latter mounting twenty-five guns), which was continued throughout a part of the day, until several of the ships were compelled to put out to sea for fear of being blown too near the shore. During the bombardment, efforts were being made about three miles north of the inlet to land the troops through the Hatteras breakers; in these efforts all the available boats were smashed. Two hulks, which had been towed from Fort Monroe for the purpose of assisting the landing, were then filled with troops and slowly allowed to drift into the breakers by means of a cable attached to an anchor and passed around a windlass fixed in the deck of each hulk. Late in the afternoon, when the wind came to blow fresh from the east, the position of the troops upon the hulks became most perilous, and for a time there were serious doubts about a successful rescue. Finally

“The State of North Carolina, immediately after passing the ordinance of secession, began the work of defending the possession of the sounds. The steamer *Winslow*, a small side-wheel steamboat, was fitted out by the governor of the State, and on the outside of Hatteras began to annoy and destroy the commerce of the United States, under Thomas M. Crossan, formerly of the United States Navy. The *Winslow* captured and brought into the sounds for condemnation many prizes. . . . The outcry that went up from commercial circles at the North may have had no little to do in influencing the naval authorities to block the outlet from which the little *Winslow* inflicted such damages. After the State united herself to the Confederate States her navy, consisting of the *Winslow*, the *Ellis*, the *Raleigh*, and the *Beaufort*, all ordinary steamboats armed with one gun

each, was turned over to the Confederate States. The defense of the entrances to these sounds was undertaken by the erection of batteries at Hatteras and Ocracoke Inlet, and at Beaufort; on the interior waters New Berne, Roanoke Island, and the mouth of the Neuse River were defended under the State by small batteries, which were not completed when the State adopted the constitution of the Confederate States.

“Major R. C. Gatlin was commander of the Southern Department Coast Defenses, with headquarters at Wilmington, North Carolina. Promoted to Brigadier-General in August, 1861, he was assigned to the command of the Department of North Carolina and the coast defenses of the State.” [Scharf's “History of the Confederate States Navy.” New-York: Rogers and Sherwood.]


the *Fanny*, after several unsuccessful backings into the breakers, which every moment were becoming more dangerous, succeeded in getting lines on board the hulks and towing them to calmer water. But the few troops (318) who had effected a landing were left on shore in face of an enemy twice their numbers. The next day the vessels came in from sea and recommenced the action as early as 8 o'clock A. M., and by 11 o'clock the last gun on Fort Hatteras had ceased firing, and before noon the white flag had taken the place of the Confederate colors. During the bombardment our troops on shore gained possession of Fort Clark, but were driven out by our own guns, a fragment of a shell striking private Lembrecht, of Company G, 9th New York, making a painful wound in the hand. This was the only casualty among the Union forces.

The immediate results of this expedition were the capture of 670 men, 1000 stand of arms, 35 cannon, and 2 strong forts; the possession of the best sea entrance to the inland waters of North Carolina; and the stoppage of a favorite channel through which many supplies had been carried for the use of the Confederate forces.†

The whole affair was conceived and carried out with simplicity and pro-

† The vessels detailed were the *Minnesota* (flag-ship), Captain G. J. Van Brunt; *Wabash*, Captain Samuel Mercer; *Susquehanna*, Captain I. S. Chauncey; *Pawnee*, Commander S. C. Rowan; *Monticello*, Commander J. P. Gillis; *Harriet Lane*, Captain John Faunce; and the *Cumberland* (sailing-ship), Captain John Marston,—carrying in all 143 guns. For the transportation of troops there were the chartered steamers *Adelaide*, Commander H. S. Stellwagen, and *George Peabody*, Lieutenant R. B. Lowry, and the tug *Fanny*, Lieutenant Pierce Crosby. Upon these were embarked detachments of infantry from the 9th and 20th New York Volunteers, the Union Coast Guard, and a company of the 2d U. S. Artillery,—in all numbering about 880 men.

Both the forts were under command of Major W. S. G. Andrews, the North Carolina troops being under Colonel Wm. F. Martin. Flag-Officer Samuel Barron, C. S. N., who was charged with the defense of this coast, arrived during the attack,



REAR-ADMIRAL SILAS H. STRINGHAM.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

and, taking command, was included in the capitulation, of which he says in his report made on board the *Minnesota*:

"During the first hour the shells of the ships fell short, we only fired occasionally to ascertain whether our shots would reach them, and wishing to reserve our very limited supply of ammunition until the vessels might find it necessary to come nearer in; but they, after some practice, got the exact range of the 9, 10, and 11 inch guns, and did not find it necessary to alter their positions, while not a shot from our battery reached them with the greatest elevation we could get. This state of things—shells bursting over and in the fort every few seconds—having continued for about three hours, the men were directed to take shelter under the parapet and traverses, and I called a council of officers, at which it was unanimously agreed that holding out longer could only result in a greater loss of life. . . . The personnel of the command are now prisoners of war on board this ship, where everything is done to make them as comfortable as possible under the circumstances, Flag-Officer Stringham, Captain Van Brunt, and Commander Case extending to us characteristic courtesy and kindness."

EDITORS.



MAP OF EARLY COAST OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA.

fessional directness, and the valuable results attained cost the Government only a small expenditure for coal and ammunition. Flag-Officer Stringham fought this action with admirable skill, worthy of a great commander. Instead of anchoring his ships, he kept them moving during the whole engagement and, as he came within range of the enemy's works, delivered his fire, generally with surprising accuracy, while the gunners in the forts were compelled to make an on-the-wing shot with pieces of heavy ordnance, and in most instances their shot fell short.↓

On the 29th of August articles of full capitulation were signed interchange-

ably by officers representing both forces, and General Butler and Flag-Officer Stringham sailed away with the prisoners, leaving the *Pawnee*, Captain S. C. Rowan, the *Monticello*, Lieutenant D. L. Braine, and the tug *Fanny*, Lieutenant Pierce Crosby, as the sea forces; and detachments of the 9th and 20th New York Volunteers and Union Coast Guard to garrison the captured forts, of which I was left in command. Just before the squadron sailed, General Butler sent word on shore that the three schooners left by the enemy inside the inlet were loaded with provisions that could be used

↓ Boynton, in his "History of the Navy," says:


"So far as known this was the first trial in our navy of this movement, and the honor of introducing it belongs to Commodore Stringham. The little that was known of the real character of the Hatteras expedition prevented the public from paying any attention to the commodore's strategy, but when it was repeated

soon after by Commodore DuPont in a more brilliant affair, its merit was duly recognized."

While DuPont rose to the highest point in public estimation, Stringham was relegated to an obscure official background and never after had a sea-service command.—R. C. H.

by the troops. An examination proved that the only food-materials were fruits from the West Indies, which were fast decaying. For the next ten days the diet of the stranded soldiers consisted of black coffee, fresh fish, and a "sheet-iron pancake" made of flour and salt-water. This diet was neither luxurious nor nutritious, and it produced unpleasant scorbutic results. On the 10th of September relief arrived, and with it, under Lieut.-Colonel George F. Betts, six more companies of the 9th New York.

Until September 16th, nothing occurred to disturb the uneventful routine work incident to military occupation of an enemy's territory. On that day a mixed expedition of land and sea forces under com-




mand of Lieutenant James G. Maxwell, of the United States navy, was sent to destroy the forts of Beacon Island and Portsmouth, near Ocracoke Inlet. They were found to have been deserted by the Confederates, but twenty-two guns of heavy caliber, that were left intact, were made useless by the Union forces.

Soon after the capture of the forts the "intelligent contraband" began to arrive, often bringing news of important military activity in several directions.

Before the first week of our occupation had expired I became convinced that the enemy was fortifying Roanoke Island, with the intention of making it a base for immediate operations, and that his first offensive work would be against the forces stationed at Hatteras Inlet, with the further purpose of destroying the Hatteras light; and that they would land a considerable force at the upper end of the island, at a point near Chicamacomico, and march down.

Seeing the necessity of counter-action on the part of the Union forces, on the 6th of September I wrote a full account of the situation to General John



FORTS HATTERAS AND CLARK. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.

E. Wool, commanding the Department of Virginia, in which occurred the following suggestions:

"*First.* Roanoke Island, which commands the Croatan Channel between Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, should be occupied at once. It is now held by the rebels. They have a battery completed at the upper end of the island and another in course of erection at the southern extremity. *Second.* A small force should be stationed at Beacon Island, which is in the mouth of Ocracoke Inlet and commands it. *Third.* Two or three light-draught vessels should be stationed between the mouths of the Neuse and Pamlico rivers. This would shut out all commerce with New Berne and Washington. *Fourth.* There should be at least eight light-draught gun-boats in Pamlico Sound. *Fifth.* Beaufort should be occupied as soon as possible. All of these recommendations should be attended to immediately. Seven thousand men judiciously placed upon the soil of North Carolina would, within the next three weeks, draw 20,000 Confederate troops from the State of Virginia.


"I wish, if you agree with me and deem it consistent with your duty, that you would impress upon the Government the importance and necessity of immediate action in this department."

General Wool gave this letter the strongest possible indorsement, and sent a copy to the Secretary of War.

In my next report (September 11th) I sent an account of the marked enterprise on the part of the enemy, setting forth that since the capture of Fort Hatteras they had strengthened Fort Macon, obstructed the Neuse and Pamlico rivers, mounted seventeen heavy guns at Roanoke Island and landed a considerable number of troops at that place. I urged my former suggestions and called for immediate action and reënforcements. A copy of this letter, with a very strong approval, was also sent to the Secretary of War, but neither brought any response beyond a merely formal acknowledgment.


My policy from the moment of assuming command on Hatteras Island had been to cultivate friendly relations with the inhabitants. As they were mostly of a seafaring race, I concluded they could not have much sympathy

with the revolt against a government which had been their constant friend. Within ten days after the landing, nearly all of the male adults had taken the oath of allegiance, and several professed their willingness to carry proclamations to the mainland, and to bring back such news of military movements as they could obtain. One of these volunteer spies succeeded in opening communication with a relative, who lived at Roanoke Island, and from him I learned that, as I had suspected, a force was to start from



THE UNITED STATES SLOOP "CUMBERLAND" SAILING INTO ACTION AT THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORTS HATTERAS AND CLARK. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

that point to make the attack upon Hatteras Island. In the meantime we had done what we could to place the forts at the inlet in a better condition for defense, and General Wool, of his own volition, had sent reënforcements,—the seven remaining companies of the 9th New York, the 20th Indiana Volunteers,



FORT HATTERAS

FLAG-SHIP "MINNESOTA."

"SUBQUEHANNA," "PAWNEE."

THE UNION FLEET BOMBARDING FORTS HATTERAS AND CLARK. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

Colonel W. L. Brown, and one company of the 1st U. S. Artillery, under Captain Lewis O. Morris.

In the latter days of September, information of the intended movement from Roanoke Island made immediate action necessary. I had already apprised General Wool of my intention to establish a post near Chicamacomico for the purpose of protecting the natives who had taken the oath, and also to prevent a surprise by the landing of a large force of the enemy to march down the island. Accordingly, on the 29th of September, I embarked the 20th Indiana regiment upon the gun-boats *Putnam* and *Ceres*, and accompanied it to a point opposite Chicamacomico, saw the troops safely disembarked, and returned with the gun-boats to the inlet. On the first day of October, the *Fanny* was dispatched with supplies, and arrived at the point of disembarkation the same afternoon. After preparations for landing had commenced, a force of the enemy's gun-boats was discovered. The *Fanny* tried to escape, but got aground and was captured, not, however, until after a spirited resistance by the men and officers with the two small guns which were mounted on her deck.

Flag-Officer W. F. Lynch, C. S. N., in his report says:

"Colonel Wright, of the 3d Georgia regiment, who commands the military forces of the island, had agreed with me to make an attempt to destroy Hatteras Light-house, and we only waited the return of an emissary I had sent to glean intelligence as to the force of the enemy in that vicinity. But early in the forenoon of the 1st instant intelligence came that one of the Federal steamers was at Chicamacomico, about forty miles distant on the eastern shore of Pamlico Sound, and I determined to get after her. As Colonel Wright was anxious, however, to make the contemplated attempt, I would not, in courtesy, refuse to wait for the embarkation of troops,

although two precious hours were thereby lost. We left here at 2:30 P. M. with about two hundred of the 3d Georgia regiment, Colonel W——, who is a man after my own heart in such matters, accompanying them. A little before 5 P. M. we came in sight and soon after opened fire upon the enemy, which was returned at first with spirit; but in about twenty minutes he attempted to escape, and in the attempt ran aground, and shortly after surrendered."

The *Fanny* had on board, when captured, a captain and 30 men of the 20th Indiana regiment, and the sergeant-major and 11 men of the 9th New York. The Confederate vessels engaged were the *Curlew*, *Raleigh*, and the little tug *Junaluski*. As soon as I heard of the disaster I sent an order for Colonel Brown to retreat. On the 4th of October a large body of Confederates, under Colonel A. R. Wright, assisted by gun-boats, landed at Chicamacomico, and Colonel Brown commenced a successful retreat down the island. Having received early news, by a native messenger, of the landing and Brown's march, I moved, with my regiment, toward the north, and met Colonel Brown's command early the next morning at the light-house. Colonel Wright was closely following the retreating troops, but as soon as he saw the reënforcements he faced about and commenced a retreat which only ended in the landing of his forces at Roanoke Island. During the march back the steamer *Monticello*, from the ocean side, with her heavy guns, maintained a fire at the Confederates across the low sand-fields, which may have annoyed them without doing any serious damage. This was the end of an elaborately conceived plan on the part of the enemy to capture our troops, destroy Hatteras Light, and recapture the forts of the inlet. From that time until the arrival of the "Burnside expedition," the Federal forces at the inlet pursued the even quiet of routine duty.

The news of the loss of the *Fanny* created some excitement both at Fort Monroe and at Washington, and I was severely censured for having divided so small a force, and was superseded by Brigadier-General J. K. F. Mansfield. I am still of the opinion that my course was right, as no other disposition of the small force at my command would have saved the light-house and prevented the landing, opposite the light-house, where there was a wharf and deep water, of the whole Confederate force of about two thousand men. That landing would have given them a safe base for a decisive movement against the Union troops at the inlet. I afterward heard that Colonel



RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES TO THEIR BOATS AFTER THEIR ATTACK UPON HATTERAS.



LANDING OF THE UNION TROOPS AT HATTERAS UNDER COVER OF THE FLEET. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

Wright intended to land part of his force above and the balance below the camp of Colonel Brown, capture his regiment, destroy the light-house, and then, in his discretion, move upon Hatteras Inlet. The prompt retreat frustrated the first part of the design, and Colonel Wright, seeing what he believed to be a large reënforcement, retreated without undertaking the other parts of his plan.

Until October 13th we had peace at the inlet. That day Brigadier-General Thomas Williams relieved General Mansfield, and assumed command of the post. The new commander was a man of many idiosyncrasies, and outside of his staff was cordially disliked for his severe treatment of the men. ¶

On the 5th of November I was sent by General Wool on a special boat to Washington to urge upon the President the importance of either abandoning Hatteras Inlet or erecting suitable accommodations for the troops. The next morning after my arrival in Washington I reported to the President and presented my letter from General Wool, and was asked by the President to appear before the Cabinet. I did so and explained fully the situation at Hatteras Inlet and urged the importance of undertaking further operations to hold that position, it being the threshold to the

¶ I was arrested by General Williams for refusing to assign to duty, as captain in my regiment, a disreputable officer who had received an appoint-

ment from Governor E. D. Morgan. I denied the right of appointment, and I was sustained by General Wool and President Lincoln.—R. C. H.

whole inland water system of North Carolina. At this meeting the Secretary of War was represented by General McClellan, who had one end of the long council-table to himself. After I had finished, he drew me into conversation about operations in the Department of Virginia, and as I had often urged upon General Wool the importance of making Fort Monroe a base for operations against Richmond, I was fully prepared to answer his questions or to combat opposition. At his request I made a rough drawing showing the old road up the peninsula, with a waterway on each side for gun-boats and general transportation. He listened attentively to all I had to say, talked but little himself, and put my drawing in his pocket. I have always suspected that my animated advocacy of that route may have had something to do with his change of base from Washington, and the undertaking of his unfortunate Peninsular Campaign. Before the council dissolved it was decided to hold Hatteras Inlet and to erect suitable quarters for the forces, and I was instructed to wait until necessary orders could be prepared before returning to General Wool and my command.☆

LAND AND WATER FIGHTING AT ROANOKE ISLAND.


THE Burnside expedition, the naval part being under command of Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough,† had concentrated in Pamlico Sound by the 4th of February, and on the 5th the welcome signal was hoisted for the whole command to move up toward the Confederate stronghold. About sundown, after a charming day's sail, the fleet came to anchor for the night, and started again early the next morning, but in consequence of the inclemency of the weather was soon compelled to seek another anchorage. On the morning of the 7th the expedition got under way very early, the armed army boats and naval part taking the lead several miles in advance. By 11 o'clock the first division of army gun-boats, under Commander Hazard, arrived opposite the forts on the west side of Roanoke Island, and commenced the bombardment in earnest, and at the same time engaged the enemy's fleet. As the naval vessels arrived they went into action, and by half-past 11 the whole fleet of gun-boats was engaged. The engagement between the heavy guns lasted all day without much damage having been done to either side. At the close the gunners answered each other with about the same spirit displayed at the commencement. The Confederate forts had, however, fared better than their fleet. The latter was protected from an assault on the part of our vessels by a row of piles driven across the navigable part of the channel, and by sunken vessels; but, notwithstanding this protection, the accurate fire of the Union fleet soon compelled it to retire out of range, with the loss

☆ Captain W. H. Parker, C. S. N., who commanded the *Beaufort* in these waters, says in his "Recollections of a Naval Officer" (N. Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons):

"The enemy made a great mistake in not taking possession of the sounds immediately after capturing Hatteras. There was nothing to prevent it but two small

gun-boats, carrying one gun each. Two of the small steamers, under Flag-Officer Stringham, should have swept the sounds, and a force should have occupied Roanoke Island."

† For details of the origin and composition of this expedition, see the article by General Burnside, p. 660.—EDITORS.



MAP OF THE OPERATIONS AT ROANOKE ISLAND—FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORDS.

Captain W. H. Parker, in his "Recollections of a Naval Officer" (Charles Scribner's Sons), thus describes the later Confederate defenses of Croatan Sound:

"Three forts had been constructed on the [Roanoke] island to protect the channel. The upper one was on Weir's Point, and was named Fort Huger. It mounted 12 guns, principally 32-pounders of 33 cwt., and was commanded by Major John Taylor, formerly of the navy. About one and three-quarter miles below, on Pork Point, was Fort Bartow; it mounted 7 [9?] guns, 5 of which were 32-pounders of 83 cwt., and 2 were rifled 32-pounders. This fort, which was the only one subsequently engaged in the defense, was in charge of Lieut. B. P. Loyall, of the navy. Between these two points was a small battery. On the mainland opposite the island, at Redstone Point, was a battery called Fort Forrest. The guns, which were 32-pounders, were mounted on the deck of a canal-boat which had been hauled up in the mud and placed so that the guns would command the channel. The channel itself was obstructed a little above

Fort Huger by piling. It was hoped that these batteries, with the assistance of Commodore Lynch's squadron, would be able to prevent the enemy's ships from passing the island. The great mistake on our part was in not choosing the proper point at which to dispute the entrance to the sound. The fortifications and vessels should have been at the 'marshes,' a few miles below, where the channel is very narrow."

The attack by the Union fleet is thus described by Captain Parker:

"At daylight the next morning, February 7th, the *Appomattox* was dispatched to Edenton, and as she did not return till sunset, and the *Warrior* did not take any part in the action, this reduced our [Confederate] force to seven vessels and eight guns. [See list, p. 670.] At 9 A. M. we observed the enemy to be under way and coming up, and we formed 'line abreast,' in the rear of the obstructions. At 11:30 the fight commenced at long range. The enemy's fire was aimed at Fort Bartow and our vessels, and we soon became warmly engaged. The commodore at first directed his vessels to fall back, in

of one of its vessels. A short time before sunset the Confederate boats came near enough to fire a few more shots, but were again driven off, this time making their last appearance as a fleet.


During the fight between the forts and the vessels the army transport fleet was at anchor about three miles to the south, prepared for landing. A little after 4 o'clock the troops began to land, General Foster's brigade taking the lead, followed by Reno's and Parke's. By 10 o'clock a force of about 7500 strong had been landed. One of the two sections of a boat-gun battery manned by men of the Union Coast Guard, in charge of Midshipman Porter, was stationed well out to the front, supported by the 21st Massachusetts; the other troops bivouacked in an open field, where before morning they were thoroughly drenched by a most uncomfortable cold rain.

The morning was cold and cheerless and the breakfast was poor, but the troops were in fine spirits. Foster was the first to move, the 25th Massachusetts in the advance, followed by Midshipman Porter's guns. The enemy's pickets gradually retired into an earth-work mounting three guns, situated in the center of a morass, flanked on each side by an almost impenetrable swamp, and protected in front by an open field of deep mud, in part covered by fallen trees with their limbs cut short and sharpened.

General Foster, as soon as he reached the earth-work, placed his troops and the boat-guns in position, and by 8 o'clock the attack had commenced in earnest. But no effective work was done until General Reno came up and with the 21st Massachusetts, the 51st New York, and the 9th New Jersey began his effective attack upon the Confederate right. With great difficulty he penetrated the swamp, covered with its thick interwoven growth of briars, shrubs, and trees. At length he succeeded in delivering his fire from

the hope of drawing the enemy under the fire of Forts Huger and Forrest; but as they did not attempt to advance, and evidently had no intention of passing the obstructions, we took up our first position and kept it during the day. At 2 P. M. the firing was hot and heavy, and continued so until sunset. Our gunners had had no practice with their rifled guns, and our firing was not what it should have been. It was entirely too rapid, and not particularly accurate. Early in the fight the *Forrest* was disabled in her machinery, and her gallant young captain, Lieutenant Hoole, badly wounded in the head by a piece of shell. She got in under Fort Forrest and anchored. Some time in the afternoon, in the hottest of the fire, reinforcements arrived from Wise's brigade, and were landed on the island. The Richmond Blues, Captain O. Jennings Wise, were, I think, a part of this force. Pork Point Battery kept up a constant fire on the fleet, and the enemy could not silence it. The garrison stood to their guns like men, encouraged by the spirited example of their instructor, Lieutenant B. P. Loyall. Forts Huger and Forrest did not fire, the enemy being out of range; but the small battery between Pork Point and Welr's Point fired an occasional gun during the day. Toward 4 o'clock in the afternoon a shot or shell struck the hurricane-deck of the *Curlew* [Captain Hunter] in its descent, and went through her decks and bottom as though they had been made of paper. Hunter put his vessel ashore, immediately in front of Fort Forrest, completely masking its guns, and we could not fire her for fear of burning up the battery, which, as I have said, was built on an old canal-boat. . . . We, in the *Beaufort*, did our best in maintaining our position. About 4 P. M. I observed

that the enemy's troops were landing to the southward of Pork Point, under the guns of a division of their fleet, and could not perceive that any successful resistance was being made to it. A little after sunset the firing ceased on both sides, and as we felt sure the enemy would not attempt to pass the obstructions by night, as he had declined to attempt them by day, we ran in and anchored under Fort Forrest. . . . Soon after we anchored signal was made by the flag-ship for the captains to report on board. Upon my entering the cabin I was informed by Commodore Lynch that we must retreat from Roanoke Island. Much surprised and mortified, I asked why, and was told that the vessels generally were out of ammunition. A council was held as to whether the vessels should retreat to Norfolk, through the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, or go to Elizabeth City, on the Pasquotank River. We would have saved the vessels by going to the former place, but the commodore's orders were to do his utmost to defend the waters of North Carolina; so we decided to go to the latter, where it was understood a fort had been built to protect the town. Elizabeth City was the terminus of the Dismal Swamp Canal, and we hoped to get ammunition that way from Norfolk in time to act in conjunction with the fort. I was sent to Roanoke Island to communicate all this to Colonel Shaw, and confess did not relish my mission. It looked too much like leaving the army in the lurch, and yet to have remained without ammunition would have been mere folly. . . . I met Colonel Shaw at his quarters, and stated the facts in relation to the vessels, and then returned to the *Beaufort*. All lights were now extinguished, and the squadron got under way for Elizabeth City."



an unexpected direction upon the enemy inside the work. They turned their guns upon his troops, but failed to drive them from their position. While General Reno was maintaining the left attack, General Foster, with the 25th Massachusetts and 10th Connecticut, was making a serious demonstration in front; and the 23d and 27th Massachusetts, later with the 51st Pennsylvania, were trying to penetrate the almost impassable wood and swamp in the far-off front of the earth-work for the purpose of getting on the enemy's left. While engaged in this move-

ment, the Massachusetts troops encountered a battalion of the enemy and drove them inside their work.

About 11 o'clock General Parke with his brigade arrived upon the field, and the 4th Rhode Island was ordered to follow the regiments making the demonstration on the enemy's left. "The 9th New York regiment, arriving upon the ground, was ordered to follow." . . . "The regiment, under the lead of the colonel, Rush C. Hawkins, entered the clearing with great spirit." Nearly two companies had succeeded in getting into the clearing immediately in front of the earth-work, where the mud was more than ankle-deep, and where they were receiving the undivided attention of the enemy's three pieces of artillery, and getting a shot now and then from the infantry. It



UNION ASSAULT UPON THE THREE-GUN BATTERY, ROANOKE ISLAND. (SEE MAP, PAGE 642.)
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

was at this point that Colonel De Monteil was killed. Seeing that it would be almost impossible to get through the deep mud, I had made up my mind to face to the front and make an effort to charge the work, and after a moment's consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel Betts and Captain Jardine, who commanded the right company, I ordered my bugler to sound the charge. At that moment I heard a great cheer down the line, and, looking in that direction, discovered that Major Kimball had broken the regiment in two parts and was heading the left companies in a direct charge up a causeway running through the center of the field of fallen timber directly to the sally-port covered by a 24-pounder howitzer. Soon the right companies joined, and all entered the work, pell-mell, together. As the column advanced, the men crowded each other from the causeway, and soon the whole front of the work was covered with an animated sea of red fezzes. The men of Company C were the first to cross the ditch and enter the work. About the same time, the 21st Massachusetts and the 51st New York came into the work from the left.

The officers of those two regiments claimed that their colors were the first on the parapet; if so, it was because the colors of the 9th New York

were in the center of the column and did not get into the work with the men on the right who led the charge. The regiments sent around to outflank the enemy's left arrived at their objective point about the time the decisive charge was made, and were entitled to a fair share of credit for the successful day's work.

The commands of Generals Foster and Reno pursued the enemy to a point near the northern end of the island, where an unconditional surrender was consummated. Soon after leaving the earth-work my regiment deflected to the right and succeeded in capturing two boat-loads of the Richmond Blues, among them O. Jennings Wise, trying to escape to Nag's Head, on the opposite shore. Company B in the meantime had taken possession of a two-gun battery at Shallowbag Bay. Wise, severely wounded, was carried to a farm-house, where he received the best attention attainable, but died the next morning, defiant to the last, and wishing he had more lives to lose in the defense of the Confederacy. Among the results of these two days' fighting were the capture of 2675 officers and men of the Confederate army and 5 forts mounting 32 heavy guns, the complete possession of Roanoke Island, and with it the control of the inland waters of North Carolina. ‡ [For losses, see p. 670.]

THE TWO SQUADRONS AT ELIZABETH CITY.

THE Confederate fleet, known as the "mosquito fleet," was under command of Commodore William F. Lynch, who, after firing one of his own steamers, the *Curlew*, and blowing up Fort Forrest, a work situated opposite Roanoke Island on the mainland, retreated up the Pasquotank River, and concentrated his vessels behind a four-gun battery at a point a short distance below Elizabeth City.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of February 10th Commander Rowan came up with the Union fleet, and the rebels opened fire upon him at a long range. The Union forces continued their course uninterrupted by the enemy's fire until within three-fourths of a mile of their position, when they opened fire and dashed on at full speed. In a few minutes five of the enemy's six vessels were either captured or destroyed, and Elizabeth City was in possession of the naval forces. † Two days later a small naval division under Lieutenant Alexander Murray took possession of Edenton.

‡ The Confederate commander at Roanoke Island was General Henry A. Wise, who, on the 7th of January, 1862, had assumed command of the Chowan district, General Benjamin Huger being in command of the department, that of Norfolk. The official relations of the two generals were somewhat strained, and the responsibility for this disaster was afterward the subject of recrimination between them. General Wise claimed that he had been deprived of his artillery by reason of the countermanding of his orders by General Huger, and that, in general, there had been culpable neglect on the part of the Confederate authorities to aid the defense of Roanoke Island. "Nothing! nothing!! nothing!!!" he said. "That was the disease which brought disaster at Roanoke Island." There was also lack of cordial agreement

between General Wise and Flag-Officer Lynch. General Wise being ill at Nag's Head on the day of the battle, the Confederate troops on the field were under command of Colonel H. M. Shaw, who says in his report: "An unceasing and effective fire was kept up from 7 A. M. until 12:20, when, our artillery ammunition having been exhausted and our right flanks having been turned by an overwhelming force of the enemy, I was compelled to yield the place."

† Of this engagement Captain Parker, C. S. N., in his "Recollections of a Naval Officer," writes as follows:

"The enemy were coming up at full speed and our vessels were under weigh ready to abide the shock, when a boat came off from the shore with the bearer of a dis-

The morning of February 9th, having heard that a portion of the command of General Henry A. Wise still remained at Nag's Head, General Parke ordered that I should take a battalion of my regiment, proceed to that point, and, if possible, effect their capture. When we arrived at the place of debarkation we were surprised to meet with no resistance to our landing. The fact was sufficiently accounted for when we learned that Wise with his whole command had retreated northward at sundown the day before.

From the time of the capture of Roanoke Island stories had come frequently to the Union commanders setting forth the loyalty of the citizens of the town of Winton on the Chowan River, and their desire to serve the Union cause. On the 18th of February an expedition of eight gun-boats under Commander Rowan, and a land force of which I had charge, started for the Chowan River, for the purpose of encouraging our friends at Winton and destroying two important bridges of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad. The morning of the 19th we began to ascend the river, and as I had never believed in the tales regarding the loyalty of the Wintonians, from the time of entering the river, I assumed the position of volunteer lookout from the cross-trees of the mainmast of the steamer *Delaware*. The day was beautiful, the sail charming, and all went well until about half-past 3 o'clock. The steamer had "slowed down" and taken a sheer in toward the Winton wharf, where a negro woman stood waving a rag, when from my lofty perch I discovered the glistening of many musket-barrels among the short shrubs that covered the high bank, and farther back two pieces of artillery in position. I shouted to the astonished native pilot at the helm, "Ring on, sheer off, rebels on shore!" fully half a dozen times before he could comprehend my meaning. At last he rang on full speed, changed his course, and cleared the wharf by about ten feet. At that moment the enemy opened fire, and

patch for me. It read: 'Captain Parker, with the crew of the *Beaufort*, will at once take charge of the fort.—Lynch.' 'Where the devil,' I asked, 'are the men who were in the fort?' 'All run away,' said the messenger. . . . Upon getting into the fort I hastily commenced stationing the men at the guns, and as quickly as possible opened fire upon the advancing enemy. Some of the officers and men of the *Forrest* made their way to us upon learning that the militia had fled. I must not forget to say that the engineer officer who had been sent from Richmond for service in the fort remained bravely at his post. . . . I found Commodore Lynch on shore; his boat had been cut in two by a shot and he could not get off to his ship, as he informed me; and he furthermore said I was to command the fort without reference to his being there—that if he saw an opportunity to get off to the *Seabird*, he should embrace it. The enemy's vessels came on at full speed under a heavy fire from our vessels and the fort. The fire from the latter was ineffectual. The officers and men were cool enough; but they had not had time to look about them. Everything was in bad working order, and it was difficult to train the guns. . . . Commodore Rowan's steamers did not reply to our fire until quite close; and without slackening their speed they passed the fort and fell upon our vessels. They made short work of them. The *Seabird* was rammed and sunk by the *Commodore Perry*. The *Ellis* was captured after a desperate defense, in which her gallant commander, James Cooke, was badly wounded. The schooner *Black Warrior* was set on fire and abandoned, her crew escaping through the marshes

on their side of the river. The *Fanny* was run on shore and blown up by her commander, who with his crew escaped to the shore. . . . Captain Sims, of the *Appomattox*, kept up a sharp fire from his bow gun until it was accidentally spiked; and he then had to run for it. He had a howitzer aft which he kept in play; but upon arriving at the mouth of the canal he found his vessel was about *two inches* too wide to enter; he therefore set her on fire, and she blew up. The *Beaufort* got through to Norfolk.

"We in the fort saw this work of destruction going on without being able to prevent it. As soon as the vessels passed the fort we could not bring a gun to bear on them, and a shot from them would have taken us in reverse. A few rounds of grape would have killed and wounded all the men in the fort, for the distance was only a few hundred yards. Seeing this, I directed Johnson to spike the guns, to order every man to shoulder his musket, and then to take down the flag.

"All this was promptly and coolly done, and upon the fact being reported to me by Johnson, I pointed to some woods in our rear and told him to make the best of his way there with the command. All this time Commodore Lynch had stood quietly looking on, but without uttering a word. As his command had just been destroyed under his eyes, I knew pretty well what his feelings were. Turning to him I said: 'Commodore, I have ordered the fort evacuated.' 'Why so, sir?' he demanded. I pointed out the condition of affairs I have just stated, and he acquiesced. Arm in arm, we followed the retreating men."

before we passed out of range the low guards, wheel-house, and masts of the *Delaware* were riddled. My descent from the cross-trees, with only the mast to protect my body, was rapid and not graceful; ratlines and shrouds were cut by bullets as I went down, and my escape without injury was one of the every-day miracles of war.

The Union forces withdrew down the river and anchored. Early the next morning we returned, and after some preliminary shelling, my regiment with two boat-howitzers were landed, the enemy was driven out, and the town was occupied. We soon discovered that the court-house and several other buildings were in use for barracks and store-houses for army supplies. They were all fired. Then the expedition returned to Roanoke Island.



VICE-ADMIRAL S. C. ROWAN.

The Winton expedition was, for the time being, the last of active operations having Roanoke Island for a base. The army forces on shore were enjoying a period of luxurious rest, while the naval vessels were making pleasant excursions to the towns on the shores of the sounds before embarking in an enterprise second

only in importance to the capture of Roanoke Island. It was an open secret that the next move would be against New Berne, a small city on the Neuse River.

The morning of the 10th of March a letter was handed to me from General Burnside containing the information that a new brigade, composed of the 9th and 89th New York and the 6th New Hampshire, and designated as the Fourth, had been formed for duty at Roanoke Island, which was to be left under my command for the protection of that post. The formation of this new brigade was the culmination of preparations for the departure of the New Berne expedition.

THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE.

THE morning of the 11th the force detailed for the attack upon that city embarked and that night, with the naval forces, rendezvoused at Hatteras Inlet. On the 12th an early start was made, and that evening the whole fleet anchored off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, about sixteen miles below New Berne.

The next morning was as unpleasant as a cold penetrating rain and dark sky could make it, but, notwithstanding, at 6:30, after some preliminary shelling of woods near the landing, the troops began to disembark, the majority

† The 9th of March had been clear and sunny, quite distinctly, the roar of the guns engaged in the action between the *Merrimac* and the Union fleet, including the *Monitor*.—R. C. H.

going in small boats, while others in their eagerness for the fray jumped from the transports, which were fast on the mud bottoms, and, holding their cartridge-boxes and muskets over their heads, waded to the land. In addition to the 13 regiments of infantry, 8 pieces of artillery were landed, 6 in charge of Lieutenant McCook, of the navy, and 2 commanded by Captains Dayton and Bennett, of the Marine Artillery.

The enemy had chosen a strong position, well calculated for defensive purposes. On Otter Creek, about seven miles up the river from the mouth of Slocum's Creek, they had a line of intrenchments reaching from the Neuse River to the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad; two miles beyond they had erected a strong field-work for preventing a landing at that point; three miles




BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. O'E. BRANCH. COMMANDING THE CONFEDERATE FORCES AT NEW BERNE. KILLED AT ANTETAM, SEPT. 17, 1862.

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

farther on there was a battery mounting 4 heavy guns, but bearing upon the river; and one mile farther up toward New Berne was their long line of strong works, the chief defense against an attack upon that city. Fort Thompson, a large and carefully planned flanking bastion, located on the river, and mounting 13 heavy guns, the enemy's extreme left, was the commencement of their main line of breastworks, which extended a mile and a quarter to the railroad; and commencing the other side of the railroad was another series of defensive works, consisting of rifle-pits and detached intrenchments in the form of redans and lunettes, that terminated in a 2-gun battery, about two miles from Fort Thompson. All were located upon a low, swampy soil. The line from the river to the railroad was protected by a ditch and clearing in front, and the one

beyond by a swamp and underbrush along its whole length. These works were armed with 41 heavy guns and 19 field-pieces, and had between 7000 and 8000 men for their defense. In the river, opposite Fort Thompson, and crossing its channel, were a double row of piles and many sunken vessels, formidable obstructions, to assist the fort in preventing an attack upon New Berne from the river. The naval forces moved up the river along with the troops while the light guns on shore were being dragged through the deep mud of the road. The first day's march took the whole Union force beyond the second deserted work, where the advance came in contact with the enemy's pickets. It being then 8 o'clock, a halt was ordered for the night, and the weary, hungry troops found a soldiers' resting-place in the mud, with no better covering than a continuous downpour of cold water. The eight pieces of artillery, although assisted on their way by the whole of the 51st Pennsylvania, did not arrive on the ground until 3 o'clock the following morning. [See map, p. 651.]

During the night it was ascertained from pickets, negroes, and others that the enemy's fortified line was not far off; and early on the morning of the 14th the positions of the Union forces were designated preparatory to a forward movement for attack. General Foster was to move up the country



FORTS ELLIS AND LANE IN THE DISTANCE.

BOMBARDMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE FORT THOMPSON DURING THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

road and attack the enemy's left; General Reno was to advance by the railroad and attempt to turn the rebel right; while General Parke was to follow on the country road as a reserve, or to operate in the center. The heads of the two advancing columns soon came within range, and a disposition of the troops for a general engagement was immediately consummated. The 25th Massachusetts had the extreme right; second in line came the 24th Massachusetts, its left resting on the country road, which was occupied by the artillery commanded by Captain Dayton and Lieutenant McCook. The 27th Massachusetts, with its right resting on the country road, was joined on its left by the 23d Massachusetts, the whole parallel with the enemy's works. The artillery and right regiments opened the engagement before those on the left of the road got into position. The 10th Connecticut Volunteers, arriving a little after the others, was ordered to the left of the 23d. The action along the whole of General Foster's front had now commenced in earnest. The 27th Massachusetts soon exhausted its short supply of ammunition, and was replaced by the 11th Connecticut, which had been ordered by General Parke to assist in bringing up the guns.

Early in the morning General Reno, on the left, moved his brigade along the railroad in the following order: 21st Massachusetts, 51st New York, 9th New Jersey, and 51st Pennsylvania. The first encounter, about 8 o'clock, was with a large detachment of the enemy who were bringing a gun to bear on the railroad. This move was checked by a well-maintained fire from the Union skirmishers, and soon after the right wing of the 21st Massachusetts, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, charged through an opening and captured a brick-kiln within the enemy's line. The other regiments of the brigade were now brought into line on the left of the 21st Massachusetts, with the 51st Pennsylvania in reserve, supporting the extreme left of the line. On this part of the field the action lasted for about three and a half hours, when the regiments engaged had expended nearly all their ammunition. At that time the right wing of the 51st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bell, was ordered to relieve the 51st New York, which had suffered severely, to pass

in front of it, deliver one volley, and then charge the enemy's works. This order was gallantly executed. At the same time the other wing of the 51st Pennsylvania and the 9th New Jersey charged the intrenchments, and the enemy fled from their entire left, leaving fifty prisoners. Just then General Reno discovered the Stars and Stripes waving from the works far off to his right.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, after capturing the brick-kiln, moved along the inside of the works toward the right, came upon a light battery of sixteen pieces which he captured, but was driven back by an overwhelming force of infantry.

General Parke's brigade, consisting of the 4th and 5th Rhode Island and the 8th and 11th Connecticut regiments, was

assigned to the center in supporting distance of either end of the line, but this command was destined to play a more important part than merely supporting the troops. Soon after getting under fire Colonel Rodman, with the 4th Rhode Island, offered to charge through an opening left in the intrenchments for the railroad to pass through. The offer was accepted, and the 8th Connecticut and the 5th Rhode Island were ordered to his support. Passing the rifle-pits, he entered the rear of the intrenchments, moving toward the right, capturing nine brass guns and driving the enemy from his intrenched position between the railroad and the river. Simultaneously with the movement of Colonel Rodman, General Foster made a charge along his whole front, when the enemy retreated. During the greater part of the action the gun-boats coöperated by shelling the woods in the rear of the works. Rodman's soldierly movement was the culminating point of the day, and ended a battle most creditable for all the Union troops and the officers who commanded them. Immediately after the close of the action, New Berne was occupied.

When the strength of the position is taken into consideration, the fatigue of the Union forces, and the great difficulties they had to encounter in making an infantry attack against a strong intrenched position, it is astonishing that they came out of the action with a loss of only 90 killed and 380



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN G. FOSTER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.


wounded. The loss to the enemy was 9 forts, mounting 41 heavy guns, over 2 miles of intrenchments, with 19 field-pieces in position, 6 32-pounders not mounted, over 300 prisoners, more than 1000 stand of small arms, tents and barracks for 10,000 troops, a large amount of army supplies and naval stores, and the control of the second commercial city in the State of North Carolina. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing was about 578. This complete success, coming so soon after that of Roanoke Island, created an *esprit de corps* among the troops of the "Coast Division" which they maintained to the end of their army career. \

¶ The Confederate forces in this engagement were all North Carolinians, and were commanded by General L. O'B. Branch, who gives in his official report this account of the battle:

"The defensive works were located and constructed before I assumed command. The troops under my command had performed a large amount of work, but it was mainly on the river defenses, which were not assailed by the enemy. They had been originally planned for a force much larger than any ever placed at my disposal, and I was for six weeks engaged in making the necessary changes to construct them, but the failure of all my efforts to obtain implements and tools with which the troops could carry on the work prevented me from making satisfactory progress. I had circulated handbills over the State, calling on the citizens generally to assist me, and received from two counties a small party of free negroes without implements. I then inserted in the newspaper an advertisement calling on the slave-owners to hire their slaves, with implements, for a few days, and I got but a single negro. During all this time I continued the troops at work, and when the enemy came into the river, five hundred per day were being detailed to construct breastworks, with

less than half that number of worn and broken shovels and axes, without picks or grubbing-hoes. If the fate of New Berne shall prevent a similar supineness on the part of citizens, and especially slave-owners, elsewhere, it will be fortunate for the country. . . . At about 7:30 o'clock, Friday morning, the fire opened along the line from the railroad to the river. I soon received a message from Colonel Lee [commanding the Confederate left wing] that the enemy were attempting to turn our left. This proved to be a feint, as I replied to him that I thought it would. The next incident of the battle was the appearance of the enemy's skirmishers in front of Vance [26th N. C.], and consequently on the prolongation of the line held by the militia. It was to drive the enemy from that position that I had directed the 24-pound battery to be placed there, and supposing it was ready for service, I sent Captain Rodman, with his company, to man it, but they found the guns not mounted, and were ordered into position to act as infantry. The skirmishers of the enemy, finding themselves on the flank of the militia, fired at them a few shots from their flank files, which caused a portion of them to flee in great disorder. I instantly ordered Colonel Avery [33d Regiment] to send five companies to dislodge them. He sent them instantly, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hoke; but before

Colonel Hoke had fully got into position, though he moved with the greatest promptness and celerity, I received a message from Colonel Clark, of the militia, informing me that the enemy were in line of battle in great force on his right. I instantly ordered up the remaining five companies of Colonel Avery's regiment, and the whole ten opened a terrific fire from their Enfield rifles. The whole militia, however, had now abandoned their positions, and the utmost exertions of myself and my staff could not rally them. Colonel Sinclair's regiment (35th) very quickly followed their example, retreating in the utmost disorder. This laid open Haywood's right (7th), and a large portion of the breastwork was left vacant. I had not a man with whom to reoccupy it, and the enemy soon poured in a column along the railroad and through a portion of the cut-down ground in front, which marched up behind the breastwork to attack what remained of Campbell's command (7th). The brave 7th met them with the bayonet, and drove them headlong over the parapet, inflicting heavy loss upon them as they fled; but soon returning with heavy reinforcements, not less than five or six regiments, the 7th was obliged to yield, falling back slowly and in order. Seeing the enemy behind the breastwork, without a single man to place in the gap through which he was entering, and finding the day lost, my next care was to secure the retreat."



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF NEW BERNE, NORTH CAROLINA,
MARCH 14, 1862.

This map is based upon the sketch map accompanying General Branch's official report of the Confederate operations in this engagement, with the addition of the Union dispositions as indicated by the official reports.




ASSAULT OF THE UNION TROOPS UPON FORT THOMPSON, NEAR NEW BERNE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.


The enemy in their retreat destroyed bridges, and as they passed through the town set fire to it, and left parts of it in a blaze; and the first work of our troops and sailors after landing was to assist the citizens in putting out the flames, which was not done until much valuable property had been uselessly destroyed. With the military machinery at his command it did not take General Burnside long to establish order and give the captured city such a government as the occasion required. The next and most important business in hand was to make the captured position secure from a land attack; and in order to accomplish this, a portion of the railroad leading to Goldsboro' had to be destroyed, and a line of fortifications built between the Neuse and Trent rivers, which would completely insulate New Berne from the surrounding country.

THE SIEGE OF FORT MACON.

THE next and last objective point of any importance in the new department of North Carolina was the capture of Fort Macon, an old-style, strong, stone, casemated work, mounting 67 guns, garrisoned by above 500 men, commanded by Colonel Moses J. White, located on the eastern extremity of Bogue Island, commanding the channel from the open sea to Beaufort Harbor, and about forty miles from New Berne. [See map, p. 634.] To General Parke was assigned the duty of moving upon this work and undertaking its capture. March 18th, General Burnside and Lieutenant Williamson, of the Engineers, made a reconnoissance to the east as far as Slocum's Creek, and occupied Havelock Station with one company of the 5th Rhode Island Battalion. The 21st,



FORT MACON AFTER ITS CAPTURE BY THE UNION FORCES, SHOWING EFFECTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.



Carolina City, a small settlement opposite Bogue Island, was occupied; the 22d, two companies of the 4th Rhode Island took possession of Morehead City; the night of the 25th, a detachment of the same regiment, with a com-

pany of the 8th Connecticut, occupied Beaufort; and the night of the 23d, Newport was garrisoned by the 5th Rhode Island. Thus all the important positions around or in the vicinity of Fort Macon had fallen into the possession of the Union forces without contest or the loss of a man. General Parke, who had established his headquarters at Carolina City, demanded a surrender of the fort, which was refused. The evidence of preparations completed and in hand left no doubt upon the mind of General Parke that Colonel White intended to make a desperate defense. It was therefore decided to besiege the fort, and as soon as possible to make a combined land and sea attack.

In this important work General Parke was most ably assisted by Captain Williamson and Lieutenant Flagler, of the Ordnance Corps. On the 29th a part of the Third Brigade was landed upon Bogue Island, and operations for besieging the fort were immediately commenced. The configuration of the sand-hills was singularly well adapted to facilitate the operations of the Union forces. These ridges or hills intervened between the working parties and the fort to such an extent in height as to permit the erection of besieging works to go on by day as well as by night, without any serious inconvenience from the enemy's fire. By April 23d, the fort was entirely cut off from communi-

cation with the outer world. On the ocean side the blockading division, consisting of the steamers *Daylight*, *State of Georgia*, and *Chippewa*, and the bark *Gemsbok*, under the command of Commander Samuel Lockwood, prevented all intercourse from that direction. General Parke announced the works completed, and his readiness for an attack, and Colonel White was again summoned, and again, in the tersest possible terms, declined to surrender.

The preparations for the reduction of the fort consisted of a battery of 3 rifled 30-pounder guns, under Captain L. O. Morris; another of 4 8-inch mortars, under Lieutenant D. W. Flagler; and a third of 4 10-inch mortars, commanded by Lieutenant M. F. Prouty, of the 25th Massachusetts. From these works the bombardment commenced on the morning of the 25th, and continued for ten hours. The fire from the Union batteries was not only vigorous, but also accurate and effective. Shell after shell dropped into the work and exploded. Many breaches were made, the ramparts were swept clean of gunners, and seventeen guns were disabled and dismounted. The naval forces, owing to the sudden coming on of a gale, after participating in the early part of the bombardment, were compelled to seek deeper water. On the morning of the 26th Colonel White, by the hanging out of a white flag, indicated his willingness to surrender. He and his troops received honorable terms and marched out of the fort as the 5th Rhode Island marched in, and so ended, in a comparatively bloodless victory, the siege of Fort Macon, the combined losses of both sides being only 9 killed and 25 wounded.☆

During the bombardment a detachment of the Signal Corps under Lieutenant Andrews rendered most important assistance to the commanders of the batteries. His position on the Bogue banks was nearly at right angles with the line of fire. Early in the action he saw that the 10-inch shells were going three hundred yards beyond the fort, and that the 8-inch shells were falling short. By signaling his observations, the elevations of the pieces were corrected, so that after 12 o'clock every projectile from the mortars fell inside the fort. This was not only one of the first, but among the better, of the achievements of the Signal Corps, proving its usefulness in war operations.

SOUTH MILLS AND OTHER OPERATIONS.

Soon after the capture of Roanoke Island rumors reached us of the building of rebel iron-clads which were to enter Albemarle Sound *via* the Dismal Swamp Canal and Roanoke River. Commander Rowan and I were equally

☆ Colonel Moses J. White says in his report:

"At 6 A. M., on the 25th, the enemy's land batteries opened upon the fort, and at 6:30 A. M. their vessels, consisting of three war steamers and one sailing vessel, commenced a cross-fire with rifle and 11-inch shell. The fire from both directions was immediately returned, and at 7 A. M. the ships retired—one disabled and two others in a damaged condition. [No such damage is reported by the commanders of the Union vessels. Commander Lockwood, of the *Daylight*, the senior naval officer, attributed the withdrawal to the rolling of the sea. He speaks, however, of the excellence of the Confederate aim.—EDITORS.] The attack from land was kept

up with great vigor, the enemy having immense advantage from their superior force, being able to relieve their men at the guns, while our morning reports showed only 263 men for duty. Our guns were well managed, but being able to do little damage to water batteries and siege guns, firing through very narrow embrasures. The enemy kept up a very vigorous and accurate fire from both rifles and mortars, dismounting guns, disabling men, and tearing the parade, parapet, and walls of the fort. At 6:30 P. M., finding that our loss had been very great, and from the fatigue of our men being unable to keep up the fire with but two guns, a proposition was made to General Parke for the surrender of Fort Macon."


anxious to protect the "pasteboard" vessels composing his fleet. We decided it would be feasible to land a considerable force at Elizabeth City, make a forced march to the south end of the Dismal Swamp Canal, and destroy the lock that connected it with the river. In an interview with General Burnside the plan was submitted and approved; he agreed to detail a necessary additional force from New Berne to take part in the movement, and I was ordered to have my entire command ready for April 14th. On the 17th I received a personal letter from him, saying he had detailed the 21st Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, and ordering me to embark immediately with at least eighteen hundred men, and closed by saying he would be up at once or send orders. The morning of the 18th I was greatly surprised to receive a call from General Reno, who stated that he had with him two regiments and was in command of the expedition.

The transports were soon under way, and reached the point of debarkation at about 1 o'clock the next morning. My brigade, consisting of the 9th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimball; the 89th New York, Colonel H. S. Fairchild; and the 6th New Hampshire, Colonel S. G. Griffin, was landed and on the march by 3 o'clock. A light mulatto man for a guide came to me from one of the gun-boats and by a circuitous route took us far out of the way, so that we marched 30 miles to get at the rebel position, instead of 16 by the direct road.] This détour led to the meeting of the Union commands where two roads joined, about three or four miles from the enemy's position. It was decided that General Reno should take the advance, and that I should follow as rapidly as the fatigued condition of my men would permit.

Soon after 1 o'clock the rebels were discovered with a small detachment of cavalry thrown to the front, their infantry and artillery in a concealed line along the edge of a wood, facing an open field. The action was commenced by rapid shell-firing from the enemy's guns, which was vigorously answered by the four rifled pieces (two belonging to Company K, 9th New York), commanded by Colonel William A. Howard, of the Marine Artillery. The 21st Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, coming in range, were deflected out of a road, through a field, to a wood on the right. My command soon arrived, when the 6th New Hampshire was ordered to the left, and the two other regiments followed those on the right. The action had continued for about an hour (chiefly artillery), when I concluded to make an observation in an open corn-field, directly in front of the rebel center. I proceeded to a fence within a hundred yards of the edge of the clearing, heard no firing of infantry, concluded the rebels had been silently outflanked on their left by the 21st Massachusetts and the 51st Pennsylvania, and thought my regiment might get across the corn-field and capture the battery which still continued the action.

I returned, and described what I proposed to do, and asked the men if they thought they were equal to the undertaking. Although greatly fatigued,

] When it was discovered that the guide had led my brigade ten miles out of the way, he was quietly taken to a wood out of sight of the troops and shot. A few days after, we heard that he had been sent to us by the enemy for the purpose of leading our troops astray.— R. C. H.



MAP OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT SOUTH MILLS, N. C., BASED ON THE MAP ACCOMPANYING GENERAL HUGER'S REPORT.

ley, which caused their artillery to retreat, and so ended the battle of South Mills, or Camden, † as it is now known.

† In his report of the fight at South Mills General Huger thus describes the Confederate position:

"On the 19th, the enemy approaching. . . . Colonel Wright moved forward with his three companies, and at 9:30 o'clock was met by Colonel McComas with his battery (1 rifled piece and 3 bronze 6-pounders). After advancing 3 miles from South Mills the road emerged from the woods, and the field on the right and the left extended 160 to 180 yards to thick woods and swamp. On the edge of the woods, on both sides of the road and perpendicular to it, was a small ditch, the earth from which was thrown up on the south side in a ridge, upon which was a heavy rail fence. From this point the road led through a narrow lane for one mile with cleared land on both sides of it. Here he determined to make his stand. About three hundred yards from the woods ran a deep wide ditch parallel with the one first mentioned and extending to the woods on either side of the road, and a short distance beyond it were dwellings and outhouses which would give cover for the enemy. Colonel Wright therefore ordered them burned. The large ditch in his front he filled with fence rails and set them on fire, his object being to have this ditch so hot by the time the enemy came up they could not occupy it. (This ditch is marked on sketch as 'Roasted Ditch.') Two pieces of artillery (the road was too narrow for more) were placed in the road just where it emerged from the woods, which commanded the road — the range of the guns. He also threw down the fences for three hundred yards on each side of the road for three hundred yards in front of the guns, and tossed the rails into the road to destroy the effect of the enemy's ricochet firing, and to deprive him of the cover of the fences. The

they answered, "We will try." Arriving at the fence, the regiment was formed in line of battle, and commenced to move over the field. When within fifty yards of the edge of the clearing, the right companies received the concentrated fire of the whole of the enemy's infantry and artillery, and in less than two minutes lost 9 killed and 58 wounded. I immediately ordered a deflection to the right, when suddenly the rebels ceased firing, and fell back to avoid being outflanked by our force that entered the wood on their left. The 6th New Hampshire gave them a parting vol-

fences on the sides of the woods were taken down and laid in heaps on the embankment in front of his men. . . . The smoke from the burning buildings and fences rolled toward the enemy, thus masking the position. . . ."

General Huger speaks of four repulses of the Union troops between 12 and 3:35 P. M., and continues:

"They soon advanced again, two regiments skirting the woods on our left, and approached near enough to engage the skirmishers. One company from the right was moved over, and Colonel Reid ordered to send one company from the reserve. The enemy deployed in the open field and bore down rapidly, but the heavy fire of musketry caused them to waver, and they fell back to the fence. Three regiments and a field-piece were in the center and the 9th New York regiment on the right. The fire was now brisk from one end of the line to the other, and the enemy were held in check, when just at this moment Captain McComas was killed by a minie-ball, and his men, who for four hours had fought with most indomitable courage, became panic-stricken and left the field, taking their pieces with them. Colonel Wright succeeded in rallying them and getting two pieces and a few men in position, and the enemy had advanced so close that canister was fired on them with effect, and they again fell back. The ammunition in the limber-boxes was exhausted, and during the temporary absence of Colonel Wright the artillery left the field. The enemy made a charge upon our line, but the steady fire at close distance . . . caused them to break in confusion, and they fell back."

The Confederate forces were the 3d Georgia,

I was helped off the field to a negro cabin, and heard nothing from General Reno until about 9 o'clock, when he came to me with the information that he had learned that reënforcements were coming from Norfolk; and we agreed, under the circumstances, that it would be better to return to the gun-boats. The command moved at once through the mud and rain, reached the point of debarkation about 4 o'clock the next morning, and returned to Roanoke Island. My brigade had marched about 46 miles in a little less than 26 hours, besides taking part in a severe action. Our entire loss was 14 killed and 100 wounded and missing. Among the former was Lieutenant Charles A. Gadsden, adjutant of the 9th New York, an Americanized Englishman, who had been with his command less than a week. He fell most gallantly at the head of the first company that came under fire, where he had no right to be.


Chaplain Thomas W. Conway, of the 9th New York, who with Surgeon George H. Humphreys remained behind with the wounded, discovered that the rebel infantry, which gave us such a warm reception, were concealed in a broad, deep drain which conformed to the edge of the wood, and was parallel to my line of attack. The lock the expedition was sent to destroy remains to this day intact, and no iron-clad has ever passed through it, and for the best of all reasons, that none was ever built for that purpose.

May 7th, Captain O. W. Parisen, with Company C, 9th New York, embarked on the gun-boat *Shawsheen*, proceeded to Catharine's Creek, which empties into Chowan River, landed his command with a part of the gun-boat's crew, marched about two miles back from the creek and destroyed a large store-house filled with \$50,000 worth of commissary supplies for the rebel army. While returning to the gun-boat, Captain Parisen repelled an attack of rebel cavalry, which after one volley retreated, with the commanding officer mortally wounded.

Immediately after the first occupation of the inland waters of North Carolina by the Union forces, great inconvenience had been experienced, and in several instances movements had been retarded, because the only way of communication with Washington was through the sometimes dangerous and always unreliable channel of Hatteras Inlet. Knowing this, I had constantly urged upon General Burnside the importance of opening connection with Norfolk through the Currituck Sound and Dismal Swamp Canal, and, as a preliminary to such an undertaking, had commenced blowing up the obstructions placed by the enemy in the Currituck Canal. May 28th, I received permission from General Burnside to make an attempt to get to Fort Monroe through my proposed route, for the purpose of having an important conference with General Wool. I embarked Company K of the 9th New York, with its battery of rifled naval boat-guns, on board the small side-wheel steamer *Port Royal*. All the canal obstructions not being removed, I decided to

some drafted militia under Colonel Ferebee, McComas's battery, and Gillette's company of cavalry. The Confederate loss was 6 killed, 19 wounded, and 3 prisoners. The Union forces were the 6th New Hampshire, 21st Massachusetts, 9th and 89th New York, 51st Pennsylvania, and 1st New

York Marine Artillery (4 pieces); and the losses were: killed, 13; wounded, 101; captured, 13,—total, 127. General Jesse L. Reno says in his report that the object of his expedition was to convey the idea that the entire Burnside expedition was marching upon Norfolk.—EDITORS.



PASSAGE OF UNION BOATS THROUGH THE DISMAL SWAMP CANAL. (SEE MAP, PAGE 634.)
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

pick my way outside in Currituck Sound through a narrow, crooked channel. The result can best be told by a dispatch to the New York "Tribune" from Fort Monroe:

"May 30th, 1862. This morning the side-wheel steamer *Port Royal* arrived here from Roanoke Island, *via* the Currituck Sound and Dismal Swamp Canal. Colonel Hawkins and a company of his gallant Zouaves are the first to open communication between Generals Wood and Burnside. By this movement we can dispense with all seaward transportation, and forward supplies, etc., in a safe and rapid manner to our troops in that vicinity."

When I was left in charge of Roanoke Island, Commander Rowan assigned to the command of the naval division in Albemarle and Croatan sounds Lieutenant Charles W. Flusser, who had been conspicuous for his efficiency upon many occasions. A finer character than this officer possessed it is impossible to imagine,—patriotic, sincere, manly, modest, considerate, and truthful to an extent almost beyond description; and a braver man never lived. Early in June he took possession of the town of Plymouth, situated a short distance above the mouth of the Roanoke River, and held it unaided by land forces until June 15th, when Company F of the 9th New York was detailed for guard and observation duty at that post. It did not take a long time for us to ascertain that there were among the non-slaveholding population many who professed sentiments not hostile to the Union, and that they had expressed a determination never to serve in the ranks of the rebel army. Lieutenant-Commander Flusser constantly urged upon me the importance of enlisting these men in the cause of the United States. Nearly all of the poorer class of inhabitants were still devoted to the old government; and many had successfully resisted rebel conscription, and had never given their allegiance to the rebel government.

Very few of them were slave-owners, and consequently had little interest in aiding the rebellion. They worked in their fields in groups, with arms near at hand during the day, and at night resorted to the swamps for shelter

against conscripting parties of rebel soldiers; and by thus constantly being on the alert, they succeeded in rendering unavailing all efforts to force them into the ranks of the Confederate army. In several interviews which I had with Commander Flusser, he urged me in the strongest manner to occupy the town of Plymouth, and to organize the Union men of that vicinity into a regiment of soldiers.

I had several conversations with General Burnside in relation to this matter, and the final result was that he placed the affair entirely in my hands. Accordingly, by appointment, Commodore Rowan and I met some two hundred and fifty Union men; and a free interchange of views in relation to the affairs of the country took place. The matter of great concern with them was, "What will become of us in case we are captured by the rebels?" We assured them that the Government of the United States would protect them and their families to the last extreme, and that any outrage perpetrated upon them or upon their families would be severely punished. An enlistment-roll was accordingly made out, and about one hundred men signed their names at once. Too much cannot be said of the devotion of these men under peculiar dangers — of these men of the 1st North Carolina. †

Things remained in this condition until July, 1862, when General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, of which my command was part, was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac.

† On the 1st of February, 1864, a large Confederate force, under the command of Major-General G. E. Pickett, made an advance upon New Berne, N. C., and after destroying the United States gun-boat *Underwriter*, burning a bridge or two, and capturing some prisoners, withdrew to Kinston. Among the prisoners captured were several natives of North Carolina, who had enlisted in our service. A court-martial was convened, composed of Virginians, and twenty-two of these loyal North Carolinians were convicted of and executed for (constructive) desertion. June 1st, 1865, Pickett applied to President Johnson for a pardon. Secretary Stanton and Judge Advocate-General Holt were for trying him, and his application hung fire. March 12th, 1866, he wrote to Lieutenant-General Grant, stating his grievances and again setting forth his claim for a pardon. Upon the back of that letter General Grant made this singular indorsement: "During the rebellion belligerent rights were acknowledged to the enemies of our country, and it is clear to

me that the parole given by the armies laying down their arms protects them against punishments for acts lawful for any other belligerents. In this case I know it is claimed that the men tried and convicted for the crime of desertion were Union men from North Carolina, who had found refuge within our lines and in our service. The punishment was a harsh one, but it was in time of war, and when the enemy no doubt felt it necessary to retain by some power the services of every man within their reach. General Pickett I know personally to be an honorable man, but in this case his judgment prompted him to do what cannot well be sustained, though I do not see how good, either to friends of the deceased or by fixing an example for the future, can be secured by his trial now. It would only open up the question whether or not the Government did not disregard its contract entered into to secure the surrender of an armed enemy." And the whole was referred to the President. The indorsement of General Grant was all-powerful, and nothing was done. — R. C. H.

THE BURNSIDE EXPEDITION. I

BY AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.



UNION LOOKOUT, MATTERAS BEACH.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

SOON after the 1st Rhode Island regiment was mustered out of service, I was appointed by President Lincoln to the office of brigadier-general. My commission was given to me on the 6th of August, 1861, and I was ordered to report to General McClellan, who placed me in charge of the division and brigades which were formed of the new troops as they arrived in Washington. My duty was to look after the drill and discipline of these brigades, with a view to giving the men the efficiency necessary for assignment to the older divisions of the army, which were then organizing in Washington under the name of

the Army of the Potomac. The duty was interesting in some respects, but was in the main somewhat tame, so that I very naturally desired more active duty.

One evening in the following October, General McClellan and I were chatting together over the affairs of the war, when I mentioned to him a plan for the formation of a coast division to which I had given some thought. After giving him a somewhat detailed account of the plan, he asked me to put it in writing as soon as possible, which was done. The next day it was presented to him, and it met his approval. He laid it before the Secretary of War, by whom it was also approved. The general details of the plan were briefly as follows: To organize a division of from 12,000 to 15,000 men, mainly from States bordering on the Northern sea-coast, many of whom would be familiar with the coasting trade, and among whom would be found a goodly number of mechanics; and to fit out a fleet of light-draught steamers, sailing vessels, and barges, large enough to transport the division, its armament and supplies, so that it could be rapidly thrown from point to point on the coast with a view to establishing lodgments on the Southern coast, landing troops, and penetrating into the interior; thereby threatening the lines of transportation in the rear of the main army then



UNIFORM OF THE 1ST RHODE ISLAND,
COLONEL A. E. BURNSIDE, WHICH
SERVED AT THE BATTLE OF
BULL RUN. (SEE ABOVE.)

† This paper was read by General Burnside before the Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island, July 7th, 1880, and is included here by permission of the Society, the text being somewhat abridged to conform to the plan of this work.—EDITORS.

concentrating in Virginia, and holding possession of the inland waters on the Atlantic coast.

After the approval of the plan, I was ordered to New York to fit out the fleet; and on the 23d of October orders were issued establishing my headquarters for the concentration of the troops of the division at Annapolis. Troops arrived from time to time at Annapolis, and all went well in the camp, which was established on beautiful grounds just outside the town. The improvement in drill and discipline was very rapid, but affairs did not progress so smoothly at the headquarters in New York. There was great difficulty in procuring vessels of a light draught, almost everything of that sort having already been called into service; but after much difficulty I was enabled to report to General McClellan on the 12th of December that a sufficient amount of transportation and armament had been secured for the division. It was a motley fleet. North River barges and propellers had been strengthened from deck to keelson by heavy oak planks, and water-tight compartments had been built in them: they were so arranged that parapets of sand-bags or bales of hay could be built upon their decks, and each one carried from four to six guns. Sailing vessels, formerly belonging to the coasting trade, had been fitted up in the same manner. Several large passenger steamers, which were guaranteed to draw less than eight feet of water, together with tug and ferry boats, served to make up the fleet, which gave a capacity to transport 15,000 troops, with baggage, camp-equipage, rations, etc. Light-draught sailing vessels were also added to the fleet, on which were stored building material for bridges, rafts, scows, intrenching implements, quartermasters' stores, tools, extra ordnance stores, etc. All of these vessels were ordered to rendezvous at Fort Monroe. Coal and water vessels were chartered in Baltimore, and ordered to rendezvous at the same place. The transports were ordered to Annapolis Harbor, at which point, after most mortifying and vexatious delays, they all arrived by the 4th of January, 1862, and on this day were promulgated the orders for embarkation, which were received with most enthusiastic cheers from one end of the camp to the other.

I had organized the division into three brigades, which were placed in command of General J. G. Foster, General Jesse L. Reno, and General John G. Parke, three of my most trusted friends. We had been cadets together at West Point, and I had always entertained for them the greatest confidence and esteem. In all future operations in the expedition, our close friendly relations were maintained, and I was never disappointed in any reliance which I placed on their gallantry, skill, and integrity. I had been notified by General McClellan that our destination would be Hatteras Inlet, with a view to operations in the inland waters of North Carolina.

On the 5th of January the troops began to embark. During that day there were some delays, which resulted from inexperience in the manœuvring of the vessels and in the new work to which they were unaccustomed. On that night, snow to the depth of from two to three inches fell, which gave to the camp and surrounding country, on the morning of the 6th, a most picturesque appearance. Regiment after regiment struck their tents and marched to the

point of embarkation, with bands playing, colors flying, and the men cheering and singing from lightness of heart. As they passed through the quaint old town of Annapolis, the lines of troops, with their dark uniforms and glittering bayonets, contrasted markedly with the snow-clad fields and trees. The men were not cheered and encouraged by many friendly voices, such as they had heard whilst coming from their homes to the seat of war; but they were



BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL RUSH C. HAWKINS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

not at all chilled by the reception, and cheerfully marched on to the work before them. Embarkation had become more easy to each regiment than it was to the preceding one, owing to the greater facility with which the vessels were handled. The order to break camp had been obeyed with joyful alacrity, and more troops poured into the Academy grounds during the day than could be embarked, so that large numbers remained there for the night. This bivouac was one of the most enlivening and beautiful that I saw during the war. There was very little sleep, but great joyousness. Wednesday morning every regiment was on board except the 6th New Hampshire, which arrived late on the night of the 7th, and was embarked on the next morning. The scene in the harbor was inspiring beyond description. The vessels, as

they passed each other from time to time, saluted with their steam-whistles, while the bands played and the troops cheered, the decks being covered with blue-coats, some chattering, some sleeping, others writing their last letters to their loved ones at home. The whole fleet seemed to be under a mixed influence of excitement and contentment.

On the morning of the 9th, each vessel set sail, under orders to rendezvous at Fort Monroe, and there, by the night of the 10th, all had joined the *Supply* and other vessels, making altogether a fleet of more than eighty. The harbor probably never presented a finer appearance than on that night. All the vessels were illuminated, and the air was filled with the strains of martial music and the voices of brave men. Not a man in the fleet knew his destination, except myself, the brigade commanders, and two or three staff-officers, yet there was no complaint or inquisitiveness, but all seemed ready for whatever duty was before them.

Sealed orders were given to the commanders of each vessel, to be opened at sea. Much discouragement was expressed by nautical men and by men high

in military authority as to the success of the expedition. The President and General McClellan were both approached, and the President was frequently warned that the vessels were unfit for sea, and that the expedition would be a total failure. Great anxiety was manifested to know its destination, but the secret had been well kept at Washington and at our headquarters. As Mr. Lincoln afterward told me, one public man was very importunate, and, in fact, almost demanded that the President should tell him where we were going. Finally, the President said to him, "Now, I will tell you in great confidence where they are going, if you will promise not to speak of it to any one." The promise was given, and Mr. Lincoln said, "Well, now, my friend, the expedition is going to sea!" The inquirer left him without receiving any further information. In this jocular manner Mr. Lincoln was in the habit of throwing off the cares of state; and it often occurs to me that but for that habit he would have broken down under the great weight of public responsibility which rested upon him from the first day of the war to the termination of his noble life. In my opinion, no man has ever lived who could have gone through that struggle as he did. At no period of his life, I believe, was his heart ever stirred with a feeling of enmity or resentment against any one. He was actuated by the simple desire and determination to maintain the authority of the Government at all hazards.

On the night of the 11th the signal for sailing was given, and very soon the fleet was under way. My headquarters were on board a large steamer, the *George Peabody*; but, with two or three of my staff-officers, I took for my headquarters during the voyage a small propeller called the *Picket*, in reality the smallest vessel in the fleet. I was moved to do this because of the great criticism which had been made as to the unseaworthiness of the vessels of the fleet, and because of a desire to show my faith in their adaptability to the service. Their weaknesses were known to me, but they were the best that could be procured, and it was necessary that the service should be performed even at the risk of losing life by shipwreck. The weather was threatening, but I did not foresee the storm by which we were afterward overtaken. At that time we had no weather signal reports; but, in any event, the sailing would not have been delayed, because the orders to proceed to our work were imperative. It was, of course, learned by all, after reaching the sea, that the destination of the fleet was Hatteras Inlet.

Just before midnight the *Picket* weighed anchor, and we were soon at sea, and it was not long before the little vessel was called upon to test her sea-going ability. On rounding Cape Hatteras we met a very strong breeze, and the little vessel got into the trough of the sea. It seemed for a time as if she would surely be swamped; but by skillful management the captain brought her head-to, after which she behaved better. We passed a most uncomfortable night. Everything on the deck that was not lashed was swept overboard; and the men, furniture, and crockery below decks were thrown about in a most promiscuous manner. The breeze died away toward morning, soon after which a heavy fog arose, which continued the greater part of the day. The ocean's swell kept one in constant thought that the little vessel was in



REAR-ADMIRAL GOLDSBOROUGH. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

momentary danger of going under. Toward night the wind arose, and within a short time it increased to a terrible gale, and we experienced more discomfort and dread, if possible, than on the preceding night. At times, it seemed as if the waves, which appeared to us mountain high, would engulf us, but then the little vessel would ride them and stagger forward in her course.

During the day before (the 12th), the fog had hidden the fleet, but at about midnight we discovered a large steamer upon our port bow. We fired a shot astern of her, which she answered by approaching us. It was the *Eastern Queen*; but we dared not go near her, for fear of being crushed. She seemed to us enormous, and we were all delighted when she answered the signal to lay by us until daylight, but to

keep off. In the morning more vessels were found to be in sight, and just before noon of the 13th we hove to, off Hatteras Inlet. Soon after, a tug-boat came out from the inlet, which, it will be remembered, had been occupied by General Butler and Commodore Stringham. [See map, p. 634.] The little boat undertook to do the duty of piloting the fleet over the bar. The *Picket* led the way, and bravely fought the breakers until she was safely anchored inside the harbor. Vessel after vessel followed us in, until we were ready to wish that the fleet were not so large. At one time it seemed as if our little boat would be crushed between two of the larger vessels which had dragged their anchors and were coming down upon her. Fortunately, the commanders of the vessels succeeded in checking them just as they came in contact with us. Most of the fleet arrived inside the bar during the afternoon.

The propeller *City of New York*, which was laden with supplies and ordnance stores, grounded on the bar, and proved a total loss. Her officers and crew clung to the rigging until the next day, when they were rescued by surf-boats sent to their assistance. One of the troop-vessels also grounded on the bar, after nightfall, and it seemed for a time as if she and her precious cargo would be lost. Some gallant volunteers went to her relief with a tug-

boat, which succeeded in getting her off the bar and into the harbor. The water and coal vessels did not approach the inlet, but went to sea as a matter of safety. Such of the vessels as were of too heavy draught to pass over the bar anchored under the protection of the cape. From one of these vessels, two officers, Colonel Joseph W. Allen and Surgeon Frederick A. Weller, of the 9th New Jersey, started in a surf-boat to report to me. They succeeded in reaching my headquarters, but on their return the boat was swamped by the breakers on the bar, and they were lost. † The crew, who were more skilled in such service, clung to the boat and were rescued. Strange to say, these were the only two of our force lost during the entire voyage and entrance into the inlet, notwithstanding the gloomy prognostications touching the seaworthiness of the vessels of the fleet. Besides the propeller, we lost the ship *Pocahontas*, with over a hundred horses on board. The gun-boat *Zouave* was sunk in the inlet after she crossed the bar, and proved a total loss, but no lives were lost. From the 14th until the 26th we had terrific weather, and it required the utmost care on the part of the commanders of the vessels to prevent a general disaster. Many of the vessels were driven from their anchors and grounded on the swash and the bar. Many collisions occurred, which caused great damage to the fleet. At times it seemed as if nothing could prevent general disaster. As I before said, the water and most of the coal vessels were driven to sea by the stress of the weather, and the entire fleet was for many days on short rations of water. Much suffering resulted from this, and at one time a flag of distress was hoisted on many of the vessels in consequence of the want of water. On one of these dreary days I for a time gave up all hope, and walked to the bow of the vessel that I might be alone. Soon after, a small black cloud appeared in the angry gray sky, just above the horizon, and very soon spread so as to cover the entire canopy, and in a few moments a most copious fall of rain came to our relief. Signals were given to spread sails to catch the water, and in a short time an abundance was secured for the entire fleet. I was at once cheered up, but was very much ashamed of the distrust which I had allowed to get the mastery of me.

From time to time we made efforts to cross the fleet from the inlet into Pamlico Sound, over what was called the swash, which separated it from the inlet. We had been led to believe that there were eight feet of water upon the swash, but when we arrived we discovered to our sorrow that there were but six feet; and as most of our vessels, as well as the vessels of the naval

† The loss of these officers occasioned profound gloom throughout New Jersey, and especially at Trenton, where the colonel was widely known and esteemed. Colonel Joseph W. Allen was born in Bristol, Pa., in 1811. He had been for many years a citizen of New Jersey, residing at Bordentown. Educated as a civil engineer, he had executed with signal ability many important works, including numerous railroad enterprises. He had been prominently identified with political affairs, and for six years had represented his county in the State Senate. From the firing upon Fort Sumter he gave all his thoughts and his time to the cause of the Union, at first in the position of

Deputy Quartermaster-General, where his energies were devoted to the forwarding of troops. When asked if he could look at his family and still say, "Country first," he replied: "In these times every man must say, 'Country first,' and that for the sake of his family." An evidence of the attachment and respect of his comrades is furnished in the monument erected to his memory by the officers of his regiment two years after his death. Surgeon Weller was born at Paterson in 1817, and was a gentleman of great intelligence and private worth, and his death was widely mourned.—Condensed from "New Jersey and the Rebellion," by John Y. Foster.


fleet which we found at Hatteras Inlet on our arrival, drew more water than that, it was necessary to deepen the channel by some process. The current upon the swash was very swift, a circumstance which proved to be much in our favor. Large vessels were sent ahead, under full steam, on the bar when the tide was running out, and then anchors were carried out by boats in advance, so as to hold the vessels in position. The swift current would wash



GENERAL BURNSIDE'S HEADQUARTERS, ROANOKE ISLAND. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

the sand from under them and allow them to float, after which they were driven farther on by steam and anchored again, when the sand would again wash out from under them. This process was continued for days, until a broad channel of over eight feet was made, deep enough to allow the passage of the fleet into the sound. On the 26th, one of our largest steamers got safely over the swash and anchored in the sound, where some of the gun-boats had preceded them. By the 4th of February the entire fleet had anchored and had passed into the sound, and orders were given for the advance on Roanoke Island. Detailed instructions were given for the landing of the troops and the mode of attack.

At an early hour on the morning of the 5th the start was made. The naval vessels, under Commodore Goldsborough, were in advance and on the flanks. The sailing vessels containing troops were taken in tow by the steamers. There were in all sixty-five vessels. The fleet presented an imposing appearance as it started up the sound. The day was most beautiful, and the sail was enjoyed beyond measure by the soldiers, who had long been so penned up in the desolate inlet. At sundown, signal was given to come to anchor within ten miles of Roanoke Island. At 8 o'clock the next morning the signal to weigh anchor was given, but our progress was very much retarded by a gale that sprung up; so we anchored, but very little in advance of our position of the night before. During that night all lights were carefully concealed. The naval vessels were well out in advance to protect the transports from the inroads of the rebel gun-boats.



GENERAL BURNSIDE AT THE CONFEDERATE COTTON BATTERY ON THE WHARF, NEW BERNE.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

On the morning of the 7th the gun-boats passed inside the narrow passage known as Roanoke Sound, and were soon abreast of the lower part of Roanoke Island. Soon after the naval fleet had passed through, the transport fleet began its passage. The rebel gun-boats were seen close inshore under the batteries of the island. At half-past 10 o'clock a signal gun was fired from one of the forts, announcing our approach. At half-past 11, one of the naval vessels opened fire, which was replied to by the rebels. Signals were given by the commodore of the fleet to begin the action. By noon the firing became rapid, and soon after, the engagement became general. The rebels had driven a line of piles across the main channel to obstruct the progress of our vessels, leaving a narrow space for themselves to retreat through; and as our naval vessels pressed them, they availed themselves of this means of safety. Our guns soon got the range of their batteries, and, by most extraordinary skill and rapidity of firing, almost silenced them. Just before noon I ordered a reconnoissance by a small boat, with the view of ascertaining a point of landing. A young negro, who had escaped from the island on our arrival at Hatteras Inlet, had given me most valuable information as to the nature of the shore of the island, from which I had determined that our point of landing should be at Ashby's Harbor, which was nearly midway up the shore. [See map, p. 641.]

At 1 o'clock, the quarters of the garrison in one of the forts were fired by one of our shells. The rebel gun-boats retired up the sound, but still continued a brisk fire as they were followed by our vessels. Orders were given for the troops to land at 3 o'clock. The ground in the rear of Ashby's Harbor was cleared by shells from the naval vessels, and our large surf-boats were

lowered, rapidly filled with troops, and towed up in long lines by light-draught vessels until they came near to the shore of the harbor, when each of the surf-boats was cut loose and steered for the shore. There was no obstruction to their landing. In less than an hour 4000 troops were ashore, and before midnight the entire force was landed, with the exception of one regiment, which was landed on the morning of the 8th. The advance of our troops was ordered on this morning, General Foster being in the advance and center, General Reno on the left, and General Parke on the right. Just above Ashby's Harbor the island from shore to shore was marshy, swampy ground. A causeway had been built up the center of the island, and on this, about one mile and a half from the harbor, was a fort, which was flanked by what seemed to be impassable ground; but it did not prove to be so to our troops. General Foster pressed the rebels in front, General Reno passed around the left with his brigade, often waist-deep in the marsh, through almost impenetrable thickets, until he gained the right flank of the enemy's line. General Parke performed equally good service on the right, and after advantageous positions had been obtained, the work was carried by a simultaneous assault, and from that time there was no hindrance to the march of our troops to the head of the island and to the forts on the shore, where the entire garrison was captured. The naval fleet pursued the rebel gun-boats, nearly all of which, however, were destroyed by their crews, to prevent capture. The results of this important victory were great, particularly in inspiring the confidence of the country in the efficiency of its armies in the field.

The troops enjoyed their rest at Roanoke Island, but were not allowed to remain idle long. On the 26th of February, orders were given to make arrangements to embark for New Berne, and within four days they were all on board. On the 12th of March, the entire command was anchored off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, and about fourteen miles from New Berne. The approach to the city had been obstructed by piles and sunken vessels. About four miles from New Berne a large fort on the shore had been built, with a heavy armament, and a line of earth-works extended from the fort inland a distance of some two miles, where it ended in almost impassable ground.

On the night of the 12th, orders were given for landing, and on the morning of the 13th the troops were put ashore, in very much the same way that they had been at Roanoke. By 1 o'clock the debarkation was finished, and the troops were put in line of march. About this time the rain began to fall, and the road became almost impassable. No ammunition could be carried except what the men themselves could carry. No artillery could be taken except the small howitzers, which were hauled by the troops with drag-ropes. This was one of the most disagreeable and difficult marches that I witnessed during the war. We came in contact with the enemy's pickets just before dark, when it was decided to delay the attack until morning. That night a most dreary bivouac followed. Early the next morning, notwithstanding the fog, the disposition for the attack was made. General Foster was ordered to engage the enemy on the right, General Reno to pass around on the extreme left, and General Parke to occupy the center. We were much nearer to the

enemy than we expected, and were soon in contact with them. General Foster rapidly closed with them, and met with severe resistance. He asked for reënforcements, but was told that every man had been ordered into action, and that there were no reserves. The contest was sharp, but brief. The 4th Rhode Island broke the enemy's line near where it crossed the railroad, after



BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT B. VANCE, C. S. A.
FROM A TINTYPE.

General Vance's portrait ought properly to have been used with the papers on the battle of Stone's River, in which he commanded a brigade. On November 17, 1861, his regiment, the 29th North Carolina, was sent to Tennessee; he took no part, therefore, in the resistance to Burnside in North Carolina.—EDITORS.

which the enemy wavered, and a general advance of our whole line placed us in possession of the works. The enemy fled to New Berne, burning the bridge behind them. Our troops rapidly pursued, but the fact that they had to cross the river in boats prevented them from capturing the main body of the enemy. As it was, large numbers of prisoners and munitions fell into our hands. In the meantime the naval vessels had worked their way up to the city and aided in the transportation of the troops across, and New Berne was occupied on the afternoon of the 14th.

It still remained for us to reduce Fort Macon, Beaufort. To this work General Parke's brigade was ordered. The country between New Berne and Beaufort was immediately occupied, and a passage by hand-car was made between the two places, all the rolling-stock having been run off the road. By the morning

of the 11th of April regular siege operations had been begun by General Parke and were pressed rapidly forward, and by the 26th of April the garrison at Beaufort had been forced to surrender.

Thus another victory was to be inscribed upon our banner. The Rhode Island troops bore a most honorable part in this conflict. After that, several small expeditions were sent into the interior of the country, all of which were successful.

Much to my sorrow, on the 3d of the following July I was ordered to go to the Peninsula to consult with General McClellan, and after that my duties as commanding officer in North Carolina ended; but a large proportion of the troops of the expedition served under me during the remainder of the war, as members of the gallant Ninth Corps.

The Burnside expedition has passed into history; its record we can be proud of. No body of troops ever had more difficulties to overcome in the same space of time. Its perils were both by land and water. Defeat never befell it. No gun was lost by it. Its experience was a succession of honorable victories.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT ROANOKE ISLAND AND NEW BERNE, N. C.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

ARMY.—Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside.
NAVY.—Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough.

TROOPS.—*First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John G. Foster: 10th Conn., Col. Charles L. Russell (k at Roanoke), Lieut.-Col. Albert W. Drake; 23d Mass., Col. John Kurtz; 24th Mass., Col. Thomas G. Stevenson; 25th Mass., Col. Edwin Upton; 27th Mass., Col. Horace C. Lee. *Brigade loss*: Roanoke, k, 19; w, 113=132. New Berne, k, 37; w, 145=182. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Jesse L. Reno: 21st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Alberto C. Maggi (at Roanoke), Lieut.-Col. William S. Clark (at New Berne); 9th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Charles A. Heckman; 51st N. Y., Col. Edward Ferrero; 51st Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. *Brigade loss*: Roanoke, k, 15; w, 79; m, 13=107. New Berne, k, 30; w, 169=199. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John G. Parke: 8th Conn., Col. Edward Harland; 11th Conn. (not at Roanoke), Lieut.-Col. Charles Mathewson; 9th N. Y. (not at New Berne), Col. Rush C. Hawkins; 4th R. I., Col. Isaac P. Rodman; 5th R. I. (1st Battalion), Maj. John Wright. *Brigade loss*: Roanoke, w, 17. New Berne, k, 21; w, 58=79. *Unassigned*: Detachment 1st N. Y. Marine Artillery, Col. William A. Howard; Co. B, 99th N. Y. (Union Coast Guard), Lieut. Charles W. Tillotson (c at New Berne). *Unassigned loss*: Roanoke Island, k, 2; w, 5=7. New Berne, k, 2; w, 8; m, 1=11.

DIVISION OF ARMED VESSELS, Capt. S. F. Hazard:

Picket, Capt. T. P. Ives; *Vidette*, Capt. John L. Foster; *Hussar*, Capt. Frederick Crocker; *Lancer*, Capt. M. B. Morley; *Ranger*, Capt. Samuel Emerson; *Chasseur*, Capt. John West; *Pioneer*, Capt. Charles E. Baker. [Only the *Picket* appears to have been used offensively in the attack on New Berne.]

NAVAL DIVISION, Commander S. C. Rowan:

Philadelphia (flag-steamers), Acting Master Com. Silas Reynolds; *Stars and Stripes*, Lieut.-Com. Reed Verden; *Louisiana*, Lieut.-Com. A. Murray; *Hetzel*, Lieut.-Com. H. K. Davenport; *Underwriter*, Lieut.-Com. William N. Jeffers (at Roanoke), Lieut.-Com. A. Hopkins (at New Berne); *Delaware*, Lieut.-Com. S. P. Quackenbush; *Commodore Perry*, Lieut.-Com. C. W. Flusser; *Valley City*, Lieut.-Com. J. C. Chaplin; *Commodore Barney*, Acting

Lieut.-Com. R. T. Renshaw; *Hunchback*, Acting Vol. Lieut.-Com. E. R. Colhoun; *Southfield* (flag-steamers temporarily at Roanoke), Acting Vol. Lieut. Com. C. F. W. Behm; *Morse*, Acting Master Com. Peter Hayes; *Whitehead* (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. Charles A. French; *Lockwood*, Acting Master Com. G. W. Graves; *Brinker*, Acting Master Com. John E. Giddings; *Seymour* (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. F. S. Wells; *Ceres* (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. John McDiarmid; *Putnam* (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. W. J. Hotchkiss; *Shawsheen* (at Roanoke), Acting Master Com. Thomas J. Woodward; *Granite* (at Roanoke), Acting Master's Mate Com. E. Boomer.

The batteries of the Union vessels at Roanoke Island and New Berne were as follows: *Philadelphia*, 2 twelve-pounders; *Stars and Stripes*, 4 eight-inch, 1 twenty-pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders; *Louisiana*, 1 eight-inch, 3 thirty-two-pounders, 1 twelve-pounder; *Hetzel*, 1 nine-inch, 1 eighty-pounder rifle; *Underwriter*, 1 eight-inch, 1 eighty-pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders; *Delaware*, 1 nine-inch, 1 thirty-two pounder, 1 twelve-pounder; *Commodore Perry*, 1 one-hundred-pounder rifle, 4 nine-inch, 1 twelve-pounder; *Valley City*, 4 thirty-two-pounders, 1 twelve-pounder; *Commodore Barney*, 4 nine-inch, 1 thirty-two-pounder, 1 twelve-pounder; *Hunchback*, 3 nine-inch, 1 one-hundred-pounder rifle; *Southfield*, 3 nine-inch, 1 one-hundred-pounder rifle; *Morse*, 2 nine-inch; *Whitehead*, 1 nine-inch; *Lockwood*, 1 eighty-pounder rifle, 2 twelve-pounders; *Henry Brinker*, 1 thirty-pounder rifle; *Seymour*, 1 thirty-pounder rifle, 1 twelve-pounder; *Ceres*, 1 thirty-pounder rifle, 1 thirty-two-pounder; *Putnam*, 1 twenty-pounder rifle, 1 thirty-two-pounder; *Shawsheen*, 2 twenty-pounder rifles; *Granite*, 1 thirty-two-pounder.

The total Union loss at Roanoke Island was 37 killed, 214 wounded, and 13 missing = 264; and at New Berne 90 killed, 380 wounded, and 1 missing = 471. At the former place the navy lost (exclusive of details from the army) 3 killed and 11 wounded, and at the latter place 4 wounded.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

ROANOKE ISLAND, Brig.-Gen. Henry A. Wise, Col. H. M. Shaw (c), second in command.

Troops: 2d N. C. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Wharton J. Green; 8th N. C., Col. H. M. Shaw; 17th N. C. (3 co's), Maj. G. H. Hill; 31st N. C., Col. John V. Jordan; 46th Va., Maj. H. W. Fry; 59th Va., Lieut.-Col. Frank P. Anderson.

NAVAL FORCES, Flag-Officer William F. Lynch:

Sea-Bird (flag-steamers), Lieut.-Com. Patrick McCarrick; *Ourlew*, Com. Thomas T. Hunter; *Ellis*, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Cooke; *Beaufort*, Lieut.-Com. W. H. Parker; *Raleigh*, Lieut.-Com. J. W. Alexander; *Fanny*, Midshipman Tayloe; *Forrest*, Lieut.-Com. James L. Hoole (w). The *Sea-Bird* was armed with 1 thirty-two-pound smooth-bore and 1 thirty-pounder rifle. The other vessels carried each 1 thirty-two-pounder rifle.

The total loss of the Confederate army is reported at


There is no definite statement in the Official Records of the numbers engaged on either side, and the returns furnish no satisfactory basis for an estimate.

23 killed, 58 wounded, 62 missing, and about 2500 captured. The loss of the navy was 6 wounded.

NEW BERNE, Brig.-Gen. L. O'B. Branch.

Troops: 7th N. C., Col. R. P. Campbell (commanded the right wing), Lieut.-Col. E. G. Haywood; 19th N. C. (cavalry), Col. S. B. Spruill; 26th N. C., Col. Zebulon B. Vance; 27th N. C., Maj. John A. Gilmer, Jr.; 28th N. C., Lieut.-Col. Thomas L. Lowe; 33d N. C., Col. Clark M. Avery (c), Lieut.-Col. R. F. Hoke; 35th N. C., Col. James Sinclair; 37th N. C., Col. Charles C. Lee (commanded the left wing), Lieut.-Col. William M. Barbour; Company N. C. Heavy Artillery, Captain C. C. Whitehurst; Special Battalion N. C. Militia, Col. H. J. B. Clark; N. C. Batteries, Capt. T. H. Brem and A. C. Latham.

The total Confederate loss was 64 killed, 101 wounded, 413 captured or missing = 578. Branch says of the missing, "About 200 are prisoners and the remainder at home."



DU PONT AND THE PORT ROYAL EXPEDITION.]

BY DANIEL AMMEN, REAR-ADMIRAL, U. S. N.



AFTER the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln as President of the United States, in March, 1861, a painful lethargy seemed to pervade every branch of the Administration, while the South was arming and organizing with extraordinary activity for the avowed purpose of destroying the Government, which apparently supinely awaited that event. The attack on

Fort Sumter broke the spell, after which an almost frantic energy manifested itself at the North in raising troops and in the purchase and armament of vessels to blockade the thousands of miles of Southern coasts. Naturally, the Navy Department sought the advice of Professor Alexander D. Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and it was at his suggestion that the department secured a board of conference composed of Captain S. F. Du Pont, of the Navy, as President, and Major J. G. Barnard, U. S. Engineers, Professor Bache, and Commander Charles H. Davis, U. S. Navy, as members.

In a private letter Captain Du Pont wrote, on the 1st of June: "It may be that I shall be ordered to Washington on some temporary duty, on a board to arrange a programme of blockade—first suggested by Professor Bache." The first memoir of the conference in the confidential letter-book of the Navy Department is written in pencil, has many erasures and interlineations, and is evidently the original draft of a paper, probably referred and never returned. It closes as follows:

"Finally, we will repeat the remark made in the beginning of this report, that we think the expedition to Fernandina should be undertaken simultaneously with a similar expedition having a purely military character. We are preparing a brief report on the latter, which we shall have the honor to submit in a few days."

Recently, the private correspondence of Admiral Du Pont has been kindly put within the scope of my researches, and his very clear and precise reports of the Port Royal expedition have been carefully examined, together with the reports of officers commanding vessels, the log-books of

most of the ships engaged, and other documentary evidence. No labor has been spared in verifying the events narrated, notwithstanding that my presence throughout our operations, in command of the gun-boat *Seneca*, gave me an intelligent personal view of the whole subject.—D. A.

A carefully prepared memoir, evidently the third, dated July 16th, discusses the question of blockade of the coast from Cape Henry to Cape Romain in one section, and from thence to Cape Florida in another section. These were afterward the limits of the North and South Atlantic blockading squadrons. A fourth report, dated July 26th, in treating of the methods to be employed in carrying out the blockade, states:

"Our second memoir, in which we discussed the occupation of Bull's Bay, St. Helena Sound, and Port Royal Bay, has left us little to say on the first of those subsections. When the three anchorages above mentioned are secured, the whole of this part of our coast will be under com-

plete control. But you are better aware than ourselves of the favorable manner in which our foreign political relations would be affected by the possession of one or more of the three points, the seizure of which was the topic of the second memoir.‡ A preceding discussion would be incomplete, if we were not to repeat at the conclusion that an inland passage from Savannah to Fernandina, long used by steamboats drawing five feet of water, unites in one common interest and intercourse all the bays, sounds, rivers, and inlets of which we have given little more than the names. A superior naval force must command the whole of this division of the coast."

On July 25th, Captain Du Pont wrote:

"They have our memoirs, and, Mr. Fox tells me, are at them. We are to see the Secretary, Mr. Welles, to-night, at our request, to talk over our labors." . . . [July 26th.] "Last night our conference had a meeting with the Secretary of the Navy and Mr. Fox, when the subject of the expeditions

was entered into. The Cabinet had our papers again." [July 28th.] "I sat up last night in the Navy Department until eleven, with Charles Davis, to prepare for this meeting, by condensing into notes the pith of our reports, and to read them to the board when called upon; but General Meigs seemed to desire that our full reports should be read, which I could not, of course, ask to be done, without seeming to attach too much importance to them. General Scott said at the conclusion, they were of singular ability, and he adopted every word of them; and General Totten told me there was not a criticism made. The meeting consisted of General Scott, General Totten, General Meigs, Colonel T. W. Sherman, Captain H. G. Wright, of the Engineers, and Colonel Cullum, aide-de-camp to the general."

Memoirs dated August 9th, September 2d and 3d, follow, giving a discussion of the blockade on the west coast of Florida, and to the border of Mexico.

A memoir dated September 12th discusses a proposition submitted from the department in relation to the taking of Fort Macon, which closes as follows:

"We beg leave to observe that here, and in all our previous reports and memoirs, we have confined ourselves to the treatment of cases, more or less special or general, connected with, and

‡ As it referred to a purely military expedition, this memoir was probably referred to the War Department, since it is not in the confidential files of the Navy Department.— D. A.



BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS W. SHERMAN.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

tending to promote, the efficiency and activity of the blockade of the Southern shores. We have not entered upon the exclusive consideration of the great military expeditions alone; we have treated mixed expeditions compounded of military and naval operations, and requiring combined naval and military action."


In the above extracts we can note the inception of the Port Royal expedition, so ably executed and so important in its results, as well as the creation of a systematic plan of blockade, practically extending from Cape Hatteras to the Rio Grande. It seems just to the memory of the late Rear-Admiral Du Pont and his associates in the conference, all of whom have passed away, to present these important facts in a substantial and reliable form.

The early attempts at blockade-coast from Hatteras to Florida the necessity of the occupying many Southern ports as blockade from within a made effective by one without the fatigue attendant upon an which must be the range of the possession of thirty vessels trances to unable to and de-

ing the revealed tion of as possible. A harbor may be or more ships and uncertainty exterior blockade, maintained beyond guns of an enemy in the adjacent coasts. Even blockading the two en- the Cape Fear River were prevent the frequent arrival pature of blockade-runners.

The only possible policy for the Navy Department was to secure the coöperation of the army. And after a well-outlined preliminary agreement, General Thomas W. Sherman, on the 2d of August, 1861, was directed "to proceed immediately to New York and organize, in connection with Captain Du Pont, of the navy, an expedition of twelve thousand men. Its destination," said his orders, "you and the naval commander will determine after you have sailed."

A dozen or more small gun-boats were then under construction in the Northern States on contract, and vessels of every size, from a canal steamboat to the



largest coasting steamers, were purchased and fitted with batteries, shell-rooms, and magazines, both for this expedition and to supply the general wants of the service in establishing and maintaining the most extended and effective blockade ever known in history. Under date of August 22d, 1861, Captain Du Pont wrote from New York:

"We drove where several of the purchased vessels were being altered, and examined the *Alabama*, *Augusta*, and *Stars and Stripes*. But, alas! it is like altering a vest into a shirt to convert a trading steamer into a man-of-war. Except that there is a vessel and a steam-engine, all else is inadaptable; but there is no help for it—the exigency of the blockade demands it." [August 23d.] "The *Tuscarora* (new steam sloop-of-war) was launched at Philadelphia yesterday. She was built in fifty-eight days, and thoroughly built too. Her keel was growing in Sussex county, Delaware, seventy days ago."

On the 19th of October, 1861, eighty days after the date of the order to General Sherman above quoted, Flag-Officer Du Pont (as officers in command of squadrons were then styled) left New York on board of the steam-frigate *Wabash*, followed by numerous men-of-war, among which were four small vessels, the *Unadilla*, *Ottawa*, *Pembina*, and *Seneca*, built in great haste and called "ninety-day gun-boats," as the contract had required their completion within that time. Other vessels purchased and improvised for war purposes proceeded when ready to Hampton Roads, where the large troop transports had already congregated, as well as war vessels, regular, irregular, and defective. Among them were ferry-boats and the old steamer *Governor*, never in her best days adapted to a sea voyage, on board of which were six hundred marines, sent as a force to operate speedily and without embarrassment in conjunction with naval vessels. Twenty-five chartered schooners, laden with coal, were also on hand, and, after being partially lightened by filling the bunkers of the squadron, were sent to sea under convoy of the sailing sloop *Vandalia* the day before the departure of the fleet.

On the morning of the 29th of October, the vessels of war and the army transports of all classes steamed outside and formed in order of sailing, which was the double échelon. The reader may know that this is in the shape of an inverted V, the leading vessel being the point, and the other vessels stretching out in lines but heading in a common direction. Our process of formation was not complete when the gun-boat *Unadilla* became disabled, and the signal was made to take her in tow. Our rate of speed was quite slow, due to a head-wind, and to the varied character of the vessels composing the fleet, which was larger than was ever before commanded by an American officer. Cape Hatteras, little more than a hundred miles from Cape Henry, was not reached until 1 o'clock on the morning of the 31st, when two of the heavier transports struck slightly on the shoals, which caused all of us to make for the south-east; and soon after, when south of the cape, we bore away. The wind had hauled more to the eastward before we reached Hatteras, and that, with a rough sea, had caused considerable indraught; and the drift from the action of the wind on the large hulls, added to our low speed, had set us considerably to leeward.

Hatteras is known to navigators as being subject to great and sudden

changes in the weather: there are few nights in the year when lightning cannot be seen from the top of the light-house, usually to seaward, over the Gulf Stream, which here approaches nearer to the coast than at any other point. An ocean depth of 2000 fathoms or more stretches almost in a direct line from the low sand islands east of Nassau to within a distance of 12 miles of the cape; from the shore the water deepens very rapidly to 100 fathoms, and then falls abruptly to a depth of 2500 fathoms. This great depth, so near the land, and the Gulf Stream sweeping even nearer, are the probable causes of the sudden and violent changes of the weather there prevailing, which were discussed in one of the memoirs of the conference.


On rounding the cape, the wind gradually rose, the sea became heavy, a dull leaden sky shut out the light, and not long after midday there were assurances of a south-east gale. About 2:30 p. m. the weather was so rough that signal was made from the flag-ship to commanders of vessels to disregard the order of sailing and take care of their individual commands.

In order to make the best of our way, and the better to avoid collisions with other vessels of the fleet, the *Seneca* was kept on the port tack, and "hove to," barely turning the engines, the vessel being under close-reefed fore and main sails. Had she been square-rigged, the other tack would have been necessary to her safety. In the drifting mists and rain, it soon grew dark. The greater part of that night I stood under the lee of the weather bulwark, near the wheel, casting glances to windward, to be in readiness to bear away should a vessel be seen coming down upon us. It was a long, weary, and anxious night. On peering to windward, the rain-drops pelted the face like sleet, and the phosphorescent spray broke over us in superlative grandeur. At 3 o'clock I observed what had been an object of watchfulness—an arch rising in the west, precursor of a sudden change of wind. The mainsail was lowered, and when the squall struck us the foresheet was shifted over. At 9 or 10 a. m. the gale had abated greatly, and the flag-ship was well under our lee; we then wore ship and were soon in her wake. Later in the day several other vessels fell into line.

We will now note the actual losses from the gale, that became known to us some days later. The *Isaac Smith* was disabled and her commander forced



REAR-ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PONT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



UNION GUN-BOAT "SENECA," CAPTAIN DANIEL AMMEN'S VESSEL AT PORT ROYAL. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

to throw his battery overboard, with the exception of one 30-pounder rifle, to enable him to go to the assistance of the *Governor*, which foundered at sea. The *Young Rover*, fortunately coming up, was able to signal to the sailing frigate *Sabine* in the distance, and, after most strenuous exertions, the marine battalion and crew of the *Governor*, with the exception of seven who were lost, were transferred to the *Sabine*. Of the army transports, the *Peerless*, laden with stores, went down, the crew being rescued by the *Mohican*. The steamers *Belvidere*, *Union*, and *Osceola*, having army stores on board, but no troops, either sank or never reached their destination. The large army transport *Winfield Scott* was so disabled that she never left Port Royal harbor after entering.

The morning of November 3d was a bright Sunday, with a moderate breeze and a smooth sea. Several others of the small steamers with the *Seneca* were following in the wake of the flag-ship. In obedience to signal, I went on board that vessel, and received orders to be delivered to Captain Lardner of the *Susquehanna*, the senior officer blockading Charleston, distant about thirty miles. These directed certain vessels to rendezvous off Port Royal entrance, but not to leave the line of blockade until after nightfall. No sooner was the *Seneca* fairly in sight of Sumter than the signal guns were fired, to announce the arrival of the *avant-courier* of the fleet that they knew was intended for the attack of Port Royal. After passing Bull's Bay, I had the belief that we were bound for Port Royal, but no actual knowledge of the fact until going on board of the *Wabash*, as my orders were marked "Confidential — not to be opened unless separated from the flag-ship." At the very time we were weathering the gale, the following telegram was sent:

"Richmond, Nov. 1, '61. Gov. Pickens, Columbia, S. C. I have just received information, which I consider entirely reliable, that the enemy's expedition is intended for Port Royal. J. P. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War."


The same telegram was sent to Generals Drayton and Ripley, commanding respectively at Port Royal and Charleston.

It was a charming mild afternoon when I stepped on the deck of the *Susquehanna*. Captain Lardner was delighted with his orders, and, after giving

him such information as would be of interest, I obtained permission to go up to the entrance to the swash channel, which was well known to me previously, when sounding out the bar on Coast Survey duty. After the sun went down, all the vessels designated left the line of blockade, proceeding, like ourselves, to the entrance of Port Royal harbor, some sixty miles away. Following the seven-fathom curve, the *Seneca* rounded the shoal lying east of the main channel, known as "Martin's Industry," at early daylight, and soon after found a small black barrel-buoy, which, we rightly conjectured, had been put there by the enemy. An hour after sunrise, aided by the refraction, the tops of the pine-trees on both sides of the headlands were plainly in sight, although twelve miles off. At that hour the flag-ship *Wabash* was at anchor with several other vessels about two miles distant, and the eastern horizon was flecked with approaching vessels. We steamed out to the flag-ship at a later hour, reported the finding of the barrel-buoy, and were informed that the entrance would soon be sounded out. About noon, Captain C. O. Boutelle, in the Coast Survey steamer *Vixen*, with the gun-boats *Pawnee*, *Ottawa*, *Pembina*, *Curlew*, and *Seneca*, crossed the bar and went far enough in to have a good view of the faces and embrasures of the earth-works that we were soon to engage, the one on Hilton Head known as Fort Walker and the other on Bay Point as Fort Beauregard.☆


After the surveying steamer had planted some buoys, to serve as general guides, the four gun-boats last named anchored in the channel some distance apart, as additional guides, the one farthest in being some three miles from Fort Beauregard, the *Vixen* and the *Pawnee* going out to pilot the vessels across the bar. This was done without delay; all of them that came in had no more than eighteen feet draught. They anchored a mile or so outside of the gun-boats, and from the shoal ground to seaward.

Near sunset three steamers came outside of the headlands and fired at our gun-boats at long range. The steamers were under the command of Josiah Tattnall, a commodore in the Confederate service, who had been a distinguished officer of our navy, and had resigned some time before, on the secession of Georgia, of which State he was a citizen. His vessels were river boats; as men-of-war they were in every respect of the most vulnerable class. The four advanced gun-boats of our squadron got under way, pivoted their heavy shell-guns over the starboard bow, and headed to the westward so as to bring



SLOOP OF WAR "VANDALIA," REAR SHIP OF THE LINE AT PORT ROYAL.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

☆ On Nov. 15th, 1861, General T. W. Sherman changed the name of Fort Walker to Fort Welles (after Secretary Welles), and of Fort Beauregard to Fort Seward (after the Secretary of State).



MAP OF THE NAVAL ATTACK AT HILTON HEAD, NOV. 7, 1861.


their guns to bear. This course with that of the enemy would soon have brought Tattnall's steamers in unpleasant proximity, and in consequence they turned abruptly, passed between the headlands, and disappeared in the distance.

Soon after sunrise the next day, three steamers commanded by Tattnall made their appearance in like manner. It so happened that General H. G. Wright, of the army, and Captain John Rodgers, of the navy, had gone on board of the *Ottawa*, under the instructions of their commanding officers, to make a reconnoissance of the forts, and had brought within supporting distance the *Pawnee*, carrying a heavy battery, and the *Isaac Smith*, carrying one 30-pounder rifle. They were approaching when Tattnall was pretty well out, and had opened fire on the smaller gun-boats. Signal was made to the *Seneca*, *Pembina*,

and *Curlew* to follow the movements of the *Ottawa*, and we went in, following Tattnall's steamers, then in retreat, and firing on them, until we were nearly on an air-line between the two earth-works before named. They opened fire on us, at rather too long a range for effective work, with smooth-bore guns; several rifles were also used by the forts, as well as by the Confederate vessels. One of our shells blew up a caisson in Fort Beauregard, and we soon became fairly informed of the number of the enemy's guns bearing on the entrance, and in a measure as to their caliber. On signal, we went out of action and anchored, without having received any material damage; the rigging of all of the vessels was cut more or less. After seven bells, "when the sun is over the foreyard," Tattnall's flag-ship *Savannah*, accompanied by a steamer, came out on the flats, or shoaler waters, to the westward of the channel. They flew about somewhat wildly, had considerable headway, and threw a rifle-shell occasionally, firing "promiscuously," but mostly at the nearest vessel, which was the *Seneca*. Her executive officer was directed to call the eleven-inch pivot gun's crew to quarters and fire a shell at ricochet, the distance supposed to be about 2500 yards. The gun was at once reported ready, and the request made to fire at an elevation. Appreciating the fact that

one rarely does well when not doing what he thinks best, I took the matter personally in hand, had the gun leveled and trained as desired, and pulled the lanyard. The huge shell skipped along the surface of a glassy sea, and, as reported from aloft, struck the vessel abaft the starboard wheel-house. In a moment the head of the flag-ship was turned for the harbor, and she lost no time in entering, followed by her consort. It was soon afterward known that the captain of the vessel had availed himself of the temporary absence of Tattnall, and had sallied out to have a little diversion, which would have proved serious had the shell exploded that lodged in the hog-braces.

About the time of this occurrence, the flag-ship *Wabash* crossed the bar, followed by all of the heavy vessels, including the transports, and anchored some two miles outside of Fishing Rip Shoal, some five miles from the forts, the bar being about twelve miles outside of the headlands. Very soon after the flag-ship anchored, signal was made for officers commanding



UNION GUN-BOAT "MOHAWK," THE GUARD-SHIP AT PORT ROYAL.
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

vessels to come aboard. On their arrival, those who commanded vessels detailed for the main line were invited into the cabin, and instructions were given as to position and plan of battle; and afterward those commanding vessels in the flanking line received their instructions, which differed as to the duties to be performed after passing within and beyond the earth-works. It was the intention of the flag-officer at that time to go at once into action, although the hour would of necessity be late.

The main line was to be on the west or Hilton Head side, in line ahead, and the vessels one ship's-length apart. The report of the flag-officer states: "The order of battle comprised a main squadron ranged in line ahead, and a flanking squadron, which was to be thrown off on the northern section of the harbor to engage the enemy's flotilla, and prevent their raking the rear ships of the line when it turned to the southward, or cutting off a disabled vessel."

The leading ship of the main squadron was the frigate *Wabash*, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers, followed by the frigate *Susquehanna*, Captain J. L. Lardner; sloop *Mohican*, Commander S. W. Godon; sloop *Seminole*, Commander J. P. Gillis; sloop *Pawnee*, Lieutenant Commanding R. H. Wyman; gun-boat *Unadilla*, Lieutenant Commanding N. Collins; gun-boat *Ottawa*, Lieutenant Commanding T. H. Stevens; gun-boat *Pembina*, Lieutenant Commanding J. P. Bankhead; and the sailing sloop *Vandalia*, Commander F. S. Haggerty, towed by the *Isaac Smith*, Lieutenant Commanding J. W. A. Nicholson. The



HILTON HEAD, FORT WALKER. ATTACK OF THE UNION FLEET, THE "WABASH" LEADING. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH. FORT BEAUREGARD, BAY POINT.


flanking squadron was led by the gun-boat *Bienville*, Commander Charles Steedman, followed by the *Seneca*, Lieutenant Commanding Daniel Ammen; gun-boat *Curlew*, Lieutenant Commanding P. G. Watmough; gun-boat *Penguin*, Lieutenant Commanding T. A. Budd; and the gun-boat *Augusta*, Commander E. G. Parrott.

The plan of attack was to pass up midway between Forts Walker and Beauregard, receiving and returning the fire of both, to about two and one-half miles north of the forts, then to turn toward and close in with Fort Walker, encountering it on its weakest flank, and at the same time enfilading its two water faces. While standing to the southward the vessels would be head to tide, with just enough headway to preserve the order of battle in passing the batteries in slow succession, and to avoid becoming a fixed mark for the enemy's fire. On reaching the extremity of Hilton Head and the shoal ground making off from it, the line was to turn to the north by the east, and, passing northward, to engage Fort Walker with the port battery, but nearer than on entering. These evolutions were to be repeated. A plan of battle was sent to the Navy Department. The "New York


Herald" of November 20th, 1861, contains a diagram in accord with the above statement, and was probably taken from the official one. There was another point in the instructions given by the flag-officer to officers commanding vessels in the flanking line that is not mentioned in his report. He said in substance, if not in words, that, in passing in, the flanking line was to deliver its fire against the fort on Bay Point, and then to guard the fleet of transports within the bar from any attempts of Tattnall; that he knew him well; that he had courage and power to plan, and in the heat of action might try to run out to destroy the transports which it was the special duty of the flanking squadron to protect; and that when Tattnall was disposed of, the vessels would take an enfilading position somewhere to the northward of the Hilton Head fort.

After receiving our instructions, the officers commanding vessels returned without delay to their commands, and made preparations for immediate movement. Soon after, the flag-ship made signal and got under way, as did all of the men-of-war. The *Wabash* stood in toward the forts, and got aground. "In our anxiety to get the outline of the forts before dark," the flag-officer reported, "we stood in too near to Fishing Rip Shoal, and the vessel grounded. By the time she was gotten off it was too late, in my judgment, to proceed, and I made signal for the squadron to anchor out of gunshot of the enemy." The shoal where the *Wabash* grounded was a little short of three miles from the forts. The vessels anchored in convenient positions for the formation of the lines when signaled, and were sufficiently inside of the transports to be unembarrassed by them in forming.

The following day [November 7th] we had a heavy westerly wind. The report of General Thomas F. Drayton, the Confederate commander, states: "On the 6th, the fleet and transports, which had increased to about forty-five sail, would probably have attacked us had not the weather been very boisterous." This conjecture was quite right. The flag-officer was impatiently awaiting the abatement of the wind, and about noon was almost on the point of going in, but wisely deferred the attack until we could make it without disadvantage. Drayton's picturesque report of the engagement continues: "At last the memorable 7th dawned upon us, bright and serene; not a ripple upon the broad expanse of water to disturb the accuracy of fire from the broad decks of that magnificent armada about advancing, in battle array, to vomit forth its iron hail, with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious strength."



TEN-INCH SHELL GUN WHICH THREW THE OPENING SHOT FROM THE FLAG-SHIP "WABASH." FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.



BAY POINT AND FORT BEAUREGARD, AFTER CAPTURE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

On the 7th, as soon as the morning light permitted, signals were made indicating that we would soon move. The flag-ship was then at anchor near where she had grounded, nearly three miles from the forts. In consequence of a hawser fouling her propeller, some delay occurred in forming after the vessels were under way, and it was 9 o'clock when signal was made for close order. Tattnall's flotilla at that time was nearly in line between the forts.↓ As we advanced, at 9:26, the forts, as well as the enemy's vessels, lying right ahead, opened fire on the foremost ships. Soon after, the flag-ship yawed sufficiently to bring a heavy pivot gun on her bow to bear on Tattnall's command, which forced him to retreat, as his vessels would soon have been within reach of our broadside guns. At that time our rate of speed was about six miles, and we were soon making good use of our batteries; the enemy on both sides of the bay had the full benefit of all the shells that both lines could send with precision. So great was the cannons' roar that it was distinctly heard at Fernandina, seventy miles away. There was deafening music in the air, which came from far and near and all around; heavy clouds of dust and smoke, due to our bursting shells and the enemy's fire, partly obscured the earth-works, while our vessels were but dimly seen through the smoke from their own guns which hung over the water. The log-book of the flag-ship states: "At 9:45 the *Bienville* ranged alongside our star-board beam." This was eighteen minutes after the enemy had opened fire on the fleet, and eight minutes before the flag-ship ceased firing and turned toward Hilton Head to repass the fort in heading toward the sea. This was the opportunity for the *Bienville* to open wide her throttles: with her great speed, possibly she might have run down Tattnall's vessels before they could have been pointed fairly and reached the entrance to Scull Creek. The log-book of the *Bienville* states: "At 10:30 the flag-ship winded the line, turning to the southward, when we engaged for a few minutes three steamers that were within long range up the river. We soon put them to flight, and then followed the line in the order of battle, down within close range of the large battery

↓ A friend of many years, who was in command of one of Tattnall's vessels, writes as follows: "There is one touching incident that I think deserves record. When the old hero Tattnall got in good range of Du Pont's flag-ship, and was about to receive

his fire, he said to the signal quartermaster: 'Dip my broad pennant to my old messmate,' and it was dipped thrice. In the confusion it was not noticed by Du Pont, which I am sure he would have regretted had he known it."—D. A.


on Hilton Head. . . .” The same authority establishes the fact that the *Bienville* thereafter, during the engagement, followed in the main line.]

The report of the *Seneca* states:

“On the morning of the 7th we took position assigned us in the line, and, passing up, delivered our fire at Bay Point, and on arriving out of the fire of the enemy’s batteries, made chase, as directed by instructions, on the rebel steamers. They, being river boats, soon left us.”

The log-book of the same vessel states that when she turned to join in the attack on Hilton Head, Tattnell’s steamers turned also and came toward the fleet, only retreating when she again steamed toward them, so as to make an engagement unavoidable should they advance farther. They then entered the intricate channel to Scull Creek and disappeared behind a wooded point, after which the *Seneca*, with other vessels of the flanking line, took up an enfilading position to the northward of Fort Walker, as previously instructed. Several vessels of the main line were also delivering an enfilading fire, among others the *Mohican*, properly next in the main line to the *Susquehanna*. Godon, who commanded her, was very excitable, and it may be on seeing a strange vessel ahead in his line, imagined that the well-planned attack had been transformed into a “free fight,” and the best he could do was to serve his battery well from the most effective point he could take up.

As an exhibition of physical force, allied to human action,



RIFLE-GUN AT FORT BEAUREGARD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

] Rear-Admiral Steedman sends to the editors the following explanation of the movements of his vessel: “The *Bienville* was the leading ship in the flanking or starboard column. After the fleet had passed into Port Royal Sound, and as the *Wabash* was turning to pass out, Tattnell’s gun-boats were seen approaching from the mouth of Scull Creek. The *Bienville* was at once pointed in that direction, and opened fire from the 30-pounder Parrott on the forecastle. The gun-boats replied with an ineffectual fire at long range. None of the shots reached her. A brisk fire was kept up from the Parrott gun, and as the shells began to fall among the gun-boats they turned and stood up toward Scull Creek. Here the *Bienville* could not safely follow them, as she drew over sixteen feet and had neither chart nor pilot for the channel; while Tattnell’s river steamers, with their light draught and the familiarity of the officers with the waters, could retreat to a position where the *Bienville*, in

following them, would almost certainly have taken the ground. Moreover, the *Bienville* was within hail of the flag-ship, and a word from the flag-officer would have sent her up Broad River had he desired her to assume the risk. After the second turn within the forts, the *Wabash* was proceeding slowly down, followed by the *Susquehanna*, when the *Mohican* and the vessels astern of her left the line and took up a position above Fort Walker. The position enabled these ships to enfilade the works; but the movement was a departure from the order of battle, and it continued, notwithstanding signals to close up from the flag-ship. The *Bienville* took her position astern of the *Susquehanna*, and these two were the only vessels that followed the *Wabash* on her third circuit; or, to speak more precisely, on her second passage out and her third passage in, under the fire of the forts.

“CHARLES STEEDMAN,


“Rear-Admiral, Retired.”

FORT WALKER.

"WABASH."

FORT BEAUREGARD.

"PAWNEE."



1.—BATTLE OF THE UNION FLEET WITH FORTS WALKER AND BEAUREGARD. 2.—HOISTING THE STARS AND STRIPES OVER FORT WALKER. FROM WAR-TIME SKETCHES.

I can conceive nothing more grand than a view of the main deck of the *Wabash* on this occasion. The hatches being battened down, a faint light only came through the ports, as did the flashes from the discharged guns, which recoiled violently with a heavy thud. As far as the smoke would

permit, hundreds of men were visible in very rapid motion, loading and running out the guns with the greatest energy. Such a view, accompanied by the noise of battle, is weird and impressive to the highest degree.

The vessels in the main line slowly passed toward the sea, throwing their shells into the earth-work with the utmost precision, and this destruction was supplemented by the fire of ten of the vessels from an enfilading position. As the main line headed seaward, the enemy may have had an idea that his fire was so destructive that the vessels were retreating, and Tattnall, with his three weak vessels, was then disposed to swoop down and pick up "lame ducks"; but, being confronted by one small gun-boat, he thought it best to enter Scull Creek, where at least he would be available for carrying off the Southern troops, if they were defeated. Though Tattnall was a brave and skillful seaman, the law of force was inexorable; and when an officer is a free agent, looking only to the success of his cause, he should not lead his command into destruction without being able to secure a commensurate advantage.

Arriving at the shoal ground off Hilton Head, the flag-ship and her followers turned again within the harbor, and in passing northward availed themselves of the occasion to give Fort Beauregard the benefit of their broadsides. Meantime the enfilading vessels had been steadily throwing their shells into Fort Walker. In relation to this hour [about 10 A. M.], General Drayton states:

"Besides this moving battery, the fort was enfiladed by two gun-boats anchored to the north, off the mouth of Fish Hall Creek, and another at a point on the edge of the shoals to the south. This enfilading fire, on so still a sea, annoyed and damaged us excessively, particularly as we had no gun on either flank of the bastion to reply with."

The vessel near the shoal, to the south, was probably the *Pocahontas*, commanded by Percival Drayton, brother of the general in command of the Confederate forces; she only crossed the bar about noon, having been delayed by deranged machinery.

The main line passed nearer Fort Walker than on entering, and delivered its fire "with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious strength." Arriving at the turning-point, signal was again made to its vessels to take position, when the *Wabash* led once more, and to within six hundred yards of the fort. The nearness of the ships was the probable cause of their suffering so little damage, the enemy's shots passing over the hulls. The flag-ship was naturally the most conspicuous target, but the shots received by her were high up, the enemy presumably delivering his fire for a distance of a thousand yards or more. At this time a shell was seen to pass between the flag-officer and the captain of the vessel, who were standing on the "bridge" extending across the vessel, just forward of the mainmast.

The flag-officer expressed officially his great admiration of the firing of the batteries of the *Wabash* and of the *Susquehanna*, which was next in line. In a private letter, written just after the engagement, he said of the former:

"In our first attack I was not satisfied with the execution of this ship, though the effect turned out to be much greater than I thought, but in the second attack I can remember nothing in naval history that came up to this ship in the terrific repetitions of her broadsides, and, to use the illustration of the reporter of the 'London News,' 'the rising of the dust on shore in perpendicular columns looked as if we had suddenly raised from the dust a grove of poplars.'"

At 1:15 the *Ottawa* signaled that the enemy was leaving the fort, and fifteen minutes later the same signal was made by the *Pembina*. At this time the flag-ship and her followers had returned from their tour, and were again ready to swoop down and deliver other broadsides. Two pivot guns fired from the flag-ship received no response, and signal was made to cease firing. Captain John Rodgers, who was serving as aide to the flag-officer, was sent on shore with a flag of truce. On landing he found no garrison, and



BRIG.-GEN. THOMAS F. DRAYTON, C. S. A., COMMANDER
OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES AT PORT ROYAL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

at 2:20 p. m. hoisted the Union flag over the fort. When that honored emblem appeared, the rigging was manned in an instant on board the flag-ship and on all of the vessels of war at anchor; three cheers were wafted over the waters, so loud that they startled the defenders of Fort Beauregard. \ Commander C. R. P. Rodgers, with the marines of the flag-ship and a division of small-arm men, landed and threw out pickets. The transports at once steamed in. Soon after sunset the fort was delivered by the naval force to General H. G. Wright, who now held watch and ward as far as the pine-trees some hundreds of yards distant.

Soon after the hoisting of our flag, a vessel was directed to make a reconnoissance of Bay Point, but at

nightfall, as nothing had been heard from her, the *Seneca* was sent to ascertain the situation. When we arrived in front of Fort Beauregard, it was so dark that the bow of the vessel was run up on the low beach. There, outlined on the horizon, was the earth-work lying in grim repose, the embrasures being plainly visible. The silence was unbroken; the work had evidently been abandoned. The flood-tide was setting in strongly. The crew of one hundred men were sent as far aft as possible and the engines backed. We at once slid off, and the flag-officer was fully informed as soon as we could steam over. Orders were then given to return to Bay Point at early daylight to reconnoiter, and, if we were not met by force, to hoist our flag at sunrise. This was duly executed, and at noon the fort was turned over to General Isaac I. Ste-

\ Captain Stephen Elliott, Jr., who was at Fort Beauregard, reported: "Colonel Dunovant [who commanded the forces] entered the fort, and said to me: 'Captain Elliott, what is the condition of things over the river?' I replied, 'Fort Walker has been silenced, sir.'—'By what do you judge?' 'By the facts that the fort has been subjected to a heavy enfilade and direct fire, to which it has ceased to reply; that the vessels having terminated their

fire, the flag-ship has steamed up and delivered a single shot, which was unanswered, and that thereupon cheering was heard from the fleet.'—'Then, sir, it having been proved that these works cannot accomplish the end for which they were designed (that of protecting the harbor) you will prepare to retire from a position from which our retreat may readily be cut off, and which our small force will not enable us to hold against a land attack.'"

vens, of the army. The flag-staff was on the gable of a small frame-house fifty yards from the fort. I went within, saw some books lying on a table, and went out and toward some tents in the distance. In a few minutes an explosion was heard, and, on turning, I saw a cloud of smoke where the house had stood. A quantity of powder had been put under it, arranged so as to ignite from a friction-tube, and a sailor, in passing along outside, had struck his foot against a small wire attached to the tube, thus causing the explosion. He was knocked over, and partially stunned, but soon revived. It may be said that it is natural in warfare to harm your enemy as much as possible, but it strikes the man who has escaped being blown up that such devices are essentially mean.

The armament found on Fort Walker was as follows: on the right angle of the sea-face, a 6-inch rifled-gun, six 32-pounders (three dismounted and with carriages ruined and another with the cascabel knocked off), one 10-inch and one 8-inch Columbiad, three sea-coast 7-inch howitzers; on the left angle of the sea-front, a 6-inch rifle; on the left wing, one 32-pounder and one sea-coast howitzer; on the outer work, in rear, two 32-pounders, one 8-inch heavy howitzer, and two English siege 12-pounders; on the right wing, three 32-pounders,—total, 23 guns. Twenty guns were found in Fort Beauregard, one of which was a 6-inch rifle, burst, and the carriage entirely destroyed. The heaviest guns were a 10-inch and an 8-inch Columbiad; the other guns mostly 32-pounders. ☆ The armaments of the attacking vessels, and the losses on both sides, will be found on page 691.

In his report General T. W. Sherman states:

“The beautifully constructed work on Hilton Head was severely crippled and many of the guns dismounted. Much slaughter had evidently been made there, many bodies having been buried in the fort, and some twenty or thirty were found some half-mile distant. . . . The number of pieces of ordnance that have fallen into our hands is fifty-two, the bulk of which is of the largest caliber, all with fine carriages, etc., except eight or nine, that were ruined by our fire, which dismounted their pieces.”

On the afternoon of the 8th General Sherman made a reconnoissance, on

☆ General Drayton thus describes the resistance made to the attack of the Union fleet, referring at the outset to the first shot from Fort Walker:

“The shell from the Dahlgren exploded near the muzzle, and was harmless. Other shots followed from both forts, and soon the fire became general on land and water. In spite of our fire, directed with deliberation



CAPTAIN PERCIVAL DRAYTON, COMMANDER OF THE U. S. STEAMER "POCAHONTAS" AT PORT ROYAL—BROTHER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE CONFEDERATE FORCES. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

and coolness, the fleet soon passed both batteries apparently unharmed, and, then returning, delivered in their changing rounds a terrific shower of shot and shell in flank and front. Besides this moving battery, the fort was enfiladed by two gun-boats anchored to the north, off the mouth of Fish Hall Creek, and another at a point on the edge of the shoals to the south. This enfilading fire, on so still a sea, annoyed and damaged us excessively,



THE OLD HEADQUARTERS, HILTON HEAD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

board of the *Seneca*, several miles up the Beaufort River. On the following day that vessel was sent to Beaufort, supported by two gun-boats. This visit brought to view an extraordinary scene. On the wharves were hundreds of negroes, wild with excitement, engaged in carrying movables of every character, and packing them in scows. As the gun-boats appeared, a few mounted white men rode away rapidly. A very beautiful rural town had been abandoned by all of the white inhabitants, quite as though fire and sword awaited them had they remained. Instead of that, I was directed by the flag-officer to assure the peaceable inhabitants that they would be protected in life and property. This

particularly as we had no gun on either flank of the bastion to reply with, for the 32-pounder on the right flank was shattered very early by a round shot, and on the north flank for want of a carriage no gun had been mounted. After the fourth fire the 10-inch Columbiad bounded over the limber and became useless. The 24-pounder rifled cannon was choked while ramming down a shell, and lay idle during nearly the whole engagement. The shells for the 9-inch Dahlgren were also too large. The fourth shell attempted to be rammed home could not be driven below the trunnions, and was then at great risk discharged. Thus far the fire of the enemy had been endured and replied to with the unruffled courage of veterans. At 10:30 our gunners became so fatigued that I left the fort, accompanied by one of my volunteer aides, Captain H. Rose, and went back to Captain Read's battery (one and three-quarter miles to the rear of the fort) and brought the greater part of his men back to take the places of our exhausted men inside the fort. . . . Two o'clock had now arrived, when I noticed our men coming out of the fort, which they had bravely defended for four and a half hours against fearful odds, and then only retiring when all but three of the guns on the water-front had been disabled, and only 500 pounds of powder in the magazine; commencing the action with 220 men inside the fort, afterward increased to 255 by the accession from Read's battery. These heroic men


retired slowly and sadly from their well-fought guns, which to have defended longer would have exhibited the energy of despair rather than the manly pluck of the true soldier."

Of the attack upon Fort Beauregard, General Drayton says:

"The attack upon the fort, though not so concentrated and heavy as that upon Walker, was nevertheless very severe. Its armament was 19 guns, of which the following, viz., 1 8-inch Rodman, bored to 24-pounder and rifled, 2 42-pounders, 1 10-inch Columbiad, 2 42-pounders, reamed to eight inches, and 1 32-pounder in hot-shot battery, were the only guns capable of being used against the fleet. The force on Bay Point was 640 men, commanded by Col. R. G. M. Dunovant, 12th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. Of the above, 149 garrisoned Fort Beauregard, under the immediate command of Capt. Stephen Elliott, Jr., Beaufort Volunteer Artillery, Company A 9th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers. The infantry force of Colonel Dunovant's regiment was intrusted with the protection of the eastern part of the island, and of the defense of the bastion line at the Island Narrows, where an attack was expected from the enemy."

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message was delivered to the only white man found, who sat in the post-office and seemed quite dazed. At General Drayton's headquarters was found a chart of the coast, and, in red-pencil marks, a very valuable addition, no less than the position of all the earth-works within his command, the number of guns being shown by the number of red marks in each locality. All of the batteries indicated from North Edisto south to Tybee were found to be abandoned; the guns, however, had been removed, with the exception of some inferior pieces. Wherever the gun-boats penetrated, into harbors or rivers, huge columns of white smoke were seen on all sides from the burning cotton, far out of our reach, had it been the special object of our visit to secure it. Thus the enemy inflicted upon the inhabitants injuries they would otherwise have escaped, even had it been within the power of the crews of the gun-boats to inflict them.



POPE'S HOUSE, HILTON HEAD, USED BY THE UNION ARMY AS A SIGNAL-STATION. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

On the 10th, on board the *Seneca*, the flag-officer paid a visit to Beaufort and endeavored, by proclamation printed and distributed, to assure peaceable inhabitants of his protection. A planter whose house was on Paris Island, plainly in view from the anchorage at Port Royal, remained without molestation for weeks, and was then constrained to leave only under threats of dire penalties from his Confederate friends.

After abandoning his works on Hilton Head, the enemy did not succeed in getting off the island, at Seabrook Landing, only six miles from the fort, until 2 A. M. of the 8th. On the Bay Point side, owing to a much longer march and the indifferent means of crossing a small stream, it was not until the following afternoon that the force reached an adjacent island or the mainland. Every man of them, whether in the one fort or the other, was doubtless greatly impressed with the power of gun-boats when brought face to face with those batteries which only a few hours before they had regarded as quite capable of sinking or driving off any force that would be brought against them.

The battle of Port Royal, occurring a little less than seven months after the fall of Fort Sumter, was of surpassing value in its moral and political effect, both at home and abroad. It gave us one of the finest harbors on the Atlantic sea-board, affording an admirable base for future operations; and, by the establishment of coaling stations, shops, and supply depots, made it possible to maintain an effective blockade within the entrances of the whole coast from Charleston to Cape Florida, except at Fernandina. Although


General T. F. Drayton says, in his report: "Notwithstanding the prompt measures adopted by Colonel Dunovant to effect his retreat in the direction of the Narrows, it is surprising that, with the knowledge possessed by the enemy (through Mr. [C. A.] Boutelle and others connected with

the Coast Survey), his retreat had not been intercepted by gun-boats passing up toward Beaufort, and mine by other steamers taking the passage through Scull Creek toward the ferry landing. Why they did not adopt this course must be left to time to explain."

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
the casualties during the engagement were inconsiderable, military men and readers who note results will not measure its importance by the small number of the killed and wounded, indicative, in this case, of the professional ability and tactical skill with which the victory was won. The capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet, August 28th, 1861, was the result of a bombardment rather than of a battle; owing to shoal water, extending far to seaward, the heavy vessels were held at so long a range that not a single projectile of

the enemy reached them. Although 9-inch shells were fired from the broadside guns of the squadron the first day of the bombardment, it is doubtful if they reached the forts: the pivot-guns, being of



UNION SIGNAL-STATION, BEAUFORT, S. C.,—HOME OF J. G. BARNWELL. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

larger caliber and having more elevation, dropped heavy shells on weak bomb-proofs and on insufficient coverings to the magazine, and compelled the surrender of the garrison. Nevertheless, the capture of Hatteras Inlet was an event of great military importance.



FULLER'S HOUSE, BEAUFORT, S. C.

So far as the relative merits of ships and earth-works were concerned, the battle of Port Royal asserted in such positive terms the power of shell-guns afloat that the enemy at once abandoned all minor points of defense along the coast not covered by difficult water approaches, and ever after seemed to regard the obstruction of channels as the main element in successful defense.

The establishment and maintenance of our most efficient system of blockade along all the Southern coasts was largely due to the intelligence and ability with which Rear-Admiral Du Pont and his co-laborers formulated the principles involved at the very outset of the contest. His long experience in blockade duty during the Mexican war was of the greatest value to the conference, and indeed prompted his selection as its president.

In a private letter, dated on board the *Cyane*, July 27th, 1847, Du Pont stated, quite prophetically, the value of his study of the subject of blockades:

"I have exhausted Kent, Wheaton, and Vattel on the subject,—a right good piece of professional work and study, which may be invaluable in the future. Three or four issues have been started not covered at all by those authorities, of which I have made notes."

Previous to our civil war no higher rank was known in the American navy than that of captain, although the law accorded the title of flag-officer, with additional pay, to captains in command of recognized naval stations. The engagement at Port Royal, the taking of New Orleans, and other successful operations of our navy doubtless led to the creation of the higher grades of commodore and rear-admiral, July 16th, 1862, on which date Flag-Officer Du Pont became a rear-admiral, ranking second on the list.

Eminently adapted to command, he knew well how to secure the best services of his subordinates. Intelligent, cheerful in manner, of tall and commanding mien, he naturally invited and obtained the confidence of those who were fortunate enough to serve under his orders. During the past half century the navy of the United States has not had an officer of more distinguished appearance, or endowed with more manly virtues. Though fitted by nature to be a leader among men, he thoroughly appreciated the necessity for study to make himself equal to every professional requirement. It is not given to man to be preëminent without an earnest exertion to that end, however much nature may have done in his behalf.

In the erection of a statue at Washington, and in the naming of Du Pont Circle, in which it stands, the American people, through Congress, have paid a proper tribute to the memory of this worthy representative of the naval service.

AMMENDALE, MD., September, 1887.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PORT ROYAL, NOVEMBER 7TH, 1861.

THE UNION FLEET, Flag-Officer S. F. Du Pont, commanding. Captain Charles Henry Davis, Fleet-Captain.

Flag-ship: frigate *Wabash* (2 10-inch, 28 9-inch, 14 8-inch, 2 12-pounders), Commander C. R. P. Rodgers; side-wheel steamer *Susquehanna* (15 8-inch, 1 24-pounder, 2 12-pounders), Captain J. L. Lardner; sloop *Mohican* (2 11-inch, 4 32-pounders, 1 12-pounder), Commander S. W. Godon; *Seminole* (1 11-inch, 4 32-pounders), Commander J. P. Gillis; *Pocahontas* (1 10-inch, 4 32-pounders), Commander Percival Drayton; *Pawnee* (8 9-inch, 2 12-pounders), Lieutenant R. H. Wyman; gun-boats *Undilla*, Lieutenant Napoleon Collins; *Seneca*, Lieutenant Daniel Ammen; *Ottawa*, Lieutenant T. H. Stevens; *Pembina*, Lieutenant J. P. Bankhead (each of the four latter carried 1 11-inch, 1 20-pounder rifle, and 2 24-pounders); sailing sloop *Vandalia* (4 8-inch, 16 32-pounders, 1 12-pounder), Commander F. S. Haggerty; steamer *Bienville* (8 32-pounders, 1 30-pounder rifle), Commander Charles Steedman; *Augusta* (8 32-pounders, 1 12-pounder), Commander E. G. Parrott; *Curlew* (6 32-pounders, 1 20-pounder rifle), Lieutenant P. G. Watmough; *Penguin* (4 32-pounders, 1 12-pounder), Lieutenant T. A. Budd; *R. B. Forbes* (2 32-pounders), Lieutenant H. S. Newcomb; *Isaac Smith* (8 8-inch, 1 30-pounder rifle, originally, but the broadside battery was thrown overboard on the way down from Hampton Roads), Lieutenant J. W. A. Nicholson.

The loss in the Union fleet, as officially reported, was 8 killed, and 23 wounded. Total, 31.

UNION LAND FORCES, Brig.-Gen. Thomas W. Sherman.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Egbert L. Vielé: 8th Me., Col. Lee Strickland; 3d N. H., Col. Enoch Q. Fellows; 46th N. Y., Col. Rudolph Rosa; 47th N. Y., Col. Henry Moore; 48th N. Y., Col. James H. Perry. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Isaac I. Stevens: 8th Mich., Col. William M. Fenton; 79th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William H. Nobles; 50th Pa., Col. Benjamin C. Christ; 100th Pa., Col. Daniel Leasure. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright: 6th Conn., Col. John L. Chatfield; 7th Conn., Col. Alfred H. Terry; 9th Me., Col. Rishworth Rich; 4th N. H., Col. Thomas J. Whipple. *Unattached*: 3d R. I., Col. Nathaniel W. Brown; 1st N. Y. Engineers, Col. Edward W. Serrell; Battery E, 3d U. S. Art'y, Capt. John Hamilton.

CONFEDERATE LAND FORCES, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Drayton: 4th Ga. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. W. H. Stiles; 9th S. C. (3 co's), Col. William C. Heyward; 12th S. C., Col. R. G. M. Dunovant; 15th S. C., Col. W. D. De Saussure; Beaufort (S. C.) Guerrillas, Capt. J. H. Sereven; Ga. Battery, Capt. Jacob Read; 1st S. C. Militia Art'y (2 co's), Col. John A. Wagener. Loss: k, 11; w, 48; m, 7 = 66.

CONFEDERATE NAVAL FORCES, Flag-Officer Josiah Tattnall: *Savannah* (flag-ship), Lieut. John N. Maffitt; *Sampson*, Lieut. J. S. Kennard; *Resolute*, Lieut. J. Pembroke Jones. They were small side-wheel steamers, and each carried 2 32-pounders (smooth-bore). There were no casualties.



THE FIRST FIGHT OF IRON-CLADS.

BY JOHN TAYLOR WOOD, COLONEL, C. S. A.

THE engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862, between the Confederate iron-clad *Virginia*, or the *Merrimac* (as she is known at the North), and the United States wooden fleet, and that on the 9th between the *Virginia* and the *Monitor*, was, in its results, in some respects the most momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever more widely discussed or produced a greater sensation. It revolutionized the navies of the world. Line-of-battle ships, those huge, overgrown craft, carrying from eighty to one hundred and twenty guns and from five hundred to twelve hundred men, which, from the destruction of the Spanish Armada to our time, had done most of the fighting, deciding the fate of empires, were at once universally condemned as out of date. Rams and iron-clads were in future to decide all naval warfare. In this battle old things passed away, and the experience of a thousand years of battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy of England vanished in the smoke of this fight, it is true, only to reappear some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the news was best described by the London "Times," which said: "Whereas we had available for immediate purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class war-ships, we have now two, these two being the *Warrior* and her sister *Ironsides*. There is not now a ship in the English navy apart from these two that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little *Monitor*." The Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy, cutting down a number of their largest ships and converting them into turret or broadside iron-clads.


The same results were produced in France, which had but one sea-going iron-clad, *La Gloire*, and this one, like the *Warrior*, was only protected amidships. The Emperor Napoleon promptly appointed a commission to devise plans for rebuilding his navy. And so with all the maritime powers. In this race the United States took the lead, and at the close of the war led all the others in the numbers and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. It is true that all the great powers had already experimented with vessels partly armored, but very few were convinced of their utility, and none had been tried by the test of battle, if we except a few floating batteries, thinly clad, used in the Crimean War.

In the spring of 1861 Norfolk and its large naval establishment had been hurriedly abandoned by the Federals, why no one could tell. It is about twelve miles from Fort Monroe, which was then held by a large force of regulars. A few companies of these, with a single frigate, could have occupied and commanded the town and navy yard and kept the channel open. However, a year later, it was as quickly evacuated by the Confederates, and almost with as little reason. But of this I will speak later.

The yard was abandoned to a few volunteers, after it was partly destroyed, and a large number of ships were burnt. Among the spoils were upward of twelve hundred heavy guns, which were scattered among Confederate fortifications from the Potomac to the Mississippi. [See foot-note, p. 712.] Among the ships burnt and sunk was the frigate *Merrimac* of 3500 tons and 40 guns, afterward rechristened the *Virginia*, and so I will call her. During the summer of 1861 Lieutenant John M. Brooke, an accomplished officer of the old navy, who with many others had resigned, proposed to Secretary Mallory to raise and rebuild this ship as an iron-clad. His plans were approved, and orders were given to carry them out. She was raised and cut down to the old berth-deck. Both ends for seventy feet were covered over, and when the ship was in fighting trim were just awash. On the midship section, 170 feet in length, was built at an angle of 45 degrees a roof of pitch-pine and oak 24 inches thick, extending from the water-line to a height over the gun-deck of 7 feet. [See pp. 715-717.] Both ends of the shield were rounded so that the pivot-guns could be



THE BURNING OF THE FRIGATE "MERRIMAC" AND OF THE GOSPORT NAVY YARD. (SEE FOOT-NOTE, P. 712.)



REMODELING THE
"MERRIMAC" AT THE GOSPORT
NAVY YARD.

[For a statement of the details of the vessel differing from them as shown in this picture, see p. 717.]

used as bow and stern chasers or quartering. Over the gun-deck was a light grating, making a promenade about twenty feet wide. The wood backing was covered with iron plates, rolled at the Tredegar works, two inches thick and eight wide. The first tier was put on horizontally, the second up and down,—in all to the thickness of four inches, bolted through the wood-work and clinched. The prow was of cast-iron, projecting four feet, and badly secured, as events proved. The rudder and propeller were entirely unprotected. The pilot-house was forward of the smoke-stack, and covered with the same thickness of iron as the sides. The motive power was the same that had always been in the ship. Both of the engines and boilers had been condemned on her return from her last cruise, and were radically defective. Of course, the fire and sinking had not improved them. We could not depend upon them for six hours at a time. A more ill-contrived or unreliable pair of engines could only have been found in some vessels of the United States navy.

Lieutenant Catesby ap R. Jones was ordered to superintend the armament, and no more thoroughly competent officer could have been selected. To his experience and skill as her ordnance and executive officer was due the character of her battery, which proved so efficient. It consisted of 2 7-inch rifles, heavily reënforced around the breech with 3-inch steel bands, shrunk on. These were the first heavy guns so made, and were the bow and stern pivots. There were also 2 6-inch rifles of the same make, and 6 9-inch smooth-bore broadside,—10 guns in all.

During the summer and fall of 1861 I had been stationed at the batteries on the Potomac at Evansport and Aquia Creek, blockading the river as far as possible. In January, 1862, I was ordered to the *Virginia* as one of the lieutenants, reporting to Commodore French Forrest, who then commanded the navy yard at Norfolk. Commodore Franklin Buchanan was appointed to the command,—an energetic and high-toned officer, who combined with daring courage great professional ability, standing deservedly at the head of his profession. In 1845 he had been selected by Mr. Bancroft, Secretary of


the Navy, to locate and organize the Naval Academy, and he launched that institution upon its successful career. Under him were as capable a set of officers as ever were brought together in one ship. But of man-of-war's men or sailors we had scarcely any. The South was almost without a maritime population. In the old service the majority of officers were from the South, and all the seamen from the North.‡

Every one had flocked to the army, and to it we had to look for a crew. Some few seamen were found in Norfolk, who had escaped from the gun-boat flotilla in the waters of North Carolina, on their occupation by Admiral Goldsborough and General Burnside. In hopes of securing some men from the army, I was sent to the headquarters of General Magruder at Yorktown, who was known to have under his command two battalions from New Orleans, among whom might be found a number of seamen. The general, though pressed for want of men, holding a long line with scarcely a brigade, gave me every facility to secure volunteers. With one of his staff I visited every camp, and the commanding officers were ordered to parade their men, and I explained to them what I wanted. About 200 volunteered, and of this number I selected 80 who had had some experience as seamen or gunners. Other commands at Richmond and Petersburg were visited, and so our crew of three hundred was made up. They proved themselves to be as gallant and trusty a body of men as any one would wish to command, not only in battle, but in reverse and retreat.

Notwithstanding every exertion to hasten the fitting out of the ship, the work during the winter progressed but slowly, owing to delay in sending the iron sheathing from Richmond. At this time the only establishment in the South capable of rolling iron plates was the Tredegar foundry. Its resources were

‡ The officers of the *Merrimac* were: *Flag-Officer*, Franklin Buchanan; *Lieutenants*, Catesby ap R. Jones (executive and ordnance officer), Charles C. Simms, R. D. Minor (flag), Hunter Davidson, John Taylor Wood, J. R. Eggleston, Walter Butt; *Midshipmen*, Foute, Marmaduke, Littlepage, Craig, Long, and Rootes; *Paymaster*, James Semple; *Surgeon*, Dinwiddie B. Phillips; *Assistant-Surgeon*,

Algernon S. Garnett; *Captain of Marines*, Reuben Thom; *Engineers*, H. A. Ramsey, acting chief; *Assistants*, Tynan, Campbell, Herring, Jack, and White; *Boatswain*, Hasker; *Gunner*, Oliver; *Carpenter*, Lindsey; *Clerk*, Arthur Sinclair, Jr.; *Volunteer Aides*, Lieutenant Douglas Forrest, C. S. A., Captain Thomas Kevill, detachment of Norfolk United Artillery; *Signal Corps*, Sergeant Tabb.




a PROW, OF STEEL.
b WOODEN BULWARK.
c PILOT-HOUSE.

THE "MERRIMAC," FROM A SKETCH MADE THE DAY BEFORE THE FIGHT.

Lt. B. L. Blackford, del. March 7, 1862.

d d IRON UNDER WATER.
f PROPELLER.

limited, and the demand for all kinds of war material most pressing. And when we reflect upon the scarcity and inexperience of the workmen, and the great changes necessary in transforming an ordinary iron workshop into an arsenal in which all the machinery and tools had to be improvised, it is astonishing that so much was accomplished. The unfinished state of the vessel interfered so with the drills and exercises that we had but little oppor-




LIEUTENANT CATESBY AP R. JONES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

tunity of getting things into shape. It should be remembered that the ship was an experiment in naval architecture, differing in every respect from any then afloat. The officers and the crew were strangers to the ship and to each other. Up to the hour of sailing she was crowded with workmen. Not a gun had been fired, hardly a revolution of the engines had been made, when we cast off from the dock and started on what many thought was an ordinary trial trip, but which proved to be a trial such as no vessel that ever floated had undergone up to that time. From the start we saw that she was slow, not over five knots; she steered so badly that, with her great length, it took from thirty to forty minutes to turn. She drew twenty-two feet, which confined us to a comparatively narrow channel in the Roads; and,

as I have before said, the engines were our weak point. She was as unmanageable as a water-logged vessel.


It was at noon on the 8th of March that we steamed down the Elizabeth River. Passing by our batteries, lined with troops, who cheered us as we passed, and through the obstructions at Craney Island, we took the south channel and headed for Newport News. At anchor at this time off Fort Monroe were the frigates *Minnesota*, *Roanoke*, and *St. Lawrence*, and several gun-boats. The first two were sister ships of the *Virginia* before the war; the last was a sailing frigate of fifty guns. Off Newport News, seven miles above, which was strongly fortified and held by a large Federal garrison, were anchored the frigate *Congress*, 50 guns, and the sloop *Cumberland*, 30. The day was calm, and the last two ships were swinging lazily by their anchors. [The tide was at its height about 1:40 P.M.] Boats were hanging to the lower booms, washed clothes in the rigging. Nothing indicated that we were expected; but when we came within three-quarters of a mile, the boats were dropped astern, booms got alongside, and the *Cumberland* opened with her heavy pivots, followed by the *Congress*, the gun-boats, and the shore batteries.



FRANKLIN BUCHANAN, ADMIRAL, C. S. N.

JOSIAH TATTNALL, COMMODORE, C. S. N.

COMMANDERS OF THE "VIRGINIA" (OR "MERRIMAC"). FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.



COLONEL JOHN TAYLOR WOOD, LIEUTENANT ON THE
"MERRIMAC." FROM AN OIL PORTRAIT.


swung, the *Congress* came in range, nearly stern on, and we got in three raking shells. She had slipped her anchor, loosed her foretop-sail, run up the jib, and tried to escape, but grounded. Turning, we headed for her and took a position within two hundred yards, where every shot told. In the meantime the *Cumberland* continued the fight, though our ram had opened her side wide enough to drive in a horse and cart. Soon she listed to port and filled rapidly. The crew were driven by the advancing water to the spar-deck, and there worked her pivot-guns until she went down with a roar, the colors still flying. No ship was ever fought more gallantly.† The *Congress* continued the unequal contest for more than an hour after the sinking of the *Cumberland*. Her losses were terrible, and finally she ran up the white flag.

As soon as we had hove in sight, coming down the harbor, the *Roanoke*, *St. Lawrence*, and *Minnesota*, assisted by tugs, had got under way, and started up from Old Point Comfort to join their consorts. They were under fire from the batteries at Sewell's Point, but the distance was too great to effect much. The first two, however, ran aground not far above Fort Monroe, and took

We reserved our fire until within easy range, when the forward pivot was pointed and fired by Lieutenant Charles Simms, killing and wounding most of the crew of the after pivot-gun of the *Cumberland*. Passing close to the *Congress*, which received our starboard broadside, and returned it with spirit, we steered direct for the *Cumberland*, striking her almost at right angles, under the fore-rigging on the starboard side. The blow was hardly perceptible on board the *Virginia*. Backing clear of her, we went ahead again, heading up the river, helm hard-a-starboard, and turned slowly. As we did so, for the first time I had an opportunity of using the after-pivot, of which I had charge. As we

† According to the pilot of the *Cumberland*, A. B. Smith: "Near the middle of the fight, when the berth-deck of the *Cumberland* had sunk below water, one of the crew of the *Merrimac* came out of a port to the outside of her iron-plate roof, and a ball from one of our guns instantly cut him in

two. . . . Finally, after about three-fourths of an hour of the most severe fighting, our vessel sank, the Stars and Stripes still waving. That flag was finally submerged, but after the hull grounded on the sands, fifty-four feet below, . . . our pennant was still flying from the top-mast above the waves."




MAP OF HAMPTON ROADS AND ADJACENT SHORES.

but little part in the fight. The *Minnesota*, taking the middle or swash channel, steamed up half-way between Old Point Comfort and Newport News, when she grounded, but in a position to be actively engaged.

Previous to this we had been joined by the James River squadron, which had been at anchor a few miles above, and came into action most gallantly, passing the shore batteries at Newport News under a heavy fire, and with some loss. It consisted of the *Yorktown* (or *Patrick Henry*), 12 guns, Captain John R. Tucker; *Jamestown*, 2 guns, Lieut.-Commander J. N. Barney; and *Teaser*, 1 gun, Lieut.-Commander W. A. Webb.

As soon as the *Congress* surrendered, Commander Buchanan ordered the gun-boats *Beaufort*, Lieut.-Commander W. H. Parker, and *Raleigh*, Lieut.-Commander J. W. Alexander, to steam alongside, take off her crew, and set fire to the ship. Lieutenant Pendergrast, who had succeeded Lieutenant Smith, who had been killed, surrendered to Lieutenant Parker, of the *Beaufort*. Delivering his sword and colors, he was directed by Lieutenant Parker to return to his ship and have the wounded transferred as rapidly as possible. All this time the shore batteries and small-arm men were keeping up an incessant fire on our vessels. Two of the officers of the *Raleigh*, Lieutenant Tayloe



THE "MERRIMAC" RAMMING THE "CUMBERLAND."

and Midshipman Hutter, were killed while assisting the Union wounded out of the *Congress*. A number of the enemy's men were killed by the same fire. Finally it became so hot that the gun-boats were obliged to haul off with only thirty prisoners, leaving Lieutenant Pendergrast and most of his crew on board, and they all afterward escaped to the shore by swimming or in small boats. While this was going on, the white flag was flying at her mainmast-head. Not being able to take possession of his prize, the commodore ordered hot shot to be used, and in a short time she was in flames fore and aft. While directing this, both himself and his flag-lieutenant, Minor, were severely wounded. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Catesby Jones.


It was now 5 o'clock, nearly two hours of daylight, and the *Minnesota* only remained. She was aground and at our mercy. But the pilots would not attempt the middle channel with the ebb tide and approaching night. So we returned by the south channel to Sewell's Point and anchored, the *Minnesota* escaping, as we thought, only until morning.

Our loss in killed and wounded was twenty-one. The armor was hardly damaged, though at one time our ship was the focus on which were directed at least one hundred heavy guns, afloat and ashore. But nothing outside escaped. Two guns were disabled by having their muzzles shot off. The ram was left in the side of the *Cumberland*. One anchor, the smoke-stack, and the steam-pipes were shot away. Railings, stanchions, boat-davits, everything was swept clean. The flag-staff was repeatedly knocked over, and finally a

boarding-pike was used. Commodore Buchanan and the other wounded were sent to the Naval Hospital, and after making preparations for the next day's fight, we slept at our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. †

But at daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the *Minnesota*, a strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's *Monitor*, which had long been expected in Hampton Roads, and of which, from different sources, we had a good idea. She could not possibly have made her appearance at a more inopportune time for us, changing our plans, which were to destroy the *Minnesota*, and then the remainder of the fleet below Fort Monroe. She appeared but a pigmy compared with the lofty frigate which she guarded. But in her size was one great element of her success. I will not attempt a description of the *Monitor*; her build and peculiarities are well known.

After an early breakfast, we got under way and steamed out toward the enemy, opening fire from our bow pivot, and closing in to deliver our starboard broadside at short range, which was returned promptly from her 11-inch guns. Both vessels then turned and passed again still closer. The *Monitor* was firing every seven or eight minutes, and nearly every shot struck. Our ship was working worse and worse, and after the loss of the smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsey, chief engineer, reported that the draught was so poor that it was with great difficulty he could keep up steam. Once or twice the ship was on the bottom. Drawing 22 feet of water, we were confined to a narrow channel, while the *Monitor*, with only 12 feet immersion, could take any position, and always have us in range of her guns. Orders were given to concentrate our fire on the pilot-house, and with good result, as we afterward learned. More than two hours had passed, and we had made no impression on the enemy



LIEUTENANT GEORGE U. MORRIS, ACTING COMMANDER OF THE "CUMBERLAND."

In the absence of Captain Radford, the command of the *Cumberland* devolved upon the executive officer, Lieutenant Morris, from whose official report we quote the following: "At thirty minutes past three the water had gained upon us, notwithstanding the pumps were kept actively employed to a degree that, the forward-magazine being drowned, we had to take powder from the after-magazine for the ten-inch gun. At thirty-five minutes past three the water had risen to the main hatchway, and the ship canted to port, and we delivered a parting fire—each man trying to save himself by jumping overboard. Timely notice was given, and all the wounded who could walk were ordered out of the cockpit; but those of the wounded who had been carried into the sick-bay and on the berth-deck were so mangled that it was impossible to save them. . . . I should judge we have lost upward of one hundred men. I can only say, in conclusion, that all did their duty, and we sank with the American flag flying at the peak." When summoned to surrender, Morris replied, "Never! I'll sink alongside!"—EDITORS.

† Lieutenant Jones reported: "It was not easy to keep a flag flying. The flag-staffs were repeatedly shot away. The colors were hoisted to the smoke-stack and several times cut down from it."—EDITORS.



THE "MERRIMAC" DRIVING THE "CONGRESS" FROM HER ANCHORAGE.

so far as we could discover, while our wounds were slight. Several times the *Monitor* ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her 11-inch shot on our sides soon undeceived us.

Coming down from the spar-deck, and observing a division standing "at ease," Lieutenant Jones inquired:

"Why are you not firing, Mr. Eggleston?"

"Why, our powder is very precious," replied the lieutenant; "and after two hours' incessant firing I find that I can do her about as much damage by snapping my thumb at her every two minutes and a half."

Lieutenant Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly an hour we manœuvred for a position. Now "Go ahead!" now "Stop!" now "Astern!" The ship was as unwieldy as Noah's ark. At last an opportunity offered. "Go ahead, full speed!" But before the ship gathered headway, the *Monitor* turned, and our disabled ram only gave a glancing blow, effecting nothing. Again she came up on our quarter, her bow against our side, and at this distance fired twice. Both shots struck about half-way up the shield, abreast of the after pivot, and the impact forced the side in bodily two or three inches. All the crews of the after guns were knocked over by the concussion, and bled from the nose or ears. Another shot at the same place would have penetrated. While alongside, boarders were called away; but she dropped astern before they could get on board. And so, for six or more hours, the struggle was kept up. At length, the *Monitor* withdrew over the middle ground where we could not follow, but always maintaining a position to

protect the *Minnesota*.\ To have run our ship ashore on a falling tide would have been ruin. We awaited her return for an hour; and at 2 o'clock P. M. steamed to Sewell's Point, and thence to the dockyard at Norfolk, our crew thoroughly worn out from the two days' fight. Although there is no doubt that the *Monitor* first retired,—for Captain Van Brunt, commanding the *Minnesota*, so states in his official report,—the battle was a drawn one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned. But in its general results the advantage was with the *Monitor*. Our casualties in the second day's fight were only a few wounded.

This action demonstrated for the first time the power and efficiency of the ram as a means of offense. The side of the *Cumberland* was crushed like an egg-shell. The *Congress* and *Minnesota*, even with our disabled bow, would have shared the same fate but that we could not reach them on account of our great draught.

It also showed the power of resistance of two iron-clads, widely differing in construction, model, and armament, under a fire which in a short time would have sunk any other vessel then afloat.

The *Monitor* was well handled, and saved the *Minnesota* and the remainder of the fleet at Fort Monroe. But her gunnery was poor. Not a single shot struck us at the water-line, where the ship was utterly unprotected [see p. 717], and where one would have been fatal. Or had the fire been concentrated on any one spot, the shield would have been pierced; or had larger charges been used, the result would have been the same. Most of her shot struck us obliquely, breaking the iron of both courses, but not injuring the wood backing. When struck at right angles, the backing would be broken, but not penetrated. We had no solid projectiles, except a few of large windage, to be used as hot shot, and, of course, made no impression on the turret. But in all this it should be borne in mind that both vessels were on their trial trip, both were experimental, and both were receiving their baptism of fire.

On our arrival at Norfolk, Commodore Buchanan sent for me. I found him at the Naval Hospital, badly wounded and suffering greatly. He dictated a short dispatch to Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, stating the return of the ship and the result of the two days' fight, and directed me to proceed to Richmond with it and the flag of the *Congress*, and make a verbal report of the action, condition of the *Virginia*, etc.

I took the first train for Petersburg and the capital. The news had pre-

\ In his official report, Captain Van Brunt says of the fight, as viewed from the *Minnesota* :

"At 6 A. M. the enemy again appeared, . . . and I beat to quarters; but they ran past my ship and were heading for Fortress Monroe, and the retreat was beaten to enable my men to get something to eat. The *Merrimac* ran down near the Rip-Raps and then turned into the channel through which I had come. Again all hands were called to quarters, and opened upon her with my stern-guns, and made signal to the *Monitor* to attack the enemy. She immediately ran down in my wake, right within the range of the *Merrimac*, completely covering my ship, as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions, and, much to my astonishment, laid herself right alongside of the *Merrimac*, and the contrast was that of a pigmy to a giant. Gun after gun

was fired by the *Monitor*, which was returned with whole broadsides from the Rebels, with no more effect, apparently, than so many pebble-stones thrown by a child. . . . The *Merrimac*, finding that she could make nothing of the *Monitor*, turned her attention once more to me. In the morning she had put one eleven-inch shot under my counter, near the water-line, and now, on her second approach, I opened upon her with all my broadside-guns and ten-inch pivot—a broadside which would have blown out of water any timber-built ship in the world. She returned my fire with her rifled bow-gun, with a shell which passed through the chief engineer's state-room, through the engineers' mess-room amidships, and burst in the boatswain's room, tearing four rooms all into one, in its passage exploding two charges of powder, which set the ship on fire, but it was promptly extinguished by a party headed by my first lieutenant."



ESCAPE OF PART OF THE CREW OF THE "CONGRESS."

ceded me, and at every station I was warmly received, and to listening crowds was forced to repeat the story of the fight. Arriving at Richmond, I drove to Mr. Mallory's office and with him went to President Davis's, where we met Mr. Benjamin, who, a few days afterward, became Secretary of State, Mr. Seddon, afterward Secretary of War, General Cooper, Adjutant-General, and a number of others. I told at length what had occurred on the previous two days, and what changes and repairs were necessary to the *Virginia*. As to the future, I said that in the *Monitor* we had met our equal, and that the result of another engagement would be very doubtful. Mr. Davis made many inquiries as regarded the ship's draught, speed, and capabilities, and urged the completion of the repairs at as early a day as possible. The conversation lasted until near midnight. During the evening the flag of the *Congress*, which was a very large one, was brought in, and to our surprise, in unfolding it, we found it in some places saturated with blood. On this discovery it was quickly rolled up and sent to the Navy Department, where it remained during the war; it doubtless burned with that building when Richmond was evacuated.

The news of our victory was received everywhere in the South with the most enthusiastic rejoicing. Coming, as it did, after a number of disasters in the south and west, it was particularly grateful. Then again, under the circumstances, so little was expected from the navy that this success was entirely unlooked for. So, from one extreme to the other, the most extravagant anticipations were formed of what the ship could do. For instance: the blockade could be raised, Washington leveled to the ground, New York laid under contribution, and so on. At the North, equally groundless alarm was felt. As an example of this, Secretary Welles relates what took place at a Cabinet meeting called by Mr. Lincoln on the receipt of the news.☆ “‘The *Merrimac*,’ said Stanton, ‘will change the whole character of the war; she will destroy, *seriatim*, every naval vessel; she will lay all the cities on the seaboard under contribution. I shall immediately recall Burnside; Port Royal must be abandoned. I will notify the governors and municipal authorities in the North to take instant measures to protect their harbors.’ He had no doubt, he said, that the monster was at this moment on her way to Washington; and, looking out of the window, which commanded a view of the Potomac for many miles, ‘Not unlikely, we shall have a shell or cannon-ball from one of her guns in the White House before we leave this room.’ Mr. Seward, usually buoyant and self-reliant, overwhelmed with the intelligence, listened in responsive sympathy to Stanton, and was greatly depressed, as, indeed, were all the members.”

I returned the next day to Norfolk, and informed Commodore Buchanan that he would be promoted to be admiral, and that, owing to his wound, he would be retired from the command of the *Virginia*. Lieutenant Jones should have been promoted, and should have succeeded him. He had fitted out the ship and armed her, and had commanded during the second day's fight. However, the department thought otherwise, and selected Commodore Josiah Tattnall;

☆ The “news” was of the first day's battle before the *Monitor* had arrived.—EDITORS.



THE EXPLOSION ON THE BURNING "CONGRESS."

except Lieutenant Jones he was the best man. He had distinguished himself in the wars of 1812 and with Mexico. No one stood higher as an accomplished and chivalrous officer. While in command of the United States squadron in the East Indies, he was present as a neutral at the desperate fight at the Peiho Forts, below Peking, between the English fleet and the Chinese, when the former lost nearly one-half of a force of twelve hundred engaged. Seeing his old friend Sir James Hope hard pressed and in need of assistance, having had four vessels sunk under him, he had his barge manned, and with his flag-lieutenant, S. D. Trenchard, pulled alongside the flag-ship, through the midst of a tremendous fire, in which his coxswain was killed and several of his boat's crew were wounded. He found the gallant admiral desperately wounded, and all his crew killed or disabled but six. When he offered his services, surprise was expressed at his action. His reply was, "Blood is thicker than water."

Tattnall took command on the 29th of March. In the meantime the *Virginia* was in the dry dock under repairs. The hull four feet below the shield was covered with 2-inch iron. A new and heavier ram was strongly secured to the bow. The damage to the armor was repaired [see p. 717], wrought-iron port-shutters were fitted, and the rifle-guns were supplied with steel-pointed solid shot. These changes, with 100 tons more of ballast on her fan-tails, increased her draught to 23 feet, improving her resisting powers, but correspondingly decreasing her mobility and reducing her speed to 4 knots. The repairs were not completed until the 4th of April, owing to our want of resources and the difficulty of securing workmen. On the 11th we steamed down the harbor to the Roads with six gun-boats, fully expecting to meet the *Monitor* again and other vessels; for we knew their fleet had been largely reënforced, by

the *Vanderbilt*, among other vessels, a powerful side-wheel steamer fitted as a ram. We were primed for a desperate tussle; but to our surprise we had the Roads to ourselves. We exchanged a few shots with the Rip-Raps batteries, but the *Monitor* with the other vessels of the fleet remained below Fort Monroe, in Chesapeake Bay, where we could not get at them except by passing between the forts.


The day before going down, Commodore Tattnall had written to Secretary Mallory, "I see no chance for me but to pass the forts and strike elsewhere, and I shall be gratified by your authority to do so." This freedom of action was never granted, and probably wisely, for the result of an action with the *Monitor* and fleet, even if we ran the gauntlet of the fire of the forts successfully, was more than doubtful, and any disaster would have exposed Norfolk and James River, and probably would have resulted in the loss of Richmond. For equally good reasons the *Monitor* acted on the defensive; for if she had been out of the way, General McClellan's base and fleet of transports in York River would have been endangered. Observing three merchant vessels at anchor close inshore and within the bar at Hampton, the commodore ordered Lieutenant Barney in the *Jamestown* to go in and bring them out. This was promptly and successfully accomplished, under a fire from the forts. Two were brigs loaded with supplies for the army. The capture of these vessels, within gun-shot of their fleet, did not affect its movements. As the *Jamestown* towed her prizes under the stern of the English corvette *Rinaldo*, Captain Hewett (now [1887] Vice-Admiral Sir William Hewett, commanding the Channel Squadron), then at anchor in the Roads, she was enthusiastically cheered. We remained below all day, and at night returned and anchored off Sewell's Point.

A few days later we went down again to within gun-shot of the Rip-Raps, and exchanged a few rounds with the fort, hoping that the *Monitor* would come out from her lair into open water. Had she done so, a determined effort would have been made to carry her by boarding. Four small gun-boats were ready, each of which had its crew divided into parties for the performance of



LIEUTENANT JOSEPH B. SMITH, ACTING COMMANDER OF THE "CONGRESS," FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

According to the pilot of the *Cumberland*, Lieutenant Smith was killed by a shot. His death was fixed at 4:20 P. M. by Lieutenant Pendergrast, next in command, who did not hear of it until ten minutes later. When his father, Commodore Joseph Smith, who was on duty at Washington, saw by the first dispatch from Fort Monroe that the *Congress* had shown the white flag, he said, quietly, "Joe's dead!" After speaking of the death of Lieutenant Smith, Lieutenant Pendergrast says, in his official report: "Seeing that our men were being killed without the prospect of any relief from the *Minnesota*, . . . not being able to get a single gun to bear upon the enemy, and the ship being on fire in several places, upon consultation with Commander William Smith we deemed it proper to haul down our colors." Lieutenant Smith's sword was sent to his father by the enemy under a flag of truce.—EDITORS.



THE "MERRIMACK."

THE ENCOUNTER AT SHORT RANGE.

THE "MONITOR."

certain duties after getting on board. Some were to try to wedge the turret, some to cover the pilot-house and all the openings with tarpaulins, others to scale with ladders the turret and smoke-stack, using shells, hand-grenades, etc. Even if but two of the gun-boats should succeed in grappling her, we were confident of success. Talking this over since with Captain S. D. Greene, who was the first lieutenant of the *Monitor*, and in command after Captain Worden was wounded in the pilot-house, he said they were prepared for anything of this kind and that it would have failed. Certain it is, if an opportunity had been given, the attempt would have been made.

A break-down of the engines forced us to return to Norfolk. Having completed our repairs on May 8th, and while returning to our old anchorage, we heard heavy firing, and, going down the harbor, found the *Monitor*, with the iron-clads *Galena*, *Naugatuck*, and a number of heavy ships, shelling our batteries at Sewell's Point. We stood directly for the *Monitor*, but as we approached they all ceased firing and retreated below the forts. We followed close down to the Rip-Raps, whose shot passed over us, striking a mile or more beyond the ship. We remained for some hours in the Roads, and finally the commodore, in a tone of deepest disgust, gave the order: "Mr. Jones, fire a gun to windward, and take the ship back to her buoy."

During the month of April, 1862, our forces, under General J. E. Johnston, had retired from the Peninsula to the neighborhood of Richmond, to defend the city against McClellan's advance by way of the Peninsula, and from time to time rumors of the possible evacuation of Norfolk reached us. On the 9th of May, while at anchor off Sewell's Point, we noticed at sunrise that our flag was not flying over the batteries. A boat was sent ashore and found them abandoned. Lieutenant Pembroke Jones was then dispatched to Norfolk, some miles distant, to call upon General Huger, who was in command, and learn the condition of affairs. He returned during the afternoon, reporting, to our great surprise, the town deserted by our troops and the navy yard on fire. This precipitate retreat was entirely unnecessary, for while the *Virginia* remained afloat, Norfolk was safe, or, at all events, was not tenable by the enemy, and James River was partly guarded, for we could have retired behind the obstructions in the channel at Craney Island, and, with the batteries at that point, could have held the place, certainly until all the valuable stores and machinery had been removed from the navy yard. Moreover, had the *Virginia* been afloat at the time of the battles around Richmond, General McClellan would hardly have retreated to James River; for, had he done so, we could at any time have closed it and rendered any position on it untenable.

Norfolk evacuated, our occupation was gone, and the next thing to be decided upon was what should be done with the ship. Two courses of action were open to us: we might have run the blockade of the forts and done some damage to the shipping there and at the mouth of the York River, provided they did not get out of our way,—for, with our great draught and low rate of speed, the enemy's transports would have gone where we could not have followed them; and the *Monitor* and other iron-clads would have engaged us with every advantage, playing around us as rabbits around a sloth, and the end

would have been the certain loss of the vessel. On the other hand, the pilots said repeatedly, if the ship were lightened to eighteen feet, they could take her up James River to Harrison's Landing or City Point, where she could have been put in fighting trim again, and have been in a position to assist in the defense of Richmond. The commodore decided upon this course. Calling all hands on

deck, he told them what he wished done. Sharp and quick work was necessary; for, to be successful, the ship must be lightened five feet, and we must pass the batteries at Newport News and the fleet below before daylight next morning. The crew gave three cheers, and went to work with a will, throwing overboard the ballast from the fan-tails, as well as that below,—all spare stores, water, indeed everything but our powder and shot. By midnight the ship had been lightened three feet, when, to our amazement, the pilots said it was useless to do more, that with the westerly wind blowing, the tide would be cut down so that the ship would not go up even to Jamestown Flats; indeed, they would not take the responsibility of taking her up the river at all. This extraordinary



CAPTAIN G. J. VAN BRUNT, COMMANDER OF THE
"MINNESOTA." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

conduct of the pilots rendered some other plan immediately necessary. Moral: All officers, as far as possible, should learn to do their own piloting.

The ship had been so lifted as to be unfit for action; two feet of her hull below the shield was exposed. She could not be sunk again by letting in water without putting out the furnace fires and flooding the magazines. Never was a commander forced by circumstances over which he had no control into a more painful position than was Commodore Tattnall. But coolly and calmly he decided, and gave orders to destroy the ship; determining if he could not save his vessel, at all events not to sacrifice three hundred brave and faithful men; and that he acted wisely, the fight at Drewry's Bluff, which was the salvation of Richmond, soon after proved. She was run ashore near Craney Island, and the crew landed with their small-arms and two days' provisions. Having only two boats, it took three hours to disembark. Lieutenant Catesby Jones and myself were the last to leave. Setting her on fire fore and aft, she was soon in a blaze, and by the light of our burning ship we pulled for the shore, landing at daybreak. We marched 22 miles to Suffolk and took the cars for Richmond.

The news of the destruction of the *Virginia* caused a most profound feeling of disappointment and indignation throughout the South, particularly as so much was expected of the ship after our first success. On Commodore Tattnall the most unsparing and cruel aspersions were cast. He promptly demanded

a court of inquiry, and, not satisfied with this, a court-martial, whose unanimous finding, after considering the facts and circumstances, was: "Being thus situated, the only alternative, in the opinion of the court, was to abandon and burn the ship then and there; which, in the judgment of the court, was deliberately and wisely done by order of the accused. Wherefore, the court do award the said Captain Josiah Tattnall an honorable acquittal."

It only remains now to speak of our last meeting with the *Monitor*. Arriving at Richmond, we heard that the enemy's fleet was ascending James River, and the result was great alarm; for, relying upon the *Virginia*, not a gun had been mounted to protect the city from a water attack. We were hurried to Drewry's Bluff, the first high ground below the city, seven miles distant. Here, for two days, exposed to constant rain, in bottomless mud and without shelter, on scant provisions, we worked unceasingly, mounting guns and obstructing the river. In this we were aided by the crews of small vessels which had escaped up the river before Norfolk was abandoned. The *Jamestown* and some small sailing-vessels were sunk in the channel, but, owing to the high water occasioned by a freshet, the obstructions were only partial. We had only succeeded in getting into position three thirty-twos and two sixty-fours (shell guns) and were without sufficient supply of ammunition, when on the 15th of May the iron-clad *Galena*, Commander John Rodgers, followed by the *Monitor* and three others, hove in sight. We opened fire as soon as they came within range, directing most of it on the *Galena*. This vessel was handled very skillfully. Coming up within six hundred yards of the battery, she anchored, and, with a spring from her quarter, presented her broadside; this under a heavy fire, and in a narrow river with a strong current. The *Monitor*, and others anchored just below, answered our fire deliberately; but, owing to the great elevation of the battery, their fire was in a great measure ineffectual, though two guns were dismounted and several men were killed and wounded. While this was going on, our sharp-shooters were at work on both banks. Lieutenant Catesby Jones, in his report, speaks of this service: "Lieutenant Wood, with a portion of the men, did good service as sharp-shooters. The enemy were excessively annoyed by their fire. His position was well chosen and gallantly maintained in spite of the shell, shrapnel, grape, and canister fired at them." Finding they could make no impression on our works, the *Galena*, after an action of four hours, returned down the river with her consorts. Her loss was about forty killed and wounded.†

This was one of the boldest and best-conducted operations of the war, and one of which very little notice has been taken. Had Commander Rodgers been supported by a few brigades, landed at City Point or above on the south side, Richmond would have been evacuated. The *Virginia's* crew alone barred his way to Richmond; otherwise the obstructions would not have prevented his steaming up to the city, which would have been as much at his mercy as was New Orleans before the fleet of Farragut.

† According to the official report, the loss on the *Galena* was 13 killed and 11 wounded; on the *Port Royal*, 1 wounded, and on the *Naugatuck*, 2 wounded. Total, 13 killed and 14 wounded.—EDITORS.



WATCHING THE "MERRIMAC."

BY R. E. COLSTON, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.

IN March, 1862, I was in command of a Confederate brigade and of a district on the south side of the James River, embracing all the river forts and batteries down to the mouth of Nansemond River. My pickets were posted all along the shore opposite Newport News. From my headquarters at Smithfield I was in constant and rapid communication through relays of couriers and signal stations with my department commander, Major-General Huger, stationed at Norfolk. †

About 1 P. M. on the 8th of March, a courier dashed up to my headquarters with this brief dispatch: "The *Virginia* is coming up the river." Mounting at once, it took me but a very short time to gallop twelve miles down to Ragged Island.

I had hardly dismounted at the water's edge when I descried the *Merrimac* approaching. The *Congress* was moored about a hundred yards below the land batteries, and the *Cumberland* a little above them. As soon as the *Merrimac* came within range, the batteries and war-vessels opened

fire. She passed on up, exchanging broadsides with the *Congress*, and making straight for the *Cumberland*, at which she made a dash, firing her bow-guns as she struck the doomed vessel with her prow. I could hardly believe my senses when I saw the masts of the *Cumberland* begin to sway wildly. After one or two lurches, her hull disappeared beneath the water, guns firing to the last moment. Most of her brave crew went down with their ship, but not with their colors, for the Union flag still floated defiantly from the masts, which projected obliquely for about half their length above the water after the vessel had settled unevenly upon the river-bottom. This first act of the drama was over in about thirty minutes, but it seemed to me only a moment.


The commander of the *Congress* recognized at once the impossibility of resisting the assault of the ram which had just sunk the *Cumberland*. With commendable promptness and presence of mind, he slipped his cables, and ran her aground upon

† "The situation of affairs, both Federal and State, at Norfolk, on the morning of the 19th of April [1861]," says J. T. Scharf in his "History of the Confederate States Navy," "was that the Federal authorities had there the U. S. frigate *Cumberland*, 24 guns, fully manned, ready for sea, and under orders for Vera Cruz; the brig *Dolphin*, 4 guns, fully manned, and ready for sea; the sloop *Germantown*, 22 guns, fully manned, ready for sea; the sloop *Plymouth*, 22 guns, ready for sea; the marines of the navy yard, and the guards of the frigate *Raritan*, 60 guns, in ordinary; the frigate *Columbia*, 50 guns, in ordinary; the frigate *United States*, 50 guns, in ordinary; the steam-frigate *Merrimac*, 40 guns, under repairs; the ship of the line *Delaware*, 74 guns, in ordinary; the ship of the line *Columbus*, 74 guns, in ordinary; and the ship of the line *Pennsylvania*, 120 guns, 'receiving-ship';—all lying at the yard or in the stream. The yard was walled around with a high brick inclosure, and protected by the Elizabeth River, and there were over 800 marines and sailors with officers. On the side of Virginia the situation was: that of General Tallaferro with his staff; Captain Heth and Major Tyler, two volunteer companies,—the Blues of Norfolk and the Grays of Portsmouth,—and Captains Pegram and Jones, of the navy. These were the only troops in Norfolk, until after the evacuation of the navy yard and the departure of the Federal ships."

Captain H. G. Wright, of the Engineers, who was on the United States steamer *Paucnee* that had been sent to secure the ships and property at the Gosport Navy Yard, reached Norfolk after dark on April 20th. He reported thus: "On reaching the yard it was found that all the ships afloat except the *Cumberland* had been scuttled, by order of Commodore McCauley, the commandant of the yard, to prevent their seizure by the Virginia forces, and that they were fast sinking. One of the objects of the expedition—that of removing those vessels and taking them to sea—was, therefore, frustrated. On reporting to the commodore of the yard, I found him disposed to defend the yard and property to the last, and the troops were accordingly landed and some disposi-

tions for defense taken. It was soon determined, however, by Commodore Paulding, who had come on the *Paucnee* from Washington, to finish the destruction of the scuttled ships, to burn and otherwise destroy, as far as practicable, the property in the yard, and withdraw with the frigate *Cumberland*, in tow of the *Paucnee* and a steam-tug which was lying at the yard. To Commander John Rodgers, of the navy, and myself was assigned the duty of blowing up the dry-dock, assisted by forty men of the volunteers and a few men from the crew of the *Paucnee*." Captain Wright and Commander Rodgers lighted the matches, but the mine, as was afterward learned, did not explode. The heat from the burning buildings drove the men in the boats from the landing, and the two officers, alone and hemmed in, had to give themselves up to the commander of the Virginia forces. They were taken to Richmond, and released on April 24th.

In his "Recollections," Captain W. H. Parker, C. S. N., says: "The evacuation of Norfolk by the Federals was a most fortunate thing for the Confederates. Why the Federal authorities did this was always beyond my comprehension. They had the place, and with the force at their command could not have been driven out. No batteries could have been put up by the Confederates in the face of the broadsides of their ships, and it being only twelve miles from Fort Monroe (Old Point Comfort) it could have been reinforced to any extent. But they did give it up, and had hardly done so when they commenced making preparations to retake it. The navy yard contained a large number of heavy cannon, and these guns were used not only to fortify Norfolk and the batteries on the York, Potomac, James, and Rappahannock rivers, but were sent to North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. They were to be found at Roanoke Island, Wilmington, Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Vicksburg, and many other places. These guns, according to J. T. Scharf, numbered 1198, of which 52 were nine-inch Dahlgrens." EDITORS.



THE "MERRIMAC" PASSING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERY ON CRANEY ISLAND, ON HER WAY TO ATTACK THE FEDERAL FLEET.

the shallows, where the *Merrimac*, at that time drawing twenty-three feet of water, was unable to approach her, and could attack her with artillery alone. But, although the *Congress* had more guns than the *Merrimac*, and was also supported by the land batteries, it was an unequal conflict, for the projectiles hurled at the *Merrimac* glanced harmlessly from her iron-covered roof, while her rifled guns raked the *Congress* from end to end.

A curious incident must be noted here. Great numbers of people from the neighborhood of Ragged Island, as well as soldiers from the nearest posts, had rushed to the shore to behold the spectacle. The cannonade was visibly raging with redoubled intensity; but, to our amazement, not a sound was heard by us from the commencement of the battle. A strong March wind was blowing direct from us toward Newport News. We could see every flash of the guns and the clouds of white smoke, but not a single report was audible.

The *Merrimac*, taking no notice of the land batteries, concentrated her fire upon the ill-fated *Congress*. The latter replied gallantly until her commander, Joseph B. Smith, was killed and her decks were reeking with slaughter. Then her colors were hauled down and white flags appeared at the gaff and mainmast. Meanwhile, the James River gun-boat flotilla had joined the *Merrimac*.

Through my field-glass I could see the crew of the *Congress* making their escape to the shore over the bow. Unable to secure her prize, the *Merrimac* set her on fire with hot shot, and turned to face new adversaries just appearing upon the scene of conflict.

As soon as it was known at Fort Monroe that the *Merrimac* had come out, the frigates *Minnesota*, *Roanoke*, and *St. Lawrence* were ordered to the assistance of the blockading squadron. The *Minnesota*, assisted by two tugs, was the first to reach the scene, but the *Cumberland* and the *Congress* were already past help. As soon as she came within range, a rapid cannonade commenced between her and the *Merrimac*, aided by the *Patrick*

Henry and the *Jamestown*, side-wheel river steamers transformed into gun-boats. The *Minnesota*, drawing nearly as much water as the *Merrimac*, grounded upon a shoal in the North Channel. This at once put an end to any further attacks by ramming; but the lofty frigate, towering above the water, now offered an easy target to the rifled guns of the *Merrimac* and the lighter artillery of the gun-boats. A shot from her exploded the *Patrick Henry's* boiler, causing much loss of life and disabling that vessel for a considerable time.

In the meantime the *Roanoke* and *St. Lawrence* were approaching, aided by steam-tugs. As they passed Sewell's Point, its batteries opened fire upon them, and they replied with broadsides. Just at that moment the scene was one of unsurpassed magnificence. The bright afternoon sun shone upon the glancing waters. The fortifications of Newport News were seen swarming with soldiers, now idle spectators of a conflict far beyond the range of their batteries, and the flames were just bursting from the abandoned *Congress*. The stranded *Minnesota* seemed a huge monster at bay, surrounded by the *Merrimac* and the gun-boats. The entire horizon was lighted up by the continual flashes of the artillery of these combatants, the broadsides of the *Roanoke* and *St. Lawrence* and the Sewell's Point batteries; clouds of white smoke rose in spiral columns to the skies, illumined by the evening sunlight, while land and water seemed to tremble under the thunders of the cannonade.

The *Minnesota* was now in a desperate situation. It is true that, being aground, she could not sink, but, looking through the glass, I could see a hole in her side, made by the *Merrimac's* rifle shells. She had lost a number of men, and had once been set on fire. Her destruction or surrender seemed inevitable, since all efforts to get her afloat had failed. But just then the *Merrimac* turned away from her toward the *Roanoke* and the *St. Lawrence*. These vessels had suffered but little from the distant fire of the Sewell's Point batteries, but both had run aground, and had not been floated off again with-

out great difficulty, for it was very hazardous for vessels of deep draught to manoeuvre over these comparatively shallow waters. When the *Merrimac* approached, they delivered broadsides and were then towed back with promptness. The *Merrimac* pursued them but a short distance (for by this time darkness was falling upon the scene of action, the tide was ebbing, and there was great risk of running aground), and then steamed toward Norfolk with the *Beaufort*, leaving her wounded at the Marine Hospital.

And now followed one of the grandest episodes of this splendid yet somber drama. The moon in her second quarter was just rising over the waters, but her silvery light was soon paled by the conflagration of the *Congress*, whose glare was reflected in the river. The burning frigate four miles away seemed much nearer. As the flames crept up the rigging, every mast, spar, and rope glittered against the dark sky in dazzling lines of fire. The hull, aground upon the shoal, was plainly visible, and upon its black surface each port-hole seemed the mouth of a fiery furnace. For hours the flames raged, with hardly a perceptible change in the wondrous picture. At irregular intervals, loaded guns and shells, exploding as the fire reached them, sent forth their deep reverberations. The masts and rigging were still standing, apparently almost intact, when, about 2 o'clock in the morning, a monstrous sheaf of flame rose from the vessel to an immense height. A deep report announced the explosion of the ship's powder-magazine. Apparently all the force of the explosion had been upward. The rigging had vanished entirely, but the hull seemed hardly shattered; the only apparent change in it was that in two places two or three of the port-holes had been blown into one great gap. It continued to burn until the brightness of its blaze was effaced by the morning sun.

During the night I had sent an order to bring down from Smithfield to Ragged Island the twelve-oared barge that I used when inspecting the river batteries, and at the first dawn of day I embarked with some of my staff, and rowed in the direction of the *Minnesota*, confident of witnessing her destruction or surrender; and, in fact, nothing could have saved her but the timely arrival of the anxiously expected *Monitor*.

The sun was just rising when the *Merrimac*, having anchored for the night at Sewell's Point, headed toward the *Minnesota*. But a most important incident had taken place during the night. The *Monitor* had reached Old Point about 10 o'clock;

her commander had been informed of the events of the day, and ordered to proceed at once to the relief of the *Minnesota*.

As soon as the *Merrimac* approached her old adversary, the *Monitor* darted out from behind the *Minnesota*, whose immense bulk had effectually concealed her from view. No words can express the surprise with which we beheld this strange craft, whose appearance was tersely and graphically described by the exclamation of one of my oarsmen, "A tin can on a shingle!" Yet this insignificant-looking object was at that moment the most powerful war-ship in the world. The first shots of the *Merrimac* were directed at the *Minnesota*, which was again set on fire, while one of the tugs alongside of her was blown up, creating great havoc and consternation; but the *Monitor*, having the advantage of light draught, placed herself between the *Merrimac* and her intended victim, and from that moment the conflict became a heroic single combat between the two iron-clads. For an instant they seemed to pause, as if to survey each other. Then advancing cautiously, the two vessels opened fire as soon as they came within range, and a fierce artillery duel raged between them without perceptible effect, although the entire fight was within close range, from half a mile at the farthest down to a few yards. For four hours, from 8 to 12 (which seemed three times as long), the cannonading continued with hardly a moment's intermission. I was now within three-quarters of a mile of them, and more than once stray shots came near enough to dash the spray over my barge, but the grandeur of the spectacle was so fascinating that they passed by unheeded. During the evolutions, in which the *Monitor* had the advantage of light draught, the *Merrimac* ran aground. After much delay and difficulty she was floated off. Finding that her shot made no impression whatever upon the *Monitor*, the *Merrimac*, seizing a favorable chance, succeeded in striking her foe with her stem. Soon afterward they ceased firing and separated as if by common consent. The *Monitor* steamed away toward Old Point. Captain Van Brunt, commander of the *Minnesota*, states in his official report that when he saw the *Monitor* disappear, he lost all hope of saving his ship. But, fortunately for him, the *Merrimac* steamed slowly toward Norfolk, evidently disabled in her motive power. The *Monitor*, accompanied by several tugs, returned late in the afternoon, and they succeeded in floating off the *Minnesota* and conveying her to Old Point.

HOW THE GUN-BOAT "ZOUAVE" AIDED THE "CONGRESS."

BY HENRY REANEY, ACTING MASTER, U. S. N.

THE *Zouave* was a tug-boat built in Albany, N. Y., for service on the Hudson River, of great power and speed for that class of vessel. On her purchase by the Government, she was delivered at Hampton Roads by her original owners to Admiral Goldsborough, at that time in command of the North Atlantic Squadron. The en-

gineers and firemen who brought her from Albany entered the naval service, both the former being appointed acting second-assistant engineers, and the latter first-class firemen. I was ordered to her February 1st, 1862, and took with me from the store-ship *William Badger*, of which I was executive, ten men, who, with the pilot, H. J. Phillips,

who had been previously ordered, comprised the crew. She had for armament a 30-pounder Parrott rifle forward and a 24-pounder howitzer aft. We were ready for service early in February and were assigned to picket duty in the James River, which employed us only from sunset to sunrise. During the daytime we acted as a tender for the *Cumberland* and *Congress*. On the 8th of March, after coming in from picket duty, we went to Fort Monroe for the mail and fresh provisions, which we got on the arrival of the mail-boat from Baltimore. We returned to Newport News about 10 o'clock. After delivering the stores belonging to the *Congress* and *Cumberland*, we went to the wharf to lie until wanted. A little after dinner, about 12:30, the quartermaster on watch called my attention to black smoke in the Elizabeth River, close to Craney Island. We let go from the wharf and ran alongside the *Cumberland*. The officer of the deck ordered us to run down toward Pig Point and find out what was coming down from Norfolk. It did not take us long to find out, for we had not gone over two miles when we saw what to all appearances looked like the roof of a very big barn belching forth smoke as from a chimney on fire. We were all divided in opinion as to what was coming. The boatswain's mate was the first to make out the Confederate flag, and then we all guessed it was the *Merrimac* come at last. When we were satisfied it was the enemy, we went to quarters and fired our 30-pounder Parrott, which was not answered. We fired again, taking deliberate aim, and were rather surprised that it was unnoticed; we fired, I think, about six shots when our recall signal was hoisted on the *Cumberland*. By this time the batteries at Newport News had commenced firing, the *Congress* had gone to quarters and opened fire; when we got close to the *Cumberland* she also began firing. The *Merrimac* kept on until abreast the *Congress*, when she opened fire, pouring a broadside in passing, and came right on for the *Cumberland*, which vessel was using her guns as fast as they could be fired. We were in rather a tight place, being between the fire of the gun-boats from Norfolk and the *Patrick Henry* and *Jamestown* from Richmond, and our own batteries on shore, the shot from which were falling all round us. However, we kept loading and firing as fast as we were able, until, seeing that the *Congress* had loosed her fore-topsail and made signal for us to come alongside, we ran down to her, leaving the *Cumberland* just as the *Merrimac* was passing her bows. We made fast to the port side of the *Congress*, passing our tow-line through a scupper, and with our breast-lines through a gun-port, she lying headed toward Hampton Roads. There was hardly a breath of

wind, so that her topsail and jib were of no account in moving her. It took us some time to get our lines fast, owing to the horrible condition of affairs on the gun-deck, which was on fire. The cries of the wounded were terrible. The men were not all regular men-of-war's-men — I think some were soldiers; but, anyhow, the tug's crew had to get on board to make our lines fast. When everything was ready, Lieut. Smith ordered me to go ahead, with our helm hard-a-starboard so as to get her into shoal water. When we had her headed toward the shore, the *Merrimac* got right astern of us and opened fire, pouring broadside after broadside, that raked her fore and aft, overthrowing several of the guns and killing a number of the crew. About this time we were in rather a bad plight; the blood was running from the *Congress* scuppers on to our deck, like water on a wash-deck morning; the tallow-cup on top of our cylinder, and the pilot-house and billet-head on the stem were shattered by shot; the pilot, Mr. Phillips, was stunned. Our *Zouave* figure-head, which was a fixture on top of the pilot-house, carried away by a shot on its way over the bows, disabled two of the crew of the rifle. It was about this time that the *Congress* grounded and the white flag was hoisted. Firing ceased and a rebel steamer was making for us. I told Lieut. Pendergrast that if he did not want me any more, I'd leave and try to escape. He told me to take care of myself, as they had surrendered. We cut our lines and backed astern, and, as soon as we got clear, commenced firing, which, I think, gave rise to the charge of the *Congress* firing after she had struck her colors. The *Minnesota* was aground in the North Channel, and had my recall signal flying. We headed for her, keeping as close to the beach on our side as possible, when about half-way, after passing all the enemy's vessels, we were struck by a shot which carried away our rudder-post and one of the blades of our propeller-wheel. Being then unable to use our rudder, and heading directly for the enemy, we stopped and backed so as to get her head right, which we did, and with our large hawser out over our port quarter, we kept her going in the right direction, until the gun-boat *Whitehall* came to our assistance. We lay that night alongside the *Minnesota*, and in the morning were towed to Fort Monroe.

I claim for the *Zouave* that she fired the first shot at the *Merrimac*, and that but for her assistance the *Congress* would have been captured; in evidence of which I refer to page 64 of Professor Soley's book, "The Blockade and the Cruisers," also to the "New York Herald" of March 10th, 1862. I held the appointment of acting master's mate, and had been in the service from June, 1861.

DETROIT, March 9th, 1884.

THE PLAN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE "MERRIMAC."

I.

BY JOHN M. BROOKE, COMMANDER, C. S. N.

EARLY in June, 1861, the Secretary of the Navy of the Confederate States asked me to design an iron-clad. The first idea presenting itself was a shield of timber, two feet thick, plated with three

or more inches of iron, inclined to the horizontal plane at the least angle that would permit working the guns; this shield, its eaves submerged to the depth of two feet, to be supported by a hull of

equal length. There was nothing novel in the use of inclined iron-plating. It was apparent that to support such a shield the ends of the vessel would be so full as to prevent the attainment of speed; and that in moving *end on* even a small sea would prevent working the bow or stern gun. It then occurred to me that fineness of line, protection of hull, and buoyancy with light draught, could be obtained by extending the ends of the vessel under water *beyond the shield*, provided the shield were of sufficient length to give the requisite stability. Considering, then, the liability to the banking up of water over these submerged ends, I erected upon each a decked superstructure of ship-iron, carried up from the sides of the submerged parts to a height above water not greater than would permit free use of the guns, and of the usual form of hull above water. Water could be admitted or taken from them.

I submitted to the secretary outline drawings,—sheer, body and deck plans, with explanations,—and he approved and adopted this novel form. In reply to my suggestion that Naval-Constructor John L. Porter and Chief-Engineer William P. Williamson should be called to Richmond, that we might put the plan in execution, he replied that a practical mechanic would be sent from the Norfolk yard. This mechanic—a master ship-carpenter—came; but as he was lacking in confidence and energy, and was averse to performing unusual duty, he was permitted to return to the yard.

Messrs. Porter and Williamson were ordered to Richmond for consultation on the same general subject, and to aid in the work. They met the secretary and myself on the 23d of June, 1861. Mr. Porter brought and submitted to the secretary a model described by the latter in a report dated March 29th, 1862, to the congress of the Confederate States, as "a flat-bottomed light-draught propeller, casemated battery, with inclined iron sides and ends." The hull of this model did not extend beyond the shield. The secretary then called the attention of Messrs. Williamson and Porter to the plan proposed by me, which had been adopted by the department. The drawings were laid before them, the reasons for extending the hull under water beyond the shield were given, and both approved it. As the drawings were in pencil, the secretary directed me to make a clean drawing in ink of the plan, to be filed in the department.

Messrs. Porter and Williamson were directed to ascertain if suitable engines and boilers could be obtained. Mr. Porter offered to make the clean drawing, as "being more familiar with that sort of work." Accepting the offer I went with Williamson to the Tredegar works, where we learned that there were no suitable engines in the South. Williamson then said he thought the engines of the *Merrimac* could be used, but that the vessel would necessarily draw as much water as the *Merrimac*, and it would not be worth while to build a new hull, as enough of the old hull remained to carry out the plan. Mr. Porter and I thought the draught too great, but that we could not do better. We so reported to the secretary, who concurred. That there might be official record of results of consultation, as there was of the original plan, he directed us to consider and report upon the best mode of making the *Merrimac* useful, which we did in accordance with the views above stated. Mr. Williamson and Mr. Porter returned to Norfolk, the former to adapt and repair the engines, the latter to cut the ship down, submerge her ends, etc. To me was assigned the preparation of armor, construction of guns, etc. On the 11th of July Mr. Porter submitted to the secretary drawings, based upon actual measurements of the ship and on the plan of *submerged extended ends*, which I had presented, and which had been unanimously approved. Having reference to this working plan and its details, the secretary issued the following order:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, July 11, 1861. FLAG-OFFICER F. FORREST. SIR: You will proceed with all practicable dispatch to make the changes in the form of the *Merrimac*, and to build, equip, and fit her in all respects according to the design and plans of the constructor and engineer, Messrs. Porter and Williamson. . . . R. S. MALLORY, Secretary of the C. S. Navy.

This and a similar order were construed by Mr. Porter to credit him with the origin of the plan, and served as a basis to a published claim after the action in Hampton Roads, which led to a call by the Confederate House of Representatives, upon the Secretary of the Navy, for information as to the origin of the plan, and to the settlement of the question by a patent, No. 100, granted me by the Confederate States, 29th July, 1862. This patent is still in my possession.

LEXINGTON, VA., October, 1887.

II.

BY JOHN L. PORTER, NAVAL CONSTRUCTOR, CONFEDERATE STATES.

IN June, 1861, I was ordered to Richmond by Secretary Mallory, and carried up with me a model of an iron-clad for harbor defense. Soon after my arrival I was informed by the secretary that I had been sent for to confer with Chief Engineer W. P. Williamson and Lieutenant J. M. Brooke in arranging an iron-clad. We went into Engineer Williamson's office, and held a consultation, the result of which was this report to the secretary:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, June 25th, 1861. SIR: In obedience to your order, we have carefully examined

and considered the various plans and propositions for constructing a shot-proof steam-battery, and respectfully report that in our opinion the steam-frigate *Merrimac*, which is in such condition from the effect of fire as to be useless for any other purpose without incurring a very heavy expense in her rebuilding, can be made an efficient vessel of that character, mounting 10 heavy guns, 2 pivot and 8 broadside guns of her original battery, and from the further consideration that we cannot procure a suitable engine and boilers for any other vessel without building them, which would occupy too much time, it would appear that this is our only chance to get a suitable vessel in a short time. The bottom of

the hull, boilers, and heavy and costly parts of the engine being but little injured, reduce the cost of construction to about one-third of the amount which would be required to construct such a vessel anew.

"We cannot, without further examination, make an accurate estimate of the cost of the proposed work, but think it will be about one hundred and ten thousand dollars, the most of which will be for labor, the materials being nearly all on hand in the yard, excepting the iron plating to cover the shield. The plan to be adopted in the arrangement of the shield for glancing shot, mounting guns, arranging the hull, and plating to be in accordance with the plan submitted for the approval of the department. We are, with much respect, your obedient servants, WILLIAM P. WILLIAMSON, Chief Engineer; JOHN M. BROOKE, Lieutenant; JOHN L. PORTER, Naval Constructor."

I returned immediately to the Gosport Navy Yard, and made a working drawing of the whole thing, put my shield on it, which I had in my model, and returned to the secretary, July 11th, 1861, who had the following order made out, and placed in my hands by himself:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, July 11th, 1861. FLAG-OFFICER F. FORREST. SIR: You will proceed, with all practicable dispatch, to make the changes in the *Merrimac*, and to build, equip, and fit her in all respects according to the designs and plans of the constructor and engineer, Messrs. Porter and Williamson. As time is of the first importance in the matter, you will see that work progresses without delay to completion. S. R. MALLORY, Secretary of the Confederate States Navy."


I came immediately back to the Navy Yard and commenced this great work, unassisted by mortal man so far as the plans and responsibilities of the hull and its workings were concerned as an iron-clad. The second letter which came from the department about this great piece of work is as follows:

"CONFEDERATE STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, August 18th, 1861. FLAG-OFFICER F. FORREST, COMMANDING NAVY YARD, GOSPORT. SIR: The great importance of the service expected from the *Merrimac*, and the urgent necessity of her speedy completion, induce me to call upon you to push forward the work with the utmost dispatch. Chief Engineer Williamson and Constructor Porter, severally in charge of the two respective branches of this great work, and for which they will be held personally responsible, will receive, therefore, every possible facility at the expense and delay of every other work on hand if necessary. SECRETARY S. R. MALLORY, Confederate States Navy."

In April, 1846, I had been stationed in Pittsburgh superintending an iron steamer, when I conceived the idea of an iron-clad, and made a model with the exact shield which I placed on the *Merrimac*. Lieutenant Brooke tried for over a week to carry out the wish of the department, but failed entirely to produce anything, whereupon I was called on by the secretary.

After I had made the plan of the *Merrimac*, and had submitted it to the department, not to Lieutenant Brooke, and when everything was fresh in the mind of the secretary, he had the order of July 11th made out and placed in my hands, to Flag-Officer Forrest, to proceed with the work with all dispatch. No man save myself had anything to do with the converting of that ship into an iron-

clad,—I calculated her displacement, weight, etc., and cut her down to suit, and no man save myself knew what she would bear. Lieutenant Brooke came to the yard once while the ship was being prepared, and stated that he had tried experiments on three inches of iron and it would not stand the fire. I then told him to put on another inch, making four inches; he asked me if she would bear it. I told him she would, and the armor was changed to four inches. All the inboard plans and arrangements were made by myself, and the whole working of the ship; Lieutenant Brooke superintended the armor and guns; Engineer Williamson superintended the machinery, and John L. Porter the construction of the hull. The accompanying drawing is a correct representation of a cross-section amidships. She had only decks, gun and berth. Her shield sloped at an angle of 35 degrees; her rudder and propeller were well protected by a heavy fan-tail; her prow was of cast-iron securely fastened to the ship, and so well secured that though it was broken in two by striking the *Cumberland* a glancing blow, the fastenings to the vessel were not broken loose. Her deck ends were two feet below water and not awash, and the ship was as strong and well protected at her center-line as anywhere else, as her knuckle was two feet below her water-line, and her plating ran down to the knuckle and was there clamped. Her draught of water was 21 feet forward and 22 feet aft.



CROSS-SECTION OF "MERRIMAC,"
FROM A DRAWING BY JOHN
L. PORTER, CONSTRUCTOR.

a — 4 inches of iron.
b — 22 inches of wood.

After the engagements of the 8th and 9th of March, 1862, I put her in the dry-dock and found she had 97 indentations on her armor from shot, 20 of which were from the 10-inch guns of the *Monitor*. Six of her top layer of plates were broken by the *Monitor's* shots, and none by those of the other vessels. None of the lower layer of plates were injured. I removed those plates and replaced them by others. Her wood-work underneath was not hurt. Her smoke-stack was full of shot-holes. She never had any boat-davits. Her pilot-house was cast solid, and was not covered with plate-iron like her shield. She had port shutters only at her four quarter port-holes. It will thus be seen that the conversion of the *Merrimac* into an iron-clad was merely accidental, and grew out of the impracticability of building an engine within the time at the disposal of the Confederacy, and no iron-clad, with submerged ends, was afterward built.

PORTSMOUTH, VA., October, 1887.

NOTES ON THE MONITOR-MERRIMAC FIGHT. ☆

BY DINWIDDIE B. PHILLIPS, SURGEON OF THE "MERRIMAC."

THE *Virginia* (or *Merrimac*), with which I was connected during her entire career, bore some resemblance to a huge terrapin with a large round chimney about the middle of its back. She was so built as not to suit high winds and heavy seas, and therefore could not operate outside the capes of Virginia. In fact she was designed from the first as a defense for the harbor of Norfolk, and for that alone. In addition to our guns, we were armed with an iron ram or prow. The prow, not being well put on, was twisted off and lost in our first encounter with the *Cumberland*. I am also satisfied that had not our prow been lost, we should have sunk the *Monitor* when we rammed her on the 9th of March, 1862. Admiral Worden is of contrary opinion. In a private letter to me, dated March 13th, 1882, he says :

"If the prow of the *Merrimac* had been intact at the time she struck the *Monitor*, she could not have damaged her a particle more by the blow with it than she did in hitting her with her stem; and for the following reasons: The hull of the *Monitor* was in breadth, at her midship section, 34 feet, and the armored raft which was placed on the hull was, at the same point, 41 feet 4 inches in breadth, so that the raft extended on either side 3 feet 8 inches beyond the hull. The raft was 5 feet deep and was immersed in the water 3½ feet. The *Merrimac's* prow, according to Jones, was 2 feet below the surface of the water. The prow, therefore, if on, would have struck the armored hull 1½ feet above its lowest part, and could not have damaged it. Further, the prow extended 2 feet forward from the stem, and had it been low enough to reach below the armored raft, it could not have reached the hull by 1 foot 8 inches."

Admiral Worden's theory, given above, like all untested ones, is merely speculation; and I doubt not the commander of the *Cumberland*, previous to a practical demonstration, would have thought it impossible for our prow to have first crushed its way through a strongly constructed raft projected in front of that vessel as a protection against torpedoes, and then to have penetrated her bow—the strongest part of the ship—and to have made a chasm in it large enough, according to Wood, to admit a "horse and cart."

Most of our crew being volunteers from the army and unused to ship-life, about twenty per cent. of our men were usually ashore at the hospital, and our effective force on the 8th of March was about 250 or 260 men.


We left the Norfolk Navy Yard about 11 A. M. of that day. As our engines were very weak and defective, having been condemned just before the war as worthless, we were fortunate in having favorable weather for our purpose. The day was unusually mild and calm for the season, and the water was smooth and glassy; and, except for the unusually large number of persons upon the shores watching our motions, there was nothing to indicate a serious movement on our part. Our vessel never having been tested before, and her model being new and unheard of, many of those who watched us predicted failure, and others suggested that the *Virginia* was an enormous metallic burial-case, and that we were conducting our own funeral.

Though we withdrew on the first day of the battle, at 7 P. M., and went to our anchorage at Sewell's Point, our duties kept us so constantly engaged that it was near midnight before we got our supper, the only meal we had taken since 8 A. M. Afterward the attractiveness of the burning *Congress* was such that we watched her till nearly 1 A. M., when she blew up, before we went to our rest, so that when we were aroused to resume the fight on Sunday morning, it seemed as though we had scarcely been asleep. After a hurried breakfast, and while the crew were getting up the anchor, I landed Captain Buchanan, Lieutenant Minor, and the seriously wounded men at Sewell's Point, for transmission to the naval hospital at Norfolk. Returning, I pulled around the ship before boarding her, to see how she had stood the bombardment of Saturday and to what extent she had been damaged. I found all her stanchions, iron railings, and light work of every description swept away, her smoke-stack cut to pieces, two guns without muzzles, and ninety-eight indentations on her plating, showing where heavy solid shot had struck, but had glanced off without doing any injury. As soon as I had got on deck (about 6:25 A. M.), we started again for Hampton Roads.

On our way to the *Minnesota*, and while we were still too far off to do her much damage, the *Monitor* came out to meet us. For some length of time we devoted our attention to her, but having no solid shot, and finding that our light shell were making but little impression upon her turret, Jones ordered the pilot to disregard the *Monitor* altogether, and carry out his first instructions by placing the *Virginia* as near to the *Minnesota* as possible. Instead, however, of taking us within a half mile of that ship, as we afterward learned he could have done, he purposely ran us aground nearly two miles off. This he did through fear of passing under the *Minnesota's* terrible broadside, as he confessed subsequently to Captain A. B. Fairfax, Confederate States navy, from whose lips I received it.

After fifteen or twenty minutes we were afloat again. We sheered off from the *Monitor* in order to get a chance to turn and ram her. This was the time when Captain Van Brunt was under the impression we were in retreat and "the little battery chasing us." As soon as the move could be effected, we turned and ran into the *Monitor*, and at the same time gave her a shot from our bow pivot-gun. Had our iron prow been intact, as I have already said, we would have sunk her. As it was, she staggered awhile under the shock, and, sheering off from us was for a time inactive [see p. 725]. The battle was renewed, but shortly after noon the *Monitor* again withdrew [see p. 727].

We continued our fire upon the *Minnesota*, at long range, for about half an hour longer, when we took advantage of the flood-tide and returned slowly to Norfolk. That we did not destroy the *Minnesota* was due solely to the fact that our pilot assured us we could get no nearer to her than we then were without grounding again.



ARRIVAL OF THE "MONITOR" AT HAMPTON ROADS.

IN THE "MONITOR" TURRET.


BY S. DANA GREENE, COMMANDER, U. S. N., EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE "MONITOR."

THE keel of the most famous vessel of modern times, Captain Ericsson's first iron-clad, was laid in the ship-yard of Thomas F. Rowland, at Greenpoint, Brooklyn, in October, 1861, and on the 30th of January, 1862, the novel craft was launched. On the 25th of February she was commissioned and turned over to the Government, and nine days later left New York for Hampton Roads, where, on the 9th of March, occurred the memorable contest with the *Merrimac*. On her next venture on the open sea she foundered off Cape Hatteras in a gale of wind (December 29th). During her career of less than a year she had no fewer than five different commanders; but it was the fortune of the writer to serve as her only executive officer, standing upon her deck when she was launched, and leaving it but a few minutes before she sank.

So hurried was the preparation of the *Monitor* that the mechanics worked upon her day and night up to the hour of her departure, and little opportunity was offered to drill the crew at the guns, to work the turret, and to become familiar with the other unusual features of the vessel. The crew was, in fact, composed of volunteers. Lieutenant Worden, having been authorized by the Navy Department to select his men from any ship-of-war in New York harbor, addressed the crews of the *North Carolina* and *Sabine*, stating fully to them the probable dangers of the passage to Hampton Roads and the certainty of having important service to perform after arriving. The sailors responded enthusiastically, many more volunteering than were required. Of the crew Captain Worden said, in his official report of the battle, "A better one no naval commander ever had the honor to command."†

† The *Monitor's* officers were: Lieut. J. L. Worden, commanding; Lieut. S. D. Greene, executive officer; Acting Master, L. N. Stodder; Acting Master, J. N. Webber; Acting Master's Mate, G. Frederickson; Acting Assistant Surgeon, D. C. Logue; Acting Assistant Paymaster, W. F. Keeler; Chief Engineer, A. C. Stimers (inspector); First Assist-

ant Engineer, Isaac Newton (in charge of steam machinery); Second Assist. Engineer, A. B. Campbell; Third Assist. Engineer, R. W. Hauds; Fourth Assist. Engineer, M. T. Sunstrom; Captain's Clerk, D. Toffey; Quartermaster, P. Williams; Gunner's Mate, J. Crown; Boatswain's Mate, J. Stocking; and 42 others,—a total of 58.—S. D. G.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1875.

John A. Worden

REAR-ADMIRAL, U. S. N.

The sword was presented to Admiral Worden by the State of New York soon after the engagement in Hampton Roads.—EDITORS.

We left New York in tow of the tug-boat *Seth Low* at 11 A. M. of Thursday, the 6th of March. On the following day a moderate breeze was encountered, and it was at once evident that the *Monitor* was unfit as a sea-going craft. Nothing but the subsidence of the wind prevented her from being shipwrecked before she reached Hampton Roads. The berth-deck hatch leaked in spite of all we could do, and the water came down under the turret like a waterfall. It would strike the pilot-house and go over the turret in beautiful curves, and it came through the narrow eye-holes in the pilot-house with such force as to knock the helmsman completely round from the wheel. The waves also broke over the blower-pipes, and the water came down through them in such

quantities that the belts of the blower-engines slipped, and the engines consequently stopped for lack of artificial draught, without which, in such a confined place, the fires could not get air for combustion. Newton and Stimers, followed by the engineer's force, gallantly rushed into the engine-room and fire-room to remedy the evil, but they were unable to check the inflowing water, and were nearly suffocated with escaping gas. They were dragged out more dead than alive, and carried to the top of the turret, where the fresh air gradually revived them. The water continued to pour through the hawse-hole, and over and down the smoke-stacks and blower-pipes, in such quantities that there was imminent danger that the ship would founder. The steam-pumps could not be operated because the fires had been nearly extinguished, and the engine-room was uninhabitable on account of the suffocating gas with which it was filled. The hand-pumps were then rigged and worked, but they had not enough force to throw the water out through the top of the turret,—the only opening,—and it was useless to bail, as we had to pass the buckets up through the turret, which made it a very long operation. Fortunately, toward evening the wind and the sea subsided, and, being again in smooth water, the engine was put in operation. But at midnight, in passing over a shoal, rough water was again encountered, and our troubles were renewed, complicated this time with the jamming of the wheel-ropes, so that the safety of the ship depended entirely on the strength of the hawser which connected her with the tug-boat. The hawser, being new, held fast; but during the greater part of the night we were constantly engaged in fighting the leaks, until we reached smooth water again, just before daylight.

It was at the close of this dispiriting trial trip, in which all hands had been exhausted in their efforts to keep the novel craft afloat, that the *Monitor* passed Cape Henry at 4 P. M. on Saturday, March 8th. At this point was heard the distant booming of heavy guns, which our captain rightly judged to be an engagement with the *Merrimac*, twenty miles away. He at once ordered the vessel stripped of her sea-rig, the turret keyed up, and every preparation made for battle. As we approached Hampton Roads we could see the fine old *Congress* burning brightly, and soon a pilot came on board and told of the arrival of the *Merrimac*, the disaster to the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*, and the dismay of the Union forces. The *Monitor* was pushed with all haste, and reached the *Roanoke* (Captain Marston), anchored in the Roads, at 9 P. M. Worden immediately reported his arrival to Captain Marston, who suggested that he should go to the assistance of the *Minnesota*, then aground off Newport News.† As no pilot was available, Captain Worden accepted the


† Captain John Marston, of the *Roanoke*, who was the senior officer present during Flag-Officer Goldsborough's absence on the sounds of North Carolina, had received peremptory orders to send the *Monitor* to Washington without delay. Similar orders had been received by Commodore Paulding in New York, but they only arrived after the *Monitor's* departure, and the tug by which Paulding endeavored to communicate with her failed to overtake her. When Worden went on board the

Roanoke to report his arrival at Hampton Roads, Captain Marston took upon himself the responsibility of retaining the *Monitor* to protect the fleet. Under the circumstances, it is hard to see how he could have done otherwise, although his action involved him in a technical disobedience of orders. In view of the spirit of routine which pervaded the older branch of the service at this time, Captain Marston's action showed commendable spirit and good sense.—EDITORS.

volunteer services of Acting Master Samuel Howard, who earnestly sought the duty. An atmosphere of gloom pervaded the fleet, and the pygmy aspect of the new-comer did not inspire confidence among those who had witnessed the destruction of the day before. Skillfully piloted by Howard, we proceeded on our way, our path illumined by the blaze of the *Congress*. Reaching the *Minnesota*, hard and fast aground, near midnight, we anchored, and Worden reported to Captain Van Brunt. Between 1 and 2 A. M. the *Congress* blew up,—not instantaneously, but successively. Her powder-tanks seemed to explode, each shower of sparks rivaling the other in its height, until they appeared to reach the zenith,—a grand but mournful sight. Near us, too, at the bottom of the river, lay the *Cumberland*, with her silent crew of brave men, who died while fighting their guns to the water's edge, and whose colors were still flying at the peak.¶

The dreary night dragged slowly on; the officers and crew were up and alert, to be ready for any emergency. At daylight on Sunday the *Merrimac* and

her consorts were discovered at anchor near Sewell's Point. At about half-past 7 o'clock the enemy's vessels got under way and steered in the direction of the *Minnesota*. At the same time the *Monitor* got under way, and her officers and crew took their stations for battle. Captain Van Brunt, of the *Minnesota*, officially reports, "I made signal to the *Monitor* to attack the enemy," but the signal was not seen by



SIDE ELEVATION AND DECK-PLAN OF THE "MONITOR."

us; other work was in hand, and Commander Worden required no signal.

The pilot-house of the *Monitor* was situated well forward, near the bow; it was a wrought-iron structure, built of logs of iron nine inches thick, bolted through the corners, and covered with an iron plate two inches thick, which was not fastened down, but was kept in place merely by its weight. The sight-holes or slits were made by inserting quarter-inch plates at the corners between the upper set of logs and the next below. The structure projected four feet above the deck, and was barely large enough inside to hold three men standing. It presented a flat surface on all sides and on top. The steering-wheel was secured to one of the logs on the front side. The position and shape of this structure should be carefully borne in mind.

Worden took his station in the pilot-house, and by his side were Howard, the pilot, and Peter Williams, quartermaster, who steered the vessel through-

¶ The fortune of civil war was illustrated in the case of the *Merrimac*. Commodore Buchanan's brother was an officer of the *Congress*, and each knew of the other's presence. The first and fourth lieutenants of the *Merrimac* had each a brother in the United States army. The father of the fifth

lieutenant was also in the United States army. The father of one of the midshipmen was in the United States navy. Lieutenant Butt, of the *Merrimac*, had been the room-mate of Lieutenant S. Dana Greene, of the *Monitor*, at the Naval Academy in Annapolis.—EDITORS.

out the engagement. My place was in the turret, to work and fight the guns; with me were Stodder and Stimers and sixteen brawny men, eight to each gun. John Stocking, boatswain's mate, and Thomas Lochrane, seaman, were gun-captains. Newton and his assistants were in the engine and fire rooms, to manipulate the boilers and engines, and most admirably did they perform this important service from the beginning to the close of the action. Webber had charge of the powder division on the berth-deck, and Joseph Crown, gunner's-mate, rendered valuable service in connection with this duty.

The physical condition of the officers and men of the two ships at this time was in striking contrast. The *Merrimac* had passed the night quietly near Sewell's Point, her people enjoying rest and sleep, elated by thoughts of the victory they had achieved that day, and cheered by the prospects of another easy victory on the morrow. The *Monitor* had barely escaped shipwreck twice within the last thirty-six hours, and since Friday morning, forty-eight hours before, few if any of those on board had closed their eyes in sleep or had anything to eat but hard bread, as cooking was impossible. She was surrounded by wrecks and disaster, and her efficiency in action had yet to be proved.

Worden lost no time in bringing it to test. Getting his ship under way, he steered direct for the enemy's vessels, in order to meet and engage them as far as possible from the *Minnesota*. As he approached, the wooden vessels quickly turned and left. Our captain, to the "astonishment" of Captain Van Brunt (as he states in his official report), made straight for the *Merrimac*, which had already commenced firing; and when he came within short range, he changed his course so as to come alongside of her, stopped the engine, and gave the order, "Commence firing!" I triced up the port, ran out the gun, and, taking deliberate aim, pulled the lockstring. The *Merrimac* was quick to reply, returning a rattling broadside (for she had ten guns to our two), and the battle fairly began. The turrets and other parts of the ship were heavily struck, but the shots did not penetrate; the tower was intact, and it continued to revolve. A look of confidence passed over the men's faces, and we believed the *Merrimac* would not repeat the work she had accomplished the day before.

The fight continued with the exchange of broadsides as fast as the guns could be served and at very short range, the distance between the vessels frequently being not more than a few yards. Worden skillfully manœuvred his quick-turning vessel, trying to find some vulnerable point in his adversary. Once he made a dash at her stern, hoping to disable her screw, which he thinks he missed by not more than two feet. Our shots ripped the iron of the *Merrimac*, while the reverberation of her shots against the tower caused anything but a pleasant sensation. While Stodder, who was stationed at the machine which controlled the revolving motion of the turret, was incautiously leaning against the side of the tower, a large shot struck in the vicinity and disabled him. He left the turret and went below, and Stimers, who had assisted him, continued to do the work.

The drawbacks to the position of the pilot-house were soon realized. We could not fire ahead nor within several points of the bow, since the blast from our own guns would have injured the people in the pilot-house, only



a few yards off. Keeler and Toffey passed the captain's orders and messages to me, and my inquiries and answers to him, the speaking-tube from the pilot-house to the turret having been broken early in the action. They performed their work with zeal and alacrity, but, both being landsmen, our technical communications sometimes miscarried. The situation was novel: a vessel of war was engaged in desperate combat with a powerful foe; the captain, commanding and guiding, was inclosed in one place, and the executive officer, working and fighting the guns, was shut up in another, and communication between them was difficult and uncertain. It was this experience which caused Isaac Newton, immediately after the engagement, to suggest the clever plan of putting the pilot-house on top of the turret, and making it cylindrical instead of square; and his suggestions were subsequently adopted in this type of vessel. [But see p. 736.—EDITORS.]

As the engagement continued, the working of the turret was not altogether satisfactory. It was difficult to start it revolving, or, when once started, to stop it, on account of the imperfections of the novel machinery, which was now undergoing its first trial. Stimers was an active, muscular man, and did his utmost to control the motion of the turret; but, in spite of his efforts, it was difficult, if not impossible, to secure accurate firing. The conditions were very different from those of an ordinary broadside gun, under which we had been trained on wooden ships. My only view of the world outside of the tower was over the muzzles of the guns, which cleared the ports by only a few inches. When the guns were run in, the port-holes were covered by heavy iron pendulums, pierced with small holes to allow the iron rammer and sponge handles to protrude while they were in use. To hoist these pendulums required the entire gun's crew and vastly increased the work inside the turret.

The effect upon one shut up in a revolving drum is perplexing, and it is not a simple matter

to keep the bearings. White marks had been placed upon the stationary deck immediately below the turret to indicate the direction of the starboard and port sides, and the bow and stern; but these marks were obliterated early in the action. I would continually ask the captain, "How does the *Merrimac* bear?" He replied, "On the starboard-beam," or "On the port-quarter," as the case might be. Then the difficulty was to determine the direction of the starboard-beam, or port-quarter, or any other bearing. It finally resulted, that when a gun was ready for firing, the turret would be started on its revolving journey in search of the target, and when found it was taken "on the fly," because the turret could not be accurately controlled. Once the *Merrimac* tried to ram us; but Worden avoided the direct impact by the skillful use of the helm, and she struck a glancing blow, which did no damage. At the instant of collision I planted a solid 180-pound shot fair and square upon the forward part of her casemate. Had the gun been loaded with thirty pounds of powder, which was the charge subsequently used with similar guns, it is probable that this shot would have penetrated her armor; but the charge being limited to fifteen pounds, in accordance with peremptory orders to that effect from the Navy Department, the shot rebounded without doing any more damage than possibly to start some of the beams of her armor-backing.

It is stated by Colonel Wood, of the *Merrimac*, that when that vessel rammed the *Cumberland* her ram, or beak, was broken off and left in that vessel. In a letter to me, about two years since, he described this ram as "of castiron, wedge-shaped, about 1500 pounds in weight, 2 feet under water, and projecting $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet from the stem." A ram of this description, had it been intact, would have struck the *Monitor* at that part of the upper hull where the armor and backing were thickest. It is very doubtful if, under any headway that the *Merrimac* could have acquired at such short range, this ram could have done any injury to this part of the vessel. That it could by no possibility have reached the thin lower hull is evident from a glance at the drawing of the *Monitor*, the overhang or upper hull being constructed for the express purpose of protecting the vital part of the vessel.

The battle continued at close quarters without apparent damage to either side. After a time, the supply of shot in the turret being exhausted, Worden hauled off for about fifteen minutes to replenish. The serving of the cartridges, weighing but fifteen pounds, was a matter of no difficulty; but the hoisting of the heavy shot was a slow and tedious operation, it being necessary that the turret should remain stationary, in order that the two scuttles, one in the deck and the other in the floor of the turret, should be in line. Worden took advantage of the lull, and passed through the port-hole upon the deck outside to get a better view of the situation. He soon renewed the attack, and the contest continued as before.

Two important points were constantly kept in mind: first, to prevent the enemy's projectiles from entering the turret through the port-holes,—for the explosion of a shell inside, by disabling the men at the guns, would have ended the fight, as there was no relief gun's crew on board; second, not to



PART OF THE CREW OF THE "MONITOR." ☆ FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SOON AFTER THE FIGHT.

fire into our own pilot-house. A careless or impatient hand, during the confusion arising from the whirligig motion of the tower, might let slip one of our big shot against the pilot-house. For this and other reasons I fired every gun while I remained in the turret.

Soon after noon a shell from the enemy's gun, the muzzle not ten yards distant, struck the forward side of the pilot-house directly in the sight-hole, or slit, and exploded, cracking the second iron log and partly lifting the top, leaving an opening. Worden was standing immediately behind this spot, and received in his face the force of the blow, which partly stunned him, and, filling his eyes with powder, utterly blinded him. The injury was known only

☆ The pride of Worden in his crew was warmly reciprocated by his men, and found expression in the following letter, written to him while he was lying in Washington disabled by his wound. We take it from Professor Soley's volume, "The Blockade and the Cruisers" (Charles Scribner's Sons).—EDITORS :

HAMPTON ROADS, April 24th, 1862. U. S. MONITOR. TO OUR DEAR AND HONORED CAPTAIN. DEAR SIR : These few lines is from your own crew of the *Monitor*, with their kindest Love to you their Honored Captain, hoping to God that they will have the pleasure of welcoming you back to us again soon, for we are all ready able and willing to meet Death or anything else, only give us back our Captain again. Dear Captain, we have got your Pilot-house fixed and all ready for you when you get well again; and we all sincerely hope that soon we will have the pleasure of welcoming you back to it. . . . We are waiting very patiently to engage

our Antagonist if we could only get a chance to do so. The last time she came out we all thought we would have the Pleasure of sinking her. But we all got disappointed, for we did not fire one shot, and the Norfolk papers says we are cowards in the *Monitor*—and all we want is a chance to show them where it lies with you for our Captain We can teach them who is cowards. But there is a great deal that we would like to write to you but we think you will soon be with us again yourself. But we all join in with our kindest love to you, hoping that God will restore you to us again and hoping that your sufferings is at an end now, and we are all so glad to hear that your eyesight will be spaired to you again. We would wish to write more to you if we have your kind Permission to do so but at present we all conclude by tendering to you our kindest Love and affection, to our Dear and Honored Captain. We remain untill Death your Affectionate Crew.

THE MONITOR BOYS.

To Captain Worden.

to those in the pilot-house and its immediate vicinity. The flood of light rushing through the top of the pilot-house, now partly open, caused Worden, blind as he was, to believe that the pilot-house was seriously injured, if not destroyed; he therefore gave orders to put the helm to starboard and "sheer off." Thus the *Monitor* retired temporarily from the action, in order to ascertain the extent of the injuries she had received. At the same time Worden sent for me, and leaving Stimers the only officer in the turret, I went forward at once, and found him standing at the foot of the ladder leading to the pilot-house.

He was a ghastly sight, with his eyes closed and the blood apparently rushing from every pore in the upper part of his face. He told me that he was seriously wounded, and directed me to take command. I assisted in leading him to a sofa in his cabin, where he was tenderly cared for by Doctor Logue, and then I assumed command. Blind and suffering as he was, Worden's fortitude never forsook him; he frequently asked from his bed of pain of the progress of affairs, and when told that the *Minnesota* was saved, he said, "Then I can die happy."

When I reached my station in the pilot-house, I found that the iron log was fractured and the top partly open; but the steering gear was still intact, and the pilot-house was not totally destroyed, as had been feared. In the confusion of the moment resulting from so serious an injury to the commanding officer, the *Monitor* had been moving without direction. Exactly how much time elapsed from the moment that Worden was wounded until I had reached the pilot-house and completed the examination of the injury at that point, and determined what course to pursue in the damaged condition of the vessel, it is impossible to state; but it could hardly have exceeded twenty minutes at the utmost. During this time the *Merrimac*, which was leaking badly, had started in the direction of the Elizabeth River; and, on taking my station in the pilot-house and turning the vessel's head in the direction of the *Merrimac*, I saw that she was already in retreat. A few shots were fired at the retiring vessel, and she continued on to Norfolk. I returned with the *Monitor* to the side of the *Minnesota*, where preparations were being made to abandon the ship, which was still aground. Shortly afterward Worden was transferred to a tug, and that night he was carried to Washington.

The fight was over. We of the *Monitor* thought, and still think, that we had gained a great victory. This the Confederates have denied. But it has never been denied that the object of the *Merrimac* on the 9th of March was to complete the destruction of the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, and that she was completely foiled and driven off by the *Monitor*; nor has it been denied that at the close of the engagement the *Merrimac* retreated to Norfolk, leaving the *Monitor* in possession of the field.]

] "My men and myself were perfectly black with smoke and powder. All my underclothes were perfectly black, and my person was in the same condition. . . . I had been up so long, and been under such a state of excitement, that my nervous system was completely run

down. . . . My nerves and muscles twitched as though electric shocks were continually passing through them. . . . I lay down and tried to sleep—I might as well have tried to fly." From a private letter of Lieutenant Greene, written just after the fight.—EDITORS.

In this engagement Captain Worden displayed the highest qualities as an officer and man. He was in his prime (forty-four years old), and carried with him the ripe experience of twenty-eight years in the naval service. He joined the ship a sick man, having but recently left a prison in the South. He was nominated for the command by the late Admiral Joseph Smith, and the result proved the wisdom of the choice. Having accepted his orders against the



COMMANDER SAMUEL DANA GREENE, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE "MONITOR." FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

protests of his physicians and the entreaties of his family, nothing would deter him from the enterprise. He arrived on the battle-ground amidst the disaster and gloom, almost despair, of the Union people, who had little faith that he could beat back the powerful *Merrimac*, after her experience with the *Cumberland* and *Congress*. Without encouragement, single-handed, and without specific orders from any source, he rose above the atmosphere of doubt and depression which surrounded him, and with unflinching nerve and undaunted courage he hurled his little untried vessel against his huge, well-proved antagonist, and won the battle. He was victor in the first iron-clad battle of the world's history.

The subsequent career of the *Monitor* needs but a few words.

On the day after the fight I received the following letter from Mr. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy:

"U. S. STEAMER *Roanoke*, OLD POINT, March 10th, 1862.

"MY DEAR MR. GREENE: Under the extraordinary circumstances of the contest of yesterday, and the responsibilities devolving upon me, and your extreme youth, † I have suggested to Captain Marston to send on board the *Monitor*, as temporary commanding, Lieutenant Selfridge, until the arrival of Commodore Goldsborough, which will be in a few days. I appreciate your position, and you must appreciate mine, and serve with the same zeal and fidelity. With the kindest wishes for you all, most truly,

G. V. FOX."

For the next two months we lay at Hampton Roads. Twice the *Merrimac* came out of the Elizabeth River, but did not attack. We, on our side, had received positive orders not to attack in the comparatively shoal waters above Hampton Roads, where the Union fleet could not manœuvre. The *Merrimac* protected the James River, and the *Monitor* protected the Chesapeake. Neither side had an iron-clad in reserve, and neither wished to bring on an engagement which might disable its only armored vessel in those waters.

With the evacuation of Norfolk and the destruction of the *Merrimac*, the *Monitor* moved up the James River with the squadron under the command

† I was twenty-two years of age, and previous to joining the *Monitor* had seen less than three years of active service, with the rank of midshipman.—S. D. G.

of Commander John Rodgers, in connection with McClellan's advance upon Richmond by the Peninsula. We were engaged for four hours at Fort Darling, but were unable to silence the guns or destroy the earth-works.

Probably no ship was ever devised which was so uncomfortable for her crew, and certainly no sailor ever led a more disagreeable life than we did on the James River, suffocated with heat and bad air if we remained below, and a target for sharp-shooters if we came on deck.

With the withdrawal of McClellan's army, we returned to Hampton Roads, and in the autumn were ordered to Washington, where the vessel was repaired. We returned to Hampton Roads in November, and sailed thence (December 29th) in tow of the steamer *Rhode Island*, bound for Beaufort, N. C. Between 11 p. m. and midnight on the following night the *Monitor* went down in a gale, a few miles south of Cape Hatteras. Four officers and twelve men were drowned, forty-nine people being saved by the boats of the steamer. It was impossible to keep the vessel free of water, and we presumed that the upper and lower hulls thumped themselves apart.

No ship in the world's history has a more imperishable place in naval annals than the *Monitor*. Not only by her providential arrival at the right moment did she secure the safety of Hampton Roads and all that depended on it, but the idea which she embodied revolutionized the system of naval warfare which had existed from the earliest recorded history. The name of the *Monitor* became generic, representing a new type; and, crude and defective as was her construction in some of its details, she yet contained the idea of the turret, which is to-day the central idea of the most powerful armored vessels.↓

↓ On account of the death of the writer of this paper, which occurred December 11th, 1884, soon after its preparation, the proofs did not receive the benefit of his revision. The article appears substantially in the form in which it was written, without changes other than verbal ones and a slight rearrangement of paragraphs.

Of the services of Mr. Greene in connection with the *Monitor*, Captain Worden made the following official record in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy:

"I was ordered to her (the *Monitor*) on the 13th of January, 1862, when she was still on stocks. Prior to that date Lieutenant S. D. Greene had interested himself in her and thoroughly examined her construction and design and informed himself as to her qualities, and, notwithstanding the many gloomy predictions of naval

officers and officers of the mercantile marine as to the great probability of her sinking at sea, volunteered to go in her, and, at my request, was ordered. From the date of his orders he applied himself unremittingly and intelligently to the study of her peculiar qualities and to her fitting and equipment. . . . Lieutenant Greene, after taking his place in the pilot-house and finding the injuries there less serious than I had supposed, had turned the vessel's head again in the direction of the enemy to continue the engagement; but before he could get at close quarters with her she retired. He therefore very properly returned to the *Minnesota* and lay by her until she floated. . . . Lieutenant Greene, the executive officer, had charge in the turret, and handled the guns with great courage, coolness, and skill; and throughout the engagement, as in the equipment of the vessel and on her passage to Hampton Roads, he exhibited an earnest devotion to duty unsurpassed in my experience."

EDITORS.

THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."

BY CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON, INVENTOR OF THE "MONITOR."



CAPTAIN JOHN ERICSSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE introduction of General Paixhans's brilliant invention, the shell-gun, in 1824, followed, in 1858, by the successful application of armor-plating to the steam-frigate *La Gloire*, under Napoleon III., compelled an immediate change in naval construction which startled the maritime countries of Europe, especially England, whose boasted security behind her "wooden walls" was shown to be a complete delusion. The English naval architects, however, did not overlook the fact that their French rivals, while producing a gun which rendered wooden navies almost useless, had also by their armor-plating provided an efficient protection against the destructive Paixhans shell.

Accordingly, the Admiralty without loss of time laid the keel of the *Warrior*, an armored iron steam-frigate 380 feet long, 58 feet beam, 26 feet draught, and 9200 tons displacement. The work being pushed with extraordinary vigor, this iron-clad ship was speedily launched and equipped, the admiration of the naval world.

Shortly after the adoption of armor-plating as an essential feature in the construction of vessels of war, the Southern States seceded from the Union, some of the most efficient of the United States naval officers resigning their commissions. Their loss was severely felt by the Navy Department at Washington; nor was it long before the presence of great professional skill among the officers of the naval administration of the Confederate States became manifest. Indeed, the utility of the armor-plating adopted by France and England proved to be better understood at Richmond than at Washington. While the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, and his advisers were discussing the question of armor, news reached Washington that the partly burnt and scuttled steam-frigate *Merrimac*, at the Norfolk Navy Yard, had been raised and cut down to her berth-deck, and that a very substantial structure of timber, resembling a citadel with inclined sides, was being erected on that deck.

The Navy Department at Washington early in August advertised for plans and offers for iron-clad steam-batteries to be built within a stipulated time. My attention having been thus called to a subject which I had thoroughly considered during a series of years, I was fully prepared to present plans of an impregnable steam-battery of light draught, suitable to navigate the shallow rivers and harbors of the Confederate States. Availing myself of the services of a friend who chanced to be in Washington at the time, proposals

were at once submitted to a board of naval officers appointed by the President; and the plans presented by my friend being rejected by the board, I immediately set out for Washington and laid the matter personally before its members, all of whom proved to be well-informed and experienced naval experts. Contrary to anticipation, the board permitted me to present a theoretical demonstration concerning the stability of the new structure, doubt of which was the principal consideration which had caused the rejection of the plan presented. In less than an hour I succeeded in demonstrating to the entire satisfaction of the board appointed by President Lincoln that the design was thoroughly practical, and based on sound theory. The Secretary of the Navy accordingly accepted my proposal to build an iron-clad steam-battery, and instructed me verbally to commence the construction forthwith. Returning immediately to New York, I divided the work among three leading mechanical establishments, furnishing each with detailed drawings of every part of the structure; the understanding being that the most skillful men and the best tools should be employed; also that work should be continued during night-time when practicable. The construction of nearly every part of the battery accordingly commenced simultaneously, all hands working with the utmost diligence, apparently confident that their exertions would result in something of great benefit to the national cause. Fortunately no trouble or delay was met at any point; all progressed satisfactorily; every part sent on board from the workshops fitted exactly the place for which it was intended. As a consequence of these favorable circumstances, the battery, with steam-machinery complete, was launched in one hundred days from the laying of the keel-plate. It should be mentioned that at the moment of starting on the inclined ways toward its destined element, the novel fighting-machine was named *Monitor*.]

Before entering on a description of this *fighting-machine* I propose to answer the question frequently asked: What circumstances dictated its size and peculiar construction?

1. The work on the *Merrimac* had progressed so far that no structure of large dimensions could possibly be completed in time to meet her.

2. The well-matured plan of erecting a citadel of considerable dimensions on the ample deck of the razed *Merrimac* admitted of a battery of heavy ordnance so formidable that no vessel of the ordinary type, of small dimensions, could withstand its fire.

3. The battery designed by the naval authorities of the Confederate States, in addition to the advantage of ample room and numerous guns, presented a

] The origin of the name *Monitor* is given in the following letter to Gustavus V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy:

"NEW-YORK, January 20th, 1862. SIR: In accordance with your request, I now submit for your approbation a name for the floating battery at Green Point. The impregnable and aggressive character of this structure will admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion that the batteries on the banks of their rivers will no longer present barriers to the entrance of the Union forces.

"The iron-clad intruder will thus prove a severe monitor to those leaders. But there are other leaders who will also be startled and admonished by the booming of the guns from the impregnable iron turret. 'Downing Street' will hardly view with indifference this last 'Yankee notion,' this monitor. To the Lords of the Admiralty the new craft will be a monitor suggesting doubts as to the propriety of completing those four steel-clad ships at three-and-a-half millions apiece. On these and many similar grounds I propose to name the new battery *Monitor*. Your obedient servant, J. ERICSSON."

EDITORS.

formidable front to an opponent's fire by being inclined to such a degree that shot would be readily deflected. Again, the inclined sides, composed of heavy timbers well braced, were covered with two thicknesses of bar iron, ingeniously combined, well calculated to resist the spherical shot peculiar to the Dahlgren and Rodman system of naval ordnance adopted by the United States navy.

4. The shallow waters on the coast of the Southern States called for very light draught; hence the upper circumference of the propeller of the battery would be exposed to the enemy's fire unless thoroughly protected against shot of heavy caliber. A difficulty was thus presented which apparently could not be met by any device which would not seriously impair the efficiency of the propeller.

5. The limited width of the navigable parts of the Southern rivers and inlets presented an obstacle rendering manœuvring impossible; hence it would not be practicable at all times to turn the battery so as to present a broadside to the points to be attacked.


6. The accurate knowledge possessed by the adversary of the distance between the forts on the river-banks within range of his guns, would enable him to point the latter with such accuracy that unless every part of the sides of the battery could be made absolutely shot-proof, destruction would be certain. It may be observed that the accurate knowledge of range was an advantage in favor of the Southern forts which placed the attacking steam-batteries at great disadvantage.

7. The difficulty of manipulating the anchor within range of powerful fixed batteries presented difficulties which called for better protection to the crew of the batteries than any previously known.


Several minor points familiar to the naval artillerist and naval architect presented considerations which could not be neglected by the constructor of the new battery; but these must be omitted in our brief statement, while the foregoing, being of vital importance, have demanded special notice.

The plans on pages 732-3 represent a longitudinal section through the center line of the battery, which, for want of space on the page, has been divided into three sections, viz., the aft, central, and forward sections, which for ready reference will be called *aft*, *central*, and *forward*.

Referring particularly to the upper and lower sections, it will be seen that the hull consists of an upper and lower body joined together in the horizontal plane not far below the water-line. The length of the upper part of the hull is 172 feet, beam 41 feet; the length of the lower hull being 122 feet, beam



1. AFT SECTION. LONGITUDINAL PLAN THROUGH THE CENTER LINE OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR.




2. CENTRAL SECTION, SAME PLAN.

34 feet. The depth from the underside of deck to the keel-plate is 11 feet 2 inches, draught of water at load-line 10 feet.

Let us now examine separately the three sectional representations.

Forward Section. The anchor-well, a cylindrical perforation of the overhanging deck, near the bow, first claims our attention. The object of this well being to protect the anchor when raised, it is lined with plate iron backed by heavy timbers, besides being protected by the armor-plating bolted to the outside of the overhang. It should be noticed that this method proved so efficient that in no instance did the anchor-gear receive any injury during the several engagements with the Confederate batteries, although nearly all of the monitors of the *Passaic* class were subjected to rapid fire at short range in upward of twenty actions. It will be remembered that the unprotected anchor of the *Merrimac* was shot away during the short battle with the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*. Having described the method of protecting the anchors, the mechanism adopted for manipulating the same remains to be explained. Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that a windlass is secured under the deck-beams near the anchor-well. The men working the handles of this mechanism were stationed in the hold of the vessel, and hence were most effectually protected against the enemy's shot, besides being completely out of sight. The Confederate artillerists were at first much surprised at witnessing the novel spectacle of vessels approaching their batteries, then stopping and remaining stationary for an indefinite time while firing, and then again departing, apparently without any intervention of anchor-gear. Our examination of this gear and the anchor-well affords a favorable opportunity of explaining the cause of Lieutenant Greene's alarm, mentioned




3. FORWARD SECTION, SAME PLAN.

in a statement recently published by a military journal, concerning a mysterious sound emanating from the said well during the passage of the *Monitor* from New York to Fort Monroe. Lieutenant Greene says that the sound from the anchor-well "resembled the death-groans of twenty men, and was the most dismal, awful sound [he] ever heard." Let us endeavor to trace to some physical cause this portentous sound. The reader will find, on close examination, that the chain cable which suspends the anchor passes through an aperture ("hawse-pipe") on the after side of the well, and that this pipe is very near the water-line; hence the slightest vertical depression of the bow will occasion a flow of water into the vessel. Obviously, any downward motion of the overhang will cause the air confined in the upper part of the well, when covered, to be blown through the hawse-pipe along with the admitted water, thereby producing a very discordant sound, repeated at every rise and fall of the bow during pitching. Lieutenant Greene also states that, apart from the reported sound, the vessel was flooded by the water which entered through the hawse-pipe; a statement suggesting that this flooding was the result of faulty construction, whereas it resulted from gross oversight on the part of the executive officer,—namely, in going to sea without stopping the opening round the chain-cable at the point where it passes through the side of the anchor-well.

The pilot-house is the next important object represented in the forward section of the illustration now under consideration. This structure is situated 10 feet from the anchor-well, its internal dimensions being 3 feet 6 inches long, 2 feet 8 inches wide, 3 feet 10 inches high above the plating of the deck; the sides consisting of solid blocks of wrought iron, 12 inches deep and 9 inches thick, firmly held down at the corner by 3-inch bolts passing through the iron-plated deck and deck-beams. The wheel, which by means of ordinary tiller-ropes operates the rudder, is placed within the pilot-house, its axle being supported by a bracket secured to the iron blocks as shown by the illustration. An ordinary ladder resting on the bottom of the vessel leads to the grated floor of the pilot-house. In order to afford the commanding officer and the pilot a clear view of objects before and on the sides of the vessel, the first and second iron blocks from the top are kept apart by packing pieces at the corners; long and narrow sight-holes being thereby formed extending round the pilot-house, and giving a clear view which sweeps round the entire horizon, all but that part which is hidden by the turret, hardly twelve degrees on each side of the line of keel. Regarding the adequacy of the elongated sight-hole formed between the iron blocks in the manner described, it should be borne in mind that an opening of five-eighths of an inch affords a vertical view 80 feet high at a distance of only 200 yards. More is not needed, a fact established during trials instituted by experts before the constructor delivered the vessel to the Government. Unfortunately the sight-holes were subsequently altered, the iron blocks being raised and the opening between them increased to such an extent that at sea, to quote Lieutenant Greene's report, the water entered "with such force as to knock the helmsman completely round from the wheel." It may be shown that but for the injudicious increase

of the sight-holes, the commander of the *Monitor* would not have been temporarily blinded during the conflict at Hampton Roads, although he placed his vessel in such an extraordinary position that, according to Lieutenant Greene's report, "a shell from the enemy's gun, the muzzle not ten yards distant [from the side of the *Monitor*], struck the forward side of the pilot-house." The size of the sight-hole, after the injudicious increase, may be inferred from the reported fact that the blast caused by the explosion of the Confederate shell on striking the outside of the pilot-house had the power of "partly lifting the top." This "top," it should be observed, consisted of an iron plate two inches thick, let down into an appropriate groove, but not bolted down—a circumstance which called forth Lieutenant Greene's disapprobation. The object of the constructor



PLAN OF THE BERTH-DECK OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR, DRAWN TO SCALE.

a, captain's cabin; b, his state-room; c, state-rooms of the officers; w, ward-room; d, quarters of the crew, with store-rooms on the sides.

in leaving the top plate of the pilot-house loose, so as to be readily pushed up from below, was that of affording egress to the crew in case of accident. Had the monitor *Tecumseh*, commanded by Captain T. A. M. Craven, when struck by a torpedo during the conflict in Mobile Bay, August 5th, 1864, been provided with a similar loose plate over the main hatch, the fearful calamity of drowning officers and crew would have been prevented. In referring to this untoward event, it should be observed that means had been provided in all the sea-going monitors to afford egress in case of injury to the hull: an opening in the turret-floor, when placed above a corresponding opening in the deck, formed a free passage to the turret, the top of which was provided with sliding hatches. Apparently the officer in charge of the turret-gear of Captain Craven's vessel was not at his post, as he ought to have been during action, or else he had not been taught the imperative duty of placing the turret in such a position that these openings would admit of a free passage from below. ‡

Lieutenant Greene's report with reference to the position of the pilot-house calls for particular notice, his assertion being that he "could not fire ahead within several points of the bow." The distance between the center of the turret and the pilot-house being fifty-five feet, while the extreme breadth of the latter is only five feet, it will be found that by turning the turret through an angle of only *six degrees* from the center line of the vessel, the shot will clear the pilot-house, a structure too substantial to suffer from

‡ Under the circumstances of the sinking of the *Tecumseh*, the turret was no doubt being worked to meet the necessities of the battle, not to afford egress for the crew.—EDITORS.


the mere aerial current produced by the flight of the shot. Considering that the *Monitor*, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, was a "quick-turning vessel," the disadvantage of not being able to fire over the bow within *six degrees* of the line of keel is insignificant. Captain Coles claimed for his famous iron-clad turret-ship the advantage of an all-round fire, although the axis of his turret-guns had many times greater deviation from the line of keel than that of the *Monitor*.

The statement published by Lieutenant Greene, that the chief engineer of the vessel immediately after the engagement in Hampton Roads "suggested the clever plan of putting the pilot-house on top of the turret," is incorrect and calls for notice. The obvious device of placing the pilot-house in the center and above the turret was carefully considered before the *Monitor* turret was constructed, but could not be carried out for these reasons:

1. The turret of the battery was too light to support a structure large enough to accommodate the commanding officer, the pilot, and the steering-gear, under the severe condition of absolute impregnability against solid shot from guns of 10-inch caliber employed by the Confederates.


2. A central stationary pilot-house connected with the turret involved so much complication and additional work (see description of turret and pilot-houses further on), that had its adoption not been abandoned the *Monitor* would not have been ready to proceed to Hampton Roads until the beginning of April, 1862. The damage to the national cause which might have resulted from that delay is beyond computation.

The next important part of the battery delineated on the forward section of the illustration, namely, the quarters of the officers and crew, will now be considered; but before entering on a description it should be mentioned that in a small turret-vessel built for fighting, only one-half of the crew need be accommodated at a time, as the other half should be in and on the turret, the latter being always covered with a water-proof awning. Referring again to the forward and to part of the central section, it will be seen that the quarters



TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE HULL OF THE ORIGINAL MONITOR.

The diagram gives a front view of the boilers and furnaces: also a side elevation of the rotating cylindrical turret which proved impregnable against ten-inch solid shot fired with battering charges at very short range.



VIEW SHOWING THE EFFECT OF SHOT ON THE "MONITOR" TURRET.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN SOON AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT.

The ridges shown in the nearer port are significant of the haste with which the vessel was built. An opening of this shape is usually made by cutting three circles one above another and intersecting, and then trimming

the edges to an oval. In this instance there was no time for the trimming process. Originally the armament was to be 15-inch guns, but as these could not be had in time, the 11-inch Dahlgrens were substituted.—EDITORS.


extend from the transverse bulkhead under the turret to within five feet of the pilot-house, a distance of fifty feet; the forward portion, twenty-four feet in length, being occupied by the officers' quarters and extending across the battery from side to side. The height of the aft part of these quarters is 8 feet 6 inches under the deck-beams; while the height of the whole of the quarters of the crew is 8 feet 6 inches. A mere glance at the illustrations showing a side elevation [p. 733] and top view of internal arrangement [p. 735] gives a correct idea of the nature of the accommodations prepared for the officers and crew of the vessel which Lieutenant Greene regards as a "crude" structure, and of which he says: "Probably no ship was ever devised which was so uncomfortable for the crew." If this opinion were well founded, it would prove that submerged vessels like the monitors are unfit to live in.

Fortunately, the important question whether crews can live permanently below water-line has been set at rest by the report of the chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to the Secretary of the Navy, 1864. This minute and carefully considered report enabled the naval administration, organized by President Lincoln, to prove the healthfulness of the monitors, by the following clear presentation of the subject: "The monitor class of vessels, it is well known, have but a few inches of their hulls above the water-line, and in a heavy sea are entirely submerged. It has been doubted whether under such circumstances it would be possible long to preserve the health of the men on board, and consequently maintain the fighting material in a condition for effective service. It is gratifying, therefore, to know that an examination of the sick-reports, covering a period of over thirty months, shows that, so far from being unhealthy, there was less sickness on board the monitors than on the same number of wooden ships with an equal number of men and in

similar exposed positions. The exemption from sickness upon the iron-clads in some instances is remarkable. There were on board the *Saugus*, from November 25th, 1864, to April 1st, 1865, a period of over four months, but four cases of sickness (excluding accidental injuries), and of these two were diseases with which the patients had suffered for years. On the *Montauk*, for a period of one hundred and sixty-five days prior to the 29th of May, 1865, there was but one case of disease on board. Other vessels of the class exhibit equally remarkable results, and the conclusion is reached that no wooden vessels in any squadron throughout the world can show an equal immunity from disease."


Apart from the ample size of the quarters on board the vessel, shown by the illustration, it should be mentioned that the system adopted for ventilating those quarters furnishes an abundant supply of fresh air by the following means. Two centrifugal blowers, driven by separate steam-engines, furnished seven thousand cubic feet of atmospheric air per minute by the process of suction through standing pipes on deck. Part of the air thus drawn in supported the combustion of the boiler furnaces, the remainder entering the lower part of the hull, gradually expelling the heated and vitiated air within the vessel. It has been imagined that the fresh air supplied by the blowers ought to have been conveyed to the quarters at the forward end of the vessel, by a system of conducting pipes. The laws of static balance, however, render the adoption of such a method unnecessary, since agreeably to those laws the fresh cold air, unless it be stopped by closed doors in the bulkheads, will find its way to every part of the bottom of the hull, gradually rising and expelling the upper heated strata through the hatches, and lastly through the grated top of the turret. Naval constructors who speculate on the cause of the extraordinary healthfulness of the monitors need not extend their researches beyond a thorough investigation of the system of ventilation just described.

Turret Department. The most important object delineated on the *central* section of the illustration, namely, the rotating turret, will now be considered; but before describing this essential part of the monitor system, it will be well to observe that the general belief is quite erroneous that a revolving platform, open or covered, is a novel design. So far from that being the case, this obvious device dates back to the first introduction of artillery. About 1820 the writer was taught by an instructor in fortification and gunnery that under certain conditions a position assailable from all sides should be



SIDE ELEVATION OF A FLOATING REVOLVING CIRCULAR TOWER, PUBLISHED BY ABRAHAM BLOODGOOD IN 1807.


defended by placing the guns on a turntable. Long before building the *Monitor* I regarded the employment of a revolving structure to operate guns on board ships as a device familiar to all well-informed naval artillerists. But although constructors of revolving circular gun-platforms for naval purposes, open or covered, have a right to



FLOATING CIRCULAR CITADEL, SUBMITTED TO THE FRENCH DIRECTORY IN 1798.

employ this ancient device, it will be demonstrated further on that the turret of the monitors is a distinct mechanical combination differing from previous inventions. The correctness of the assumption that revolving batteries for manipulating guns on board floating structures had been constructed nearly a century ago will be seen by the following reference to printed publications.

The "Nautical Chronicle" for 1805 contains an account of a "movable turning impregnable battery, invented by a Mr. Gillespie, a native of Scotland, who completed the model of a movable impregnable castle or battery, impervious to shot or bombs, provided with a cannon and carriage calculated to take a sure aim at any object." It is further stated that "the invention proposed will be found equally serviceable in floating batteries. Its machinery is adapted to turn the most ponderous mortars with the greatest ease, according to the position of the enemy." Again, the Transactions of the Society for the Promotion of Useful Arts in the State of New York, 1807, contains an illustration representing a side elevation of a circular revolving floating battery constructed by Abraham Bloodgood. The guns of this battery, as the inventor points out, "would be more easily worked than is common, as they would not require any lateral movement." It is also stated, as a peculiar feature of this floating battery, that "its rotary motion would bring all its cannon to bear successively, as fast as they could be loaded, on objects in any direction"; and that "its circular form would cause every shot that might strike it, not near the center, to glance." Thirty-five years after the publication of the illustration and description of the circular floating revolving tower of Abraham Bloodgood, Theodore R. Timby proposed to build a tower on land for coast defense, to be composed of iron, with several floors



SIDE ELEVATION AND TRANSVERSE SECTION (THROUGH THE CENTER LINE OF ITS REVOLVING SEMI-SPHERICAL TURRET) OF AN IRON-CLAD STEAM-BATTERY, PLANS OF WHICH WERE SUBMITTED BY CAPTAIN ERICSSON TO NAPOLEON III. IN SEPTEMBER, 1854.

and tiers of guns, the tower to turn on a series of friction-rollers under its base. The principal feature of Timby's "invention" was that of arranging the guns radially within the tower, and firing each gun at the instant of its coming in line with the object aimed at during the rotary motion of the tower, precisely as invented by Bloodgood. About 1865 certain influential citizens presented drawings of Timby's revolving tower to the authorities at Washington, with a view of obtaining orders to build such towers for coast defense; but the plan was found to be not only very expensive, but radically defective in principle. The slides of the gun-carriages being fixed permanently in a radial direction within the tower, the guns, of course, are directed to all points of the compass. Hence, during an attack by a hostile fleet, with many ships abreast, only one assailant can be fired at, its companions being scot-free in the dead angle formed between the effective gun and the guns on either side. In the meantime the numerous guns, distributed round the tower on the several floors, cannot be fired until their time comes during the revolution of the tower. The enemy's fleet continuing its advance, of course, calls for a change of elevation of the pieces, which, considering the constant revolution of the tower and the different altitudes above the sea of the several tiers, presents perplexing difficulties. Nothing further need be said to explain why the Government did not accept the plans for Timby's revolving towers.

The origin of rotating circular gun-platforms being disposed of, the consideration of the central section of the illustration will now be resumed. It will be seen that the turret which protects the guns and gunners of the *Monitor* consists simply of a short cylinder resting on the deck, covered with a grated iron roof provided with sliding hatches. This cylinder is composed of eight thicknesses of wrought-iron plates, each one inch thick, firmly riveted together, the inside course, which extends below the rest, being accurately faced underneath. A flat, broad ring of bronze is let into the deck, its upper

face being very smooth in order to form a water-tight joint with the base of the turret without the employment of any elastic packing, a peculiar feature of the turrets of the monitors, as will be seen further on. Unfortunately, before the *Monitor* left New York for Hampton Roads, it was suggested at the Navy Yard to insert a plaited hemp rope between the base of the turret and the bronze ring, for the purpose of making the joint perfectly water-tight. As might have been supposed, the rough and uneven hemp rope did not form a perfect joint; hence during the passage a great leak was observed at intervals as the sea washed over the decks. "The water came down under the turret like a waterfall," says Lieutenant Greene in his report. It will be proper to observe in this place that the "foundering" of the *Monitor* on its way to Charleston was not caused by the "separation of the upper and lower part of the hull," as was imagined by persons who possessed no knowledge of the method adopted by the builders in joining the upper and lower hulls. Again, those who asserted that the plates had been torn asunder at the junction of the hulls did not consider that severe strain cannot take place in a structure nearly submerged. The easy motion at sea, peculiar to the monitors, was pointed out by several of their commanders. Lieutenant Greene in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board the *Monitor*, March 27th, 1862, says with reference to sea-going qualities:

"During her passage from New York her roll was very easy and slow and not at all deep. She pitched very little and with no strain whatever."

Captain John Rodgers's report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board of the monitor *Weehawken*, January 22d, 1863, refers specially to the easy motion of his vessel:


"On Tuesday night, when off Chincoteague shoals, we had a very heavy gale from the E. N. E. with a very heavy sea, made confused and dangerous by the proximity of the land. The waves I measured after the sea abated; I found them twenty-three feet high. They were certainly seven feet higher in the midst of the storm. During the heaviest of the gale I stood upon the turret and admired the behavior of the vessel. She rose and fell to the waves, and I concluded that the monitor form had great sea-going qualities. If leaks were prevented no hurricane could injure her."

The true cause of the foundering of the *Monitor* was minutely explained to the writer some time after the occurrence by the engineer, a very intelligent person, who operated the centrifugal pumping-engine of the vessel at the time. According to his statement, oakum was packed under the base of the turret before going to sea, in order to make sure of a water-tight joint; but this expedient failed altogether, the sea gradually washing out the oakum in those places where it had been loosely packed, thereby permitting so large a



ISAAC NEWTON, FIRST ASSISTANT-ENGINEER OF THE "MONITOR." FROM A MEDALLION PORTRAIT BY LAUNT THOMPSON.

At the time of Mr. Newton's death (September 25, 1884) he had been for several years Chief Engineer of the Croton Aqueduct. The plans which have been adopted for the new aqueduct were his, both in the general features and the details.—EDITORS.



TRANSVERSE SECTION OF THE "MONITOR" THROUGH THE CENTER OF THE TURRET.

quantity of water to enter under the turret, fully sixty-three feet in circumference, that the centrifugal pumping-engine had not sufficient power to expel it. The hull consequently filled gradually and settled, until at the expiration of about four hours the *Monitor* went to the bottom. It will be asked, in view of the preceding explanation of the construction of the monitor turrets, namely, that the smooth base of the turret forms a water-tight joint with the ring on the deck, why was oakum packed under the turret before going to Charleston? The commander of the vessel, Captain Bankhead, in his report of the foundering, adverts to the admission of water under the turret, but does not duly consider the serious character of the leak, sixty-three feet in length. Captain Bankhead evidently had not carefully investigated the matter when he attributed the accident to an imaginary separation of the upper and lower hull.† It should be observed, in justice to this officer, that having commanded the *Monitor* only during a brief period he possessed but an imperfect knowledge of his vessel, and probably knew nothing regarding the consequence of employing packing,—namely, that it might cause “water to come down under the turret like a waterfall,” as previously reported by the second officer in command. It is proper to mention as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the second officer, Lieutenant Greene, that previous to the battle in Hampton Roads he had “never performed any but midshipman duty.” The important question, therefore, must remain unanswered, whether in the hands of an older and more experienced executive officer the *Monitor*, like the other vessels of her type, might not have reached Charleston in safety.

Referring again to the central part of the illustration [p. 733] and the sectional representation of the turret [above], it will be found that the guns are

† Captain J. P. Bankhead says in his report :

“ Found [in the morning] that the packing of oakum under and around the base had loosened somewhat from the working of the tower as the vessel pitched and rolled . . . towards evening the swell somewhat decreased, the bilge-pumps being found amply sufficient to keep her clear of the water that penetrated through the sight-hole of the pilot-house, hawse-hole, and base of tower (all of which had been well calked previous to leaving). At 7:30 the wind hauled more to the south . . . Found the vessel towed badly, yawing very much, and with the increased motion making somewhat more water around the base of the tower. . . . 8 P. M.; the sea

about this time commenced to rise very rapidly, causing the vessel to plunge heavily, completely submerging the pilot-house, and washing over and into the turret, and at times into the blower-pipes. Observed that when she rose to the swell, the flat under-surface of the projecting armor would come down with great force, causing a considerable shock to the vessel and turret, thereby loosening still more the packing around its base. . . . I am firmly of the opinion that the *Monitor* must have sprung a leak somewhere in the forward part, where the hull joins on to the armor, and that it was caused by the heavy shocks received as she came down upon the sea.”

EDITORS.

placed across the vessel; consequently only the end of the breech and upper part of the port-hole are seen. The object of the pendulum port-stoppers suspended under the roof is to afford protection to the turret crew while loading the guns. Generally, however, the turret should be moved, and the port-holes thereby turned away from the enemy. Much time was lost during the conflict with the *Merrimac* by closing the port-stoppers in place of merely moving the turret, the latter operation being performed by a small steam-engine controlled by a single hand; while opening and closing the port-stoppers, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, required the entire gun-crew. The slow fire of the *Monitor* during the action, complained of by critics, was no doubt occasioned by an injudicious manipulation of the port-stoppers. There are occasions, however, when the turret should not be turned, in which case the port-stoppers are indispensable. The method adopted for turning the turret will be readily understood. The small steam-engine controlled by one man, before referred to, drives a double train of cog-wheels connected with the vertical axle of the turret, this axle being stepped in a bronze bearing secured to the central bulkhead of the vessel. The mechanism thus described was carefully tested before the *Monitor* left New York for Hampton Roads, and was found to move very freely, the turret being turned and the guns accurately pointed by the sailing-master without aid. The trouble reported by Lieutenant Greene regarding the manipulation of the turret was caused by inattention during the passage from New York, the working-gear having been permitted to rust for want of proper cleaning and oiling while exposed to the action of salt-water entering under the turret, from causes already explained.

Having thus briefly described the turret and its mechanism, our investigation of the central part of the sectional view of the battery will be completed by a mere reference to the steam-boilers placed aft of the turret. There are two of these boilers placed side by side, as shown in the cut on page 736. Two views being thus presented, the nature of the boilers will be understood without further explanation. It should be mentioned, however, that they proved very economical and efficient.

Aft Section. The following brief reference to this section of the sectional illustration, showing the motive engine, propeller, and rudder, will complete our description:

1. The motive engine, the construction of which is somewhat peculiar, consists of only one steam-cylinder with pistons applied at opposite ends, a steam-tight partition being introduced in the middle. The propeller-shaft has only one crank and one crank-pin, the difficulty of "passing the centers" being overcome by the expedient of placing the connecting-rods, actuated by the steam-pistons, at right angles to each other. Much space is saved within the vessel by employing only one steam-cylinder, an advantage of such importance in the short hulls of the monitors that the entire fleet built during the war was provided with engines of the stated type.

2. The propeller, being of the ordinary four-bladed type, needs no description; but the mode of protecting it against shot demands full explanation.

Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that the under side of the overhang near the stern is cut out in the middle, forming a cavity needed to give free sweep to the propeller-blades; the slope of the cavity on either side of the propeller being considerably inclined in order to favor a free passage of the water to and from the propeller-blades.

3. The extreme beam at the forward side of the propeller-well is 31 feet, while the diameter of the propeller is only 9 feet; it will therefore be seen that the deck and side armor projects 11 feet on each side, thus protecting most effectually the propelling instrument as well as the equipoise rudder applied aft of the same. It will be readily admitted that no other vessel constructed here or elsewhere has such thorough protection to rudder and propeller as that just described.

THE foregoing description of the hastily constructed steam-battery proves that, so far from being, as generally supposed, a rude specimen of naval construction, the *Monitor* displayed careful planning, besides workmanship of superior quality. Experts who examined the vessel and machinery after completion pronounced the entire structure a fine specimen of naval engineering.

The conflict in Hampton Roads, and the immediate building of a fleet of sea-going monitors by the United States Government, attracted great attention in all maritime countries, especially in the north of Europe. Admiral Lessoffsky, of the Russian navy, was at once ordered to be present during the completion and trial of our sea-going monitors. The report of this talented officer to his government being favorable, the Emperor immediately ordered a fleet of twelve vessels on the new system, to be constructed according to copies of the working-drawings from which the American sea-going monitors had been built. Sweden and Norway also forthwith laid the keels of a fleet of seven vessels of the new type, Turkey rapidly following the example of the northern European nations. It will be remembered that during the naval contest on the Danube the Russian batteries and torpedo-boats subjected the Turkish monitors to severe tests. England, in due course, adopted our turret system, discarding the turn-table and cupola.



SINKING OF THE "MONITOR."

THE LOSS OF THE "MONITOR."†

BY FRANCIS B. BUTTS, A SURVIVOR OF THE "MONITOR'S" CREW.

AT daybreak on the 29th of December, 1862, at Fort Monroe, the *Monitor* hove short her anchor, and by 10 o'clock in the forenoon she was under way for Charleston, South Carolina, in charge of Commander J. P. Bankhead. The *Rhode Island*, a powerful side-wheel steamer, was to be our convoy, and to hasten our speed she took us in tow with two long 12-inch hawsers. The weather was heavy with dark, stormy-looking clouds and a westerly wind. We passed out of the Roads and rounded Cape Henry, proceeding on our course with but little change in the weather up to the next day at noon, when the wind shifted to the south-south-west and increased to a gale. At 12 o'clock it was my trick at the lee wheel, and being a good hand I was kept there. At dark we were about seventy miles at sea, and directly off Cape Hatteras. The sea rolled high and pitched together in the peculiar manner only seen at Hatteras. The *Rhode Island* steamed slowly and steadily ahead. The sea rolled over us as if our vessel were a rock in the ocean only a few inches above the water, and men who stood abaft on the deck of the *Rhode Island* have told me that several times we were thought to have gone down. It seemed that for minutes we were out of sight, as the heavy seas entirely submerged the vessel. The wheel had been temporarily rigged on top of the turret, where all the officers, except those on duty in the engine-room, now were. I heard their remarks, and watched closely the movements of the vessel, so that I exactly understood our condition. The vessel was making very heavy weather, riding one huge wave, plunging through the next as if shooting straight for the bottom of the ocean, and splashing down upon another with such force that her hull would tremble, and with a shock that would sometimes take us off our feet, while a fourth would leap upon us and break far above the turret, so that if we had not been protected by a rifle-armor that was securely fastened and rose to the height of a man's chest, we should have been washed away. I had volunteered for service on the *Monitor* while she lay at the Washington Navy Yard in November. This going to sea in an iron-clad I began to think was the dearest part of my bargain. I thought of what I had been taught in the service, that a man always gets into trouble if he volunteers.

About 8 o'clock, while I was taking a message from the captain to the engineer, I saw the water pouring in through the coal-bunkers in sudden volumes as it swept over the deck. About that time the engineer reported that the coal was too wet to keep up steam, which had run down from its usual pressure of 80 pounds to 20. The

water in the vessel was gaining rapidly over the small pumps, and I heard the captain order the chief engineer to start the main pump, a very powerful one of new invention. This was done, and I saw a stream of water eight inches in diameter spouting up from beneath the waves.

About half-past 8 the first signals of distress to the *Rhode Island* were burned. She lay to, and we rode the sea more comfortably than when we were being towed. The *Rhode Island* was obliged to turn slowly ahead to keep from drifting upon us and to prevent the tow-lines from being caught in her wheels. At one time, when she drifted close alongside, our captain shouted through his trumpet that we were sinking, and asking the steamer to send us her boats. The *Monitor* steamed ahead again with renewed difficulties, and I was ordered to leave the wheel and was kept employed as messenger by the captain. The chief engineer reported that the coal was so wet that he could not keep up steam, and I heard the captain order him to slow down and put all steam that could be spared upon the pumps. As there was danger of being towed under by our consort, the tow-lines were ordered to be cut, and I saw James Fenwick, quarter-gunner, swept from the deck and carried by a heavy sea leeward and out of sight in attempting to obey the order. Our daring boatswain's mate, John Stocking, then succeeded in reaching the bows of the vessel, and I saw him swept by a heavy sea far away into the darkness.

About half-past 10 o'clock our anchor was let go with all the cable, and struck bottom in about sixty fathoms of water; this brought us out of the trough of the sea, and we rode it more comfortably. The fires could no longer be kept up with the wet coal. The small pumps were choked up with water, or, as the engineer reported, were drowned, and the main pump had almost stopped working from lack of power. This was reported to the captain, and he ordered me to see if there was any water in the ward-room. This was the first time I had been below the berth-deck. I went forward, and saw the water running in through the hawse-pipe, an 8-inch hole, in full force, as in dropping the anchor the cable had torn away the packing that had kept this place tight. I reported my observations, and at the same time heard the chief engineer report that the water had reached the ash-pits and was gaining very rapidly. The captain ordered him to stop the main engine and turn all steam on the pumps, which I noticed soon worked again.

The clouds now began to separate, a moon of about half-size beamed out upon the sea, and the *Rhode Island*, now a mile away, became visible. Signals were being exchanged, and I felt that

† By the courtesy of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society, of Rhode Island, we are permitted to print the following interesting paper condensed from one of its pamphlets.—EDITORS.

¶ The method of communication from the *Monitor*

the *Monitor* would be saved, or at least that the captain would not leave his ship until there was no hope of saving her. I was sent below again to see how the water stood in the ward-room. I went forward to the cabin and found the water just above the soles of my shoes, which indicated that there must be more than a foot in the vessel. I reported this to the captain, and all hands were set to bailing,—bailing out the ocean as it seemed,—but the object was to employ the men, as there now seemed to be danger of excitement among them. I kept employed most of the time, taking the buckets from them through the hatchway on top of the turret. They seldom would have more than a pint of water in them, however, the remainder having been spilled in passing from one man to another [see foot-note, p. 742].

The weather was clear, but the sea did not cease rolling in the least, and the *Rhode Island*, with the two lines wound up in her wheel, was tossing at the mercy of the sea, and came drifting against our sides. A boat that had been lowered was caught between the vessels and crushed and lost. Some of our seamen bravely leaped down on deck to guard our sides, and lines were thrown to them from the deck of the *Rhode Island*, which now lay her whole length against us, ☆ floating off astern, but not a man would be the first to leave his ship, although the captain gave orders to do so. I was again sent to examine the water in the ward-room, which I found to be more than two feet above the deck; and I think I was the last person who saw Engineer G. H. Lewis as he lay seasick in his bunk, apparently watching the water as it grew deeper and deeper, and aware what his fate must be. He called me as I passed his door, and asked if the pumps were working. I replied that they were. "Is there any hope?" he asked; and feeling a little moved at the scene, and knowing certainly what must be his end, and the darkness that stared at us all, I replied, "As long as there is life there is hope." "Hope and hang on when you are wrecked" is an old saying among sailors. I left the ward-room, and learned that the water had gained so as to choke up the main pump. As I was crossing the berth-deck I saw our ensign, Mr. Frederickson, hand a watch to Master's Mate Williams, saying, "Here, this is yours; I may be lost"—which, in fact, was his fate. The watch and chain were both of unusual value. Williams

abandon their ship, they would burn a red light as a signal. About 10 o'clock the signal was given. When the steamer stopped to allow the hawsers to be cast off, the *Monitor* forged ahead under the impetus of her headway, and came so close up under the steamer's stern, that there was great danger of her running into and cutting the steamer down. When the engines of the *Rhode Island* were started to go ahead to get out of the way, it was discovered that the hawser had got afool of the paddle-wheel, and when they were put in motion, instead of getting clear of her, the rope wound up on the wheel and drew the vessels together. This was an extremely dangerous position, for they were being pitched and tossed about so much by the heavy seas that if the iron-clad had once struck the steamer they must both have gone down together. However, a fireman went into the wheel at the risk of his life, and with an axe cut the hawser away so that the steamer was

received them into his hand, then with a hesitating glance at the time-piece said, "This thing may be the means of sinking me," and threw it upon the deck. There were three or four cabin-boys pale and prostrate with seasickness, and the cabin-cook, an old African negro, under great excitement, was scolding them most profanely.

As I ascended the turret-ladder the sea broke over the ship, and came pouring down the hatchway with so much force that it took me off my feet; and at the same time the steam broke from the boiler-room, as the water had reached the fires, and for an instant I seemed to realize that we had gone down. Our fires were out, and I heard the water blowing out of the boilers. I reported my observations to the captain, and at the same time saw a boat alongside. The captain again gave orders for the men to leave the ship, and fifteen, all of whom were seamen and men whom I had placed my confidence upon, were the ones who crowded the first boat to leave the ship. I was disgusted at witnessing the scramble, and, not feeling in the least alarmed about myself, resolved that I, an "old haymaker," as landmen are called, would stick to the ship as long as my officers. I saw three of these men swept from the deck and carried leeward on the swift current.

Bailing was now resumed. I occupied the turret all alone, and passed buckets from the lower hatchway to the man on the top of the turret. I took off my coat—one that I had received from home only a few days before (I could not feel that our noble little ship was yet lost)—and, rolling it up with my boots, drew the tompon from one of the guns, placed them inside, and replaced the tompon. A black cat was sitting on the breech of one of the guns, howling one of those hoarse and solemn tunes which no one can appreciate who is not filled with the superstitions which I had been taught by the sailors, who are always afraid to kill a cat. I would almost as soon have touched a ghost, but I caught her, and, placing her in another gun, replaced the wad and tompon; but I could still hear that distressing howl. As I raised my last bucket to the upper hatchway no one was there to take it. I scrambled up the ladder and found that we below had been deserted. I shouted to those on the berth-deck, "Come up; the officers have left the ship, and a boat is alongside."

As I reached the top of the turret I saw a boat

enabled to get away at a safe distance.—From a letter to the Editors from H. R. SMITH, then of the *Rhode Island*.

☆ The boat lowered was not lost, as I well know, since I was in command of her. The gunwale on the starboard side was crushed by the *Rhode Island* as she tossed helplessly about with two lines wound up in her wheel, but the boat kept above water, and brought off sixteen men, among them Surgeon Weeks. The men did not leap down upon the deck to guard the side, which would have been sheer folly, but remained in the turret, and were with difficulty urged to come on deck and be taken off. The stern of the *Monitor* lay under the *Rhode Island's* quarter—at no time were the vessels parallel. The *Monitor* should not have been lost. She was going against a head-sea. Had she turned back before dark she would have had no difficulty, as all the officers of the *Rhode Island* thought. —A. O. TAYLOR, Acting Ensign of the *Rhode Island*.

made fast on the weather quarter filled with men. Three others were standing on deck trying to get on board. One man was floating leeward, shouting in vain for help; another, who hurriedly passed me and jumped down from the turret, was swept off by a breaking wave and never rose. I was excited, feeling that it was the only chance to be saved. I made a loose line fast to one of the stanchions, and let myself down from the turret, the ladder having been washed away. The moment I struck the deck the sea broke over it and swept me as I had seen it sweep my shipmates. I grasped one of the smoke-stack braces and, hand-over-hand, ascended, to keep my head above water. It required all my strength to keep the sea from tearing me away. As it swept from the vessel I found myself dangling in the air nearly at the top of the smoke-stack. I let myself fall, and succeeded in reaching a life-line that encircled the deck by means of short stanchions, and to which the boat was attached. The sea again broke over us, lifting me feet upward as I still clung to the life-line. I thought I had nearly measured the depth of the ocean, when I felt the turn, and as my head rose above the water I was somewhat dazed from being so nearly drowned, and spouted up, it seemed, more than a gallon of water that had found its way into my lungs. I was then about twenty feet from the other men, whom I found to be the captain and one seaman; the other had been washed overboard and was now struggling in the water. The men in the boat were pushing back on their oars to keep the boat from being washed on to the *Monitor's* deck, so that the boat had to be hauled in by the painter about ten or twelve feet. The first lieutenant, S. D. Greene, and other officers in the boat were shouting, "Is the captain on board?" and, with severe struggles to have our voices heard above the roar of the wind and sea, we were shouting, "No," and trying to haul in the boat, which we at last succeeded in doing. The captain, ever caring for his men, requested us to get in, but we both, in the same voice, told him to get in first. The moment he was over the bows of the boat Lieutenant Greene cried, "Cut the painter! cut the painter!" I thought, "Now or lost," and in less time than I can explain it, exerting my strength beyond imagination, I hauled in the boat, sprang, caught on the gunwale, was pulled into the boat with a boat-hook in the hands of one of the men, and took my seat with one of the oarsmen. The other man, named Thomas Joice, managed to get into the boat in some way, I cannot tell how, and he was the last man saved from that ill-fated ship. As we were cut loose I saw several men standing on top of the turret, apparently afraid to venture down upon deck, and it may have been that they were deterred by seeing others washed overboard while I was getting into the boat. }

After a fearful and dangerous passage over the frantic seas, we reached the *Rhode Island*, which still had the tow-line caught in her wheel and had drifted perhaps two miles to leeward. We came

alongside under the lee bows, where the first boat, that had left the *Monitor* nearly an hour before, had just discharged its men; but we found that getting on board the *Rhode Island* was a harder task than getting from the *Monitor*. We were carried by the sea from stem to stern, for to have made fast would have been fatal; the boat was bounding against the ship's sides; sometimes it was below the wheel, and then, on the summit of a huge wave, far above the decks; then the two boats would crash together; and once, while Surgeon Weeks was holding on to the rail, he lost his fingers by a collision which swamped the other boat. Lines were thrown to us from the deck of the *Rhode Island*, which were of no assistance, for not one of us could climb a small rope; and besides, the men who threw them would immediately let go their holds, in their excitement, to throw another — which I found to be the case when I kept hauling in rope instead of climbing.

It must be understood that two vessels lying side by side, when there is any motion to the sea, move alternately; or, in other words, one is constantly passing the other up or down. At one time, when our boat was near the bows of the steamer, we would rise upon the sea until we could touch her rail; then in an instant, by a very rapid descent, we could touch her keel. While we were thus rising and falling upon the sea, I caught a rope, and, rising with the boat, managed to reach within a foot or two of the rail, when a man, if there had been one, could easily have hauled me on board. But they had all followed after the boat, which at that instant was washed astern, and I hung dangling in the air over the bow of the *Rhode Island*, with Ensign Norman Atwater hanging to the cat-head, three or four feet from me, like myself, with both hands clinching a rope and shouting for some one to save him. Our hands grew painful and all the time weaker, until I saw his strength give way. He slipped a foot, caught again, and with his last prayer, "O God!" I saw him fall and sink, to rise no more. The ship rolled, and rose upon the sea, sometimes with her keel out of water, so that I was hanging thirty feet above the sea, and with the fate in view that had befallen our much-beloved companion, which no one had witnessed but myself. I still clung to the rope with aching hands, calling in vain for help. But I could not be heard, for the wind shrieked far above my voice. My heart here, for the only time in my life, gave up hope, and home and friends were most tenderly thought of. While I was in this state, within a few seconds of giving up, the sea rolled forward, bringing with it the boat, and when I would have fallen into the sea, it was there. I can only recollect hearing an old sailor say, as I fell into the bottom of the boat, "Where in — did he come from?"

When I became aware of what was going on, no one had succeeded in getting out of the boat, which then lay just forward of the wheel-house. Our captain ordered them to throw bow-lines, which was immediately done. The second one I caught,

and, placing myself within the loop, was hauled on board. I assisted in helping the others out of the boat, when it again went back to the *Monitor*; it did not reach it, however, and after drifting about on the ocean several days it was picked up by a passing vessel and carried to Philadelphia. ‡

It was half-past 12, the night of the 31st of December, 1862, when I stood on the fore-castle of the *Rhode Island*, watching the red and white lights that hung from the pennant-staff above the turret,

‡ After making two trips there were still four officers and twelve men on the *Monitor*, and the gallant boat's crew, although well-nigh exhausted by their labors, started for the third time on its perilous trip, but it never reached them, for while all on board the steamer were anxiously watching the light in the turret and vainly peering into the darkness for a glimpse of the

and which now and then were seen as we would perhaps both rise on the sea together, until at last, just as the moon had passed below the horizon, they were lost, and the *Monitor*, whose history is familiar to us all, was seen no more.

The *Rhode Island* cruised about the scene of the disaster the remainder of the night and the next forenoon in hope of finding the boat that had been lost; then she returned direct to Fort Monroe, where we arrived the next day.

rescuing boat, the light suddenly disappeared and forever, for after watching for a long time to try and find it again, they were forced to the conclusion that the *Monitor* had gone to the bottom with all that remained on board. The position of the *Rhode Island* at this time was about eight or ten miles off the coast directly east of Cape Hatteras.—H. R. SMITH.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE BUILDING OF THE "MONITOR."

IN 1877, at the request of ex-Secretary Gideon Welles, C. S. Bushnell, of New Haven, one of the associate owners of the *Monitor*, embodied, in a letter to the former, his recollections of the negotiations which led to the building of that vessel. That letter immediately following, and letters of comment by Captain Ericsson and ex-Secretary Welles, have been sent to the editors for publication, by the Reverend Samuel C. Bushnell, son of the builder:

"HONORABLE GIDEON WELLES. DEAR SIR: Some time since, during a short conversation in regard to the little first *Monitor*, you expressed a desire to learn from me some of the unwritten details of her history; particularly, how the plan of the boat came to be presented to the Government and the manner in which the contract for her construction was secured.

"You doubtless remember handing me in August, 1861, † at Willard's Hotel in Washington, D. C., the draft of a bill which you desired Congress should pass, in reference to obtaining some kind of iron-clad vessels to meet the formidable preparations the Rebels were making at Norfolk, Mobile, and New Orleans. At that time you stated that you had already called the attention of Congress to this matter, but without effect.

"I presented this bill to the Honorable James E. English, member of Congress from my district, who fortunately was on the Naval Committee and untiringly urged the matter on their attention. The chairman of the committee, A. H. Rice, of Massachusetts, ‡ also coöperated most heartily, so that in about thirty days, ¶ if I remember correctly, the bill passed both Houses, and was immediately signed by President Lincoln. The bill required all plans of iron-clad vessels to be submitted to a board of naval officers appointed by yourself. The board consisted of Admirals Smith and Paulding and Captain Davis, who examined hundreds of plans, good and bad, and among others that of a plated iron gun-boat called the *Galena*, contrived by Samuel H. Pook, now a constructor in the Navy Department. The partial protection of iron bars proposed for her seemed so burdensome that many naval officers warned me against the possibility of the *Galena's* being able to carry the additional weight of her armament.

"C. H. Delamater, of New York, advised me to consult with the engineer, Captain John Ericsson, on the matter.

† Mr. Bushnell's recollection of the dates is inexact. The bill (Senate, 36) was introduced July 19th, in the Senate, by Mr. Grimes of Iowa, "at the instance of the Department." (Congressional Globe, 1st Session, 37th Congress, pp. 205, 344). It became a law August 3d.—EDITORS.

‡ As Mr. Welles points out in his letter (see below), this

This I proceeded at once to do, and on supplying him with the data necessary for his calculations promptly gained the answer, 'She will easily carry the load you propose, and stand a 6-inch shot—if fired from a respectable distance.' At the close of this interview, Captain Ericsson asked if I had time just then to examine the plan of a floating battery absolutely impregnable to the heaviest shot or shell. I replied that the problem had been occupying me for the last three months, and that, considering the time required for construction, the *Galena* was the best result that I had been able to attain. He then placed before me the plan of the *Monitor*, explained how quickly and powerfully she could be built, and exhibited with characteristic pride a medal and letter of thanks received from Napoleon III. For it appears that Ericsson had invented the battery when France and Russia were at war, and out of hostility to Russia had presented it to France, hoping thereby to aid the defeat of Sweden's hereditary foe. The invention, however, came too late to be of service, and was preserved for another issue.

"You no doubt remember my delight with the plan of the *Monitor* when first Captain Ericsson intrusted it to my care; how I followed you to Hartford and astounded you by saying that the country was safe because I had found a battery which would make us master of the situation so far as the ocean was concerned. You were much pleased, and urged me to lose no time in presenting the plan to the Naval Board at Washington. I secured at once the coöperation of wise and able associates in the person of the late Honorable John A. Griswold of [Troy] N. Y., and John F. Winslow of Troy, both of them friends of Governor Seward and large manufacturers of iron plates, etc. Governor Seward furnished us with a strong letter of introduction to President Lincoln, who was at once greatly pleased with the simplicity of the plan and agreed to accompany us to the Navy Department at 11 A. M. the following day, and aid us as best he could. He was on hand promptly at 11 o'clock—the day before you returned from Hartford. Captain Fox, together with a part of the Naval Board, was present. ☆ All were surprised at the novelty of the plan. Some advised trying it; others ridiculed it. The conference was finally closed for that day by Mr. Lincoln's remarking, 'All I have to say is what the girl said when she put her foot into the stocking, "It strikes me there's something in it."'" The following day Admiral Smith convened the whole board, when I presented as best I could the plan and its merits, carefully noting the

was an error of Mr. Bushnell's. The chairman of the Naval Committee was Charles B. Sedgwick, of Syracuse, New York. Mr. Rice came second on the committee.—EDITORS.

¶ The time was actually fifteen days.—EDITORS.

☆ Several naval officers were also present unofficially.—EDITORS.

remarks of each member of the board. I then went to my hotel quite sanguine of success, but only to be disappointed on the following day. For during the hours following the last session, I found that the air had been thick with croakings that the department was about to father another Ericsson failure. Never was I more active than now in the effort to prove that Ericsson had *never* made a failure; that, on the contrary, he had built for the Government the first steam war-propeller ever made; that the bursting of the gun was no fault of his, but of the shell, which had not been made strong enough to prevent its flattening up with the pressure of the explosion behind it, making the bursting of the gun unavoidable; that his calorific principle was a triumphant success, but that no metal had yet been found to utilize it on a large scale. I succeeded at length in getting Admirals Smith and Paulding to promise to sign a report advising the building of one trial battery, *provided* Captain Davis would join with them. On going to him, I was informed that I might 'take the little thing home and worship it, as it would not be idolatry, because it was made in the image of nothing in the heaven above or on the earth below or in the waters under the earth.' One thing only yet remained which it was possible to do: this was to get Ericsson to come to Washington and plead the case himself. This I was sure would win the case, and so informed you, for Ericsson is a full electric battery in himself. You at once promised to have a meeting in your room if I could succeed in inducing him to come. This was exceedingly doubtful, for so badly had he been treated and so unmercifully maligned in regard to the *Princeton* that he had repeatedly declared that he would never set foot in Washington again.

"Nevertheless I appeared at his house the next morning precisely at 9 o'clock, and heard his sharp greeting: 'Well! How is it?' 'Glorious,' said I. 'Go on, go on,' said he with much impatience. 'What did they say?' 'Admiral Smith says it is worthy of the genius of an Ericsson.' The pride fairly gleamed in his eyes. 'But Paulding—what did he say of it?' He said, 'It's just the thing to clear the 'Rebs' out of Charleston with.'" 'How about Davis?' he inquired, as I appeared to hesitate a moment. 'Oh, Davis,' said I, 'he wanted two or three explanations in detail which I couldn't give him, and so Secretary Welles proposed that I should come and get you to come to Washington and explain these few points to the entire board in his room to-morrow.' 'Well, I'll go—I'll go to-night.'

"From that moment I knew that the success of the affair was assured. You remember how he thrilled every person present in your room with his vivid description of what the little boat would be and what she could do; and that in ninety days' time she could be built, although the Rebels had already been four months or more on the *Merrimac* with all the appliances of the Norfolk Navy Yard to help them.

"You asked him how much it would cost to complete her. 'Two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars,' he said. Then you promptly turned to the members of the board, and one by one asked them if they would recommend that a contract be entered into, for her construction, with Captain Ericsson and his associates. Each one answered, 'Yes, by all means.' Then you told Captain Ericsson to start her immediately. On the next day in New York a large portion of every article used in her construction was ordered, and a contract at once entered into between Captain Ericsson and his associates and T. F. Rowland, at Green Point, for the expeditious construction of the most formidable vessel ever made. It was arranged that after a few days I should procure a formal documentary contract from the Naval Board to be signed and executed by the Secretary of the Navy, Captain John Ericsson and associates.

"I regret that this part of the matter has been misunderstood, as though you had made terms heavier or the risk greater than you ought. The simple fact was that after we had entered upon the work of construction, and before the formal contract had been awarded, a great clamor arose, much of it due to interested parties, to the effect that the battery would prove a failure and

disgrace the members of the board for their action in recommending it. For their own protection, therefore, and out of their superabundant caution they insisted on inserting in the contract a clause requiring us to guarantee the complete success of the battery, so that, in case she proved a failure, the Government might be refunded the amounts advanced to us from time to time during her construction. To Captain Ericsson and myself, this was never an embarrassment; but to Mr. Winslow, as indeed to Mr. Griawold also, it appeared that the board had asked too much. But I know that the noble old Admiral Smith never intended that we should suffer, and among the many fortunate things for which the nation had occasion to be grateful—such as the providential selection as President in those dark days of the immortal Lincoln and his wisely chosen Cabinet—was the appointment of Admiral Smith to the charge of the navy yards, who always seemed to sleep with one eye open, so constant was his watchfulness and so eager his desire that the entire navy should be always in readiness to do its part in the overthrow of the rebellion.

"I am confident that no native-born child of this country will ever forget the proud son of Sweden who could sit in his own house and contrive the three thousand different parts that go to make up the complete hull of the steam-battery *Dictator*, so that when the mechanics came to put the parts together not a single alteration in any particular was required to be made. What the little first *Monitor* and the subsequent larger ones achieved is a part of history. . . . Very respectfully, C. S. BUSHNELL."

The date of the following letter from Captain Ericsson to the son of Mr. C. S. Bushnell indicates that the above letter was submitted to Captain Ericsson before it was sent to Ex-Secretary Welles:

"NEW YORK, March 2d, 1877.

"ERICSSON F. BUSHNELL, ESQ., NEW HAVEN. MY DEAR SIR: I have read with much pleasure your father's statement to Mr. Welles concerning the construction of the original *Monitor*. I do not think any changes or additions are needed, the main facts being well stated. . . . Yours very truly, J. ERICSSON."

Ex-Secretary Welles, under date of Hartford, 19th March, 1877, addressed the following letter to Mr. C. S. Bushnell:

"MY DEAR SIR: I received on the 16th inst. your interesting communication without date—relative to the construction of the *Monitor*. Many of the incidents narrated by you I remember, although more than fifteen years have gone by since they transpired. Some errors, not very essential and caused by lapse of years, occur—Sedgwick, not Rice, was chairman of the Naval Committee; Griswold resided in Troy, not New York, and subsequently represented the Troy District in Congress, etc., etc.

"I well remember asking you to put in writing the facts in your possession concerning the construction of the *Monitor*. Some statements of General Butler, Wendell Phillips, and others, to disparage the Navy Department, pervert the truth and deny us all credit, led Admiral Smith, in the autumn of 1868 to address to me a communication reciting the facts, for he said, when we were gone, those of us who took the responsibility and would have incurred the disgrace had Ericsson's invention proved a failure, would be ignored and history misstated. As you were more intimate with the case at its inception, were the first to bring it to the attention of the department, it seemed to me proper that your recollection and knowledge of the transaction should be reduced to writing. I am greatly obliged to you for the full and satisfactory manner in which you have complied with my request. Next, after Ericsson himself, you are entitled to bringing his invention to the knowledge of the department. I would not knowingly do injustice to any one, and I am well aware that the official in civil life, and who in administering the

government directs movements by which naval and military men acquire renown, is often by the passing multitude little thought of and scarcely known; but the truth should not be suppressed.

"The civilians of the Navy Department who adopted and pursued through ridicule and assault the *Monitor* experiment, Butler and others would slight and defame. In the histories of the war, the Navy Department, which originated, planned, and carried forward the naval achievements from Hatteras to New Orleans, and finally Fort Fisher, is scarcely known or mentioned. The heroes who fought the battles and periled their lives to carry into effect the plans which the department devised have deservedly honorable remembrance—but the originators and movers are little known. I remember, my dear sir, your earnest efforts in the early days of the war and the comfort they gave me.

"Yours, GIDEON WELLES."

Captain Ericsson's version of the visit to Washington, as given in Colonel William C. Church's paper on "John Ericsson" in "The Century" magazine for April, 1879, is as follows:

"With his previous experience of the waste of time and patience required to accomplish anything at Washington, Captain Ericsson, who is not, it must be said, like the man Moses, 'exceeding meek,' would not himself go to the capital to secure attention to his ideas. There were associated with him three men of practical experience, great energy and wealth, who had become interested in the *Monitor* and were determined that it should have a trial. One of these was Mr. C. S. Bushnell, of Connecticut. He went to Washington, but failed in the attempt to persuade the iron-clad board that the designer of the *Princeton* was worthy of a hearing. Nothing remained except to induce Ericsson to visit Washington in person and plead his own cause with that rude but forcible eloquence which has seldom failed him in an emergency. To move him was only less difficult than to convince the Navy Department without him. At last a subterfuge was adopted. Ericsson was given to understand that Mr. Bushnell's reception at Washington had been satisfactory and that nothing remained but for him to go on and complete the details of a contract for one of his vessels. Presenting himself before the board, what was his astonishment to find that he was not only an unexpected but apparently an

unwelcome visitor! It was evident that the board were asking themselves what could have brought him there. He was not left long in doubt as to the meaning of this reception. To his indignation, as well as his astonishment, he was informed that the plan of a vessel submitted by him had already been rejected. The first impulse was to withdraw at once. Mastering his anger, however, he stopped to inquire the reason for the determination of the board. The vessel had not sufficient stability, Commodore Smith exclaimed; in fact, it would upset and place her crew in the inconvenient and undesirable position of submarine divers. Now, if there is anything which especially distinguishes the *Monitor*, with its low free-board, it is the peculiarity which it has in common with the raft it resembles—its inability to upset. In a most earnest and lucid argument, Captain Ericsson proceeded to explain this. Perceiving that his explanation had its effect, and his blood being well warmed by this time, he ended by declaring to the board with great earnestness: 'Gentlemen, after what I have said, I consider it to be your duty to the country to give me an order to build the vessel before I leave this room.' Withdrawing to one corner, the board consulted together and invited Captain Ericsson to call again at 1 o'clock. Promptly at the hour named he appeared at the Navy Department. In the board-room he found Commodore Paulding alone. The commodore received him in the most friendly manner, invited him into his private office, and asked that he would repeat the explanation of the morning as to the stability of the vessel. Between the two interviews, Ericsson had found time to make at his hotel a diagram presenting the question of stability in a form easily understood. With this diagram, he repeated his previous demonstration. Commodore (afterward Admiral) Paulding was thoroughly convinced, and with frankness which did him great credit said: 'Sir, I have learnt more about the stability of a vessel from what you have now said than all I knew before.' This interview ended with a request to call again at 3 o'clock. Calling at 3, Ericsson was at once invited to pass into the room of secretary Welles. Here, without farther parley, the secretary informed him that the board now reported favorably upon his plan of a vessel, and wished him to return to New York and commence work upon it at once. The contract would be sent on for signature. Before this contract was received, the keel-plates for the first *Monitor* had passed through the rolling-mill."

EDITORS.

END OF VOLUME I.



UNION SOLDIER'S CANDLESTICK.

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